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THE HISTORY OF  
ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.

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VOLUME THE SECOND.



THE HISTORY  
OF  
ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.

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# HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.

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## BOOK VII.

### SECOND PERIOD—PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS.

#### PART I.

#### SOCRATES AND THE IMPERFECT SOCRATICISTS.

#### CHAPTER I.

##### PRELIMINARY REMARKS ON THE WHOLE PERIOD.

AMID the political storms which visited Athens at the close of the Peloponnesian war, Philosophy was actively and successfully cultivated. At an earlier period Athens had created a peculiar poetry—the Drama, usually regarded as the perfection of Greek poesy, which however, is only partially true. In other arts likewise she either had attained, or was just attaining, to the highest excellence; and (according to the law which always regulates the free development of the human mind, which is such that the ripeness of the intellect follows close on that of the imagination) Science now reached an elevation at Athens, which it neither before aspired to nor afterwards maintained in Greece. Among

its many consequences was the perfection of the Attic prose—that model of all after times—to whose improvement philosophers, historians, and orators alike and equally contributed. By this confluence of the different forms of intellectual culture, Athens, whose political power was, at best, but brief and limited, acquired such influence over the literature of all subsequent ages, that no one who wrote for the Greek republic of letters ever ventured to employ any other medium of communication than the polished prose of Attica.

When we look at the total amount of intellectual activity in arts and sciences at this æra, we cannot long hesitate to rank it high above all other periods of Greek enlightenment. In arms indeed Athens yielded to Sparta, and, in after times, when all Greece was doomed to serve a foreign master, her only distinction in the universal prostration was, that she most clearly saw and felt her disgrace. But it was ever the proud pre-eminence of the Athenian, that he, more than any of his fellow Greeks, was worthy to be the centre and expression of the national consciousness. Hence it was that in the brightest period of her political existence, Athens, animated with a profound feeling of the unity of the Greek race, was first and foremost to wrest victory from the barbarian, and that in later times she became the metropolis of the national science and art; and, thereby, long after the decay of her political independence, maintained, in all its freshness and vigour, the true spirit and life of the Greek character. Before the bloom of Athenian art and science many isolated essays

had, it is true, been put forth by the Greeks, but it was only in the Athenian mind that they met together and formed a whole. It is this enlargement of her intellectual view, beyond the narrow and partial limits of race and locality, that constitutes the distinctive character of Athenian civilization.

When however we speak of Athenian science and art, we must not forget that it was not Athens alone that took part in this mental progress; nor indeed such only as were of the Ionic stem; on the contrary, in every land and clime where a Greek dwelt, labourers were found busy and zealous in the advancement of the commonwealth of the national mind, and Athens appears but as the centre towards which all their various efforts converged. This result was assuredly not accidental; but it is only imperfectly and from local circumstances that the force and extent of local influences can be traced. Much undoubtedly is attributable to habit and custom; for all the other ties and relations of life were throughout this interval too shifting and variable to have any influence in this respect. Although both before and at the rise of this period the naval superiority of Athens, and her external splendour, founded both on public and on private affluence, and displayed in magnificent fetes and spectacles, had attracted many a stranger from all parts, both on business and pleasure, her power and her opulence lasted but for a while. Equally transient or perhaps even more so was the form of her polity. The Athenian constitution with all the glittering aspects it

presents, cannot justly demand our admiration unless it be right to praise a government, which allowed the convicted violators of its laws to show themselves in public in open defiance of authority.<sup>1</sup> Nevertheless, this abandoned democracy was peculiarly fitted, by the freedom it ensured, to attract many a highly gifted individual, who, impatient of restraint, desired above all things to follow the bias of his own tastes and inclinations.<sup>2</sup> But even this liberty was quickly lost amid the many democratical, oligarchical and tyrannical revolutions to which Athens was subjected; and the honour of being the nurse of free inquiry was all that remained to her: no empty fame, however, for it had become a habit and a law to consider her the Prytaneum of Greek wisdom;<sup>3</sup> and to her hearth accordingly flocked young and old, and all who wished to share and profit by her wisdom and knowledge. Thither also resorted the most famous and experienced teachers unable to find elsewhere so wide and influential a sphere of action; and thus, by the prevailing fashion of centuries, Athens as the seat of the philosophical sects, became the high-school of Greece.

Of the intellectual activity of Athens, so far as it related to science, philosophy was the centre, and as the development of the latter proceeded in conformity with the Athenian mind, this fact affords in some degree a justification of those who are wont to give to this period the name of The Athenian. But, as is generally the case with those

<sup>1</sup> Plat. de Repub. viii. p. 558.

<sup>2</sup> Ib. p. 557.

<sup>3</sup> Plat. Protag. p. 337.

denominations which put prominently forward a particular individuality, this designation is extremely vague and indeterminate. It might easily give rise to the narrow view, that this particular philosophy was not the common property and joint production of the Greek mind, and we therefore propose another, which both indicates more fully the origin of this philosophical development and is also preferable on other grounds. Our title is: *The Philosophy of the Socratic Schools*, a title in the first place really ancient, and, in the opinion of older writers, historically valid, since all the schools of this period, with a single exception, called themselves by the name of Socrates, and each assumed the merit of exclusively propagating the true principles of their common master. In the next place, it can actually be shown that in most of them some partial view at least of the Socratic theory was carried forward and continued. Lastly, the single school which refused to call itself by his name, and in which his spirit was not livingly present, was based on a corruption of the philosophical feeling, and must be considered as a retrogression rather than as an advancement; for, as it admitted no element that was not contained in anterior developments, it tended to stifle the true pursuit of philosophy. Its history therefore may, with great propriety, be treated as an episode, and as in nowise determining the character of the period. Consequently, as our principal object is to trace the actual development back to the living thought and inquiring spirit from which it arose, we cannot do better than to treat the history of this period

as the result of the mode in which science was handled by Socrates.

The character we have given of this period, as distinguished from the earlier by the fact that the differences of locality and descent no longer exercised any calculable influence, but that all or most was derived from the common Greek mind, has been drawn entirely from external considerations; we must now attempt to ascertain its inner peculiarities. By the ancients the School of Socrates was generally considered a moral school;<sup>4</sup> but they seem to have adopted this view upon a very superficial comparison of the Socratic with the earlier sects, in which the absence of the moral element in the latter, and its prominent position in the former, was the first thing to strike the attention. This opinion may moreover have been in some degree justified by the notion pretty generally entertained both of Socrates himself and of some of his disciples, Antisthenes for instance, and Aristippus; nevertheless, in the most important development of his philosophy in the schools of Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics, a constant reference was made, it is true, to the Ethical, which to a certain degree is the point at which their whole theory of the universe centres, but not however in such wise as to exclude or to limit any other of the philosophical sciences; on the contrary, logic, physics, and ethics are discussed by these philosophers as co-ordinate and equivalent branches of their respective systems. This enlarged view assuredly furnishes a more marked distinction

<sup>4</sup> Diog. L. i. 18.

of the Socratic philosophy than the merely equivocal contrast between physical and ethical schools. Still it cannot be denied that both Socrates and some of his disciples exhibited a certain neglect, not to say dislike, of physical science, which in an accurate description of the period must not be overlooked, notwithstanding that we are constrained to find for it some more general and distinctive character.

It was natural that the first philosophical inquirers should have been principally occupied with the study of external nature, this being the root and source of all intellectual life; for as the individual is at first chiefly and most sensitively alive to his dependence on the outward conditions of his existence, they naturally attract and constrain his earnest attention. In this state of mental development the only way to philosophical satisfaction is the feeling, that man is both similar and akin to the physical objects by which he is surrounded; and from this identification of himself with the universe, a single and exclusive science is the necessary result—the science of universal nature. In the first philosophical essays of the Greeks we have this step exhibited. Gradually, however, man begins to observe, that his faculty of reason is peculiar to himself, and nowhere else perceptible, and the conviction insensibly grows upon him, that reason is not a physical power, but a something wholly different; thus his belief in the agreement between himself and the powers of the world about him is weakened or destroyed. He cannot therefore advance further in the direction

which philosophy had previously taken, without using sophistical means to obscure the light he has already acquired ; his mind arrives at the point at which the ethical and the physical, nature and morality, must be distinguished. Now it was just to this point that the doctrine of science had been carried before the time of Socrates. This is evinced by the investigation of the Sophists, and perhaps also of Archelaus, into the nature and constitution of law and custom, which, however, starting from a physical point of view, attempted to show that reason is in fact nothing but a power of nature, and that might makes right. These aberrations of scientific thought contained however an occasion for new and further inquiry ; and it was only natural that its first object should be to establish the moral in contradistinction to the physical. This affords, at the same time, a satisfactory explanation why, in the investigations of Socrates, the moral view predominates over the physical. Nevertheless this could not satisfy the unifying tendency of Philosophy ; for the result of such an attempt would be the formation of two conflicting and opposite sciences, both making nevertheless equal pretensions to universality, until a higher and more scientific range of thought should present itself, adapted to combine and to reconcile their opposite conclusions. Such a view, it must be evident, could only have been presented by logical or dialectical investigations, which, from the nature itself of philosophical thought, should show how equally necessary it is to the completeness and perfection of science, that it



should comprehend within itself both nature and reason. And herein is contained the right interpretation and true import of the dialectical labours of Socrates ; of the method in which he exercised his disciples ; of the mode in which he insisted on free consciousness in every scientific process ; and of his assertion, that it is a necessary condition of the right understanding of any notion, that he who entertains it should be able to give an account of it to others. This clear perception of the scientific value of thought, this cognition of oneself in thinking, which it was the object of all the labours of Socrates to establish, is found in none of the earlier philosophers ; and it is this that constitutes the peculiar character of method and view which marked his own doctrine, and which he imparted to all the genuine Socraticists. In them we invariably discern at least, the attempt, to embrace all within the light of universal science, in such a manner, that every kind of knowledge be pointed out and shown to be a necessary member of the general notion of science. By this pursuit of universal knowledge, resulting from the perception of its unity, philosophy was able to free itself from the special interests which swayed and directed the earlier systems. It is this which constitutes the essential character of the period we are about to consider.

The next question is to determine its close,—a question not so easy to answer. From a variety of external circumstances the decay of a true and vital philosophy was protracted through a long interval, in which it fluctuated between

the new and the old. Of outward causes we shall briefly notice the most important. The conquests of Alexander the Great had led to the establishment of new kingdoms over a considerable portion of Asia and Africa, to which Greek laws and institutions quickly gave a Greek character. In the absence of all information as to the state of civilization in the unsettled times at which these empires in Egypt, Asia Minor, Syria, and Bactria arose, one thing alone is clear, that the language, customs, arts, and science of Greece were every where diffused by her settlers. In this case a certain fusion of the Asiatic character with the Grecian was almost inevitable. Yet, in spite of this, the Greek in general, was little disposed to adopt aught from the Barbarian in the higher region of his intellectual culture; and in fact it was long ere this amalgamation did take place notwithstanding the changed state of their mutual relations. Schools of Greek erudition it is true, quickly arose in the new states, especially at Alexandria in Egypt, and at Pergamos in Asia Minor; nevertheless Greece Proper still continued for a long while to be the principal seat of Greek science, whence these schools were for the most part provided with their learned professors. At a later period Athens, it must be admitted, was thrown into the shade by the superiority of Alexandria in many branches of learning; still it was long ere this was the case in philosophy: moreover it is a fact particularly worthy of remark, that the Alexandrine scholars were chiefly engaged in such studies as were designed and calculated

to secure the national character against the corrupt influence of foreign modes of thought and literature—namely, the criticism of the olden writers. Thus, in spite of the mixture of the Grecian and the oriental, the former was long enabled to preserve itself uncorrupted in the higher departments of science. The oriental was forced to obtain an entrance into the lower region of Greek activity before it could attack and penetrate into the higher; and it is easily conceivable that the process of corruption which was hereby induced must have been slow and tardy indeed.

It is equally difficult to determine with accuracy the close of this æra by a consideration of the inner development of philosophy. True it is that the determination of the boundary line is much facilitated by the fact, that this and the following periods are, like the first and second, distinguished from each other by the corruption of the previous philosophical effort. But the decay of true and vital energy, which commenced at the end of this interval, does not itself admit of such accurate determination as that which forms the transition from the first to the second period. For as a body, in the freshness and vigour of life, is subject to violent diseases, which show themselves with decided symptoms, but pass away as rapidly as they came on, while the aged and decrepit frame is wont to feed a lingering and hardly-recognised consumption: so, that disease of sophistry to which the youthful vigour of philosophy is liable, is marked by the rapidity and violence of its course; whereas the decay of an exhausted and servile mode

of thought creeps on more latently and passes away more slowly. Now, although we are thus able to give a general character of the symptoms of this decay, nevertheless, in the actual case its diagnosis is extremely difficult and perplexing. There are two ways in which the closing vitality of a nation, which has arrived at its perfect development, may show itself, both, however, having a common source in the want of creative energy. So soon as a people has lost its powers of original production, and retains nothing but the consciousness of former scientific creations, two cases are possible, according as the national mind is more or less impressed with a conviction of its inability to produce philosophical ideas. In the absence of a full and clear perception of this deficiency, there is usually found a trifling with the ideas of earlier times, totally alien from the true spirit of science, which assumes, however, a mien of grave earnestness, and is, in truth, to a certain degree, founded on seriousness of purpose: thoughts, in the received form and as so many dead formulæ, are transmitted from hand to hand like any other piece of antiquarian lore. This is the erudite handling of philosophy, which may well consist with a certain eclectic process, arising from an unwillingness to renounce all self-activity. For even after the total decay of the productive energy, a capacity of choosing from all that has been produced, as well in the whole as in parts, may still survive. Hereby philosophy becomes a business of mere learning. It no longer seizes and takes possession of the inner man, for it is only

when endowed with the energy of life that it can lead to original creation. On the other hand, wherever man is conscious of his unfitness, and is content to review the earlier results of the philosophical spirit, without a wish or effort, on his part, that they should attain to a living energy within him, such a one, measuring objects by the standard of himself, will be disposed to deny the vitality and convincing power of truth. And so scepticism grows up out of the decay of the philosophical activity.

Now assuming, that the erudite handling of philosophy and scepticism are the boundary marks between the second and third period of our history, we shall yet find some difficulty in our application of the position. For from reasons, which obviously suggest themselves, this learned transmission of philosophy and the eclecticism connected therewith, continues throughout the last period; while, on the other hand, the sceptical spirit shows itself more decidedly in the third than in the second, and even though we might be disposed to omit all consideration of these eclectic labours and the erudite transmission of ancient doctrines, as lying wholly without the circle of the development of philosophy, and consequently not belonging to its history, but merely to that of literature, such a plea would not hold in the case of scepticism, which must necessarily have excited many a philosophical investigation. We must, consequently, distinguish two species of scepticism, one of which forms the close of the second period, while the other, on the contrary, belongs, by its character,

to the third. On this point all that can now be said preliminarily is, that we are not justified in drawing the character of the sceptical mode of thinking from the philosophical opinion or thoughts to which it may apply itself, for these are extrinsically presented to it, but rather from the objects which it proposes to itself without and beyond its sceptical system, and which, indeed, constitute its real grounds. Now the species which we naturally expect to meet with, at the close of the second period, is that which, arising from a long and fruitless occupation with anterior philosophical ideas, has no other object than to show that they are insufficient to afford that true and perfect conviction which is the end and property of science, but merely a certain degree of probability. Now, under this form, it is intimately allied to eclecticism, and is perhaps no otherwise distinguished from it than by the greater and clearer conviction it retains of its relation to science. That however this species belongs not to a period in which science has lost its peculiar shape and character, results from its very nature; for its relation to philosophy is at most negative, and not actually hostile. On the other hand, that form of the sceptical character, which is hostile to philosophy, and attempts directly to subvert and destroy the true philosophical impulse, must be first sought for in the third period.

We shall now proceed to determine, as accurately as possible, the end of this period, conformably to the preceding remarks. The purely erudite transmission of philosophy which borders closely upon eclecticism, begins pretty early. For

with the perfection of the stoical system by Chrysippus—i. e. about 200 B. C. the further development of philosophy, in its important sense, ceases completely; yet even the imperfect notices we have of these times, authorize the conjecture, that, for a long while an earnest desire existed to maintain pure and entire the doctrines of the several philosophical schools, which is a proof of a still-existing perception of their individual character. Nearly at this time was formed, principally by Carneades, the new academy, a school of that species of scepticism which we have already described as characterizing the close of the second period. This long maintained itself, though it was not supported by any distinguished talents, and was associated with more or less of the eclectic spirit. However, both of these modes of thought are continued into the following period, and consequently afford no distinctive mark for determining the boundary line between them. But another species of scepticism, in which we think we can discover an anti-philosophical spirit, grew up about the commencement of our æra, at which date also commences a blending of the oriental and the Grecian in philosophy. This confusion sufficiently evinces that the Greek individuality of character had now lost its fruitful and productive energy in philosophy. Of this nature are the considerations by which we have been induced to carry the second portion of our history down to the middle of the last century before Christ.

## CHAPTER II.

### SOCRATES.

AN accurate acquaintance with the personal history of Socrates is indispensable to the due appreciation of his philosophical labours, inasmuch as, more than in any other philosopher of ancient times, his scientific influence was intimately dependent on his whole individual being and character. It may with great justice be said, that unless faithful hands had transmitted to us many single anecdotes of his life and times, the astonishing success which followed his teaching must ever have remained an enigma in the history of mind. Indeed, the very circumstance that the disciples of Socrates have recorded so many personal traits of their teacher, is of itself a proof that even they were aware that his external actions and conduct were of great importance to the extensive promulgation of his influence and doctrines, and that not merely the philosopher, but the man had impressed his entire image on their minds.

Socrates, a citizen of Athens, the son of Sophroniscus, a statuary, and of Phænarete, a midwife, was born Ol. 77.<sup>1</sup> Of his early life little is known, and there is no reason to suppose that in his education he possessed any advantages beyond those ordinarily within the reach of an Athenian citizen of

<sup>1</sup> Diog. L. ii. 44.



those days. It is said, we know, that he enjoyed the instructions of Anaxagoras,<sup>2</sup> or of Archelaus the naturalist;<sup>3</sup> but the former statement is demonstrably false, and the latter, in the absence of all ancient testimony, is, to say the least, improbable. By his father he was instructed and brought up as a statuary, in which art he is represented as having been far from deficient in skill. It is, however, likely that he engaged in philosophical inquiries at a very early period,<sup>4</sup> profiting by the facilities afforded by the then state of things, which had collected at Athens the results and fruits of all anterior labours in philosophy. The statements of his disciples exhibit him in manifold intercourse with the most eminent men of his day, whether distinguished for the scientific character of their minds, or their attainments and abilities in the various departments of knowledge. Thus he enjoyed the lessons of Prodicus, on the distinction of synonyms; and was taught music by Damon, so famous for having insisted upon and exhibited its

<sup>2</sup> Diog. L. ii. 19; 45. Plato, on the contrary, makes Socrates derive from the works of Anaxagoras his knowledge of the system of that philosopher. Phæd. p. 97.

<sup>3</sup> Diog. L. i. 16; ii. 19; cf. ii. 23. The tradition seems to have originated with Aristoxenus, at all events it cannot be traced higher. How little credit the statements of Aristoxenus regarding Socrates deserve has been shown by Luzac (Lect. Atticæ, especially ii. 27, sqq.), on which account we do not consider it necessary to enter at large into the many calumnies which are current against the moral and scientific character of Socrates. The statement that Socrates was a disciple of Archelaus stands on the same footing. Diog. L. ii. 19. By others the syllograph Timon is made the source of the tradition that Socrates had been a scholar of Archelaus, Clem. Alex. Strom. i. p. 301. But the verses there adduced afford any thing but a proof. That Socrates never received any direct instruction in philosophy is clear from Xenoph. Conv. i. 5, where he calls himself *ἀβρουργὸς τῆς φιλοσοφίας*.

<sup>4</sup> Plat. Phæd. p. 96.

ethical and political applications,<sup>5</sup> and who, on this account, has been considered one of its most distinguished teachers. By the lessons of Konnas, he also sought, even in his old age, to increase his proficiency in this art, maintaining, in the spirit of earlier times, its important influence in the education of youth.<sup>6</sup> These, however, are but a few trifling elements of the education which, in the age of Pericles, was freely open to all who felt a thirst for knowledge. Indeed we may take for granted that Socrates neglected no single branch of mental improvement; for in those sciences even which he held to be of little value—as astronomy and geometry—his attainments were far beyond the ordinary standard of the educated men<sup>7</sup> of his time.

Any means of instruction beyond those which Athens was able to furnish, were not sought after by Socrates. Except, indeed, upon the military expeditions to Potidæa, Delion, and Amphipolis, in which he earned the character of a brave, undaunted, and obedient soldier, he never quitted Athens, and thereby gave ample proofs of his devotion and attachment to the city of his birth.<sup>8</sup> Athens was dear to Socrates for the freedom of life it insured, and which, dreading nothing so much as dependence, he prized beyond all things else. This feeling

<sup>5</sup> Plat. de Rep. iii. p. 400; iv. p. 424. The musical theory of Damon is generally referred to the Pythagoreans. Heindorf. ad Plat. Prot. p. 490.

<sup>6</sup> Plat. Euthyd. p. 272; Menex. p. 235.

<sup>7</sup> Xenoph. Memorab. Socr. iv. 7. nr. 3. sq.

<sup>8</sup> Plat. Crito, p. 52; cf. Phædr. p. 230. Compare also Diog. L. ii. 23. As to the campaigns of Socrates consult Plat. Charm. init.; Apol. p. 28. e; Conv. p. 219. e; Antisthenes ap. Athen. v. p. 216.

led him to prefer a life of comparative poverty and limited wants, to the ambitious hopes and pecuniary advantages which a share in the administration of public affairs held out; this disinclination to political life was in all probability strengthened by the unbridled licentiousness of a democracy, which, to the honest and upright statesman,<sup>9</sup> offered no prospect of a favourable issue of his labours. Once only did he take part in state affairs, when, as president of the Prytanes, he proved at the same time his unfitness for a public life,<sup>10</sup> and the inflexible integrity of his character, by opposing the popular will at the hazard of his life.<sup>11</sup> The same unbending honesty was exhibited on another occasion, when he refused to yield obedience to an unjust decree of the Thirty tyrants. Now, when we see, on one hand, his whole conduct thus strongly marked with a love of justice and with patriotism, even at the risk of personal danger, and, on the other, behold him refusing to join in any political enterprise, either for the conservation or bettering of the national institutions, the only solution of this seeming contradiction we can find, is a conviction, on his part, that his fitting mission was the education of the young. By following this vocation he probably believed he should best benefit his country; for, in his opinion, the true government of a nation must begin with the education of the child, and it is far higher and better to form many to be virtuous citizens and

<sup>9</sup> Plat. Apol. p. 31; cf. de Rep. vi. p. 496.

<sup>10</sup> Plat. Gorg. p. 473.

<sup>11</sup> Plat. Ap. p. 32; Xenoph. Hell. i. 7; Memor. Secr. i. 1, nr. 18.

enlightened rulers, than to be oneself the chief of the state.<sup>12</sup>

At what time Socrates first devoted himself to the education of youth, cannot be accurately determined; from the constitution of his mind, however, which proceeding through many attempts in the discovery of truth, could only at a late period have attained to certainty, it is not improbable that he had already arrived at a ripe age before he began to incite others to the pursuit of philosophy.<sup>13</sup> In the more detailed accounts, he is almost without exception depicted as an old man. There are other reasons also which scarcely admit of a supposition, that he devoted himself suddenly and all at once to this vocation; for though it be true that his observation of man, with a view to the science of humanity, has been referred to an oracle<sup>14</sup> for its occasion, even the oracle itself implies his having previously pursued philosophical studies in common with Chærephon; and it is quite consistent with the nature of the case to suppose, that a sense of his peculiar fitness for the education of youth gradually opened upon his mind, as he observed the improvement and instruction which others derived from his society. Socrates, however, did not offer or recommend himself as teacher to any

<sup>12</sup> Xenoph. Mem. i. 6. nr. 15. Plat. Euthyphr. p. 2.

<sup>13</sup> The assumption of Wiggers (Socrates, § 30,) that he commenced teaching in his thirtieth year, is wholly unfounded. That of Delbruck (Socrates, § 34,) that he had openly philosophised 5 or 6 years before he was brought upon the stage by Aristophanes (Olymp. 89. 1,) which would make him about forty at his first appearance as a teacher, is not improbable; although the anecdote of Euclidean (Gell. Noct. Att. vi. 10,) is apparently inconsistent with it.

<sup>14</sup> Plat. Apol. p. 21.

one, but permitted all freely to participate in his conversation,<sup>15</sup> and thus the opinion may have become insensibly formed, among old and young alike, that his society was improving and instructive. In this way was established what has been called his school, i. e. the custom of many to meet daily, or as often as possible, around him, to enjoy and share in his conversation.

Thus Socrates arrived at general consideration and respect. Indeed his person and conduct must have contributed to render him not merely a striking, but even an attractive phenomenon. By nature he was anything but prepossessing; his projecting eyeballs,<sup>16</sup> his depressed nose, with upturned and dilated nostrils, his large unwieldy belly, gave to his whole appearance somewhat of the satyr, altogether in keeping with the tone of his discourse, which not seldom breathed forth a vein of latent mockery, and pursued with the bitter expressions of scorn and irony, every arrogant pretender to wisdom and virtue. His dress, too, which was coarse and suited to his means, with nothing like display, contributed but little to impress the spectator with respect, and was strikingly characteristic of the rude simplicity of his habits and manners. Moreover, the strange-

<sup>15</sup> Plat. Apol. p. 33.

<sup>16</sup> Xenoph. Symp. ii. 19; iv. 19; v. 5; Plat. Theaet. p. 143; Symp. p. 216. My attention has been called by one well acquainted with ancient works of art to the fact that the busts of Socrates do not exhibit any such prominence of the eyeball. However, it is well known that the first statues of Socrates were erected after his death, and that it was not until later times, or at least not generally, that the ancients aimed at giving a portrait-like resemblance in their statuary.

ness and singularity of his demeanour—his mode of looking all round him, of stopping suddenly when walking, and remaining for some time fixed on the spot—must have afforded a striking contrast to the elegant exterior and refined habits of his youthful companions. When, however, these peculiarities had once drawn upon him the eyes and attention of the world, his bearing was peculiarly fitted to gain and deserve the affection of those who frequented his society, and to detain them within his circle. His disciple Xenophon has transmitted to us many instances, where, in critical emergencies, his counsel and advice was sought and given, and assistance afforded, which are calculated to create no mean opinion of his tact and judgment. But his conversational powers, even by the acknowledgment of his enemies, were most wonderful, and have been described as almost irresistible.<sup>17</sup> This talent, however, was displayed not so much in continued discourse as in dialogue, in which, taking up the most improbable positions, and proceeding from the well known to the less known, he had the skill to lead on to the most unexpected results; a method in which he has been imitated by many, and which even to this day is designated by his name. This procedure is however of so much importance, in connection with his system and doctrines, that an accurate and precise account of it

<sup>17</sup> Plat. *Apol. init*; *Conv.* p. 215, sq.; *Aristoxenus ap. Cyrill contra Julian*, vi: p. 185, ed. Spanh. As to the *δογμασμένη* of Socrates in his discourse, which is here alluded to, consult Engelhardt ad Plat. *Euthyphr.* p. 130.

must be reserved to a more fitting place. Here we can only give a general outline of the subject matter and peculiarities of his teaching. He chiefly confined himself to questions of morality, referring to the duties of private and public life; not, however, to the exclusion of other topics, both of science and opinion, forasmuch as Socrates made it his peculiar business to expose, in all its nakedness, the pretended wisdom of those who enjoyed a reputation for great talents, as well of politicians and of sophists as of artists and others. By this procedure he highly gratified the young Athenians by whom he was usually attended, and who strove to acquire the famed Socratic irony, in which he represented himself as one desiring to learn of those whose claim to wisdom it was his purpose to ridicule and expose. But there is one peculiar feature in his mode of teaching, which we must not fail to notice, viz., the skill and dexterity with which he adapted himself, in the most eminent degree, to the thoughts and sentiments of others, and limited his observations to the capacity of his hearers. This tact, to say or not to say a thing, or merely to hint it, might even be inferred from the different views of his system which were taken by his various disciples; it is also shown by the different positions from which he started in his different lessons, (catching now at one point, now at another,) which accounts for much of that mixture of seriousness and irony which forms the distinctive character of his teaching. When we reflect that, though living in an age in which

all were anxious to compose, and though well qualified to give expression to his views and principles,<sup>18</sup> (and assuredly not without a wish that they should be preserved to posterity,) he nevertheless made no attempt to collect in writing the scattered results of his investigations into life and science, or even to communicate them in a connected form to his disciples, we cannot well doubt that he was imbued with a lively conviction that instruction must begin with the perfect knowledge of the intellectual character and constitution of the learner. This is further confirmed by his custom\* of commencing all his dialogues with an attempt to draw out and to sound the man with whom he was about to converse. That in such a course, isolated points and single features of his doctrine would necessarily be thrown prominently out, is conceivable, and even though it were to be feared, that his view of science in general might be misunderstood, or apprehended in a one-sided and partial light, he still perhaps felt confident, that he who was capable of understanding his system, would find in his whole life the best explanation of single words and doctrines. This consideration, at the same time, satisfactorily explains how it happened that his philosophical labours were by many apprehended partially and superficially, and by others in a wholly false light—for in truth the

<sup>18</sup> Aristoxenus, it is true, (ap. Plut. de Malignitate Herod. 9,) calls him ἀπαιδευτον καὶ ἀμαθῆ καὶ ἀκρίλαστον; I only mention the fact as a proof of the credibility of this historian. Socrates, however, was capable of writing verses—a Hymn in praise of Apollo, and Fables in the manner of Æsop. Plat. Phæd. p. 60.



majority are incapable of comprehending the lesson of a whole life.

Such may possibly have been the case with those who, on his trial, condemned him as guilty. Rightly has it been held that his death contributed largely to the efficiency of his teaching. After he had lived and taught many years at Athens in his usual manner, he was brought to trial for his doctrines and opinions, condemned to death, and in the seventieth year of his age, 399 B. C. (Olymp. 95. 1) drank off the cup of poison.<sup>19</sup> Whoever hears this fact, and at the same time brings before his mind the character of the man, cannot easily refrain from astonishment; yet upon further consideration of the matter, as well as of all the circumstances, his surprise will gradually subside. It is true, if we think of Socrates, such as he appears to us now, ennobled both by the encomiums of his tried disciples and the results of his teaching, we cannot but feel astonished at the levity or malice of the judges who condemned him. But it is not a rare circumstance that a present age should misunderstand what a future age admires. We need not go far back in history to find instances of philosophers who have been successfully calumniated and misrepresented by their contemporaries. The personal character of Socrates' accusers was any thing but distinguished; Melissus, a young poet, the chief accuser, and the Syndics, Anytos a demagogue, and Lycon an orator, could not have brought any considerable party

<sup>19</sup> Diog. L. ii. 44; Plat. Crito, p. 52 e; Apol. p. 17 d.

against him; and in making the charge they appear to have been less actuated by personal enmity than by the opinions prevalent among the people with whom they associated. That an unfavourable opinion of him was pretty general, may fairly be inferred from the manner in which he was handled by the comedians, especially by Aristophanes, and this is indeed admitted in the defence which Plato puts into his mouth.<sup>20</sup> The accusation ran thus: Socrates is guilty of impiety, in that he does not acknowledge the gods acknowledged by the state, but introduces other new demons, and does wrong in corrupting the young.<sup>21</sup> Now each article in this indictment was easily supported before those who judged solely from the detached expressions reported to them. This is at once manifest, when we reflect that Socrates, in all his discourses, mixed the serious with the gay, and seldom gave utterance to the whole of his sentiments, and often allowed an hypothesis to pass as valid with the mere view of showing the inconsistencies and contradictions contained in the doctrines of others. As to the first part of the accusation, that Socrates did not put faith in the gods of the state, it was, according to all the accounts which we have of him,<sup>22</sup> most assuredly unfounded; but in courts of justice, such as that before which Socrates was brought, the general opinion which has taken root in the popular mind is usually more regarded than the personal character of the accused. Now Socrates had an-

<sup>20</sup> Page 18. 19.

<sup>21</sup> Xenoph. Mem. i. 1, nr. 1; Plat. Ap. p. 24; Diog. Laert. ii. 40.

<sup>22</sup> On this point the Clouds of Aristophanes must be held an impartial witness.

nounced himself a philosopher, one of a class of men whose opposition to the popular religion had been pretty general; and it was taken for granted, that in this point, as well as in others, he resembled the rest of his profession.<sup>23</sup> And although, both in doctrine and outward conduct, Socrates invariably evinced his respect for the national deities, still it cannot be denied that he shared the opinion, which had led many of the earlier philosophers to attack and reject polytheism—viz., that one supreme God ruled all human things. Now, looking to the fact, that many gross notions of the divine nature had been assailed and controverted in his school, and that some of his disciples had even gone so far as to evince an open contempt for the popular religion, many, who were but imperfectly acquainted with his real character, and otherwise ill-disposed towards the profession of philosophy and sophistry, might easily be led to believe, that all his discourses concerning the gods of the state, and all the homage which he paid them, were attributable to an indulgent compliance with the mistaken opinion of his countrymen, or even to hypocrisy. The second charge, that he introduced new gods, is grounded on the singular manner in which he was accustomed to say that a something divine was present to him.<sup>24</sup> This was indeed easily explicable by the ancient notions of religion; still, how open it lay to misconception is sufficiently proved by the many and conflicting opinions, which, in later times, have been maintained

<sup>23</sup> Plat. Ap. p. 18, 23, 26, 28.

<sup>24</sup> Plat. Euthyphr. p. 3. Xenoph. Ap. 12.

regarding the demons of Socrates. But the third count, which charged him with corrupting the minds of youth, was precisely the one which had most weight with the minds of his judges. The corruption here meant was the introducing new habits of thought and a new style of education; a change, however, which was not brought about exclusively by Socrates, though it was certainly effected chiefly in his time, and with considerable co-operation on his part. We have already called attention to the struggle which was now awakened between old national prejudices and the sentiments of a new age, and to the necessity by which, from a change of moral pursuits, a complete reform of education must result, the first manifestation of which was given in the welcome which awaited the Sophists in their character as teachers.<sup>25</sup> Now Socrates was looked upon by the mass as one of these new-fangled teachers;<sup>26</sup> and it cannot be denied that he actually was so, in so far as he regarded the philosophical development of mind as the true completion of human improvement. His object, indeed, was to represent this as a healing remedy for all the diseases of the age;

<sup>25</sup> Monuments of this contest have been preserved to us, particularly in the comedies of Aristophanes; and, for the other side, in the works of Plato, where, however, there is perhaps an attempt to compromise between the two parties. Cf. the opening of the *Laches*.

<sup>26</sup> Cf. *Suvern über die Wolken des Aristoph.* § 24, which work it is important to consult as to the relation of Socrates to the age in which he lived. That there was a strong and widely spread dislike to Socrates, and not merely a momentary effervescence or particular enmity, is clear from Xenophon judging it necessary to publish his *Memoir* in defence of his master, five years after his condemnation. For the chronology cf. Boeckh's *de similitudine quam Plato cum Xenoph. exercuisse fertur*, p. 19.

while the opponents of this new system of education had, in philosophy and science, a spreading cancer, as it were, to contend with, and in fact wished to drive an advanced age back into its former position. There was much, moreover, in the circumstances of the times to aggravate these feelings and to provoke his opponents. The misfortunes, which the depraved state of morals had occasioned, began to be felt more sensibly after the close of the Peloponnesian war and the expulsion of the Thirty tyrants; and the two individuals who had been the chief causes of the public calamities, Alcibiades and Kritias,<sup>27</sup> lived in the closest intimacy with Socrates. When, consequently, a return was made in some degree to the old constitution of the state, a wish and an endeavour, it is probable, arose with it to restore the old system of education also, and for this restoration it was requisite that Socrates should fall.<sup>28</sup> From all this it is easy to see that reasons sufficiently specious could be urged to judges who were biassed by popular prejudices against Socrates. The question was not as to his integrity and uprightness of conduct, it was enough that he appeared personally dangerous to the views of the party. It cannot, therefore, be surprising that his death should be quickly resolved upon in an age, of which Thucydides says, passion was esteemed more than self-

<sup>27</sup> Xenoph. Mem. i. 2, nr. 12. Æschin. contra Timarch. p. 24, Steph. Theramenes may perhaps be reckoned among these. Diod. Sic. xiv. 3.

<sup>28</sup> The judges of Socrates are described as being of those who having fled from the Thirty, returned and expelled them. Plat. Ap. p. 21. Socrates with them might well pass for an aristocrat. Comp. Xenoph. Mem. iv. 6, nr. 12. Plat. *Menex.* p. 238.

command, prudence more than virtue, and by a people like the Athenians, who were only too wont to be carried away by the hasty impulses of the moment. Among the many horrors which the free people of Athens committed in the spirit of party, the condemnation of Socrates must appear but a trifle.

In such a state of things, and recollecting, moreover, that Socrates in his defence would not descend to the usual practices of accused persons, and disdained to move the compassion of his judges by lamentations, or their good will by flattery, but in the proud consciousness of innocence, without a fear of death, perhaps even with a desire to die,<sup>29</sup> boldly defied his judges, and made them listen, not to sweet words of adulation, but to bitter truths—there is nothing to surprise us in his condemnation. Indeed his contemporaries do not appear to have been amazed at the result, but rather to have wondered that he should have been condemned by a bare majority of five or six votes.<sup>30</sup> Nay, more, he probably might have escaped the capital punishment, if, when brought up to be sentenced, he had presented a more humble demeanour; but he despised any self-humiliation which would have been equivalent to an acknowledgment of guilt;<sup>31</sup> and this bearing in a condemned criminal provoked the sensitive Athenians to such a degree, that eighty judges, who had previously been for his ac-

<sup>29</sup> Xenoph. *Apol. Socr.* 5, sqq.; *Mem.* iv. 8, nr. 6, sqq.

<sup>30</sup> *Plat. Apol.* p. 24, 36.

<sup>31</sup> So we are told in the *Apology* (23) which is attributed to Xenophon. In the slighting and humble manner in which Socrates speaks of himself in the *Apology* of Plato there is nothing humiliating. Cf. *Cic. de Orat.* i. 54. *Diog. L.* ii. 41, 42.

quittal, now voted for his death. From this fact we may clearly see how a momentary and transient rage and indignation decided his fate; and we may infer from it, that the strong prejudice which was excited against him as a philosopher, was yet in a considerable degree overborne by his personal reputation for honour and integrity. Upon his sentence being pronounced, Socrates delivered another short speech to his judges,<sup>32</sup> in which he openly expressed his contempt of death. At the close of his address he is represented by Plato as uttering these sublime words: "But it is now time to be going, me to die, you to live, whose lot is the better of the two is hidden from all but God."

He survived his condemnation thirty days, by reason of the festival of the Theoria being then in celebration, during which it was unlawful that a criminal should be put to death. This interval was passed by him in prison, chiefly in conversation with his dearest friends. Crito, one of the oldest, who had also been his bail, had contrived and secured the means of escape, but Socrates rejected the proffered opportunity, and prepared to meet his death in obedience to the laws. Plato has described this dialogue with Crito, and his last conversations with his friends, unquestionably not as they were actually delivered (for Plato himself was not present), but yet with some few features bearing evident signs of the individuality of So-

<sup>32</sup> This does not seem to have been usual, but it is mentioned in both the Apologies, which exhibit to us the whole proceeding, though from different points of view, both of them giving exclusively some of the sentiments uttered by Socrates.

crates' character, and which were probably drawn from the narration of those who were present. To contemplate him thus spending the last moments of his existence, instructing his friends, and finally exhorting them to live in accordance with the principles he had taught, and assuring them that thus they would best evince their gratitude and affection is one of the most touching, but at the same time most sublime of spectacles. Crito promised this in the name of his friends, and we can well imagine the impression this must have made upon all present. His last discourse was upon the immortality of the soul, describing death as nothing more than a change of residence, which he prayed the gods might in his case be a happy one. He consoled his weeping friends when he had already drank off the cup of poison, and in the calm elevation of soul, which all his words bespeak, we may perceive how deeply he was imbued with the spirit of that philosophy he had so often described as a longing after death. His last words were, "Crito, we owe a cock to Æsculapius; take care that you pay it to him, and do not neglect it." The meaning of these words was, that death is the last cure of the disease of life.<sup>33</sup>

Thus died this rare and wonderful man. But he left behind him the seeds of his immortal science, which, in the congenial minds where he had planted them, brought forth abundant fruit. Others have imitated his life and conduct, and have wished and succeeded in attaining to a still higher moral excel-

<sup>33</sup> This is the most probable explanation. Cf. Plat. *Phædon*, particularly at the beginning and end.



lence; yet perhaps we are not asserting too much when we affirm, that even if among the later Greeks some attained to higher excellence in particular branches of inquiry, none ever exhibited such a happy and harmonious union of mental powers, both in theory and practice, combining, in such due proportions, enthusiasm with reflection. It is only when the active energy of a whole people is beginning to fail, and when the intellect is the only field left for the great efforts of the spirit, that the unperverted instinct of human nature can impel a few extraordinary individuals, with equal freshness and vigour, to action and to speculation at once; rarely, if ever, afterwards is such perfection to be met with.

In order to delineate truly the character of Socrates, it is necessary to notice a few of its nicer and more delicate peculiarities. He was a perfect Greek in his faults and his virtues; hence he always regarded morals under a political aspect. Accordingly, as the feuds and disorders of the times in which he lived, made it necessary for every one to be prepared to repel hostile attacks and to assist his friends, Socrates taught that to be able and ready to injure an enemy, and to benefit a friend to the utmost, constituted manly virtue.<sup>34</sup> Now, although this view of virtue did not necessarily exclude all nobleness of sentiment, nor even a due observance of law towards an opponent, still there

<sup>34</sup> Xenoph. Mem. ii. 2, nr. 2; 3, nr. 14; here, it is true, public enemies are spoken of; but ii. 6, nr. 35, of other enemies also. Gratitude to the former is enjoined in the first cited passage. Cf. Arist. Rhet. ii. 23, *καὶ διὰ Σωκράτους οὐκ ἔφη βαδίζειν ὡς Ἀρχέλαον* ὕβριν γὰρ ἔφη εἶναι τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ἀμύνεσθαι ὁμοίως εἰς παθόντα ὥσπερ καὶ κακῶς.

is no trace of that right feeling which would lead him to consider enmity as a mere passing evil. By this view of social duties his own conduct was actuated; for although he is rather passive under the attacks of his enemies, and unwilling to protect himself by straining or violating the laws, it is clear, from both the Apologies put into his mouth, that he bore no very gentle feeling towards them. This predominance of political considerations in his idea of virtue, is farther manifested by his love of his native city,<sup>35</sup> and in the exaggerated spirit of independence which would not suffer him to visit the tyrant Archelaus, because he could never make him a like return for his hospitality.<sup>36</sup> In such a political view of virtue, the relations of domestic life fell naturally enough far into the background; the notorious bad feeling of his wife Xantippe to her husband and child,<sup>37</sup> prevents the supposition of a very happy home; and when we remark the degree to which, in his devotion to philosophy,<sup>38</sup> he neglected his family duties, and the little attention he paid his wife and child,<sup>39</sup> we are justified in ascribing to him, in common with his countrymen, little respect for domestic life in comparison with public duties.

<sup>35</sup> Plat. Ap. p. 30.

<sup>36</sup> Arist. ib.

<sup>37</sup> Xenoph. Symp. ii. 10. *χαλεπωτάτη γυναῖκων*; Memor. ii. 2. She is generally depicted as somewhat of a shrew, and as invariably addressing her son in terms of reproach, without being however in any way *κακονοῦς* towards him. The description which Plato de Rep. viii. p. 459, gives of a woman ill-disposed towards her husband in consequence of his refusal to take part in public affairs, and for bestowing but little attention to herself, has so many nice and particular traits that I cannot help considering it as an allusion to what usually took place between Xantippe and Socrates.

<sup>38</sup> Plat. Ap. p. 23.

<sup>39</sup> Xenoph. Symp. ib. Plat. Phæd. p. 60.

To the more antique features of his character must be referred the intimacy which subsisted between Socrates and his younger friends, and which has often been reproachfully objected to him as unbecoming and immoral in its nature.<sup>40</sup> His friends, however, have zealously defended him against the unfavourable appearances which are presented by his intercourse with the more beautiful of his companions, and by the mode in which he was wont to acknowledge himself their lover. That he should attach himself to well-favoured youths, was a natural consequence of his wish and endeavour to instruct and improve the rising generation, which led him, we are told, to regard every one in the bloom of youth as beautiful; though, no doubt much is to be attributed to a quick and pleasurable perception of corporeal beauty, as well as to an opinion that the body is the exponent of the soul. When however he gave himself out as their lover, this was partly ironical, partly the expression of the genuine pleasure he felt in contemplating the youthful aspirants after knowledge, seeing in them the hopes and promise of the coming age. This is a remnant of those ancient feelings and habits, which, in the degradation of womanly love, gave to the connection of manly youth with the more aged, a character of tenderness and softness, which however fast inclined to corruption.<sup>41</sup>

<sup>40</sup> The source of this objection seems to have been the work falsely ascribed to Aristippus, *περὶ παλαιᾶς τρύφης*. Cf. Luzac de digamia Soc. p. 108.

<sup>41</sup> Cf. particularly Xen. Mem. iv. 1, nr. 2; Conv. viii. nr. 22. Plat. Conv. p. 216, sqq. Charm. p. 154. It must be observed that this love of boys

But in order to view in their proper light the peculiarities of his character, it must be remembered that the moving principle of his life was the religious feeling of an early age. Two things especially present a most singular phenomenon in his character, which, in so high a degree, are seldom found associated ;—a mind excited by the strongest and most lively feelings, and a self-command which regulated his whole conduct. At times, indeed, it would seem as if his feelings had become too strong for controul. Thus, when he was going to the Symposium, a particular thought took so strong possession of him, that, suddenly stopping, he remained fixed on the spot until the repast was half finished ;<sup>42</sup> on another occasion, in the midst of the tumult of a camp, he sunk into a deep meditation and continued on the same spot the whole day and night absorbed in thought until the sun rose, to which he immediately directed his prayers.<sup>43</sup> These were the occasional outbreakings of a mind which was ever powerfully possessed by the objects it contemplated, and they do indeed look very much like absence or abstraction ; yet for the most part he was able to master their tendency, and was wont to express himself ironically upon all the different conditions in which the mind is not entirely itself, nor fully aware of surrounding circumstances.<sup>44</sup>

among the ancients was a substitute for what with us is sensibility or gallantry towards the other sex. No comparison fits, exactly, it is true. At the same time it is evident that Socrates availed himself of and employed this circumstance in his own way and for his own ends.

<sup>42</sup> Plat. Conv. p. 174, sqq.

<sup>43</sup> Ib. p. 220.

<sup>44</sup> These states were comprised by the ancients under the idea of madness. But with Socrates madness is what is opposed to wisdom—to clear intelli-

Who then can question that the occasions on which Socrates was carried away by the force of his feelings were regretted by him, not on account of the feelings which prevailed therein, but, merely for the mastery which they had usurped over his self-controul. He who doubts this need only look at the opinion he entertained of the supernatural intimations given to him.<sup>45</sup> By these signs, which happened to him from his youth upwards, but more frequently in his latter years, he was dissuaded from many things he was about to undertake; whereby he was led to conclude what he ought to do.<sup>46</sup> These intimations had reference also to the affairs of others, and were regarded by him as a peculiar gift of the gods to himself—as an inner voice of which no farther information could be given.<sup>47</sup> We shall not perhaps be far wrong if we explain this as nothing more than excitability of feeling, expressing itself as a faculty of presentiment. It must not, however, be supposed that

gence. Xenoph. Mem. iii. 9, n. 6. Enthusiasm is also one of these states. Plat. Ap. p. 22. Cf. Nitzsch. Plat. Ion proleg. c. 4.

<sup>45</sup> In refutation of the modern opinion that Socrates ascribed to himself a particular demon or genius, consult the observations of Schleiermacher in his translation of the Plat. Apol. p. 432; cf. Plat. Euthyphr. p. 3; Phædr. p. 242; Euthydem. p. 272 e.; Apol. p. 40.

<sup>46</sup> This reconciles the different statements upon this point in Plato and Xenophon. See Xenoph. Mem. i. n. 4. Plat. Ap. p. 31, and the commentators upon the passage.

<sup>47</sup> Xenoph. Ap. 12; Plat. de Gen. Soc. 20. As to the prophecies of Socrates, see Xen. Mem. i. 1, n. 4; Ap. 13; Cic. de Divin. i. 54. Xenophon says they were all fulfilled. Cicero quoted from a work of one Antipater, probably of Tarsis, a stoic, wherein the prophecies of Socrates were collected. Some of them are to be found in the Pseudo-platonic Theages, p. 128. Some moderns have been disposed to understand by the demonic intimations nothing more than the voice of conscience, which however is not justified by the traditions which have reached us on that head.

we seek thereby to screen Socrates from the imputation of superstition; for his opinion of demonical intimations was in unison with his veneration, not merely of the Deity, but of the gods. This is apparent from his recommendation of divination as a remedy for the deficiency of our knowledge of the future and of contingent events,<sup>48</sup>—his advice to Xenophon that he should consult the Delphic god as to his Asiatic expedition,<sup>49</sup>—his disposition to pay attention to dreams,<sup>50</sup>—and lastly, his constant sacrifices, and his command to make all due offerings to the gods of house and state.<sup>51</sup> Now in this superstition there are two points to be distinguished; that which he derived from the common opinion of his nation, and that which was founded on his own experience. In both phases it is equally superstition, but venial if not commendable. For, in respect to the former, he who, brought up in the olden creeds and traditions of his country, adheres to them so long as nothing better is offered for his adoption, and so far as they are not opposed to his own reason and enlightenment, is, to our minds, a better and a wiser man than he who lightly or hastily turns into ridicule the objects of public veneration. As to the demonical intimations of Socrates, they were, in common with his other superstition, the good foundation of his belief, that the gods afford assistance to the good, but imperfect endeavours of

<sup>48</sup> See especially Xenoph. Mem. i. l. nr. 6, sqq.

<sup>49</sup> Xenoph. Anab. iii. l. He does, it is true, give a different reason for it.

<sup>50</sup> Plat. Phæd. p. 60, e.; Crito. p. 44; Ap. p. 33.

<sup>51</sup> There is in Plat. Ap. p. 35, a very solemn attestation of his belief in the gods.

virtuous men,<sup>52</sup> and prove the scrupulous attention he paid to the emotions and suggestions of his conscience.<sup>53</sup> Among the various thoughts and feelings which successively filled and occupied his mind, he must have noticed much that presented itself involuntarily, and which, habituated, as he was, to reflect upon every subject, and yet unable to derive it from any agency of his own, he referred to a divine source. This is particularly confirmed by the exhortation he gives, in Xenophon, to Euthydemus,<sup>54</sup> to renounce all idle desire to become acquainted with the forms of the gods, and to rest satisfied with knowing and adoring their works, for then he would acknowledge that it was not idly and without cause that he himself spoke of demonical intimations. By this, Socrates evidently gave him to understand, that this demonical sign would be manifest to every pious soul, who would renounce all idle longing for a visible appearance of the Deity. Still, in spite of all this, he cautiously guarded against the danger of that weak and credulous reliance upon the assistance of the Deity which necessarily proves subversive or obstructive of a rational direction of life; for he taught that those who consult the oracles in matters within the compass of human powers, are no less insane than those who maintain the all-sufficiency of human reason.<sup>55</sup>

Seeing then how these religious impulses, springing from olden traditions and inward feelings, pervaded his whole life and conduct, it becomes im-

<sup>52</sup> Xenoph. Mem. iv. 7, nr. 10; Plat. Ap. p. 40, to the end.

<sup>53</sup> Xenoph. Mem. iv. 3, nr. 13.

<sup>54</sup> L. l.

<sup>55</sup> Xenoph. Mem. l. l. nr. 9.

possible to doubt that Plato has reproduced with great truth the sentiments of Socrates, when, in the *Apology*, he makes him declare, that he regarded his business to examine, dissuade, and stimulate men, as a solemn *duty* enjoined upon him by the Delphian god, from which he ought not to retire any more than the soldier from his post. In proof of this he referred not merely to demonical and other signs, by which the Divine intentions are intimated, but also to the oracle of the Delphian god, given to Chærephon the friend of his youth, declaring Socrates to be the wisest of mortals;<sup>56</sup> an oracle, which he could only explain by supposing, that, by it, the god intended to intimate that human wisdom is at best of little value, and that he is the wisest, who is most profoundly conscious of its insignificance. Socrates lived obedient to this divine vocation, and afforded by his whole life, and still more by his death, the strongest proofs of the sincerity of his belief. We might add, that even his view of the insufficiency of human reason has herein found its complete justification, that, although impelled by a heavenly vocation, he yet could mistake the purpose of his mission; for, while the influence of his life and teaching was most assuredly of God's disposing, its issue was to be far different from what he imagined. He thought to benefit practical life by his view of science; it was only a portion of his wish that he obtained, since it was rather the cause of the latter that he advanced by a consideration of the former.

When now, after depicting his life and character,

<sup>56</sup> Plat. Ap. p. 21, 33.



we proceed to the investigation of his doctrines, our position becomes painful and difficult, since the authorities for his history are far more credible than for his philosophy.<sup>57</sup> The *Memorabilia*, which of all the works of Xenophon have most of an historical value with respect to Socrates personally, are in the same degree unsatisfactory as to his doctrines, since the author, who occasionally seems to have cast even an unkindly view upon philosophy,<sup>58</sup> and moreover did not rightly understand the definition of terms or ideas<sup>59</sup>, was but ill qualified to form a due estimate of the Socratic philosophy. The Platonic writings in their scientific portions are equally unavailable as guides in this inquiry, since, with the exception of a few unconnected remarks, they do not furnish us with any means whereby we might distinguish the Platonic from the Socratic.

There remains then the testimony of Aristotle, which will indeed furnish us with some important information as to the scientific labours of Socrates, but are yet very inadequate to supply a perfect outline of his philosophy. Such being the nature of the sources from which we have to draw our estimate of his philosophical merits, the only course which is left to take is, after a critical and comparative examination of these three writers, to accord to each the credit which is due to his statements.

<sup>57</sup> As to the merits of Socrates as a philosopher consult Schleiermacher in the *Abh. der Berl. Akad. d. W.* 1814—15, § 39, f; Brandis *Grundlinien d. Lehre des Socr. im Rheinischen Archiv.* i. 1, st. § 118, f.

<sup>58</sup> Cf. the passage in Sturz. *Lex. Xenoph.* under the heads φιλόσοφος and σοφιστής.

<sup>59</sup> Xenoph. *Mem.* iv. 6.

Xenophon and Aristotle must serve as the basis of our sketch, since both alike are rather too scanty than lavish in the information they impart :—Aristotle, because perhaps from his later date he was unable to satisfy himself upon many points, or perhaps did not deem it advisable to be more explicit ;—Xenophon, because consistently with the apologetic purpose of his work, he could only exhibit him in the light in which, to his own judgment, he appeared a truly estimable and worthy man—in reference, *i. e.* to his labours to ennoble and improve practical life. After having thus laid our foundation for a knowledge of the Socratic philosophy, we may proceed to finish the edifice by the assistance of Plato : for Aristotle affords, in part at least, a sure criterion whereby to distinguish what is Socratic and what Platonic ; Xenophon also, notwithstanding the narrowness of his views, has, in his recollections of his master, unconsciously recorded many striking and remarkable observations, which although he himself may have understood them wrongly or imperfectly, nevertheless when completed and corrected by statements of Plato, open to us an extensive view and deep insight into the Socratic habit of thought. By these means we shall be able to determine pretty accurately where Plato is content to confine himself within the Socratic limits, and where, leaving them, he advances from a tenet of Socrates to wider inferences. In this task the historian admits with regret that he has to rely upon his own critical skill rather than upon the certain testimony of others. In his investigations he has scrupu-

lously adhered to this method; nevertheless he does not deem it necessary to observe it in the exposition of his subject, but shall confine himself to the simple statement of the results he has ascertained.

In the first evolutions of philosophy it was a pure and innocent love of knowledge that had impelled men to search and inquire; subsequently a feeling of doubt grew up, which, insensibly taking possession of men's minds, dared at last to raise its head boldly against truth itself. The holy reverence for authority, law, and religion was the first to fall before the new dogmas of philosophers, which, however, incapable of substituting any better or more solid principle, subverted an ignorant faith without establishing in its stead a scientific conviction. Pre-occupied with the investigation of nature and its principles, they gave little attention to the intellectual, or at least did not allow it to stand prominently enough forward in its opposition to the purely physical, and consequently neglected that which alone was calculated to reveal to man the true principle and foundation of his existence and his science. Moreover, there was little unanimity in their principles and systems, and as their investigations proceeded from one-sided and limited views, he who adopted their theories soon found himself involved in difficulties both mutually contradictory and irreconcilable to his own mind.<sup>60</sup> It is therefore nowise surprising that at a time when the relations of society presented an image of vague and shifting morality, corresponding to the

<sup>60</sup> Cf. Xenoph. Mem. i. 1, nr. 14.

uncertainty which prevailed in science, such an imperfect state of progress should have given rise to such a corrupt result as the art of sophistry, which was based upon the monstrous opinion, that for man there is no truth, but that he may play with its shadow as he will,—that he is the wisest of men who, despairing utterly of its possibility, is adroit enough to conceal from others his own incapacity and ignorance, and yet to dazzle them by an ingenious display of artifices and forms. From this abyss of vanity and ignorance there was but one escape; a strong hold must be taken of what is fixed and indestructible in man,—his moral convictions. It was only by opposing to sophistry the general belief of the moral order of things and its reality and truth that it could be successfully combated. This Socrates attempted with success. As at other times, when all is weak and tottering, man needs only to revive within him a consciousness of his moral destiny, to find the firmness of conviction which is necessary for the right conduct of life, so at this period Socrates did no more than hold fast to this moral stay, and thereby enabled science to open for herself a new route across the delusions of sophistry.

Starting from these considerations we shall be able to account for the fact, that we find Socrates almost exclusively engaged with questions of morals, (insomuch that Xenophon, Plato, and almost all antiquity agree in representing it as his peculiar merit, that he encouraged and promoted ethical inquiries,) while it was only in his younger days that he paid any attention to physical studies, which he afterwards abandoned from an opinion,

either that they surpassed human comprehension, or that they were of secondary importance<sup>61</sup>. This circumstance offers a confirmation of the general remark, that every grand advancement of humanity is attended with an element of opposition, which disqualifies it from duly and rightfully appreciating the labours of the past. In this respect, every state of progress, when compared with its forerunner, appears to retrograde and to be a violent and capricious departure from the route of civilisation previously entered upon. Even the Socratic philosophy, at its first appearance, is open to this objection, and by attaching to it more importance than in truth it deserved, the character of its author has been too often misunderstood and prejudged, as if it were only from a particular and personal point of view he had combated opinions, which were utterly destructive of the universality of science in its principle.<sup>62</sup>

<sup>61</sup> The chief passages are: Xenoph. Mem. i. 1, nr. 11, sqq.; iv. 7, nr. 2, sqq. In the main he states that Socrates maintained that it was impossible for man to discover a Science of Nature; but afterwards he admits that his master had held the acquaintance with natural objects to be in a certain degree indispensable to a truly educated mind. When, however, we farther find it stated, ib. iv. 8, nr. 10, that the chief aim of Socrates was to classify all things in their genera and species, it is difficult to refuse altogether to give credit to such conflicting statements. Plato is deserving of more confidence in his assertion that his objection to physical inquiries was only directed against the prevailing method of pursuing them, and which led to the confusion of the intellect rather than to a clear and luminous result. Phæd. p. 96, sqq.; de Rep. vii. p. 529. In the latter passage we find entire the opinions of Socrates upon this subject. He is made by Plato to object to the physiology of his age; that it looked downwards rather than upwards; i. e., it directed its attention more to sensible than to divine things. Its atheistical tendency was what he sought to controvert. In the opposite sense he himself cultivated the science of nature, as we shall see afterwards from Plato and Xenophon. Cf. Plat. de Legg. xii. p. 966—7. Brandis im Rh. Mus. i. 1, p. 131.

<sup>62</sup> In this sense the tendency of the Socratic ethics has been recently interpreted. See Röscher's u. sein Zeitalter, p. 246, f. and 368, f. We shall

But we must not permit our judgment to be deluded by this appearance. What has been held to be the one-sided tendency of Socrates to ethical considerations, rests merely, as already observed, upon the fact, that the moral convictions of men afford the only stable point to which he could attach his efforts to establish the certainty of science against the attacks of the sophists, and to shew its necessity by referring to those more general principles of belief, which are implied in and indispensable to, a right conduct of the affairs and business of life.<sup>63</sup> It is true that, in the case of moral science, his merit is different from that in physics; for in ethics a scientific spirit of inquiry had yet to be awakened, whereas in the latter department it had been long cultivated; still this does not preclude the possibility, that in his investigations into the nature of moral obligation, the ultimate end of all his labours was to establish the universality of science.

Nevertheless, as we wish to prove that the general idea of science was the centre towards which all the scientific labours of Socrates were directed, it becomes necessary that we should enter into a close examination of the several objections which may be advanced. There are mainly two points which seem to afford some confirmation of the assertion, that he entertained a narrow and partial

afterwards have occasion to refute the view that Socrates despised both law and custom as opposed to his subjective opinion of right. Röscher, who attributes to him this view, and consequently holds that the *Crito* of Plato gives an exact description of Socrates, seems to have forgotten to consult the *Apology* for the laws, which however forms a principal portion of the dialogue.

<sup>63</sup> Schleiermacher, *ib.* § 46.

view of science: *viz.* his so-called contempt of physics, already noticed, and his manner of dissuading his disciples from a profound acquaintance with mathematical studies. But properly he had no such contempt for physics as is objected to him; on the contrary, we are expressly told, that he adopted with approbation the doctrine of Anaxagoras, that all in nature is ordered and governed by Intelligence, and that he only found fault with the inadequate development of the idea;<sup>64</sup> and similarly the work of Heraclitus received his commendation, although qualified by his regret at its general difficulty and obscurity.<sup>65</sup> Moreover, the controversy, in which he was continually engaged with the most eminent physiologists of his day, appears to have been solely directed to two points,—the manner in which they exalted the irrational above the rational, and their want of a comprehensive and perfect idea of science, in consequence of which they conducted their investigations so unmethodically as inevitably to lead to confusion.<sup>66</sup> As to the second objection, his dissuasion from a profound acquaintance with the mathematics, it has often been slurred over more hastily than was justifiable; and looking only to Xenophon, it was thought sufficient to throw the blame upon the unscientific character of the disciple, who, it was averred, had incompletely reported opinions of his master, which he had himself superficially apprehended and misunderstood.<sup>67</sup> But it is not in Xenophon

<sup>64</sup> Plat. Phæd. i. 1.

<sup>65</sup> Diog. L. ii. 22.

<sup>66</sup> Xenoph. Mem. i. 1, nr. 14; Plat. Phæd. i. 1.

<sup>67</sup> Mem. Socr. iv. 7, nr. 2, sqq., and the commentators upon this passage.

only that this advice is to be found; nay, nor merely among his less scientific disciples, Aristippus, for instance, but similar opinions are even advanced by Plato, not only in the name of his master, but in his own person.<sup>68</sup> This circumstance is of itself sufficient to prove that this doctrine did not involve any unscientific limitation of the pursuit of knowledge, any more than if, in the present time, a student in philosophy or politics should be recommended to devote no greater portion of his time and attention to mathematics than would suffice to acquire a right appreciation of their general nature and utility.

The object which, in their instructions to the young, Socrates and his disciples kept constantly in view, was the formation of a liberal and able character, fitted for all the duties of life, and not merely scholars and adepts in any single art. It must, consequently, have appeared to them perfectly inconsistent for a liberal and capacious mind to devote itself exclusively to any special pursuit which did not embrace within its objects the whole being of man.<sup>69</sup> This is perfectly in the spirit of an age, in which pure erudition first began to shew itself, and was necessarily considered a falling off from, and a corruption of the olden liberality of the burgher when an individual, for the sake of private studies, neglected to qualify himself for the discharge of his public duties as a

<sup>68</sup> De Legg. vi. p. 771; vii. p. 817, sqq.

<sup>69</sup> In Xenophon the matter in question is the formation of the *καλὸς-καγαθός*. In order rightly to understand the spirit of the advice, it is of importance to note that medical science is spoken slightly of; but most assuredly not because it is utterly unprofitable.



citizen. To such narrow and exclusive pursuits the spot of infamy seemed to cling as closely as to those of the craftsman and the mechanic.

On the other hand, the important view taken by Socrates of the injunction of the Delphic god,—“Know thyself,”—was not inconsistent with the universality of his scientific labours: for the knowledge of self which he strove to acquire had reference to the scientific value of his thoughts; and to be ignorant of his own ignorance appeared the lowest pitch of degradation, and closely bordering upon madness.<sup>70</sup> This persuasion was, in all probability, the ground of his desire, that the first object of scientific pursuit should be the acquisition of a knowledge of man's nature (*i. e.* of man's capacity for science)—since he held that its only foundation is a consciousness of the scientific value of every thought and idea.<sup>71</sup> Equally agreeable to this view is his famous apophthegm,—that his own superior wisdom consisted solely in the consciousness of his own ignorance.<sup>72</sup> This sentiment has, it is true, been often explained less favourably, and in widely different senses. Some have been disposed to see in it nothing more than a general expression of the Socratic irony, wherein the sense of his superiority to his contemporaries and this modest

<sup>70</sup> Xenoph. Mem. iii. 9, nr. 6, τὸ δὲ ἀγνοεῖν ἑαυτὸν καὶ ἂ μὴ οἶδε δοξάζειν τε καὶ οἰεσθαι γινώσκειν, ἐγγυτάτῳ μανίας ἐλογίζετο εἶναι. Consequently the knowledge of self is the starting-point for philosophy. Plat. Phæd. p. 229, 230.

<sup>71</sup> This is implied in the distinction between human and superhuman wisdom, Plat. Ap. p. 20, as is clear from the context. The human is that which is ignorant of its own insufficiency.

<sup>72</sup> Plat. Ap. p. 21, ἔοικα γοῦν τούτου γε μικρῶ τινὶ αὐτῷ τούτῳ σοφώτερος εἶναι, ὅτι ἂ μὴ οἶδα, οὐδὲ οἶομαι εἰδέναι.

confession of his own ignorance formed a rare mixture, which however was designed to put to greater shame and confusion all ignorant pretenders to wisdom.<sup>73</sup> Others, on the contrary, have regarded it as an expression of absolute doubt, destitute of all scientific knowledge. The latter explanation, however, makes too much, the former too little, of the Socratic ignorance. This irony evidently rested upon a conviction not only of the ignorance of his adversaries, but also of the limited extent of all human knowledge, and therefore of his own, as is thrown out strongly and pointedly enough in Plato's *Apology*.<sup>74</sup> This however is not merely a particular condition of doubt, but a perfectly general result, which had formed itself in his mind in the course of his many scientific investigations as to what is science and what is not.<sup>75</sup> In other passages Plato expressly mentions it as the peculiar attribute of Socrates, that his mind was pre-eminently alive to the distinction between science and right opinion.<sup>76</sup> But if he was convinced of their difference he must also have possessed some distinctive character for scientific thought, and which he must have apprehended so

<sup>73</sup> In support hereof it is usual to refer to *Plat. Conv.* p. 216, but wrongly.

<sup>74</sup> Page 23. *ὅτι ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία ὀλίγου τινὸς ἀξία ἵστί καὶ οὐδενός.*

<sup>75</sup> Schleierm. *ib.* p. 45, correctly says, "If he went about in the service of the god, and was qualified to justify the oracle, it must have been impossible that his superior wisdom was confined to the knowledge of his own ignorance, but he must have known what it is to know."

<sup>76</sup> *Meno*, p. 98. *ἀλλ' εἶπερ τι ἄλλο φαίην ἀν εἰδέναι—ὀλίγα δ' ἀν φαίην—ἔν δ' οὐκ καὶ τοῦτο ἐκείνων θείην ἀν ὥν οἶδα, ὅτι ἵστί τι ἄλλοιον ὁρθὴ δόξα καὶ ἐπιστήμη.* This is one of the few passages in which Plato clearly distinguishes by the course of the exposition the proper Socratic notion of science from his own. Brandis, *ib.* § 142.

strongly and so clearly as to justify the severe estimate he formed of the powers and extent of the human understanding. It is only such an exalted idea of the unsearchable depth of truth that could have restrained him from attributing a scientific certainty to the common opinions of man.

It does not appear, however, that he ever gave to his disciples any definite or precise explanation of what he meant by knowledge. We must suppose, therefore, that his object and labour was not so much to establish its idea in any precise formula, as to work it into the minds of his disciples by repeated applications of its principle. Such indeed is the Socratic method in general. Consequently the notion of certainty, by which he was influenced and lead on, is, we may fairly presume, expressed in the general tenour of his method of investigation. And on this head two chief points require general notice,—first, That he most frequently, and by preference, took up improbable positions, in order to evolve from them some philosophical idea, or at least to awake in others an endeavour to do so. Secondly, That when examining any particular thought or idea he placed it in every possible combination. This latter practice, as exhibited in the imitations of Xenophon and Plato, implies that the thought must, so far as it contains any degree of certainty, preserve its validity in every possible combination, and it rests consequently on the perception of the essential connexion of all scientific thought. This was the ground of his method of investigation in respect to which he likened himself to his mother

Phænarete, being as he says, no longer able to produce thoughts himself, but yet able and skilful to distinguish in others such as are inane and worthless from the fruitful and valuable.<sup>77</sup> On the other hand, his habit of taking up improbable and trivial objects, however much it exposed him to the ridicule of vain and arrogant pretenders,<sup>78</sup> is evidence of the wide range of his views of science; for, with his desire of knowledge, the only reason he could have had for pursuing such a course must have been his conviction that every conception, however imperfect as a work of the reason, nevertheless contains the idea of certainty. Now while the former practice is rather of a negative character, the latter has more of a positive tendency. Xenophon tells us, that when Socrates wished to come to a decision on any matter, his investigations proceeded from propositions most generally received as true.<sup>79</sup> And in the same spirit, although for a different purpose, Plato makes Parmenides prophecy of the young Socrates, that when he should arrive at maturity he would despise nothing as unworthy of examination, and incapable of being reduced to some more general idea, however contemptible it might appear. Accordingly we find Socrates almost invariably occupied with matters which they, in whose mouths nothing but great and high-sounding words are heard, are wont to overlook and condemn, haughtily deeming

<sup>77</sup> Plat. Theaet. p. 149.

<sup>78</sup> Comp. Plat. Conv. p. 221; Xenoph. Mem. i. 2, nr. 37; iv. 4, nr. 6, with Herbst's note.

<sup>79</sup> Mem. iv. 6, nr. 15. ὁπότε δὲ αὐτός τι τῶν λόγων διαΐται, διὰ τῶν μάλιστα ὁμολογουμένων ἐπορεύετο.

that such humble topics are wholly devoid of instruction or novelty, while with him the question was not so much the particular subject of discourse, but every topic was regarded as an illustration of his great principle, that, even in the most trivial<sup>80</sup> and insignificant matters, the idea of certainty must be taken as the standard of truth. In short, there cannot be a doubt that the living principle of all his labours was the conviction that every thought, so far as it is a certainty, is the creation of the reason, and consequently it must always be possible to trace in it the process by which it was obtained. Every clear and certain thought, therefore, is intended to form, in connexion with all others, a complete work of the reason, in which it gives account to itself; on the other hand, every thought which cannot give an account of itself, or of its connexion with others, is so far destitute of scientific certainty, and is a matter merely of opinion, or an unconscious production of the imagination or habit.<sup>81</sup>

Now it is quite certain, that Socrates himself neither possessed, nor pretended to possess, this science so all-comprehensive and founded on the clear consciousness of the reason; but, inasmuch as he insisted on the necessity of this knowledge of self, and excited his disciples to kindred inquiries, it was evidently his intention, to make the knowledge of man's ignorance the basis of philo-

<sup>80</sup> Parm. p. 130.

<sup>81</sup> Plat. Ap. p. 22. *ἔγνω οὖν αὖ καὶ περὶ τῶν ποιητῶν ἐν ὀλίγῳ τοῦτο, ὅτι οὐ σοφία ποιοῖεν ἀ ποιοῖεν, ἀλλὰ φύσει τινὶ καὶ ἐνθουσιάζοντες ὥσπερ οἱ θεομάντις καὶ οἱ χρησμοφοδοί.* Meno, p. 99.

sophical investigation,<sup>82</sup> in the same way as others, of a less scientific cast of mind, have employed universal doubt for the same purpose. But that it was not his intention to remain satisfied with this preception, is clear from his endeavour to establish a true scientific method, which however he did not seek to impart in any general formula, but preferred, by oft-repeated experiments and practical illustrations, to accustom his disciples to a skilful employment of it. It is remarkable, that even the mere matter-of-fact Xenophon, who wished to represent the labours of Socrates as confined to practical objects, nevertheless allows the truth to escape him, that his chief object was to exercise his disciples in dialectics, and to teach them to consider every object in conformity to the genus or notion to which it belonged.<sup>83</sup> Of his manner of proceeding in this, Xenophon has not given us, it is true, the most appropriate examples,<sup>84</sup> but even the instances which he does give, are sufficient to shew that the end of his master's inquiries was, by the definition of the notion, to determine what each thing is in itself—or its essence.<sup>85</sup> Thus it is

<sup>82</sup> Xen. Mem. iv. 2, nr. 21—30. Socrates considered in the light of fools all those who abandoned his society upon his convincing them of ignorance. Ib. 40; Plat. Theæt. p. 150.

<sup>83</sup> Mem. iv. 5, nr. 12. *ἔφη δὲ καὶ τὸ διαλέγεσθαι ὀνομασθῆναι ἐκ τοῦ συνῶντας κοινῇ βουλευέσθαι διαλέγοντας κατὰ γένη τὰ πράγματα. δεῖν οὖν πειρᾶσθαι ὅτι μάλιστα πρὸς τοῦτο ἑαυτὸν ἱτοιμον παρασκευάζειν καὶ τούτου μάλιστα ἐπιμελεῖσθαι· ἐκ τούτου γὰρ γίγνισθαι ἀνδρας ἀρίστους τε καὶ ἡγεμονικωτάτους.*

<sup>84</sup> Ib. c. 6.

<sup>85</sup> Ib. nr. 1. *σκοπῶν σὺν τοῖς συνοῦσι τί ἕκαστον εἴη τῶν ὄντων οὐδέποτε ἔληγε. πάντα μὲν οὖν ᾗ διωρίζετο, πολλὰ ἔργον ἂν εἴη διεξιθεῖν.* The two passages last quoted are characteristic of the narrow view with which

clear, that the ultimate object of the Socratic method was to apprehend in the thought the essence of a thing, and that, strongly impressed with the character which predominates in the Platonic and Aristotelian, it made the explication of terms the centre of its system, and sought to exhibit, in the definition, the real nature of an object. Consequently, although we must hesitate before we assert, with a later writer,<sup>86</sup> that Socrates was the first to establish the doctrine of ideas, still we cannot deny that the connexion, which he discovered between the idea and its object, must naturally have awakened investigations, calculated to call the ideal theory into existence.<sup>86</sup>

What Xenophon notices cursorily, but still admitting the great importance assigned to it by Socrates, becomes in Plato the very centre of all philosophy, and is acknowledged by Aristotle as the most essential service conferred by Socrates upon the cause of philosophy. "For," says the latter, "there are two things which must, in justice, be attributed to Socrates, the inductive method of proof, and the general definition of ideas; both of

Xenophon contemplated Socrates. Still more narrow is the view which K. F. Hermann appears to have taken of Socrates' range of thought, when (*Neue Jahrb. f. Philol. u. Pädag.* 1833, § 401,) he advances the opinion, that the Socratic dialectics cultivated the general merely for the sake of the particular, and for practical applications; and that the doctrine of the subordination of notions or terms is the discovery of Plato. But the definitions even which Xenophon ascribes to Socrates are sufficient to shew that Socrates was not ignorant of this law—without which he could never have attempted any induction.

<sup>86</sup> Aristocles, ap. Euseb. *Pr. Ev.* x. 3. On the other hand, *Arist. Met.* xiii. 4.

<sup>87</sup> This is acknowledged by *Arist. Met.* xiii. 9.

which belong to the first principles of philosophy.<sup>88</sup> All who are aware of the great importance Aristotle assigns to these two methods, cannot doubt that he intended to indicate Socrates as the founder of the scientific method in general,<sup>89</sup> intimating at the same time, that the earlier philosophers had proceeded unconsciously in the path of science, whereas he was the first, reflectingly and consequentially, to apply a right method. For this reason Socrates has justly been placed at the head of the free development of Greek philosophy. It was he who pointed out the way, by which later inquirers sought to attain to the knowledge of the essence of things.

Now, if the conviction, that the form of science connects all true thoughts, was fully present to the mind of Socrates, we cannot but suppose that he must have arrived at an equal degree of consciousness relative to its subject-matter. This, like science itself, he must have regarded as one, and while he considered perfect knowledge and certainty to be an end unattainable by human development, he could not well fail to perceive, that the object of all knowledge is illimitable—a somewhat truly divine. To prove this, we must,

<sup>88</sup> Met. xiii. 4. δύο γὰρ εἰσιν, ἃ τις ἂν ἀποδῶη Σωκράτει δικαίως, τοὺς τ' ἐπακτικὸς λόγους καὶ τὸ ὀρίζεσθαι καθόλου· ταῦτα γὰρ εἰσιν ἀμφω περὶ ἀρχὴν ἐπιστήμης. Ib. c. 9 ; i. 6 ; de Part. Anim. i. 1. Of Induction mention is also made by Xenophon, Mem. iv. 6, nr. 13, 14. ἐπανῆγεν τὸν λόγον, τῶν λόγων ἐπαναγομένων. For ἐπανάγειν a slight alteration is necessary to restore the technical term ἐπάγειν. Instances are everywhere to be found in Plato and Xenophon. As to the definition, cf. Plat. Phædr. p. 237 ; de Rep. x. p. 596. ἐκ τῆς εἰρωθείας μεθόδου.

<sup>89</sup> Cf. Brandis, ib. p. 145, sq.



in the first place, consider the self-knowledge which he strove after, in a different point of view from that in which we have already taken it. For this purpose, Plato, in a passage bearing an historical look, furnishes us with the desired information.<sup>90</sup> This self-knowledge was regarded by Socrates, not merely as a knowledge of one's own ability or inability to know certainly, but he also referred it to the cognition of man's moral value, and thus it appears to come back again to the well-known saying, that Socrates had called down philosophy from heaven, and forced her to inquire into the good or evil of humanity.<sup>91</sup> But if this be interpreted so as to make it appear, that he had neglected and despised the consideration of divine things, on the plea that they were forbidden to human ken, it will be found that, by Plato at least, it was understood very differently, since he held it to be impossible to form a just estimate of man's nature without an acquaintance with the divinity within him.<sup>92</sup> And, in truth, since he so carefully traced out the impulses of the divine power within himself, is it not clear that this conviction must have given the tone to his whole character and sentiments? That all his inquiries were directed to this point, is further proved by the direct testimony of Xenophon, who says, "Socrates by his moral in-

<sup>90</sup> Phæd. p. 229, 230. Cf. Xenoph. Mem. iv. 2, nr. 24, 25.

<sup>91</sup> Cic. Qu. Tusc. v. 4.

<sup>92</sup> Plat. Phæd. l. l. σκοπῶ οὐ ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ ἐμαυτόν, εἴτε τι θήριον ὢν τυγχάνω, Τυφῶνος πολυπλοκώτερον καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπιτεθυμένον, εἴτε ἡμερώτερόν τε καὶ ἀπλούστερον ζῶον, θείας τινὸς καὶ ἀτόφου μοίρας φύσει μετέχον. Cf. Xenoph. Mem. iv, 3, nr. 14. καὶ ἀνθρώπου γε ψυχῇ, ἢ εἴπερ τι καὶ ἄλλο τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων τοῦ θείου μετέχει.

quiries was the first to instruct his disciples in the true nature of the gods.<sup>93</sup> It is clear, however, from what follows, that this instruction referred not to gods, but to the Divine Power which pervades and rules the world. Accordingly, we cannot doubt that he was fully convinced, that self-knowledge is impossible, so long as man is ignorant of the universal principle whence are the issues of all things, and consequently, as implied therein, of the system of nature in the midst of which the Deity has placed him.

It is now, however, necessary to examine more closely the Socratic notion of God. For this purpose it must be remembered that atheistical opinions had grown up in his day, and, among the educated classes, given rise to feelings of unbelief and doubt. His teaching consequently had reference to the prevailing opinions on the subject. In his attempt to shew their utter groundlessness he directed himself, principally to two points,—the proofs of God's existence which arise from the intellectual order of things; and the causes of unbelief. As to the latter, he considered that they had their primary source, in a scornful feeling of unbelief in all that is unseen and imperceptible by the outward senses. To shew the unreasonableness of this scepticism, he directed attention to the fact, that the best, in every species, is invariably unseen, and only noticeable in its effects, and that in like

<sup>93</sup> Mem. iv. 3, nr. 2. *πρῶτον μὲν δὴ περὶ θεοῦ ἐκείνου σώφρονος ποιεῖν τοῦς συνόντας.* It is to be noticed that Xenophon here alludes to other dialogues which contained his doctrine of God. This is a proof of the historical truth of such dialogues.

manner the soul, which participates in the divine nature, and is clearly the ruling principle within us, nevertheless cannot by any means be discerned.<sup>94</sup> He therefore who has emancipated himself from all foolish desire to behold some palpable and substantial shapes of the gods, may soon recognise the operations of the Deity within him,<sup>95</sup> for the gods have implanted in man's mind a knowledge of their power.<sup>96</sup> Having thus overthrown this groundless disbelief of a divine existence, by a reference to the presence of the Deity within us, it was but natural he should maintain, that a like power may be discovered in the universe; and his views upon this head constitute the second point which we have now to consider. Having discovered by reason a divinity within us, Socrates was convinced that not man alone but the whole universe is under the rule of an intelligent super-

<sup>94</sup> Xenoph. Mem. iv. 3, nr. 13. *ἐκνέει δὲ ὅτι καὶ αὐτοὶ οἱ θεοὶ οὕτως ὑποδεικνύουσιν· οἱ τε γὰρ ἄλλοι ἡμῖν τὰ ἀγαθὰ διδόντες οὐδὲν τούτων εἰς τοῦφανὲς ἰόντες διδάσιν καὶ ὁ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον συντάττων τε καὶ συνέχων, ἐν ᾧ πάντα τὰ καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ ἐστὶ, καὶ αἰεὶ μὲν χρωμένοις ἀτριβῆ τε καὶ ὑγιᾶ καὶ ἀγήρατον παρέχων, θᾶττον δὲ νοήματος ἀναμαρτήτως ὑπηρετοῦντα, οὗτος τὰ μέγιστα μὲν πράττων ὁρᾶται, τάδε δὲ οἰκονομῶν ἀόρατος ἡμῖν ἐστίν.* Next comes the image of the sun, with which must be compared Plat. de Rep. vii. init.; de Leg. x. p. 987. And lastly of the soul: *ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἀνθρώπου γε ψυχῇ, ἣ εἴπερ τι καὶ ἄλλο τῶν ἀνθρώπινων τοῦ θεοῦ μετέχει, ὅτι μὲν βασιλεύει ἐν ἡμῖν, φανερόν, ὁρᾶται δὲ οὐδ' αὐτῇ. ἃ χρὴ κατανοοῦντα μὴ καταφρονεῖν τῶν ἀοράτων, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν γιγνομένων τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῶν καταμανθάνοντα τιμᾶν τὸ δαιμόνιον.* Cf. i. 4, nr. 9; Plat. de Leg. x. p. 898. The same polemic against those who held that the sensible is alone the true, is found in Plat. Soph. p. 246.

<sup>95</sup> The question is of the dæmonical intimations. Xenoph. Mem. iv. 3, nr. 13. *ὅτι δὲ γε ἀληθῆ λέγω καὶ σύ, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, γνώσῃ, ἂν μὴ ἀναμνήσῃς, ἕως ἂν τὰς μορφὰς τῶν θεῶν ἴδῃς, ἀλλ' ἐξαρκῆ σοι τὰ ἔργα αὐτῶν ὁρῶντι σέβεσθαι καὶ τιμᾶν τοὺς θεοὺς.*

<sup>96</sup> Xenoph. Mem. i. 4, nr. 16. *τοὺς θεοὺς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις δόξαν ἐμφύσαι, ὥς ἱκανοὶ εἰσιν εὖ καὶ κακῶς ποιεῖν.* Cf. Plat. de Leg. x. p. 899.

intendence. Hence arose in his mind the persuasion, that in the universal reason there is maintained a correspondence to the reason within us; that all is formed for some wise end, and affords evidence of that supreme reason from which man's reasonable soul derives and has its being.<sup>97</sup> These thoughts contain essentially nothing more than an application to particular cases of his general notion, that the true interpretation and the true ground of all things is to be found in its rational end and design. For the spirit of all his opinions is that intelligence alone (*φρόνησις*) is of any value; and that, on the contrary, all that is destitute of it is contemptible,<sup>98</sup> except so far as it subserves to the reason, in which respect the corporeal, as ministering to the soul, is to be held in some account. How, consistently with this view, he defined body, is impossible for us to say; indeed, it is not improbable that on this point his ideas were far from being fully developed; at the same time it is manifest that his whole endeavours tended to bring the absolute reason to knowledge and action. In a passage

<sup>97</sup> Xenoph. Mem. i. 4, nr. 4; nr. 8. σὺ δὲ σαυτὸν φρόνιμόν τι δοκεῖς ἔχειν, ἀλλοθι δὲ οὐδαμοῦ οὐδὲν οἷε φρόνιμον εἶναι; καὶ ταῦτα εἰδώς, ὅτι γῆς τε μικρὸν μέρος ἐν τῷ σώματι πολλῆς οὐσης ἔχεις καὶ ὕδατος βραχὺ πολλοῦ ὄντος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων δῆπου μεγάλων ὄντων ἑκάστου μικρὸν μέρος λαβόντι τὸ σῶμα συνήρμοσταί σοι νοῦν δὲ ἄρα μόνον οὐδαμοῦ ὄντα σε εὐτυχῶς πως δοκεῖς συναρπάσαι, καὶ τάδε τὰ ὑπερμεγίσθη καὶ πλήθος ἄπειρα δι' ἀφροσύνην τινὰ οὕτως οἷε εὐτάκτως ἔχειν. In perfect accordance herewith is Plat. Phil. p. 28, sq. Xenoph. l. i. nr. 17. οἰεσθαι οὖν χρή καὶ τὴν ἐν τῷ παντὶ φρόνησιν τὰ πάντα ὅπως ἂν αὐτῇ ἡδὺ ᾖ, οὕτω τίθεσθαι.

<sup>98</sup> Xenoph. Mem. i. 2, nr. 53, sqq. τὸ ἄφρον ἄτιμόν ἐστιν. Thus he insists that the statuary or painter should not merely imitate the bodily, but give expression likewise to the mental. Ib. iii. 10, nr. 1—8.

clearly historical, Socrates is made to say by Plato, that the procedure of Anaxagoras, in which he indeed sought to account for all things by intelligence, and yet referred most of them to material causes, appeared to be just as if one should say, Socrates does all that he does according to reason, and yet afterwards, when called to explain why he is now sitting in the prison, should account for it by alleging many things as to the posture and collocation of his limbs, by which sitting is rendered possible, instead of saying that, after it had seemed good to the Athenians to condemn him, he had considered it best to sit there and await his punishment.<sup>99</sup> Thus, then, in the consideration of individuals, not more than in the contemplation of the universe, the question with him was to establish intelligence and design as the sole true and ruling principle. This affords us, at the same time, a right view of his real opinion of the earlier physics. He despised them for the same reason that Bacon did the superficial philosophy of the schools, because they stopped at the mean, and did not remount to first causes, which he believed could only be found in intelligence, which beneficently disposes all for the best.<sup>100</sup> But even this is a species of philosophy, which, from its very nature, could not look to first and last causes, but merely to the intermediate;

<sup>99</sup> Phæd. p. 98. This is expressed by Aristotle in his peculiar manner in *Magna Moral.* i. 1, where he says of Socrates : *ἐκείνος γὰρ οὐδὲν φερε δεῖν μάτην εἶναι.*

<sup>100</sup> *Ib.* p. 97. *καὶ ἔδοξέ μοι τρόπον τινὰ εὖ ἔχειν τὸ τὸν νοῦν εἶναι πάντων αἰτίων καὶ ἡγησάμην, εἰ τοῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει, τὸν γε νοῦν κοσμοῦντα πάντα κοσμεῖν καὶ ἕκαστον τιθεῖναι αὐτόν, ὅπη ἂν βέλτιστα ἔχη.*

nevertheless, although Socrates in his physics sought only to give a palpable illustration of his own general view, as detailed by Xenophon,<sup>101</sup> still, he must in justice be regarded as the founder of the true system of physics, which Plato and Aristotle scientifically carried out and completed. While the earlier philosophers did not entirely neglect the marks of design discoverable in the universe, still they invariably confounded nature with intelligence; he, on the contrary, laboured to shew that reason is above nature, and that the natural is merely subservient to intellectual ends.

Further, although he placed the unity of science in the investigation of the Divine reason as it reigns throughout the system of nature, he does not appear to have entered upon any strictly scientific inquiry into the Divine essence. From such inquiries he was in all probability deterred by his religious scruples, by his attachment to the popular religion, and principally, perhaps, by an aversion from barren and unprofitable formulæ. To his mind, it was better to trace out the Divinity as manifested both outwardly in the conduct, and inwardly, in the heart and conscience of man, than to give to his friends a few cold and general propositions. This is a proof, on the one hand, that science lived in him, as yet, merely as a principle; and, on the other, of his prudence and moderation. His prudence is further shewn by the caution he carefully maintained when speaking of the mythology of the Greeks. He was, it is true, opposed to all anthropomorphic conceptions of the gods;<sup>102</sup>

<sup>101</sup> Ibid.

<sup>102</sup> Xenoph. Mem. i. 3, nr. 3.

still he did not wish to overturn, or allegorically to expound the olden mythology.<sup>103</sup> But the principal point in his theology was a conviction that the gods are omniscient and omnipresent, and that they rule everywhere by the law of goodness, and are all-sufficient.<sup>104</sup> All this is implied in his fundamental principle that the Deity is the supreme reason, which is to be honoured by man as the source of all things, and of all phenomena, and as the end of all human endeavours. That besides this he held the Divine to be one, notwithstanding the multiplicity of gods, is clearly to be inferred from his insight into the unity both of reason, and the object of intellectual thought. Now we must admit that in all this there is nothing novel; nevertheless, even if all the elements of this particular view had been separately established at a much earlier period, still their coincidence had never been presented in such purity; and previously no philosopher had admitted and asserted the doctrine of a truly intelligent Deity without any dualism, and without either physical limitation or *pantheistic* annihilation of individuality. But the facility with which it suggested itself to his mind, so spontaneously and so pure from every thing like a *controversial* spirit, except perhaps against the defective tendencies of humanity, is, on the one hand, a proof even of the antecedent original existence in the human mind of the idea of God, and, on the other, of the intimate and natural connexion between the

<sup>103</sup> Plat. Phæd. p. 229; it is only jestingly that he gives the allegorical interpretation. Xenoph. Mem. i. 3, nr. 7.

<sup>104</sup> Xenoph. Mem. i. 1, nr. 19; 4, nr. 5, 6, 10; iv. 4, nr. 19.

consciousness of a universal science, and that of the universality of its object.

From these several doctrines, *viz.*, the divinity within man, the intelligence which governs the whole world, and the worthlessness of the body, except so far as it is a mean subservient to the reason, Socrates deduced the immortality of the soul as a necessary consequence. It is true, that in the Platonic Apologies his expressions on this point are wavering and undecided;<sup>105</sup> but his declaration that the present life is in itself utterly worthless, and in nowise to be preferred to death, if there be not another existence in which the destination of humanity may be more successfully and more happily pursued, sufficiently attests his unlimited confidence in the eternal care which the gods take of the good and pious.<sup>106</sup> And besides this, moreover, all his disciples unanimously attribute to him the doctrine of the immortality of the soul. As to its condition after death, it probably seemed to him hazardous to put forward any positive opinion; and yet that it was of importance to maintain that, the virtuous man, being freed by death from all impediments, is in the full enjoyment of his intellectual activity. This at least is the source from which Plato makes him derive his resignation when on his path to death, with which moreover the expressions of Xenophon coincide,<sup>107</sup> and the general tenour of Socrates' ideas.

He who is wont to look upon Socrates as simply a citizen, endued, as is usually said, with strong common sense, without any scientific culture, will

<sup>105</sup> Page 40, sq.

<sup>106</sup> Plat. Phæd.; Xen. Cyrop. viii. 7, 3, sqq.

<sup>107</sup> Ib. nr. 20.



find it difficult to account for the manner in which such a one could have arrived at the conviction that the universe is ruled by intelligence, and that the merely corporeal is of no importance, except so far as it ministers to the purposes of reason. Still more inexplicable must the ethical doctrines of Socrates appear to him when reduced to their first principles; his embarrassment will not, it is true, arise from any thing like the artistical perfection of system; on the contrary, it is from the absence of such systematic form, that the obstinacy with which Socrates adhered to particular opinions will cause him the greater trouble and perplexity. When we look for some general principle which might have served as the basis of the Socratic ethics, we find, indeed, many formulæ which apparently are expressions of it. At times his investigations proceed upon the assumption that man naturally strives after felicity; but it is evident, that the notion of this ultimate end and aim is so vague and indefinite, as to be insufficient to afford a characteristic insight into the doctrines of any philosopher. He consequently felt the necessity of defining it more accurately. For this purpose a most important limitation presented itself, in the distinction he drew between accidental good fortune (*εὐτυχία*), and the success which is the result of science and industry (*εὐπραξία*).<sup>108</sup> This definition makes the essence of the moral

<sup>108</sup> Xenoph. Mem. iii. 9. nr. 14. ἐρομένου δὲ τινος αὐτόν, τί δοκοίη αὐτῷ κρᾶτιστον ἀνδρὶ ἐπιτήδευμα εἶναι, ἀπεκρίνατο, εὐπραξίαν. ἐρομένου δὲ πάλιν, εἰ καὶ τὴν εὐτυχίαν ἐπιτήδευμα νομίζοι εἶναι, Πᾶν μὲν οὖν τοῦναντίον ἔγωγ', ἔφη, τύχην καὶ πράξιν ἡγοῦμαι τὸ μὲν γὰρ μὴ ζητοῦντα

purpose to consist in the free agency of man; notwithstanding that the question, what it is that constitutes a free act, is left undetermined.

Another formula determines at least the relation subsisting between happiness and sensual enjoyment; though negatively only, since sensual enjoyment, we are told, arises from the mere gratification of wants, of which he who has the fewest, approaches most nearly to the gods.<sup>109</sup> This thought is the ground of all his animadversions upon intemperance, and of his injunctions of moderation, because, he said, the freedom of the soul is invariably sacrificed in the pursuit of licentious enjoyment;<sup>110</sup> although we are not informed, on the other hand, what are the benefits which accrue from a steady perseverance in a course of moderation. The precept that man ought, as nearly as possible, to assimilate himself to the Divine Being, by emancipating himself from the empire of his passions, has by some been regarded as forming the distinctive character of the Socratic ethics; but even Xenophon gives us to understand, that this is only a negative description of the moral liberty to which Socrates wished and endeavoured to lead men. And, just as the opinion grew up and maintained itself, that he could indeed convict man of ignorance, but was unable to lead him to

*ἐπιτυχεῖν τινὲ τῶν δεόντων εὐτυχίαν οἶμαι εἶναι, τὸ δὲ μαθόντα τε καὶ μελετήσαντά τι εὖ ποιεῖν εὐπραξίαν νομίζω.* Plat. Euthyd. p. 278, e. sqq.

<sup>109</sup> Ibid. i. 6, nr. 10. *ἔοικας, ὦ Ἀντιφῶν, τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οἰομένην τρυφήν καὶ πολυτέλειαν εἶναι· ἐγὼ δὲ νομίζω το μὲν μηδενὸς δεῖσθαι θεῶν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ὡς ἐλαχίστων ἐγγυάτω τοῦ θεοῦ, καὶ τὸ μὲν θεῶν κράτιστον, τὸ δὲ ἐγγυάτω τοῦ θεοῦ ἐγγυάτω τοῦ κρατίστου.*

<sup>110</sup> Ibid. iv. 5, nr. 2, sqq.

truth, a corresponding belief arose that he was able to dissuade men from vice, and thereby excite in them a desire of virtue; but that to determine the objects to which all virtuous agency must direct itself, was beyond his ability.<sup>111</sup> Against these two objections in common, Xenophon attempts to defend his master. In his arguments there is much that is not absolutely worthless, or inapplicable to the purpose, but still there is enough to prove that he neither understood the objection itself, nor the right mode of refuting it. The negative and the positive are so unskilfully jumbled together as to prove that Xenophon did not perceive what Socrates had intended by either. For instance, he represents Socrates as recommending temperance on the singular ground, that in the gratification of hunger, thirst, and the real wants of life, the temperate man alone enjoys a real and memorable pleasure.<sup>112</sup> Now it is certainly possible that Socrates may on some occasion have expressed himself to this or a like effect; but one who had been in the constant consideration of such subjects, ought to have seen that he there commended temperance, only in its opposition to the inordinate pursuit of pleasure,<sup>113</sup> and did not, by any means, go to the extreme of recommending a total emancipation from all the wants of nature. Indeed the Socrates of Xenophon is inconsistent with himself, since, on the one hand, he lays it down

<sup>111</sup> Xenoph. Mem. i. 4, nr. 1; Plat. Clitoph.

<sup>112</sup> Mem. iv. 5, nr. 9.

<sup>113</sup> Cf. Plat. Phæd. p. 68, where also the connection of *σωφροσύνη* with *φρονήσις* is to be noted.

that to lack nothing is divine, and that the happiness of man consists in having as few wants as possible; while, on the other, he recommends us by the restraints of temperance, to sharpen and enhance our desires, in order to increase the pleasure of gratification. Such a position could only have been advanced for the purpose of refuting his adversaries, and we must not look to it as the real ground upon which he recommended temperance. But even Xenophon connects it with the one previously considered, where the intellectual pleasures of knowledge and understanding are declared to be the true fruits of temperance,<sup>114</sup> and that generally the knowledge of good, and a conduct conformable to its precepts, constitute the true happiness of man, while the pursuit of pleasure is disgraceful and brutalising.<sup>115</sup>

Hence, then, the more we enter into details, the more fully shall we discover the true spirit of the Socratic ethics. With Socrates, the end of life is reason and intelligence; accordingly, he avers, that all that is intellectual is precious, and all that is the contrary despicable; and thus his ethical labours stand in the closest connexion with his

<sup>114</sup> Ibid. nr. 10, sqq. ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦ μαθεῖν, τί καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν, καὶ τοῦ ἐπιμελεσθῆναι τῶν τοιούτων τινός, εἰ ὧν ἂν τις καὶ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ σῶμα καλῶς διοικήσειε καὶ τὸν ἑαυτοῦ οἶκον καλῶς οἰκονομήσειε καὶ φίλοις καὶ πόλει ὠφέλιμος γένοιτο καὶ ἐχθρῶν κρατήσκειν, ἀφ' ὧν οὐ μόνον ὠφίλειαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡδοναὶ μέγισται γίγνονται, οἱ μὲν ἰγκρατεῖς ἀπολαύουσι πράττοντες αὐτά, οἱ δὲ ἀκρατεῖς οὐδενὸς μετέχουσι. — ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἰγκρατεῖσι μόνοις ἔξῃ σκοπεῖν τὰ κράτιστα τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ διαλέγοντας κατὰ γένη τὰ μὲν ἀγαθὰ προαιρεῖσθαι, τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἀπέχεσθαι. Cf. i. 6, nr. 9.

<sup>115</sup> Xenoph. Mem. iv. 5, nr. 11. ὅστις γὰρ τὰ μὲν κράτιστα μὴ σκοπεῖ, τὰ ἥδιστα δ' ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου ζητεῖ ποιεῖν, τί ἂν διαφέρει τῶν ἀφρονισμάτων βωσκημάτων;

scientific. The moral end of life is knowledge, which, in its truth, is the knowledge of the good, and of the reason which rules all and is over all—God.<sup>116</sup> It is only when thus understood, that his maxim, “Man ought to strive after an assimilation to the gods,” receives its right explanation, *viz.*, the Divine, the pure reason, is the type of the good.

This interpretation reveals also the ground of his doctrine, that all virtue is one,—wisdom or intelligence,—and that no act performed *without* a clear insight into its nature and tendency is good; or evil, if *with* that insight.<sup>117</sup> For there can be no merit in performing a bold or virtuous action, unless it has been undertaken as such, intentionally and knowingly; the will being determined thereto by the notion of good.<sup>118</sup> Fatal indeed are the consequences when our natural sense of right is overborne by any stronger motive which hurries away its victim as a slave.<sup>119</sup> But

<sup>116</sup> In addition to the passages already cited, cf. Xenoph. Mem. i. 2, nr. 49; iv. 2, nr. 22 and 31. They who know not what is beautiful and good and right are slaves: this knowledge is necessary to the liberal mind, and not the knowledge of profitable handiworks. Plato's agreement herewith needs not to be shewn by detailed proof. Arist. Eth. Eud. i. 5. Σωκράτης — φέρ' εἶναι τέλος τὸ γινώσκειν τὴν ἀρετήν.

<sup>117</sup> Xenoph. Mem. iii. 9, nr. 5. ἔφη δὲ καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὴν ἄλλην πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν σοφίαν εἶναι. τὰ τε γὰρ δίκαια καὶ πάντα, ὅσα ἀρετῇ πράττεται καλὰ τε καὶ ἀγαθὰ εἶναι· καὶ οὐτ' ἂν τοὺς ταῦτα εἰδότας ἄλλο ἀντὶ τούτων οὐδὲν προελέσθαι, οὔτε τοὺς μὴ ἐπισταμένους δύνασθαι πράττειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐὰν ἐπιχειρῶσιν, ἀμαρτάνειν. οὕτω καὶ τὰ καλὰ τε καὶ ἀγαθὰ τοὺς μὲν σοφοὺς πράττειν, τοὺς δὲ μὴ σοφοὺς οὐ δύνασθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐὰν ἐπιχειρῶσιν, ἀμαρτάνειν. ἐπεὶ οὖν τὰ τε δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἄλλα καλὰ τε καὶ ἀγαθὰ πάντα ἀρετῇ πράττεται, διήλον εἶναι, ὅτι καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ ἄλλη πᾶσα ἀρετὴ σοφία ἐστί. Cf. Plat. Phæd. p. 68.

<sup>118</sup> Arist. Magn. Mor. i. 35. διὸ οὐκ ὀρθῶς Σωκράτης ἔλεγε, φάσκων εἶναι τὴν ἀρετὴν λόγον· οὐδὲν γὰρ ὁφελος εἶναι πράττειν τὰ ἀνδρεία καὶ τὰ δίκαια μὴ εἰδότα καὶ προαιρούμενον τῷ λόγῳ. Cf. Brandis, p. 133.

<sup>119</sup> Arist. Eth. Nic. VII. 3. δεινὸν γὰρ ἐπιστήμης, ὥς φητο Σωκράτης,

this innate perception, like all other human faculties, however excellent, stands in need of instruction to strengthen and expand its powers; for even virtue can be taught, since it consists in the science of good, which whoever refuses or neglects to acquire, becomes the more dangerous and the more evil, the more richly and the more nobly he has been endowed by nature.<sup>120</sup>

A mind penetrated and possessed with a particular idea, and labouring to follow it out in every possible direction, will often be led to consequences apparently at issue with the general opinions of men, and even with experience. These extreme cases afford perhaps the best standard for correctly appreciating the internal strength and import of the idea itself. This appears to have been the case even with Socrates, the calm and sober thinker. Unquestionably he did maintain that no one could knowingly offend or commit a wrong act, because he that knew a thing to be good would do it; consequently it is only from ignorance of what is good that a man errs when he does err;<sup>121</sup> and it is only involuntarily (*ἄκων*) that the bad are bad;<sup>122</sup>

ἄλλο τι κρατεῖν καὶ περιέλκειν αὐτὸν ὥσπερ ἀνδράποδον. Xenoph. Mem. iii. 9, nr. 4; Plat. Prot. p. 352, sqq.

<sup>120</sup> Xenoph. Mem. ii. 6, nr. 39; iii. 9, nr. 1, sqq.; iv. 1; Arist. Eth. Eud. i. 5. Σωκράτης — ἐπεζητέι, τί ἐστὶν ἡ δικαιοσύνη, καὶ τί ἡ ἀνδρία καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν μορίων αὐτῆς. ἐποίει γὰρ τοῦτ' ἐυλόγως· ἱπιστήμας γὰρ ᾤετ' εἶναι πάσας τὰς ἀρετάς, ὥστε ἕμα συμβαίνειν εἶδέναι τε τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ εἶναι δίκαιον.

<sup>121</sup> Xenoph. Mem. iii. 9, nr. 4. πάντας γὰρ οἶμαι προαιρουμένους ἐκ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων, ἃ ἀν οἴωνται συμφορώτατα αὐτοῖς εἶναι, ταῦτα πράττειν. Plat. Gorg. p. 460; Arist. Eth. Nic. vii. 3. οὐδὲνα γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνοντα πράττειν παρὰ τὸ βέλτιστον, ἀλλὰ δι' ἄγνοιαν.

<sup>122</sup> Plat. Apol. p. 25; Prot. p. 345; Arist. Magn. Mor. i. 9. See Brandis, p. 135.

nay, more, he who knowingly tells a lie, or does wrong, is a better man than he who does wrong or tells a lie in ignorance.<sup>123</sup> Propositions such as these have not seldom caused him to be reviled as a sophist—whether justly or unjustly is a matter that can be decided only by a most intimate acquaintance with his entire doctrine. As to the last position, there cannot be a doubt, that, when he put it forward, he saw clearly its incongruity with his previous assertions; and it was only employed by him in preliminary discourses, in order to shew the nullity of the seeming wisdom of others, and the true ground on which it is based, is the perception that the intellectual man alone is capable of a free choice, whether for good or for evil; but, as he further shews, only for good in the case of one who really understands his true interests. The other two amount to the same, if only we assume that the ignorant man is such against his will; and this must have been the opinion of Socrates, since he took for granted the presence of a universal longing after wisdom in every rational creature.<sup>124</sup> But if his proposition, that no one acts unjustly unless in ignorance, be taken in the common acceptation of things, so many instances subversive of its truth immediately present themselves, that it is impossible to believe they could have escaped his observation. Here, therefore, if anywhere, we must admit that Socrates, in

<sup>123</sup> Xenoph. Mem. iv. 2, nr. 20; Plat. Hipp. Min. p. 365, sqq., especially p. 375.

<sup>124</sup> On this point the pseudo-Platonists may be taken as authorities. See de Justo, p. 375. *ἐκόντες δὲ ἀμαθείς εἰσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι, ἢ ἀκόντες; ἄκοντες.*

his ethical views, did not take his stand within the domain of sensible presentation, but in that of suprasensible truth, where no partial result of observation and experience could either refute or confirm him in his reasonings. That by the wisdom which is associated with the moral act, he understood a something very different from the imperfect thought, which is indeed often called wisdom, is unquestionable, when we consider that he acknowledged none to be wise but God. According to Socrates, the true wisdom which is coincident with the moral conduct, is nowhere to be found among men; it is a perfect insight into the good.<sup>125</sup> And the degree to which, in his doctrine, the scientific and the moral interpenetrate and are reciprocal, is shewn by his making knowledge the final cause of the will—"for no one is willingly ignorant"—and good of knowledge, for no one knowingly acts otherwise than for good. However, the true meaning of these propositions cannot be fully understood until we reflect that he intended to express by them, not merely the suprasensible unity of the good and the true, but that he likewise applied them to the conditions of this life, and thereby brought them home to man's heart and mind. In its latter reference, the doctrine rests on the assumption, that the knowledge of good is not

<sup>125</sup> It is only with an appearance of justice that Aristotle argues against Socrates on the supposition that he had held there was nothing without some end of its existence, and yet had posited virtue as without an end, since he made it to be science. Magn. Mor. i. 1, οὐκ ὁρθῶς ἐστὶ οὐδ' ὁ Σωκράτης ἐπιστήμης ἐποίησεν τὰς ἀρετὰς· ἐκεῖνος γὰρ οὐδὲν ψετο εἶναι μάρτυν εἶναι· ἐκ δὲ τοῦ τὰς ἀρετὰς ἐπιστήμης εἶναι συνίστασθαι αὐτῷ τὰς ἀρετὰς μάρτυν εἶναι. For with Socrates virtue is transcendent perfection—the supreme good, and therefore the same as science itself.



a purely abstract and general knowledge, but one embracing alike the individual and the general. It was his opinion, that no man can possess a real knowledge of good, except in so far as he knows what his own true, good, and real interest is at each moment of his existence; and that with this perfect insight into his real happiness, it is as impossible for him to act contrary to his interests, as, without it, consciously and intentionally to advance them. In this spirit he maintained that they alone rule in truth and in fact who know how to rule.<sup>126</sup> Here again we see how deeply the mind of Socrates was imbued with a conviction of the perfect oneness of all science, since he denied that a knowledge of the good, in general, is possible without the knowledge of good in particular.<sup>127</sup> At the same time, it is clear he did not pretend that he had discovered in human experience this absolute science and absolute virtue, but, nevertheless, a science and a virtue continually striving after this supreme good; for even wisdom itself, such as it is found in man, was not regarded by him as absolutely a good, though he denied not that it was a good so far as it ministers to good.<sup>128</sup> It is evident, then, that neither the science nor the virtue, nor generally the good of this present life, could satisfy Socrates, but that, nevertheless, he stimulated men to the

<sup>126</sup> Xenoph. Mem. iii. 9, nr. 10. ἀρχοντας εἶναι — τοὺς ἐπισταμένους ἀρχεῖν.

<sup>127</sup> This he expressly asserts in the position that every one is ignorant in the same proportion as he is intemperate. Xenoph. Mem. iii. 9, n. 4.

<sup>128</sup> Xenoph. Mem. iv. 2, nr. 33; cf. i. 6, nr. 13; Plat. Meno, p. 88. He even counted happiness among the relatively good things. Xenoph. Mem. iv. 2, nr. 34. 35.

pursuit of virtue and of the supreme good, in the opinion that this pursuit would necessarily lead to some good result; and if we only explain in this sense the so-often-repeated demand of the Xenophontean Socrates for the profitable,<sup>129</sup> we shall be able to recognise therein a true feature of his character.

With this commencement of ethical inquiry Socrates was apparently contented, and did not attempt to draw any particular applications from his general view. Nay, more, the question having been started, what is right and good in particular, he afforded to the inquirer no further information, and only referred, in the old-fashioned spirit, to the laws of the state,<sup>130</sup> which he seems to have regarded as containing the legitimate and obligatory expression of the rational will as sanctioned by the gods themselves, the founders of communities and states. To these laws, Socrates added the unwritten law, as equally binding in particular cases;<sup>131</sup> understanding thereby both that unwritten law which is recognised by all states, and which was given by the gods, and on that very account needs not to be written, because

<sup>129</sup> Xenoph. Mem. iv. 6, nr. 8: τὸ ἄρα ὠφέλιμον ἀγαθὸν ἴσθιν ὅτι ἂν ὠφέλιμον ᾖ; Δοκεῖ μοι, ἔφη.

<sup>130</sup> Xenoph. Mem. iv. 4, nr. 12, sq. φημί γὰρ ἐγὼ τὸ νόμιμον δίκαιον εἶναι — νόμους δὲ πόλεως, ἔφη, γινώσκεις; cf. Plat. Crito, p. 50, sqq. There is a very perverted application of this principle in the dialogue of the Cobbler, sub. fin.

<sup>131</sup> Xenoph. ib. 19. Plat. de Rep. viii. p. 563, d. Wiggers is of opinion (Soc. p. 193,) that he was the first who employed the term "unwritten law," which is however refuted by the passage of Xenophon first quoted: it is also employed by Thucydides in the Funeral Oration of Pericles, ii. 37, fin. As to its meaning, cf. Diog. L. iii. 86, pretendedly after Aristotle.

it is universally valid, and requires not to be enforced by any arbitrary enactment, since its infringement invariably induces its own penalty,<sup>132</sup> and also that inner voice of the Deity which speaks to the conscience of every individual, and in obedience to which man's whole life and energies ought to be directed.<sup>133</sup> Thus did he carry back all morality to the consciousness of all that is highest and truest both in the community and in the individual; but scientifically to develop the grounds of the special laws of morality, and their co-ordination and agreement, was beyond his power. Conscious of his inability in this respect, he refused to assume the title of sage or teacher of justice.<sup>134</sup>

By combining in our consideration these several points, we shall be struck with the peculiar fitness of Socrates to awaken, by his discourses, the mind of the rising generation, to a new and more comprehensive pursuit of science; which not one-sided, and directed exclusively to a particular branch of science, but guided and encouraged by the conviction of its universality, should extend to all that is knowable. He advanced no particular system of physics, but he held fast the general philosophical principle, that all the objects in nature are only so far worth knowing as they are capable of being traced to some intellectual thought and design. He elaborated no ethical system, but was content to call attention to the rational and

<sup>132</sup> Xenoph. Mem. ib. 19, sq. The word is thus used by Thucyd. *ibid.* and Aristotle, *Polit.* vi. 5; *Rhet.* i. 10, 13. As to another sense thereof, cf. Nitzsch *de Historia Homer.* xvi. p. 62.

<sup>133</sup> Plat. *Apol.* *passim.*

<sup>134</sup> Xenoph. Mem. iv. nr. 5, sqq.; cf. Plat. *Meno.* p. 89, sq.

intentional plans of man, and to the consciousness of responsibility in the moral act. Lastly, he did not impart to his disciples any systematically-evolved doctrine of the form and subject-matter of science, but was satisfied with exercising them in its form, and with implanting in their minds the living and pregnant thought, that the intrinsic value of every branch of knowledge can only be tested by its agreement with all others, and that every thought of man must give an account of itself, and must have its root in the knowledge of himself and the Deity. Having thus projected the ideal of science, both in its extent and form, he contributed little himself towards its realisation. In this respect he may well be compared with an aged master who lives on still energetic of thought and invention, but who, feeling the gradual decay of his powers of execution, is superior to the vanity which delighteth in the contemplation of its own works. With his regards fixed not upon the past but upon the future, he collects around him his approved disciples, to see if there is one among them able to comprehend, and possessing a hand of skill and of power to realise his matured designs. He speaks to them of the divine image which is present to his soul, and practises them in the mode in which alone it can be realised. So long as he lives, they listen to his instructions, and practise under his guidance ; and after his death, all labour to accomplish his design. But one only is found at last, who has come at all near to its ideal excellence ; one only,—who, however, inspires many to strive as he has striven. Could the good master

see the work of his most skilful disciple, at first he would shake his head, and think awhile whether this was really what he had intended; but eventually, even through its strange investiture, he would recognise some features of his own ideal.

The Socratic school in general now demands a few observations. One who, like Socrates, enters deeply into, and, in many respects, is in advance of, the spirit of his age, usually gathers around him men of every variety of character and opinion,—the good and the evil, the humane and the benevolent; delighting in the free communication of thoughts and feelings, he would be little likely and little disposed to exclude any from his presence, but hoping the best of all, would give to every one the opportunity and chance of improvement. Socrates had, moreover, a strong trust in the providence of God, and so may have suffered himself the more calmly to be entangled in a web of diversified interests and pursuits, convinced that, on one side or the other, some unlooked-for benefit would accrue.

Even had he been certain that his intercourse with weak, dubious, and evil characters, would have been prejudicial to his reputation, both with contemporaries and posterity, he would not, on that account, have turned aside from the path he had chosen; for the evil only judge according to the evil appearance. But among his associates there were many of really good intentions,—sincere friends in sorrow and in joy; a few were highly distinguished for their political rank, for their talents for business, and knowledge. These loved to acknowledge the benefit they derived from

his society, and the consequent advancement of their interests and pursuits. The examination of the various elements of which his circle was composed, is highly important and interesting, since they unquestionably had considerable influence on the general character and habits of the Greeks of succeeding times.

By what has been called the school of Socrates, we must not understand a close society or sect, strictly adhering to and professing his doctrines. In truth, he had no system, and refused the title and appellation of teacher. It was only subsequently that schools of philosophy, in the proper sense, were formed; up to this time we may venture to assert that there was nothing like a strict philosophical school, in which a teacher propounded a doctrine which the disciple received, propagated, and, as it might chance, enlarged. The first rise of such schools belongs generally to an age in which philosophy has begun to be degraded into a portion of mere erudition. By that of Socrates we have, therefore, to understand nothing more than a number of individuals, who, differing greatly in sentiments and opinions, agreed only in the belief that his society was profitable and instructing. Our next business is to divide this mass into groups, and arrange them according to their shades of difference. The first striking distinction which presents itself is a difference of age; for around him we find not only the young and inexperienced, but such as had already arrived at maturity. Thus Chærephon, his zealous admirer, to whom was given the oracle from the Delphic god, that Socrates was the wisest of mortals, was his

companion in years, as also Chærekrates his brother, who was indeed younger, though not by much. In this circle we find, likewise, not merely the youthful Critobulus, but his father Crito, who was far advanced in age; Antisthenes, too, was no longer a young man when he attached himself to his society. Now, although this may appear a purely outward distinction, it nevertheless goes deep into the essential character of the school. For from those whose opinions were already formed, and who had been accustomed to rely upon their own judgment, it could not be expected that, equally with the young, whose minds were unformed, they could enter into the intellectual tendency and spirit of Socrates, but each brought with him his own peculiar habits of thinking, and his personal scientific conviction, which, in seeking his society, it was their intention merely to improve, confirm, and enlarge. In this way the school must have received into it many heterogeneous elements.<sup>135</sup> Another more essential distinction between the disciples of Socrates arises from the ends and objects which attracted them. Some of them, as, (according to Xenophon,<sup>136</sup>) Critias and Alcibiades, had no other object in frequenting his society than the acquisition of a similar command of language, and equal powers of persuasion; others a desire to become good and useful citizens; while a few were attracted by a pure love of philosophy. Thus, while individuals of every variety of opinions and pursuits were collected around him by the per-

<sup>135</sup> Xenoph. Conv. viii. 5, is an instance of this.

<sup>136</sup> Mem. i. 2, nr. 12, sqq.

sonal charms of his character, and frequented his society for longer or shorter periods, it is plain that he could not have stood in the same relation to all. In his intercourse with characters of the first class—with a Critias or Alcibiades—his bearing seems to have been passive, restrained, and negative;<sup>137</sup> less reserved, on the contrary, and more confiding, and adapting himself to their peculiarities of thought and habits, was his behaviour towards such as with honesty and sincerity devoted their time and talents to a political life;<sup>138</sup> for not a few did he encourage to take part in the administration of affairs, even while he inveighed against the weakness of those who, without due qualifications, entered upon a public life from the low motives of vanity. In the presence of such men—a Xenophon, for instance—he would talk on constitutional government, the true sovereignty, the genuine aristocracy,<sup>139</sup> the difference between tyranny and monarchy, timocracy and democracy. On the other hand, he conversed on philosophical subjects with a Theages,<sup>140</sup> Theætetus, or a Plato—of pure science and its object—of the true intelligence—of the beautiful and the good. That, however, those who followed him with enthusiasm into these subjects were, for the most part, his younger disciples, is both clear from the dialogues of Plato, and was of itself to be expected. It is true, indeed, that a few among those more advanced in years, such as Antisthenes, were not indisposed to take part in his

<sup>137</sup> Ibid. 15. τοῦ βίου τοῦ Σωκράτους ἐπιθυμῶν.

<sup>138</sup> Plat. Conv. p. 215, sqq.

<sup>139</sup> Xenoph. Mem. iv. 6, nr. 12; cf. Plat. Menex. p. 238.

<sup>140</sup> Plat. de Rep. vi. p. 496.



philosophical conversations; still it may justly be conceived that they were less taken by the general spirit of his method of investigation, than with some particular propositions which he occasionally advanced, and that, consequently, they were attracted chiefly by the desire of confirming certain previously formed views, and to combine with them the reasoning and inferences of Socrates.

It is only with such of his disciples as evinced a taste for, and inclination to, philosophical subjects that we are concerned in the history of philosophy. But from what has been observed it cannot be expected, that even these should all take a similar view of the principles of Socrates. The philosophical Socraticists may be separated into three classes, according to the different force with which they were animated with a true Socratical impulse. In the first it is but weak;—they were carried away by the irresistible power of the senses, and gave scarcely more than the external man to the novel but pure instruction of their master. Others were more zealous, it is true, yet without power to emancipate themselves from their ancient prejudices, and the relics of earlier philosophy; they were consequently unable to abandon themselves free and unshackled to the development of the Socratic principles. This second class we shall call the imperfect Socraticists. The third class, the perfect Socraticists, on the contrary, seized the Socratic spirit in its full import and true relation to the earlier philosophy. These attached themselves to Plato, the truest disciple of Socrates.

We see here therefore a renewal of what we considered as the distinctive character of the pre-Socratic period in the development of philosophy ;—*viz.* the cotemporaneous evolution of different schools. In the present case, however, their mutual relation is wholly different : formerly the concurrent productions of the scientific mind of the Greeks were equally vigorous and powerful ;—but now the energy of youth has mastered all the good and fair results of the earlier labours in science, and stands beside the decrepitude of age, which is but the wreck of by-gone days, notwithstanding any appearance of vigour it may exhibit. Thus in the period of philosophy about to open, alongside of the vigorously flourishing schools, first of Plato, next of Aristotle, and lastly of the Stoics, appear the relics of the earlier schools. The ancient cast of thought is contained in an antiquated form scarcely amounting to more than a weak tradition, oftentimes perverted with the grossest misconceptions and exaggerations. Very different was the philosophical agency of Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics ;—it was the creation of the age,—the best and noblest production which the Greek mind, under existing circumstances, could give birth to,—and may be regarded as the representatives of the philosophical wisdom of their day.

Agreeably to the course of development, we shall begin with the imperfect Socraticists, and then proceed to the more perfect schools which were formed out of the Platonic. Among the former we include the Cyrenaics, the Cynics, the Megarians, and some others still more insignificant.

In the Cyrenaic we shall find the Socratic element subordinate to a strange and foreign element ; in the others the reverse is the case. We propose therefore to open our history of the Socratic schools with an exposition of that of Cyrene.

## CHAPTER III.

### CYRENAIC SCHOOL.

AMONG those who frequented the society of Socrates, there was one especially, who was regarded by the strict Socraticists as an unworthy disciple of their great master—Aristippus. The objections made to him may be reduced to three heads: A habit of life alien to, and inconsistent with, the Socratic moderation and simplicity;<sup>1</sup> the acceptance of a remuneration for his teaching;<sup>2</sup> and lastly, the character of his doctrines.<sup>3</sup> Not merely on account of the second but also of the third has he been called a Sophist.

Aristippus was born at Cyrene in Africa, a colony of the Minyæ, which had risen rapidly to great prosperity at home and power abroad, but was in ill repute for its devotion to luxury and pleasure. Born of illustrious and wealthy parentage he appears to have indulged the general and prevailing habits. Having heard, while yet young, a report of the wonderful discourses of Socrates, he was seized with an eager desire to share his society and conversation, and immediately embarked for Athens.<sup>4</sup> Socrates, however, with

<sup>1</sup> Xenoph. Mem. ii. 1, n. 1. Upon the aversion of Xenophon and Plato to Aristippus, consult Diog. L. ii. 65, c. not; see also Aristot. Rhet. ii. 23.

<sup>2</sup> Diog. L. ib. Cf. Xenoph. Mem. i. 2, n. 60.

<sup>3</sup> Arist. Met. ii. 2.

<sup>4</sup> Plut. de Curios. 2; Diog. L. i. 1.

whom he remained until his execution,<sup>5</sup> does not appear to have cured him of his inclination for pleasure. For, although there is little consistency in the notices we have of his life and conduct, it is nevertheless clear, from a variety of anecdotes, that, notwithstanding he was able to endure privations and sufferings with equanimity and dignity,<sup>6</sup> the serenity of mind, (which seems to have been a natural gift, and which moreover he endeavoured by every means to strengthen and confirm) arose, principally, from the readiness and facility with which he could extract pleasures and gratifications from the most difficult situations of life. Hence, he never avoided the society of the courtesan, or of the tyrant, or Satrap, in full and calm reliance upon his tact in the management of men.<sup>7</sup> From the public affairs, however, of his native city he withdrew entirely from a dread of the restraint and dependence they entailed, and preferred a residence in a foreign land, where he was less exposed to restraint than in his native country.<sup>8</sup> Thus we meet with him in a variety of places, and many anecdotes are told of his intimacy with Dionysius, the Syracusan tyrant, and the courtesan Laïs, which would seem to imply that Aristippus endeavoured to observe faithfully his own maxim, that a man ought to control circumstances, and not be con-

<sup>5</sup> Plat. Phæd. p. 59.

<sup>6</sup> Diog. L. ii. 67. σοὶ μόνῳ δίδονται καὶ χλαμύδα φορεῖν καὶ ῥάκος.  
Plut. de Alex. Fort. i. 8.

<sup>7</sup> Diog. L. ii. 68, 77, 78, 79.

Xenoph. Mem. ii. 1, nr. 8—13.

trolled by them.<sup>9</sup> In his old age he appears to have returned to Cyrene where we find his family and school.<sup>10</sup>

In what sense Aristippus is justly entitled to be considered a founder of a school of philosophy is a much debated question. According to some, he left no written exposition of his views, nor did he in a general way ever publicly deliver his opinions as to the end and destination of humanity;<sup>11</sup> while others attribute to him a long series of Dialogues and other works.<sup>12</sup> But, even supposing that he did commit his opinions to writing, it is still clear that he did not give a systematic exposition of his view of sciences and of life. On the contrary, there appears to be some foundation in truth for the statement of Aristocles,<sup>13</sup> that the views of Aristippus were only at a subsequent period reduced into a coherent form, for, at all events, the system of doctrines which is usually ascribed to the Cyrenaic school, implies the formation of later theories of the supreme good.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>9</sup> Horat. Ep. i. 1, v. 18 :

Nunc in Aristippi furtim præcepta relabor  
Et mihi res, non me rebus subjungere conor.

Diog. L. iv. 66, 68, 75. πρὸς οὖν τοὺς μεμφομένους ἔφη· ἔχω Λαίδα, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔχομαι.

<sup>10</sup> Diog. L. ii. 86.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid. ii. 84.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid. ii. 84, 85. Cf. Menag. ad h. l. The second Catalogue of Panætius and Sotion gives the most probable titles. That supposititious works were ascribed to Aristippus is proved by Luzac de Digamia Socr. p. 108, in the particular case of the work *περὶ παλαιᾶς τροφῆς*, and is, moreover, generally probable from the variations in the Catalogues. Too much weight must not be given to the testimony of Theopompus, ap. Athen. xi. p. 508, in favour of the genuineness of the works current under his name.

<sup>13</sup> Ap. Euseb. Præp. Ev. xiv. 18.

<sup>14</sup> It is in favour of our opinion that Aristotle, whenever he has occasion to refute the Cyrenaic doctrine of the supreme good, controverts the opinions of

The school founded by Aristippus scarcely enjoyed more than a local reputation, for the individuals, who are enumerated as its members, belonged principally to Cyrene and the neighbouring districts of Africa. The succession of the school is destitute of any certain chronology, and there is much confusion in the statements transmitted on this head.<sup>15</sup> Aristippus is said to have taught his daughter Arete<sup>16</sup> and Antipater the Cyrenian; Arete was the instructress of her son, the younger Aristippus, who on this account received the surname Metrodidactus.<sup>17</sup> It is to this Aristippus that the systematic completion of the doctrine is usually attributed; and he is also made the teacher of Theodorus, the Atheist, who, however, is placed considerably later by other accounts.<sup>18</sup> Antipater, on the other hand, commences another series, of whom the last two, Hegesias and Anniceris, alone are in any degree known to us. By these philosophers the Cyrenaic doctrine was carried out and

Eudoxus, one, who, in a philosophical respect, is very inconsiderable, (Eth. Nic. x. 2,) rather than those of Antisthenes (ib. i.), although in doing so he is forced to enter upon the subject at greater length. I shall here venture a conjecture: There is only one passage in Aristotle where I think the opinions of Aristippus is alluded to, and that only in a point accessory to the matter in hand, viz. Eth. N. x. 6, where he is speaking of those who are pleasing to tyrants, because they understand the *παῖδι*, and thereupon the opinion is controverted which would make happiness to consist in *παῖδι*. Cf. Diog. L. ii. 8. It might be alleged, against my position of the later formation of the Cyrenaic doctrine, that Antisthenes and Plato, particularly in Phileb, p. 53, seem to have evolved their theory against pleasure with a view to Aristippus, which, however, does not presuppose the existence of a system on his part.

<sup>15</sup> Diog. L. ii. 86.

<sup>16</sup> Ælian, Hist. Anim. iii. 40, calls her his sister, most writers make her his daughter.

<sup>17</sup> Aristocles ap. Euseb. Pr. Ev. xiv. 18.

<sup>18</sup> Diog. L. ii. 98; Suid. s. v. Θεόδωρος.

completed in a manner that can only be considered a corruption and constantly widening deviation from Socratic ideas and sentiments. Its starting point was Socrates, its goal Epicurus. As the chronology of this school does not furnish us any assistance in determining the succession of its members, we may, perhaps, be allowed to follow, what appears the probable course of its inner development.

In the first place, we must endeavour to exhibit the earlier doctrine of the school. On this point we are informed by the most ancient authorities, that it embraced merely a portion of philosophy, ethics,<sup>19</sup> and had an especial contempt for physics,<sup>20</sup> on the ground that they surpass all human powers of comprehension, and because there is no utility in inquiries having any other end than to determine what is good or evil for the family and society. This statement consists well with the reproach of unscientific cast of thought which Aristotle brings against the elder Aristippus, as having despised and neglected all mathematical learning, because it did not treat of the good and the evil, which, however, are the end and object of all other arts, even the mechanical.<sup>21</sup> This, however, so far as it applies to the ancient Cyrenaics in general, is somewhat of an exaggeration; for not only are we told that they applied themselves to the study of logic and its practical utility,<sup>22</sup> but

<sup>19</sup> Diog. L. ii. 92; Sext. Emp. adv. Math. vii. 11; Euseb. Pr. Ev. xv. 62.

<sup>20</sup> Diog. L. ii. 92, Plut. ap. Euseb. Pr. Ev. i. 8.

<sup>21</sup> Arist. Met. iii. 2; Syrian. in Met. Arist. ii. fol. 11, a.

<sup>22</sup> Diog. L. i. 1.; Sext. Emp. vii. 15.



we also know, on formal testimony, that they did not wholly neglect physical researches. They divided, for instance, all philosophy into five parts—the doctrine of Desire and Aversion—Affections and Actions—Causes and Proofs; the fourth related to physical, and the fifth to logical science, both however were, it is true, subordinate to the ethical, as is clear from the fact of their calling science in general ethics.<sup>23</sup> This, however, is still more strikingly shewn in the internal relations of the several parts of their philosophy.

As to the connexion between the doctrines of Aristippus and of Socrates, it will be found to lie chiefly in the close resemblance of their views as to the objects of desire and aversion. Socrates, in his inquiries into the true ends of life, proceeded on the supposition that happiness is the desire and aim of all men; and even his refutation of the votaries of inordinate indulgence and sensuality was mainly directed to shew, that they mistook the true nature of pleasure, which does not consist in irrational gratifications, but in the prudent and well-regulated life of the soul. Now, pleasure is here apparently admitted to be the end of life, and this may have been the point taken up by Aristippus, when he taught that good is pleasure and

<sup>23</sup> Sext. Emp. vii. ii. 15. δοκοῦσι δὲ κατὰ τινὰς καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Κυρήνης μόνον ἀσπάζεσθαι τὸ ἠθικὸν μέρος, παραπέμπειν δὲ τὸ φυσικὸν καὶ τὸ λογικόν, ὡς μηδὲν πρὸς τὸ εὐδαιμόνως βιοῦν συνεργοῦντα. καίτοι περιτρέπεσθαι τούτους ἔνιωι νενομίκασιν, ἐξ ὧν τὸ ἠθικὸν διαιροῦσιν εἰς τε τὸν περὶ τῶν αἰρετῶν καὶ φευκτῶν, καὶ εἰς τὸν περὶ τῶν παθῶν, καὶ ἔτι εἰς τὸν περ τῶν πράξεων, καὶ ἤδη τὸν περὶ τῶν αἰτίων καὶ τελευταῖον εἰς τὸν περὶ τῶν πίστειων· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ ὁ περὶ αἰτίων τόπος, φασιν, ἐκ τοῦ φυσικοῦ μέρους ἐτύγχανεν, ὃ δὲ περὶ πίστειων τοῦ λογικοῦ. Senec. Ep. 89.

pain is evil, referring, for proof thereof, to the concurrent testimony, not merely of men, but of all living creatures.<sup>24</sup> But as at the same time he seems to have maintained, that in true pleasure the soul must still preserve its authority; his true pleasure was consequently nothing more than the Socratic temperance<sup>25</sup>. In Aristippus, as in the other disciples of Socrates, we discover a like tendency to the doctrine of the independence of mind, such as might easily result from a narrow view of the true Socratic liberty. Aristippus, however, believed he had discovered another road by which independence might be attained, besides that of the subjection and control of all pleasures. Pleasure, indeed, he was willing to permit, but not the desire of pleasure, because it is this which renders man the creature of hope and fear. Hence he taught that a man ought not to desire more than he already possesses; <sup>26</sup> for all pleasures are similar, and none more agreeable than another,<sup>27</sup> and that he ought not to suffer himself to be overcome by any sensual enjoyment.<sup>28</sup>

By regulating his whole life in strict conformity with these ideas, he exhibited throughout a

<sup>24</sup> Diog. L. ii. 88. *πίστιν δ' εἶναι τοῦ τέλους εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν τὸ ἀπροαιρέτως ἡμᾶς ἐκ παίδων ὥκειώσθαι πρὸς αὐτὴν καὶ τυχεύοντας αὐτῆς μηθὲν ἐπιζητεῖν, μηθὲν τε οὕτω φεύγειν, ὥς τὴν ἐναντίαν αὐτῇ ἀλγέειναι.* Ibid. 87. *καὶ τὴν μὲν (sc. ἡδονήν) εὐδοκητὴν πᾶσι ζώοις, τὸν δ' (sc. πόνον) ἀποκρουστικόν.*

<sup>25</sup> Diog. L. ii. 75; Stob. Serm. xvii. 18. *κρατεῖ ἡδονῆς οὐχ ὁ ἀπὸ ἐπιθυμίας, ἀλλ' ὁ χρώμενος μὲν, μὴ προεφερόμενος δέ.*

<sup>26</sup> Cf. Stob. Serm. xx. 63, xxxvii. 25, xlix. 18; Plut. Fragm. in Hesiod. de Tranq. An. 8; de Profec. in Virt. 10.

<sup>27</sup> Diog. ii. 72. *τὰ ἄριστα ὑπετίθετο τῇ θυγατρὶ Ἀρήτῃ, συνασκῶν αὐτὴν ὑπεροπτικὴν τοῦ πλείονος εἶναι.* Plut. de Cupid. Div. 3.

Diog. L. ii. 87.

perfect indifference for all good things beyond those of which he was in the actual enjoyment at the moment.<sup>29</sup> Opinions like these evidently sprung from the happy, careless, and serene character of the man which could adapt itself with facility to every situation in life, and trusted less to his good fortune than to his own tact and ability to employ to his own satisfaction all the changes and circumstances of life.<sup>30</sup> This character of mind is further manifest in the leading maxim of his school, *viz.*, that pleasure is more accordant with man's nature than pain.<sup>31</sup> This, when expressed generally, amounts to the doctrine, that a man must direct his attention to the mere enjoyment of the present, neither regretting the past nor caring for the future; for the present alone is ours, the past is no more, the future has not yet arrived, and is moreover doubtful.<sup>32</sup>

When the Cyrenaics proceeded to apply this doctrine to the regulation of human conduct and action, it was impossible for them to look beyond

<sup>29</sup> Diog. L. ii. 69. οὐ τὸ εἰσελθεῖν, ἔφη, χαλεπὸν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ἐξελθεῖν.

<sup>30</sup> Horat. Ep. i. 17, v. 23. Omnis Aristippum decuit color et status et res. Diog. L. ii. 66. ἀπέλαυε γὰρ ἡδονῆς τῶν παρόντων, οὐκ ἐθήρα δὲ πόνῳ τὴν ἀπόλαυσιν τῶν οὐ παρόντων· ὅθεν καὶ Διογένης βασιλικὸν κύνα ἔλεγεν αὐτόν.

<sup>31</sup> Diog. L. ii. 90. χαλεπώτερον γὰρ τὸ πονεῖν, οἰκείωτερον δὲ τὸ ἡδεσθαι ὑπελάμβανον.

<sup>32</sup> Ælian. Var. Hist. xiv. 6. πάνυ σφόδρα ἐρρώμένως ἐφκει λέγειν ὁ Ἀριστίππος παρεγγυῶν, μήτε τοῖς παρελθοῦσιν ἐπικάμνειν, μήτε τῶν ἐπιόντων προκάμνειν· εὐθυμίας γὰρ δείγμα τὸ τοιοῦτο, καὶ ἴλεω διανοίας ἀπόδειξις. προσέταττε δὲ ἐφ' ἡμέρας τὴν γνώμην ἔχειν, καὶ αὐτὸ πάλιν τῆς ἡμέρας ἐπ' ἐκείνῳ τῷ μέρει, καθ' ὃ ἕκαστος ἢ πράττει τι, ἢ ἐννοεῖ. μόνον γὰρ ἔφασκεν ἡμίτερον εἶναι τὸ παρόν, μήτε δὲ τὸ φθάνον, μήτε τὸ προσδοκώμενον. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀπολωλέναι, τὸ δὲ ἀδελον εἶναι, εἴπερ ἔσται. Athen. xii. 63, p. 544.

the momentary gratification, or to regard as a good the whole happiness of life, since the latter can never be the object of any particular act or intention, simply because it is unattainable, for even the wisest sage is exposed to many necessary or natural evils.<sup>33</sup> Happiness, forsooth, is as distinct from pleasure as the whole from the part—but it is not a system of pleasure which excites desire, only particular pleasure<sup>34</sup>. In this we recognise at once the endeavour to maintain absolute the notion of pleasure as determined by the enjoyment of the present, while at the same time we discover a fear, lest by permitting any consideration of the future and the past to interfere with the present enjoyment, its intensity should be weakened and its amount diminished. This doctrine, it must at once be admitted, was utterly destructive of the unity of the moral purpose, to which as many ultimate objects were now proposed as moments of existence.

The second portion of the Cyrenaic system, which treats of the affections, had in view to determine what it is that constitutes pleasure and pain (*πόνος*), and the intermediate states. In this

<sup>33</sup> Athen. l. i. ταύτην (sc. τὴν ἡδονήν) τέλος εἶναι ἔφη καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν βεβλήσθαι καὶ μονόχρονον αὐτὴν εἶναι. Diog. L. ii. 90. ὥς δυσκολώτατον αὐτοῖς φαίνεσθαι τὸν ἀθροισμὸν τῶν ἡδονῶν εὐδαιμονίαν ποιοῦντα. ἀρέσκει δ' αὐτοῖς, μήτε τὸν σύφον πάντα ἡδέως ζῆν. —λυπήσεσθαι μέντοι καὶ φοβήσεσθαι· φυσικῶς γὰρ γίνεσθαι.

<sup>34</sup> Diog. L. ii. 87. δοκεῖ δὲ αὐτοῖς καὶ τέλος εὐδαιμονίας διαφέρειν. τέλος μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τὴν κατὰ μέρος ἡδονήν, εὐδαιμονίαν δὲ τὸ ἐκ τῶν μερικῶν ἡδονῶν σύστημα, αἷς συναριθμοῦνται καὶ οἱ παροχρηκῆαι καὶ αἱ μέλλουσαι. εἶναι τε τὴν μερικὴν ἡδονήν δι' αὐτὴν αἰρετήν. τὴν δὲ εὐδαιμονίαν οὐ δι' αὐτήν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὰς κατὰ μέρος ἡδονάς. From this, as well as from many other points, we may perceive how this doctrine, as it was developed, assumed a more decided opposition to the Epicurean. Athen. l. i.

inquiry they took for granted that all these affections are actually in the soul. Their principal object seems to have been to shew that pleasure and pain are something positive, and to refute certain opinions in which pleasure was regarded merely as the gratification of a want.<sup>35</sup> On this account they taught that the pleasure, which is the ultimate object of life, does not consist in the removal of its contrary; and that the absence of pleasure is not a pain, but that both ought rather to be looked on as emotions, whereas non-pleasure and non-pain are not emotions, but as it were a sleep of the soul.<sup>36</sup> The connexion in which the idea of pleasure is here placed with that of motion, is in perfect conformity with the whole view of the Cyrenaics, which considered life as the sum of the single states of the soul; but it has moreover some resemblance to the Sophistical doctrine of Protagoras, that all is in a state of motion; with which, as we shall presently see,<sup>37</sup> the system of Aristippus has many other points in common. In one respect only does the latter appear to deviate from the former—in the admission of a state of rest in negative pleasure and pain. This discrepancy however is merely in appearance, for the Cyrenaics did not admit of a perfect rest,—

<sup>35</sup> Hereby we are far from intending to deny that this opinion was also in later times opposed to the Epicurean.

<sup>36</sup> Diod. L. ii. 87, 89. ἡ δὲ τοῦ ἀλγοῦντος ὑπεξαίρεσις (ὥς εἴρηται παρ' Ἐπικουρῷ) δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς μὴ εἶναι ἡδονή· οὐδὲ ἡ ἀηδονία ἀλγηδών. ἐν κινήσει γὰρ εἶναι ἀμφοτέρω, μὴ οὐσης τῆς ἀπονίας ἢ τῆς ἀηδονίας κινήσεως. ἐπεὶ ἡ ἀπονία οἶονεὶ καθεύδοντός ἐστι κατάστασις. Unlike Epicurus, the Cyrenaics only acknowledged a pleasure which consisted in motion. Diog. L. x. 136.

<sup>37</sup> Cf. Plat. Phileb. p. 43; de Rep. ix. p. 583.

merely a slower motion than could be noticed by our powers of perception.<sup>38</sup> This at the same time afforded them an expression for their view of the Socratic temperance, calling pleasure a gentle, pain a violent motion; the former being comparable to that of the sea under fair winds, the latter to the storm-tossed waters, while the intermediate state was likened to a calm.<sup>39</sup> By this they meant to intimate, that violent mental excitement must deprive man of the reflection and calmness, which are necessary to his being conscious of an agreeable state; on which account they forbade all vehement gratifications of sense, as awakening those ardent desires, which destroy all calmness and self-possession.<sup>40</sup>

In the third portion of their system, which treated of actions, they appear to have investigated man's true and proper relation to pleasure and pain. To this portion of inquiry belonged undoubtedly their theory of virtue, and probably also the distinction between pleasure and non-pleasure, so far as it influences character and conduct. In general every act must have been held by them to be in itself morally indifferent, since in their view the only question was the

<sup>38</sup> This is indirectly implied in Diog. L. ii. 85. τίλος δ' ἀπίφαινε τὴν λείαν κίνησιν, εἰς αἰσθησιν αναδιδομένην. As also in the comparison of the intermedium with the calm of the sea, which they carried out at great length. Cf. Plat. ib.

<sup>39</sup> Diog. L. ii. 86; Euseb. Praep. Ev. xiv. 18. τρεῖς γὰρ ἔφη καταστάσεις εἶναι περὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν σύγκρασιν. μίαν μὲν καθ' ἣν ἀλγοῦμεν, βουκίαν τῷ κατὰ θάλασσαν χειμῶνι· ἑτέραν δὲ, καθ' ἣν ἡδόμεθα, τῷ λείῳ κύματι ἀφομοιούμενοι. εἶναι γὰρ λείαν κίνησιν τὴν ἡδονήν, οὐρίῳ παραβλλομένην ἀνέμῳ τὴν δὲ τρίτην μίσην εἶναι κατὰστασιν, καθ' ἣν οὐτε ἀλγοῦμεν, οὔτε ἡδόμεθα, γαληνῇ παραπλησιαίαν οὖσαν.

<sup>40</sup> Plut. non posse suav. vivi sec. Epic. 4; de Cupid. Divit. 3.

result of the action,—pleasure or pain.<sup>41</sup> This was founded on the maxim of the Sophists that no action is in itself naturally good or evil, but merely as established from law and custom,—a maxim the perniciousness of which, in the case of the Cyrenaics, was in some degree moderated, by their teaching that the advantages acquired by injustice are trifling, whereas the evils of apprehension and punishment are considerable.<sup>42</sup> As to virtue it could not naturally be to them an ultimate end, only a mean. They appear, however, to have taken the idea of virtue in a very extensive sense, since they referred thereto whatever in actions appears as a mean to pleasure; so that even the irrational man may participate in virtue, so far at least as he possesses a capacity of body for pleasurable enjoyments; consequently the exercise and training of the body are necessary for the attainment of virtue. They appear, however, to have made this concession to the doctrine of Socrates; they admitted rationality to be the principal element in virtue. As, however, they of necessity determined the essence of reason in conformity with their own view of the end of life, it consequently received from them a merely negative signification, and was represented to be that which teaches how to avoid all the disturbances of pleasure; for by it a man is freed from all vain and ground-

<sup>41</sup> Diog. L. ii. 88. *εἶναι δὲ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθόν, κἀν ἀπὸ τῶν ἀσχημοσύ-  
των γίνεσθαι.*—*εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἡ προὔξις ἀποπὸς εἴη, ἀλλ' οὖν ἡ ἡδονὴ δι' αὐτὴν  
αἰρετὴ καὶ ἀγαθόν.*

<sup>42</sup> Ibid. 93.

less delusions, among which they reckoned envy, passionate love, the fear of death, and superstition.<sup>43</sup> If they did ascribe to it any positive influence, it was merely when they assigned to it the determination of choice between different species of pleasure. For, although they denied to pleasures all difference in degree, still a question might arise as to the degree of relative purity from disturbing and limiting causes. But even on this point—the indifference of pleasure as to intensity—a perfect uniformity of opinion did not, seemingly, prevail, and a different estimate of their purity is easily conceivable, since upon such a point individual tastes must decide.<sup>44</sup> Two species of pleasure were especially distinguished by some of the Cyrenaics,—those which depend on corporeal enjoyment, and those which rest on the affections of the soul. That the former must have appeared to them a good, is evident, nevertheless we may well doubt the truth of the statement, that they held them to be superior to mental enjoyment; <sup>45</sup> for it is difficult to suppose that their pur-

<sup>43</sup> Diog. L. ii. 91. *τὴν φρόνησιν ἀγαθὸν μὲν εἶναι, οὐ δὲ ἑαυτήν, εἰ αἰρετήν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὰ ἐξ αὐτῆς περιγινόμενα.—τῶν ἀρετῶν ἐνίας καὶ περὶ τοῦς ἄφρονας συνίστασθαι. τὴν σωματικὴν ἄσκησιν συμβάλλεσθαι πρὸς ἀρετῆς ἀνάληψιν. τὸν σόφον μῆτε φθονῆσειν, μῆτε ἱρασθήσεσθαι, ἢ δεισιδαιμονήσειν. γίνεσθαι γὰρ ταῦτα παρὰ κενὴν δόξαν. δεισιδαιμονίας ἐκτὸς εἶναι καὶ τὸν περὶ θανάτου φόβον ἐκφεύγειν.*

<sup>44</sup> Diog. L. ii. 87. *μὴ διαφέρειν τε ἡδονὴν ἡδονῆς, μῆτε ἡδίων τι εἶναι.* Wendt (Gotting. gel. Anzeig. v. 1835, § 789, sqq.) considers this a mistake, and that the Cyrenaic dogma, that nothing in nature is more agreeable than another (*μῆτε ἡδίων τι εἶναι*) is falsely interpreted in a sense which would be destructive of all differences in degree of pleasure. But this was a necessary consequence of their wish to shew the absurdity of a desire for more. Consequently they posited pleasure generally, and not the greatest pleasure, as the supreme good.

<sup>45</sup> Diog. L. ii. 87, 90. *πολὸν μέντοι τῶν ψυχικῶν (sc. ἡδονῶν) τὰς*



suit of self-command and of temperance should have been wholly without influence upon the system in this point, and, indeed, many traces of the contrary are actually discovered. Thus they made pleasure to rest not on the prosperity of the individual alone, but also on the welfare of the common country<sup>46</sup>. Nor did they in general, derive the feeling of gratification solely from the sensual excitement of the body, but from the mental state arising therefrom; and in support of this view they appealed to the fact, that so soon as an object is perceived, whether presented in its reality or in the imitations of art, it equally excites pleasure or pain.<sup>47</sup>

This tenet is in intimate and close accordance with their doctrine of causes. This, we are naturally led to suppose, referred chiefly to physical inquiries; and, in fact, it appears to have been confined to such subjects, though, in truth, proceeding from certain logical principles calculated to shew the impossibility of certainty in physics.

*σωματικὰς ἀμείνουσιν εἶναι.* Ibid. x. 137. οἱ μὲν γὰρ (sc. Κυρηναῖκοί) χεῖρους τὰς σωματικὰς ἀλγηδόνας τῶν ψυχικῶν κολάζεσθαι γοῦν τοὺς ἀμαρτάνοντας σώματι· ὁ δὲ (sc. Ἐπίκουρος) τὰς ψυχικὰς. τὴν γοῦν σάρκα τὸ παρὸν μόνον χειμάζειν, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν καὶ τὸ παρελθὸν καὶ τὸ παρὸν καὶ τὸ μέλλον. The testimony of Panætius, which is quoted in the first citation, would be important, if the point were not in itself improbable. It is more probable that the Epicureans were the first to bring in question these differences of pleasure when refuting the Cyrenaic theory. Cf. Cic. Acad. Qu. ii. 45.

<sup>46</sup> Diog. L. ii. 89.

<sup>47</sup> Diog. L. ii. 90. λέγουσι δὲ μηδὲ κατὰ ψυχὴν τὴν ὕσασιν ἢ τὴν ἀκοήν γίνεσθαι ἡδονὰς· τῶν γοῦν μιμουμένων θρήνους ἡδέως ἀκούομεν, τῶν δὲ κατὰ ἀλήθειαν ἀηδῶς. Plut. Symp. v. 1, nr. 2, τοῦτο τεκμήριόν ἐστι μέγα τοῖς Κυρηναῖκοις—τοῦ μὴ περὶ τὴν ὕσιν εἶναι, μηδὲ περὶ τὴν ἀκοήν, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν ἡμῶν τὸ ἡδόμενον ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀκούσμασι καὶ θεάμασι.

No one will consider this a Socratic procedure, but rather a recurrence to the doctrines of Protagoras. The Cyrenaics taught, for instance, that the affections of the soul may be known, but not that, from which they arise.<sup>48</sup> Their reasoning in support of this position rests on the so-called illusions of sense, and the opinion, that all thought is nothing more than the consciousness of the present affection; consequently, there cannot be universality in human conceptions, and men may agree in terms, but not in judgments.<sup>49</sup> Putting all this together, and, at the same time, remembering that, according to these philosophers, all the states of the mind are simply motions, and combining therewith their doctrine, that besides the mental

<sup>48</sup> Diog. L. ii. 92. *τά τε πάθη καταληπτά, — οὐκ ἀφ' ὧν γίνεται.* Cic. Acad. ii. 7.—*de tactu et eo quidem, quem philosophi interiorem vocant, aut doloris aut voluptatis (in quo Cyrenaici solo putant veri esse iudicium, quia sentiatur).* Upon this point, Sext. Emp. vii. 191, sq., and Plut. adv. Colot. 24, enter at length. Tennemann. *Gesch. der Phil.* Th. ii. § 106, ascribes this whole doctrine to Theodorus—without sufficient grounds. According to Aristocles ap. Euseb. Pr. Ev. xiv. 19, it was the doctrine of some of the Cyrenaics.

<sup>49</sup> Sext. Emp. l. i. 195. *Ἐνθεν οὐδὲ κριτήριόν φασιν εἶναι κοινὸν ἀνθρώπων ὀνόματα δὲ κοινὰ τίθεται τοῖς κρίμασι λευκὸν μὲν γάρ τι καὶ γλυκὲ καλοῦσι κοινῶς πάντες, κοινὸν δὲ τι λευκὸν ἢ γλυκὲ οὐκ ἔχουσιν.* *Ἐκαστος γὰρ τοῦ ἰδίου πάθους ἀντιλαμβάνεται.* Upon what grounds K. F. Hermann (in d. Heidelb. Jahrb. 1832, § 1067,) can maintain that the Cyrenaics denied the universality of propositions merely, and not of notions, is to my mind inconceivable. By so doing he ascribes to them a distinction between notions and propositions which they assuredly never made. When they said that men have common terms, but that each understood by them a different object—a *πάθος* of his own, and corresponding to his own peculiar temperament (cf. Sext. Emp. *ibid.* 198,) they thereby denied the universality of the notions which those terms expressed. On the other hand, it might be said that they admitted the existence of universal judgments, since they taught that there is no truth but that we have sensations of white and the like (*λευκαινόμεθα*). However, these judgments naturally express nothing more than mere appearances.

states nothing is,<sup>50</sup> and that wisdom consists merely in transforming our disagreeable sensations into agreeable, we shall have pretty nearly the entire system of Protagoras, such as it is exhibited by Plato in the *Theætetus*, with this difference of form merely, that they made the motions of the soul in pleasure and pain to be truth, and not the sensations, as the sophist maintained.<sup>51</sup>

As to the fifth part of their system, which treated of proofs, no information has reached us. We cannot for a moment suppose that the arguments and reasonings in support of their physical and ethical system were here first given, for the proofs could not well be separated from the doctrine itself; we must therefore conjecture, that they gave, in conclusion, a few rules and modes of proof which were useful and available for the maintenance of their own opinions, and the refutation of opposite views.

Of the individuals who enlarged the Cyrenaic doctrine, and gave to it any peculiar character, it may be said that, at most, they only carried out, more extensively, particular and partial points of the general system. In its pursuit of independence there was always a tendency to isolate the individual, which is still more prominent in the doctrine of Theodorus. This man, surnamed Atheist

<sup>50</sup> Sext. Emp. adv. Math. vi. 53. Οἱ τε γὰρ ἀπὸ τῆς Κυρήνης φιλόσοφοι μόνα φασὶν ὑπάρχειν τὰ πάθη, ἄλλο δὲ οὐδέν. This sophistry is still more manifest in the proposition ὅθεν καὶ τὴν φωνὴν μὴ οὔσαν πάθος, ἀλλὰ πάθους ποιητικὴν, μὴ γίνεσθαι τῶν ὑπαρκτῶν. Here the actual existence of the word, whose universality was however admitted, is denied.

<sup>51</sup> Cf. Wendt in. d. Gött. Gelehrt. Anzeig. § 790, f. Cic. Acad. ii. 46. Aristocl. ap. Euseb. Pr. Ev. xiv. 19.

or Theist,<sup>52</sup> appears to have publicly taught at Cyrene, Egypt, and also in other parts of the Grecian states, in the time of the first successors of Alexander. Of the circumstances of his life, however, nothing certainly is known. By some, he is called a pupil of the younger Aristippus; by others, of Anniceris.<sup>53</sup> He founded a school of his own which was called by his name, and to which Euhemerus the Atheist is usually, but without reason, assigned.<sup>54</sup>

The tendency to centre man within himself is revealed at once in the formula wherein the end of all conduct and action is defined. He taught, for instance, that the objects of desire and aversion, are not pleasure and pain, but joy and sorrow; and that reason leads to joy, but irrationality to sorrow; on which account the former is good, the latter evil; but that pleasure and pain are morally indifferent.<sup>55</sup> This variation of the fundamental maxim of the school seems to have had in view nothing more than to show that the end of life consists not in any enjoyment, having an outward source, but in the inner constitution of the mind. Still more strongly does this appear

<sup>52</sup> Diog. L. ii. 86, 100, 116. The latter name seems to have been given him in derision.

<sup>53</sup> Diog. L. ii. 86, 93. In the latter passage and in Suid. s. v. Θιούωρος, many others are mentioned as his masters.

<sup>54</sup> By myself, among others, in the first edition, after Tennemann, cf. his History of Philos. ii. p. 126. Brucker also mentions him among the Cyrenaics, as also do Tiedemann and Buhle. A strict investigation has convinced me there is no ground for so doing. In all probability Euemeros is even older than Theodorus.

<sup>55</sup> Diog. L. ii. 98. τέλος δ' ὑπελάμβανε χαρὰν καὶ λύπην, τὴν μὲν ἐπὶ φρονήσει, τὴν δὲ ἐπὶ ἀφροσύνῃ· ἀγαθὰ δὲ φρόνησιν καὶ δικαιοσύνην κακὰ δὲ τὰς ἐναντίας ἔξει· μέσα δὲ ἡδονὴν καὶ πόνον.

in the assertion of Theodorus, that man is all-sufficient for himself, because his joys depend on his reason alone. With this fundamental principle correspond his more particular precepts, from which we are able to gather what it was that he understood by reason. Friendship and patriotism, which the earlier Cyrenaics had left to man, were rejected by him as unworthy the sage, because generally there is no such thing as friendship, for the fool loves a friend merely for objects and wants of his own; viz.—he loves himself; and the wise man, who is all-sufficient for himself, stands not in need of friends: as to patriotism, the world is the wise man's country, and no sage will sacrifice self for his country, for it would be folly to sacrifice the wise for the sake of fools.<sup>56</sup> But the one-sidedness of this principle is chiefly shewn, in the manner in which all actions are regarded as indifferent. Nothing is bad in its own nature, but solely by opinion, which is established for the subjection of the multitude;<sup>57</sup> consequently, the wise will not hesitate to commit robbery, adultery, and sacrilege, whenever a good opportunity offers itself.<sup>58</sup> In

<sup>56</sup> Diog. L. i. l.; cf. Stob. Serm. cxix. 16, which appears to have been directed against Hegesias.

<sup>57</sup> Diog. L. i. l. ἀνὴρ δὲ καὶ φίλιον, διὰ τὸ μήτε ἐν ἄφροσιν αὐτὴν εἶναι, μήτ' ἐν σόφοις· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ τῆς χρείας ἀναιριθείσης καὶ τὴν φιλίαν ἐκποδῶν εἶναι· τοὺς δὲ σοφοὺς αὐτάρκεις ὑπάρχοντας μὴ δεῖσθαι φίλων. ἔλεγε δὲ καὶ εὐλογον εἶναι τὸν σπουδαῖον μὴ ἐξαγαγεῖν ὑπὲρ τῆς πατρίδος ἑαυτόν. οὐ γὰρ ἀποβαλεῖν τὴν φρόνησιν ἕνεκα τῆς τῶν ἀφρόνων ὀφελείας. εἶναι τε πατρίδα τὸν κόσμον.

<sup>58</sup> Diog. L. ii. 99. (τὸν σπουδαῖον) κλέψειν τε καὶ μοιχεύσειν καὶ ἱεροσυλήσειν ἐν καιρῷ. μηδὲν γὰρ εἶναι τούτων αἰσχρὸν φύσει, τῆς ἐπ' αὐτοῖς δόξης αἰρομένης, ἢ συγκεῖται ἕνεκα τῆς τῶν ἀφρόνων συνοχῆς. According to Plutarch, Theodorus complained that his opinions were misunderstood. It

all this there is no trace of the Socratic moderation; all betokens the effrontery of the sophist. The denial of the existence of a God,<sup>59</sup> by Theodorus and his school, is, seemingly, nothing more, than a further deduction from the earlier Cyrenaic doctrine, that the sage ought to free his mind from all superstition.<sup>60</sup> Such unbelief is the natural result of a theory, which could find no delight or gratification in the beautiful and the good, or in aught save the gloomy haughtiness of its own self-sufficiency.

In this particular, Hegesias and his disciples perfectly coincided with Theodorus, only that pretty clear traces may be discovered of their being gradually struck with a conviction of the vanity of this pretension. Hegesias, it is said, was the disciple of Parabates, a Cyrenaic philosopher.<sup>61</sup> As he is made the third in succession from the elder Aristippus, he was perhaps contemporary, or nearly so, with Epicurus. We find him in Alexandria, where he was forbidden to teach in consequence of having, by his gloomy and painful description of life, driven many to commit suicide; on which account he received the surname of Peisithanatos. He published his theory in a work in which he

is possible that there may be some misconception in all these statements, especially as he maintained integrity to be a good: see above, p. 100, note 55. But perhaps it only consisted in the belief that he wished to lead to every unjust and unholy deed, whereas he, at most, held the indifference of all acts.

<sup>59</sup> Diog. L. ii. 97; Plut. adv. Stoic. 31; Cic. de Nat. Deo. i. 1, 23, 42.

<sup>60</sup> On this account his defence by Clem. Alex. Protr. p. 15, is inadmissible. The statement, that the Cyrenaics taught, that men ought not to pray, seems to refer to this atheism of the Theodorists.

<sup>61</sup> Diog. L. ii. 86.

puts his opinions in the mouth of one who is dying from voluntary starvation.<sup>62</sup>

Since the doctrine of Aristippus was that of a gladsome spirit in the midst of circumstances favourable for enjoyment, its effects must have been widely different in a less happy state of things, and upon characters less accessible to the impressions of gaiety and joy: this is evident in the doctrine of Hegesias. He admitted, indeed, that pleasure is the object of man's desire, and pain of his aversion; but to the Epicurean and similar theories he objected strongly, that happiness cannot be the aim of life, because, in general, it is unattainable, since the body is subject to many maladies, in which the soul must sympathise, and because chance brings about a multitude of events directly counter to man's hopes and wishes.<sup>63</sup> Hegesias, on the contrary, held it impossible for man to give himself up to the gratification of the moment, and he therefore directed his attention to the entire course of man's life; and so arrived at the conclusion that the wise man would limit his wishes to freedom from pain and annoyance.<sup>64</sup> Thus the negative notion of sensual pleasure, which the Cyrenaics had attempted to refute, was again distinctly brought forward; for the followers of Hegesias taught, that nothing is pleasant or unpleasant in itself, but becomes so either by

<sup>62</sup> Diog. L. l. 1.; Cic. Tusc. i. 34; Plut. de Amore Prol. 5.

<sup>63</sup> Diog. L. ii. 94.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid. 96. τὸν δὲ σοφὸν οὐχ οὕτω πλεονάσειν ἐν τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν αἰρέσει, ὥς ἐν τῇ τῶν κακῶν φυγῇ, τέλος τιθέμενον το μὴ ἐπιπόνως ζῆν, μηδὲ λυπηρῶς, ὃ δὴ περιγίνεσθαι τοῖς ἀδιαφορήσασι περὶ τὰ ποιητικὰ τῆς ἡδονῆς.

want or satiety.<sup>65</sup> This neutral result they attempted to shew to be attainable, by advancing, like Theodorus, but in a form still more negative, the doctrine of the self-sufficiency of the individual, and by shewing, that what is usually looked upon as good is no true good. For instance, riches and poverty, freedom and slavery, noble and ignoble birth, glory and infamy, in fine, every thing which may be made an object of enjoyment, is indifferent, considered as real sources of pleasure, for poor and rich, the slave and free, and so on, may equally enjoy pleasure.<sup>66</sup> Consequently, the wise man ought to hold himself indifferent to that which might excite pleasure, and to regard nothing more highly than himself; gratitude, friendship, and benevolence, should be nothing to him.<sup>67</sup> The extreme result of this doctrine must naturally be to represent all action and passion as indifferent; and it found utterance in the position, that life appears really a good to the fool; while, to the rational man, it is a matter of indifference; to him death is as desirable as life.<sup>68</sup>

Anniceris is stated to have been the fellow disciple of Hegesias, although he greatly differed from him in his exposition of the Cyrenaic system. An opinion prevailed amongst the ancients that he subsequently adopted the views of Epicurus;<sup>69</sup> this, however, must not be taken literally, for, on

<sup>65</sup> Ibid. 94. φύσει τε οὐδὲν ἡδὺ ἢ ἀηδὲς ὑπελάμβανον, διὰ δὲ σπάνιν ἢ ξενισμὸν ἢ κόρον τοὺς μὲν ἡδεσθαι, τοὺς δὲ ἀηδῶς ἔχειν.

<sup>66</sup> Diod. L. i. l.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid. 93—96.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid. 94. τήν τε ζώην καὶ τὸν θάνατον αἰρετόν. 95. καὶ τῷ μὲν ἄφρονι τὸ ζῆν λυσιτελεῖς εἶναι, τῷ δὲ φρονίμῳ ἀδιάφορον.

<sup>69</sup> Suid. s. v. Ἀννικερις.



the contrary, we find him in general directly opposing them, and only inclining towards them in a few points; still, however, so far as to justify the assertion, that upon a consequential development of these points he would be found to agree fully with Epicurus. It is chiefly in two points that his doctrine is opposed to the Epicurean: one, that he did not acknowledge that life was given for any general object, but that every act has its particular object; *viz.*, the pleasure which arises out of the act itself: the other, that he did not reduce pleasure to a mere absence of pain, for in that case death would be a pleasure, but maintained that it has a positive element.<sup>70</sup> In this he merely re-asserted the fundamental principle of his school. By the Cyrenaics, of his own and earlier times, its consequences had been brought out so prominently, as naturally to give rise to the wish and endeavour to obviate the deduction of such inferences by a milder interpretation. This is perceptible in the admission of Anniceris, that our efforts ought not to be directed exclusively to the immediate pleasure of the moment, but that we should be willing to endure pain for the sake of the pleasure which would result from it; as, for instance, the gratification arising from an act of benevolence or of friendship.<sup>71</sup> A similar softening of their leading

<sup>70</sup> Clem. Alex. Strom. ii. p. 417. οἱ δὲ Ἀννικέρειοι καλούμενοι — τοῦ μὲν ὅλου βίου τέλος οὐδὲν ὀρισμένον ἔταξαν· ἐκάστης δὲ πράξεως ἴδιον ὑπάρχειν τέλος, τὴν ἐκ τῆς πράξεως, περιγινωμένην ἡδονήν. οὗτοι οἱ Κυρηναῖκοι τὸν ὕρον τῆς ἡδονῆς Ἐπικούρου, τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τὴν τοῦ ἀλγοῦντος ὑπεξαίρεσιν, ἀθετοῦσιν, νεκροῦ κατάστασιν ἀποκαλοῦντες.

<sup>71</sup> Diog. L. ii. 97. τὸν τε φίλον μὴ διὰ τὰς χρείας μόνον ἀποδέχεσθαι, ὣν ὑπολειπουσῶν μὴ ἐπιστρέφειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ παρὰ τὴν γεγενυῖάν.

principles is seemingly visible in the opinion of Anniceris, that the reason is insufficient to render the sage unerring, and to raise him above the opinion of the vulgar, but that habit is requisite to destroy the wrong and evil affections.<sup>72</sup>

In all this there is evidently a growing tendency to view man's life as a whole; but, at the same time, we cannot fail to see therein the gradual falsification of the Cyrenaic Philosophy. Anniceris seems to have maintained the value of intellectual pleasures in opposition to the selfish views of Theodorus and Hegesias. Hence arises a proof, that in the estimate of pleasure, individual tastes and inclinations must always prevail. We, at the same time, perceive the impossibility of arriving at a right estimate of pure pleasure if we start from a comparison of its several species. Anniceris, who could find a pleasure in friendship, in the society of his fellow men, in the love of parents and country, in gratitude and a sense of honour, even when they are attended with a sacrifice, did not fail to perceive, that the sage must submit to many deductions from his own personal enjoyments.<sup>73</sup> In what way this view was further carried out, so as to form the Epicurean doctrine, we shall see here-

*εὐνοίαν, ἧς ἕνεκα καὶ πόνους ὑπομένειν· καίτοι τιθέμενον ἡδονὴν τέλος καὶ ἀχθόμενον ἐπὶ τῷ στέρεσθαι αὐτῆς ὕμῳς ἰκονσίως ὑπομένειν διὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸν φίλον στοργήν.*

<sup>72</sup> Ibid. 96. *μη εἶναι δὲ αὐτάρκη τὸν λόγον πρὸς τὸ θαρρῆσαι καὶ τῆς τῶν πολλῶν δόξης ὑπεράνω γενέσθαι. δεῖν δὲ ἀνεθίξισθαι εἰς τὴν ἐκ πολλοῦ συντραφέισαν ἡμῖν φαύλην διάθεσιν.*

<sup>73</sup> Diog. L. ii. 96. *ἀπέλιπον δὲ καὶ φιλίαν ἐν βίῳ καὶ χάριν καὶ πρὸς γονέας τιμὴν καὶ ὑπὲρ πατρίδος τι πράξειν. ὅθεν διὰ ταῦτα κἂν ὀχλήσεις ἀποδείξῃται ὁ σοφός, οὐδὲν ἥττον εὐδαιμονήσει, κἂν ὀλίγα ἡδέα περιγίγηται αὐτῷ. Clem. Alex. l. i. χαίρειν γὰρ ἡμᾶς μὴ μόνον ἐπὶ ἡδοναῖς, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπὶ ὁμιλίαις καὶ ἐπὶ φιλοτιμίαις.*

after. In following the historical connection of these schools, we have already been carried beyond the time of the first Socraticists, though we have only met with doctrines which, we may confidently assert, were all in existence even before the time of Socrates. The merit of the Cyrenaics consists solely in their having given to them a scientific form whereby the decision as to their value or worthlessness was facilitated.

## CHAPTER IV.

### ANTISTHENES AND THE CYNICS.

ANTISTHENES an Athenian, born of a Phrygian or Thracian mother, was originally a disciple of Gorgias, and is said to have given his mind to the practice of sophistical rhetoric, and to have presided over a school.<sup>1</sup> Subsequently, he became acquainted with Socrates, and, up to the time of his execution, remained his faithful disciple.<sup>2</sup> At the date of this acquaintance he appears somewhat advanced in age, with his moral and scientific opinion already formed, which circumstance, in some measure, accounts for his having regarded the Socratic system in a partial and one-sided light;<sup>3</sup> but it must be noticed that the sternness of his character also contributed to this, as likewise his fondness of exaggeration, which Socrates appears, not without sufficient reason, to have attributed to a vain desire of admiration.<sup>4</sup> After the death of Socrates his one-sidedness appears to have shewn itself more decidedly both in life and doctrine.

<sup>1</sup> Diog. L. vi. 1 and 2. One of his dialogues was composed against Gorgias. Athen. v. 33, p. 220.

<sup>2</sup> Diog. L. vi. 2; Xenoph. Mem. iii. 11, nr. 17; Plato, Phæd. p. 59.

<sup>3</sup> Plato describes Antisthenes, not by name, it is true, but still clearly enough, as a γέρον and δψιμαθής, and speaks of his *κενία τῆς περὶ φρόνησιν κτήσεως*. Sop. p. 251. In another passage, Phileb. p. 44, again without naming him, he imputes to him, in reference to his ethical opinions, *δυσχέρεια φύσεως οὐκ ἀγεννοῦς*.

<sup>4</sup> Diog. L. vi. 8.

He founded, at this time, a school in the Cynosarges,<sup>5</sup> a gymnasium near the temple of Hercules, whom he regarded as a type of manly virtue. His followers were sometimes called by his name, but more commonly Cynics, in allusion to the place of resort, or rather, perhaps, to the habits of the school, which to the more refined Athenians appeared those of dogs rather than of men. Antisthenes believed that philosophy consisted in action rather than in speculation. He was poor, and by birth excluded from all political rights; in this, however, he gloried, and taught that the true dignity of man consists in wisdom, and wisdom in independence of mind.<sup>6</sup> This independence, or rather, freedom from all restraint, he strove to attain by rendering his wants as few and simple as possible; accordingly, in his exterior he resembled a mendicant, assuming a staff and wallet, whilst his whole dress was mean and negligent. Undoubtedly, this was nothing more than an expression of opposition to the gradually increasing luxury and pleasure of the age; his wish and object being to bring men back to their original simplicity in life and manners. Thus he set himself directly against the tendency and civilization of his age, as is clear from many of his sayings, which are tinged at once with bitterness and wit. And although this was scarcely more than a negative resistance, yet, as he obstinately placed himself in opposition to the

<sup>5</sup> The Cynosarges was a Gymnasium for Athenians born of foreign mothers. Plut. Themist. i. It was, therefore, his proper place, and he found there a suitable sphere of action.

<sup>6</sup> Xenoph. Conv. 4, nr. 34, sq.

<sup>7</sup> Diog. L. vi. 4, 18; Ælian. Var. Hist. x. 16.

circumstances in which he lived, and to the advancing progress of science, his position must naturally have reacted upon the feelings of his contemporaries towards himself. We consequently find that his school met with little encouragement, and this so annoyed him, that he drove away the few scholars he had. Diogenes of Sinope, who resembled him in character, is said to have been the only one who remained with him to his death. When we consider the many traces of ostentation and vanity discoverable in the life and conduct of Antisthenes, we are tempted, at times, to ascribe to such a source, the multitude and diversity of his writings, although, perhaps, they are rather a lurking consequence of his previous sophistical labours. It was not, assuredly, the richness of his philosophical ideas which incited him to the composition of so many works; in which, however, although they evinced great penetration and acuteness,<sup>9</sup> and bore a striking resemblance to the rhetorical manner of Gorgias, even the ancients could not discover many signs of erudition.

The doctrine of Antisthenes was mainly confined to morals; but, even in this portion of philosophy, it is exceedingly meagre and deficient, scarcely furnishing anything beyond a general defence of the olden simplicity and moral energy,

<sup>8</sup> Timo Sillogr. ap. Diog. L. vi. 18. For the catalogue of his works, see *ibid.* 15—18.

<sup>9</sup> Cic. ad Attic. xii. 38; Diog. L. vi. 1. As to his works, cf. Lobeck *Aglaoph.* p. 159; Welcker. *Rhein. Mus. s. Phil.* § 592, sq. We possess two declamations usually attributed to Antisthenes—*Ajax* and *Ulysses*. Whether they are or not genuine, it is difficult to say. They exhibit traces of the manner of Gorgias, but only very doubtful vestiges of the doctrines of Antisthenes. Fors de Gorg. 94, ascribes them to Antisthenes.

against the luxurious indulgence and effeminacy of later times, with a particular reference, however, to the Aristippic doctrine of pleasure. In all this there is undoubtedly a certain virtuous zeal, as is expressed in the maxim,—in all, that the wise man does, he conforms himself to perfect virtue;—still, instead of being duly tempered by the Socratic moderation, it was carried to excess. There is reason, however, to fear, that, in many of the accounts which have come down to us from antiquity, his doctrine is painted in somewhat exaggerated colours. The ancients were led into this error partly by the immoderation and extravagance of the later Cynics, and partly deceived by certain propositions in his writings, which were advanced not so much as his own personal opinions, as of those of his interlocutors: for Antisthenes, like most of the disciples of Socrates, published his works in the form of dialogue.

Among these exaggerated statements we are disposed to reckon the one which represented him as depreciating science, and teaching that even to learn to read and write is pernicious, as they withdraw us from the true purpose of life;<sup>10</sup> for, otherwise, there must have been a striking contradiction between the doctrines and the practice of one so fond of composition; unless, perhaps, we should be nearer the truth in supposing that the peevishness of old age led him vainly to lament his own

<sup>10</sup> Schol. in Hom. Il. O. 123, ed. Bekk. ἐκ τούτου καὶ Ἀντισθένης φησὶν, ὥς εἴ τι πράττει ὁ σοφός, κατὰ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν ἐνεργεῖ, ὥς καὶ ἡ Ἀθηνᾶ τριχῶς νουθετεῖ τὸν Ἄρην.

<sup>11</sup> Diog. L. vi. 11, 103.

literary labours.<sup>12</sup> At all events, it may be fairly assumed, that, like all other disciples of Socrates, he argued that every single science is only so far of value as it promotes man's moral interests. It was, probably, for this reason, that he wished all science to bear a reference to virtue; for he held, with Socrates, that virtue is learnable;<sup>13</sup> but he could hardly have agreed with later Cynics in their rejection of the physical and logical portion of philosophy,<sup>14</sup> since he composed a treatise upon physics, not, as might be expected, in order to depreciate, but to throw light upon that province of inquiry.<sup>15</sup> His writings appear also to have contained many logical and grammatical precepts.<sup>16</sup>

Of his theory of pleasure and pain much is told us which not only of itself suggests a suspicion of exaggeration, but fails to coincide with other accounts. Thus, he is represented as teaching, that pain, or labour, and even infamy, is a good,<sup>17</sup> and pleasure, on the contrary, an evil; for he is made to say—"I had rather go mad than experience pleasure."<sup>18</sup> In this we cannot fail to recognise

<sup>12</sup> Of this moroseness there is proof in his aphorism in Philo. Quod. Omn. Prob. lib. 5, p. 449. *δυσβάστακτον εἶναι τὸν ἀστυϊόν*.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid. 8, 10.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid. 103. The division of philosophy, here implied, can hardly have been known to Antisthenes.

<sup>15</sup> See the catalogue of his works, Diog. L. vi. 15—18. Cic. de Nat. D. i. 13.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. Schleiermacher upon Plato, ii. 2, p. 16.

<sup>17</sup> Diog. L. vi. 2, 11. *τὴν τε ἀδοξίαν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἴσον τῷ πόνῳ*. With this *ἀδοξία* we must compare the *ἀτυφία*, which, according to Clem. Alex. Strom. ii. p. 417, was recommended by Antisthenes; i. e. if the reading be correct.

<sup>18</sup> Diog. L. vi. 3. *μανεῖην μᾶλλον ἢ ἡσθεῖην*. Sext. Emp. adv. Math. xi. 74.



at once the opposition of Antisthenes to Aristippus. Indeed we might feel disposed to see therein traces of a deeper wisdom, as if, while the latter maintained that it is the objects of the mental excitement that constitutes the good, the former had perceived that the end lies in the excitement itself, and the profit in the pursuit. Nevertheless, his investigations do not appear to have been so profound;<sup>19</sup> and it would, perhaps, be idle to suppose that the controversy between these conflicting views was already reduced to so strict a form, and has stamped itself so deeply on the very terms of dispute. There are grounds for assuming that Antisthenes in his zeal against mere enjoyment, termed pleasure evil or contemptible;<sup>20</sup> he even appears to have formed a sort of theory on the subject, in which he attempted to prove that properly there is no such thing as pleasure,<sup>21</sup> but that it consists merely in the limitation of pain: a view which he must have drawn chiefly from a consideration of corporeal pleasure, which results from the gratification of desire. Yet it does not therefore follow, that he wished to exclude all pleasure from a rational conduct of life, but only that impure and sensual species,<sup>22</sup> which, flowing from artificial desires, ceases with their gratification, and consequently is incompatible with true equanimity.

<sup>19</sup> My opinion has been founded on the want of connexion in the Cynic doctrine, and the little estimation it was held in by Plato and Aristotle.

<sup>20</sup> Arist. Eth. Nic. x. 1. οἱ δ' ἐξ ἐναντίας κομιδῇ φαῦλον (sc. τὴν ἡδονήν), most assuredly alludes to Antisthenes and his school.

<sup>21</sup> With Schleiermacher I refer to Antisthenes the passage in Plat. Phil. p. 44, sq.; cf. de Rep. ix. p. 583, sq.

<sup>22</sup> Pleasure is οὐδὲν ὑγιές, Plat. l. l.

This inference is supported by many of the apophthegms of this philosopher, in which we find him commending intellectual pleasure, (a true pleasure of soul,) and those enjoyments which spring from the natural wants of man.<sup>23</sup> He seems to have given a compendious expression of his doctrine of pleasure and labour, in the maxim, that man must not strive after sensual gratifications, which relax and enervate the soul, but such only as result from business and action.<sup>24</sup> According to this, he might justly term both labour and pain a good, but still only so far as they are a mean to sound pleasure—the wealth and freedom of soul—and as they endow men with true virtue, and assimilate them to the gods.<sup>25</sup>

The more precise formula in which Antisthenes advanced his doctrine of the supreme good is, unquestionably, that which defines it to be a life

<sup>23</sup> Xenoph. Symp. iv. nr. 41. *καὶ γὰρ ὅταν ἡδυνασθῇσαι βουλευθῶ, οὐκ ἐκ τῆς ἀγορᾶς τὰ τίμια ὠνοῦμαι· πολυτελεῖ γὰρ γίγνεται· ἀλλ' ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς ταμιεύομαι. καὶ πολλὸν πλεῖον διαφέρει πρὸς ἡβονήν, ὅταν ἀναμίσχῃς τὸ δεηθῆναι προσφέρωμαι, ἢ ὅταν τινὶ τῶν τιμίων χρῶμαι.*

<sup>24</sup> Stob. Serm. cxix. 65. *ἡδονὰς τὰς μετὰ τοὺς πόνους ἐιωκτικόν, ἀλλὰ οὐχὶ τὰς πρὸ τῶν πόνων.*

<sup>25</sup> Xenoph. l. i. 42. *οἷς γὰρ μάλιστα τὰ παρόντα ἀρκεῖ, ἥκιστα τῶν ἀλλοτριῶν ὀρέγονται. ἀξίον δ' ἐννοῆσαι, ὡς καὶ ἐλευθερίους τοιαῦτος πλοῦτος παρέχεται κ. τ. λ.* Diog. L. vi. 105. Rixner, in his Manual of the History of Philosophy, quotes, as he gives out, from the apophthegmata of Plutarch, the following passages: *τὴν ἀρετὴν οὐκ ἄνεν πόνον· ἀλλ' ὁ πόνος ἀγαθὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐναρέτους καὶ ἐγγενεῖς καὶ θεοὺς ποιεῖ.* The positions are quite in the spirit of Antisthenes. But there is no work of Plutarch with the title Apophthegmata barely, and I have looked in vain for them in the Apophthegmata Regum et Imperatorum and the Apophthegmata Laconica, as also in other works of Plutarch. How πόνος is the best mean to the attainment of the supreme good, and how consistent it was with the ancient simplicity of manners and imperfect education, Antisthenes seems to have illustrated by Hercules and Cyrus as models of virtue. Diog. L. vi. 2. Cf. Julian Orat. vi. p. 187.

according to virtue.<sup>26</sup> Virtue, he teaches, is sufficient for happiness, and needs nothing except an indwelling Socratic energy;<sup>27</sup> consequently, whatever intervenes between virtue and vice,—riches, for example, and honour, and noble birth, are morally indifferent, and the moral problem is to render oneself indifferent to such things.<sup>28</sup> Further, virtue consists in action, and requires neither many words nor extensive knowledge, and, when once it has gained a firm footing in the soul, can never be lost; consequently, the sage is raised above possibility of error.<sup>29</sup> This conception of virtue places it in the closest connexion with reason, and in this respect we cannot fail to recognise its Socratic character. It is true Antisthenes considered the Socratic energy a necessary element of virtue; nevertheless, as he held virtue to be attainable, the constancy and firmness of the moral character can have no other ground than the light of reason, which is the true root and essence of virtue.<sup>30</sup> Hence he very pointedly says, “man must have reason or a halter.”<sup>31</sup>

But still the question may be further raised,

<sup>26</sup> Diog. L. vi. 104. ἀρεσκέϊ δ' αὐτοῖς καὶ τέλος εἶναι τὸ κατ' ἀρετὴν ζῆν, ὡς Ἀντισθένης φησὶν ἐν τῷ Ἡρακλεῖ.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid. 11. αὐτάρκη γὰρ τὴν ἀρετὴν εἶναι πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν, μηδενὸς προσδεόμενῃ, ὅτι μὴ Σωκρατικῆς ἰσχύος.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid. 105. τὰ δὲ μετὰ αὐτὴν ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας ἀδιάφορα λέγουσιν. Ibid. 2. τὸν ἀπαθὲς ζηλώσας.

<sup>29</sup> Diog. L. vi. 11. τὴν ἀρετὴν τῶν ἔργων εἶναι. Ibid. 12. ἀναφαίρετον ὕπλον ἀρετῆς. Ibid. 105. τὴν ἀρετὴν—ἀναπόβλητον ὑπάρχειν.—τὸν σοφὸν—ἀναμάρτητον.

<sup>30</sup> Diog. L. vi. 13. τεῖχος ἀσφαλέστατον — φρόνησιν. — τεῖχη κατασκευαστέον ἐν τοῖς αὐτῶν ἀναλώτοις λογισμοῖς. Cf. *ibid.* 7, 8.

<sup>31</sup> Plut. de Stoic. Rep. 14. δεῖν κτᾶσθαι νοῦν ἢ βρόχον. This is elsewhere attributed to Diogenes. Diog. L. vi. 24.

wherein does this light of reason consist? and this question is extremely appropriate, inasmuch as Antisthenes acknowledges that every species of knowledge or science is not equally necessary to a virtuous life; the answer, however, which he gives is neither such as we should expect or desire, for he is unable to give any further information as to what is virtue and goodness than that it is the insight into the good;<sup>32</sup> and he only repeats this, with a slightly different turn, when in answer to the question, how one might become virtuous, he says that he 'must learn to avoid evil from those who possess this rational insight.'<sup>33</sup> In both cases alike we are referred to some unknown insight. In the latter, however, the negative character of his moral doctrines, as formed in opposition to the effeminacy of his contemporaries, is exhibited in a strong light, as is also the case in his apophthegm, that the most necessary science is, to unlearn evil.<sup>34</sup>

This negative tendency is further shewn from another point of view. For instance, he wished to isolate the moral man—the sage—entirely within himself, and withdraw him from all natural connexion with others. By this attempt to make

<sup>32</sup> Plat. de Rep. vi. p. 505. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τόδε γε οἶσθα, ὅτι τοῖς μὲν πολλοῖς ἡδονὴ δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθόν, τοῖς δὲ κομψοτέροις φρόνησις — καὶ ὅτι γε οἱ τοῦτο ἡγούμενοι οὐκ ἔχουσι δεῖξαι, ἥτις φρόνησις, ἀλλ' ἀναγκάζονται τελευτῶντες τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φάναι. Antisthenes is not expressly named, but yet indicated clearly enough, as well as the Socraticists who thought with him, by the antithesis.

<sup>33</sup> Phanias ap. Diog. L. vi. 8. ἐρωτηθεὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ, τί ποιῶν καλῶς κάγαθός ἐσοίτο, ἔφη· εἰ τὰ κακὰ, ἃ ἔχεις, ὅτι φευκτά ἐστι μάθοις παρὰ τῶν εἰδότην.

<sup>34</sup> Diog. L. vi. 7. ἐρωτηθεὶς, τί τῶν μαθημάτων ἀναγκαιότατον, ἔφη. τὸ κακὰ ἀπομαθεῖν.

the individual a self-sufficient whole, his system necessarily became as selfish as that of the Cyrenaics, only in a different sense.<sup>35</sup> Accordingly, the Cynics maintained that the sage ought to be free from all outward influences, and superior to all the accidents of chance and change;<sup>36</sup> while Antisthenes denied the moral worth of affection and love of kin,<sup>37</sup> and saw in wedlock no higher nor better end than the propagation of the species.<sup>38</sup> In general, too, he contemned all civil institutions, and regarded them as nought when compared with the virtue of the sage; indeed, he even seems to have renounced the ties of country.<sup>39</sup> From this contempt of all social institutions arose the shamelessness of the Cynics, who were restrained by no custom of law or society, and the insolence of these pretended sages, so proud of their freedom and independence. The germ of these notions may be traced in the doctrines of Antisthenes, who declared that nothing is strange or unlawful in the wise man, except evil, nothing unbecoming

<sup>35</sup> Diogenes himself expressly declared that Cynicism was only a different way from the vulgar one to pleasure. Diog. L. vi. 71.

<sup>36</sup> Diog. L. vi. 105.

<sup>37</sup> Diog. L. vi. 12.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid. 11; cf. 72. He did not reject the irregular gratifications of the passion. Cf. Diog. L. vi. 3, 4.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid. 11. τὸν σοφὸν οὐ κατὰ τοὺς κειμένους νόμους πολιτεύεσθαι, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸν τῆς ἀρετῆς. Rixner has given us also from the same inaccessible apophthegms of Plutarch ἀνδρὶ σοφῷ πᾶσα γῆ πατρίς. This is found in Philo. quod Omn. Prob. Lib. 20, p. 458, without the name of Antisthenes. This dogma was perpetuated in the Cynic school. Diog. L. vi. 63, 72, 93. This indifference to the ties of a citizen was perhaps connected with his own ignobleness of birth, and with his ill opinion of the Athenian constitution. Diog. L. vi. 8. To this there is, perhaps, a reference in Arist. Pol. iii. 13.

except immorality.<sup>40</sup> We must not, however, forget to call attention to the fact, that the example of Socrates, or his own sociable temperament, prevented Antisthenes from being wholly indifferent to the ties and pleasures of friendship, in which he permitted the sage to indulge so long as his choice is determined by the standard of virtue.<sup>41</sup>

There is, however, one point, on which we may well expect to find his views of morality stretching far beyond the narrow consideration of the sage, individually and personally. This was connected with his physical doctrine, which, as we have already observed, was not altogether negative; for in it, we are told, Antisthenes treated of the being and attributes of the gods.<sup>42</sup> We may well suppose that, on this point, his opinions would closely approximate to those of Socrates, since the sentiments of his scholar, Diogenes of Sinope, were of a similar nature.<sup>43</sup> Antisthenes was, perhaps, sensible, that even when our wants are restricted within the narrowest limits, the gratification of them is not, even then, absolutely within our command, but is dependent upon external circumstances. In order, therefore, to maintain, in spite of this, the

<sup>40</sup> Ibid. 12. τῷ γὰρ σοφῷ ξένον οὐδέν, οὐδ' ἄπο.—τάγαθὰ καλὰ τὰ κακὰ αἰσχροῦ τὰ πονηρὰ πάντα ἐνόμιζε ξενικά. Cf. Sext. Emp. Hyp. Pyrrh. iii. 199.

<sup>41</sup> Stob. Serm. i. 30; Diog. L. vi. 11. μόνον γὰρ εἶδέναι τὸν σοφόν, τίνων χρὴ ἐρᾶν. Ibid. 14, 15, 105; Plut. Amator. 15. In his Hercules he must have treated at length of the influence of Love and Beauty. Procl. in Plat. Alcib. p. 239, ed. Cous. On the other hand, Clem. Alex. Strom. ii. p. 406, speaks of the unphilosophical love of women. His veneration of Beauty was, in all probability, connected with the Socratic view that the beauty of the body is an index of the beauty of the mind. Schol. in Hom. Il. ψ. 65, ed. Beekh.

<sup>42</sup> Cic. de Nat. D. i. 13.

<sup>43</sup> Diog. L. vi. 72.

sufficiency of virtue for happiness, he must shew that all contingent circumstances are so disposed, that the wise man may gratify his wants; and in this he was assisted by the Socratic doctrine—that, in the universe, all is regulated by a divine intelligence, from design, so as to benefit the good man, who is the friend of God. For the sage shall possess all things.<sup>44</sup> This doctrine of God, therefore, was connected with his ethical opinions by indicating the physical conditions of a happy life. It led him, however, to deviate from Socrates, and to declare, that, in opposition to the vulgar Polytheism, there is but one natural God, but many popular deities;<sup>45</sup> that God cannot be known or recognised in any form or figure, since he is like to nothing on earth.<sup>46</sup> Hence, undoubtedly, arose his allegorical explanation of mythology,<sup>47</sup> and his doubts of the demoniac intimations of Socrates.<sup>48</sup>

Some logical propositions have likewise been attributed to Antisthenes, which exhibit an appearance of sophistry, and have, therefore, been regarded as a relic of his previous labours. Still we cannot believe, that a true disciple of Socrates could have consciously employed such propositions for purely sophistical purposes. Neither Plato nor Aristotle seem to have supposed such a thing, but rather to have imputed to the deficiencies of his

<sup>44</sup> Diog. L. vi. 11.

<sup>45</sup> Cic. l. l. Antisthenes in eo libro, qui physicus inscribitur, populares deos multos, naturalem unum esse dicens tollit vim et naturam Deorum.

<sup>46</sup> Clem. Alex. Strom. v. p. 601. ὅ τε Σωκρατικὸς Ἀντισθένης—οὐδενὶ εἰκόνα φησὶν (τὸν θεόν)· διόπερ αὐτὸν οὐδεὶς ἐκμαθεῖν ἐξ εἰκότος δύναται.

<sup>47</sup> Buttmann scholia antiqua in Hom. Odyss. p. 561. Cf. Lobeck Aglaoph. p. 159.

<sup>48</sup> Xenoph. Symp. 8, nr. 5.

judgment the partial and exclusive character of his doctrines. By what process, moreover, he arrived at them, and what import they had in his mind, is left to conjecture. He held, that the essence of a thing cannot be expressed in a definition; for of every individual it can only be said, that it is that which it is, repeating, in each case, the same name, since one thing can neither be another nor many. Thus we may say of man, he is a man; and of the good, it is good; but not of man, that he is good. Consequently, a definition properly determines nothing more than some single quality of a thing, by which it is like to another;—e. g. when it is said of silver, it is white, like tin.<sup>49</sup> These propositions are in perfect keeping with the assertion, that man cannot dispute, because only the same can be said of the same; by which, however, Antisthenes did not intend to condemn the refutation of error, but merely captious disputation.<sup>50</sup> It appears to be in consistency with this that he attacked the truth of the higher Platonic ideas, since he may have looked upon such as mere conceptions of man, drawn, probably, from the mutual resemblances

<sup>49</sup> Aristot. Met. viii. 3. ὥστε ἡ ἀπορία, ἣν οἱ Ἀντισθένησι καὶ οἱ οὕτως ἀπαίδευτοι ἠπόρουσαν, ἔχει τινὰ καιρὸν, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι τὸ τι ἔστιν ὀρίσασθαι· τὸν γὰρ ὅρον λόγον εἶναι μακρόν· ἀλλὰ ποῖον μὲν τι ἔστιν ἐνέχουσθαι καὶ διδάξαι, ὥσπερ ἀργύριον, τί μὲν ἔστιν, οὐδ', ὅτι ὁ' οἷον καττίτερος. Ibid. v. 29. διὸ Ἀντισθένης φέρετο εὐήθως μηδὲν ἀξιῶν λέγεσθαι πλὴν τῷ οἰκείῳ λόγῳ ἐν ἑφ' ἑνός· ἐξ ὧν συνέβαινε μὴ εἶναι ἀντιλέγειν. Top. i. 11; Plat. Soph. p. 251; cf. Theæt. p. 201, d. sq. As to the difficulty the ancients felt in respect to the predicating one thing of another, cf. Arist. Phys. i. 2, and Simpl. ad h. l. fol. 20, a. and b. The notice in Diog. L. vi. 3, as to the definition of the λόγος, which Antisthenes was the first to give, does not admit of any sure explanation.

<sup>50</sup> Stob. Serm. lxxxii. 8. οὐκ ἀντιλέγοντα δεῖ τὸν ἀντιλέγοντα παύειν, ἀλλὰ διδάσκειν· οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸν μαινόμενον ἀντιμαϊνόμενός τις ἰᾶται.



of things, and, in support of his view, appealed to the fact, man may indeed be seen, but not manhood.<sup>51</sup> If, therefore, he held, with Socrates, that the first step necessary in every inquiry is to define the word or name of that which was in question, he cannot have advanced this precept in the same meaning as his master; for, with him the question is not, to determine what a thing is, but how the object in dispute is termed. In fact, we cannot but feel surprised to meet with such propositions in a disciple of Socrates, whose chief aim was directed to the right explications of terms; and our astonishment, in this particular instance, can only be lessened by discovering similar misconceptions, not in one, but in many of the philosophers who were formed in the school of Socrates.<sup>52</sup> It seems, that after Socrates, with the co-operation of the Sophists, had introduced logical investigations, many partial and one-sided opinions arose as to the right method, in consequence of his having shewn the difficulties of a correct definition rather than the rules for its attainment. In this way, the opinion might easily have been formed among his disciples, that a correct explanation is impossible; each particular object of thought has its peculiar essence, which can only be seized by immediate intuition, and may, indeed, be compared

<sup>51</sup> Tzet. Chil. vii. 605, sq. ψιλὰς ἐννοίας γὰρ φησι ταύτας (sc. τὰς ἰδέας) ὁ Ἀντισθένης

λέγων, βλέπω μὲν ἄνθρωπον καὶ ἵππον δὲ ὁμοίως,

ἱππότητα οὐ βλέπω δέ, οὐδ' ἀνθρωπότητα γε.

Upon this point consult also Simpl. in Ar. Cat. 3, fol. 54, 13. Ammon. Herm. in Porphy. Inst. p. 19; Interpr. Lat. Venet. 1559. Cf. Diog. L. vi. 53.

<sup>52</sup> Arrian. Epict. Diss. i. 17. ἀρχὴ παιδείσεως ἡ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐπίσκεψις.

with the essence of another thing, but not explained by it; consequently, the predication of one thing of another is merely a simile referring to particular points and marks, by which, however, the true essence of the thing is not exhibited. Such a view seems to be intimately allied with the whole character of Antisthenes' doctrine, which has a strong tendency to individualise and to isolate. It may, however, have been employed by him with a design to exhibit the vanity of every scientific procedure, which has not a reference to the moral actions of man—nay, even to palliate and to justify his own imperfect definitions of morality.<sup>53</sup> And thus, even this portion of his doctrine may well consort with its general direction towards practical life.

In the later Cynics, all scientific purpose seems to have fallen still further into the background. With them, philosophy was merely the art of living. Diogenes of Sinope, the famous scholar of Antisthenes, sought to restrict philosophy altogether to practice, and to the means which ensure the attainment of a pleasant life,<sup>54</sup> which, according to him, consist solely in dispensing with all, even the most simple and most necessary wants: on this account, and as carrying to excess the Socratic simplicity of life, he has been called the mad Socrates. According to the accounts we have of his doctrines,<sup>55</sup> he seems to have held peculiar and origi-

<sup>53</sup> The mode in which, according to Arist. Eth. Nicom. vii. 12, the Hellenic doctrine is controverted on the ground, *οὐ γὰρ εἶναι αὐτὸ τὸ εἰπαθὲν καὶ ἡδονήν*, belonged probably to Antisthenes, and may have been a particular application of his position, that a notion cannot be explained by another.

<sup>54</sup> Diog. L. vi. 70.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid. 70—73.

nal views of the universe, which, however, were very unsystematic, and imperfectly carried out.<sup>56</sup> As, however, the opinion is well-founded that he did not himself commit his opinions to writing,<sup>57</sup> but little reliance can be placed on the traditionary statement of them by others. The leading trait in his character was a biting and caustic sarcasm; while the most famous of his disciples, Crates, the husband of the philosophical Hipparchia, seems to have been of a softer and more benevolent disposition, and on this account he forms, not inappropriately, the transition to the Stoical school, as formed by his disciple Zeno. Otherwise, there is nothing either in him or contemporaneous and later Cynics, such as Monimos, Onesicritus, Metrocles, Menippus, and Menedemus, which is evidence of original and peculiar scientific enlightenment.

<sup>56</sup> They contain many vestiges of Heraclitic doctrines, which Schleiermacher thinks, are also traceable in those of Antisthenes, while the connexion of the Stoics and the Cynics favours the conjecture. Cf. *ibid.* nr. 32, 37, 72, 73.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.* 80.

## CHAPTER V.

### SCHOOLS OF MEGARA, ELIS, AND ERETRIA.

UPON the death of Socrates, Plato and the majority of his disciples retired to Megara, probably from fear of some popular outbreak of the Athenians, who were in a state of excitement against all who had been the friends and companions of the philosopher.<sup>1</sup>

For a while, perhaps, a common regret for their late master, and a desire to continue their previous philosophical intercourse, served as a bond of union, of which Euclid, who seems to have been one of the oldest disciples of Socrates, and dwelt at Megara, was at once the centre and the attraction. This society was, however, speedily dissolved by causes easy to be conceived : for as it had been mainly brought about by external considerations, it was naturally broken up by a difference of opinion and sentiments among its members. Of these, a few remained with Euclid, who formed a school which lasted for a considerable period at Megara, which town, although it was small, was, nevertheless, by the frugality and industry, as well as the talents and acuteness of its inhabitants, eminently fitted to become a seat of philosophical learning.

Although Euclid was one of the most devoted

<sup>1</sup> Diog. L. ii. 106 ; iii. 6.

disciples of Socrates,<sup>2</sup> this did not prevent him from studying the doctrines of the Eleatæ,<sup>3</sup> from whom he appears to have drawn many of his opinions, as well as that fondness for subtle and captious disputation, which brought upon him the reproofs of his great master, as evincing a disposition for sophistry.<sup>4</sup> In all probability, we shall be justified in classing him among those, who, ripe in years and judgment, when they acceded to the circle of Socrates, were unable to renounce altogether their earlier opinions.<sup>5</sup> He is cited as an example of moderation and conciliating temper.<sup>6</sup> There are many dialogues extant under his name, the genuineness of which has been called in question by modern criticism.<sup>7</sup>

The character of the Megarian doctrine, so far as it is possible to fix it, in the defective state of our information, may be briefly given as the Eleatic view, enlarged by the Socratic conviction of the moral obligation and the laws of scientific thought. The ancients unanimously agree in connecting it with the Eleatæ.<sup>8</sup> The Megarian philosophers are consequently said to have maintained that, there is but one unalterable being, which cannot be known by the senses, but by the reason alone. This,

<sup>2</sup> Plat. Theæt. init. ; Gell. Noct. Att. vi. 10.

<sup>3</sup> Diog. L. ii. 106 ; cf. Cic. Qu. Acad. ii. 42 ; Aristocles ap. Euseb. Pr. Ev. xiv. 17.

<sup>4</sup> Diog. L. ii. 30.

<sup>5</sup> On this point consult my treatise on the Megarian Philosophy in the Rhein. Mus. f. Philol. 2 ; Jahrg. 3 Hft. § 298 cf. also ; Ferd. Deycks de Megaricorum doctrina ejusque apud Platonem et Aristotelem vestigiis. Bonn. 1827.

<sup>6</sup> Plut. de Frat. Am. 18.

<sup>7</sup> Diog. L. ii. 64 ; 108, Suid. s. v. *Ἐκλειδης*.

<sup>8</sup> Cic. Aristocl. *ibid*.

in conformity with the ethical tendency of Socrates, Euclid called "the good," and it was also denominated God, reason, intelligence, and the like; all else that is contrary to good exists not;<sup>9</sup> so that the distinctive character of true morality, like that of true being, lies in its oneness and constant identity.<sup>10</sup> This is apparently a phase of the doctrine of Socrates, that true virtue is not any partial cultivation of the human mind, but constitutes the true and entire essence of the rational man, and, indeed, of the whole universe. On the other hand, the admission of Euclid, that the one may bear many names, seems to imply an attempt to explain how the true, being one, can nevertheless appear as many.

Besides these propositions, which are strongly characteristic of the Megarian school, we have two logical determinations of Euclid, which evince clearly enough, that his disciples only imitated him in giving a negative direction to logic. We are told that in refuting any reasoning, he did not attack the premises, but the conclusion<sup>11</sup>—consequently his method was indirect. If Antisthenes rejected the principle of definitions, he neverthe-

<sup>9</sup> Diog. L. ii. 106. Οὗτος ἐν τῷ ἀγαθὸν ἀπεφαίνετο πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι καλούμενον· ὅτε μὲν γὰρ φρόνησιν, ὅτε δὲ θεόν, καὶ ἄλλοτε νοῦν καὶ τὰ λοιπά· τὰ δὲ ἀντικείμενα τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἀνήρει, μὴ εἶναι φάσκων. Cf. *ibid.* vii. 161.

<sup>10</sup> Cic. *ibid.* Post Euclides, a quo iidem illi Megarici dicti, qui id bonum solum esse dicebant, quod unum et simile et idem semper. Simile is the translation of ὅμοιον, which, with the Eleatæ, signifies the perfectly similar. Diog. L. vii. 16. μίαν (sc. ἀρετήν) πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι καλουμένην ὡς οἱ Μεγαρικοί.

<sup>11</sup> Diog. L. ii. 107. ταῖς τε ἀποδείξεσιν ἐνίστατο οὐ κατὰ λήμματα, ἀλλὰ κατ' ἐπιφώραν.

less admitted the legitimacy of comparing things one with another; but even this was questioned by Euclid, who argued that the comparison must either be of like to like, or to unlike; in the first case, it is better to speak of the object itself; in the latter, there must be error.<sup>12</sup> One might almost conjecture, that this negative and indirect method was invented for the express purpose of proving the worthlessness and nullity of all mediate and inferred knowledge.

The negative character of this theory appears, in the course of its history, to become more and more decided, as was naturally to be expected, since it rested upon an opinion which, to the Greek mind, was already dead. The majority of its later members are famous either for the refutation of opposite doctrines, or for the invention and application of certain fallacies, on which account they were occasionally called Eristici and Dialectici.<sup>13</sup> Still it may be presumed that they did not employ these fallacies for the purposes of delusion, but of instructing rash and hasty thinkers, and exemplifying the superficial vanity of common opinion. At all events, it is certain that they were mainly occupied with the forms of thought, more, perhaps, with a view to the discovery of particular rules than to the foundation of a scientific system or

<sup>12</sup> Ibid. καὶ τὸν διὰ παραβολῆς λόγον ἀνῆρει, λέγων ἦτοι ἐξ ὁμοίων αὐτόν, ἢ ἐξ ἀνομοίων συνίστασθαι· καὶ εἰ μὲν ἐξ ὁμοίων, περὶ αὐτὰ δεῖν μᾶλλον, ἢ οἷς ὁμοιά ἐστιν, ἀναστρέφεσθαι· εἰ δ' ἐξ ἀνομοίων, παρέλκειν τὴν παράθεσιν. Upon the translation, cf. Rhein. Mus. § 326. This reasoning recalls strongly the arguments of Xenophanes, part i. p. 429. The term ὁμοιος is here used, as already observed, p. 126, n. 10, in its strictest sense.

<sup>13</sup> Diog. L. ii. 106.

method, notwithstanding that many treatises on the different parts of logic are to be found among the reputed writings of this school.<sup>14</sup>

Most of these fallacies are ascribed to Eubulides of Miletus, who also opposed the doctrine of Aristotle.<sup>15</sup> Of these, (which, however, he was not the first to employ, for they were invented by the Sophists,) there are three which, although they bear different names, are identical in the results to which they lead, the Liar, the Disguised, and the Electra.<sup>16</sup> They are nothing more than artifices, similar to those employed by the Sophists, in order to prove that to learn what we do not already know, is impossible; <sup>17</sup> for they rest upon the fact, that a man may see an unknown or disguised person without recognising who he is, and yet, at the same time, he must know, and, nevertheless, not know him. Perhaps the true object of this sophism was to awaken attention to the difference between the perception of sense and the cognition by the reason, which is the ground upon which they rest,—an object which would well consist with the principal direction of their theory.<sup>18</sup> The Sorites and the Bald-head, which are, logically, of the same value, are less intimately connected with the general character of their theory; still we

<sup>14</sup> Clinomachus, of Thurii, is said to have written a treatise upon Axioms and Prædicates. Diog. L. ii. 112.

<sup>15</sup> Diog. L. ii. 109.

<sup>16</sup> Diog. L. ii. 108. Εὐβουλίδης ὁ Μιλήσιος, ὃς καὶ πολλοὺς ἐν διαλεκτικῇ λόγους ἠρώτησε, τὸν τε ψευδόμενον καὶ τὸν διαλανθάνοντα καὶ Ἠλέκτραν καὶ ἐγκεκαλυμμένον καὶ σωρείτην καὶ κερατίνην καὶ φαλακρόν. Cf. Menag. ad h. l.

<sup>17</sup> Plat. Euthyd. p. 276, sq.

<sup>18</sup> A similar argument is employed by Plato for the like purpose. Theæt. p. 165.



may well suppose that they were not employed by them without some rational and consistent object. These well-known fallacies,<sup>19</sup> the object of which is to prove that the notions of a heap and of baldness are incapable of any precise limitation, may have served to shew, that the distinction of degree, of which a heap and baldness are here the representatives, is unavailable for philosophical purposes, and to call attention to the fact, that the sensuous presentation, in which the differences of quantity hold, cannot be admitted into true science.<sup>20</sup> In like manner, Zeno employed his arguments of the infinitely great and the infinitely small.<sup>21</sup> Of similar import, perhaps, was their employment of the sophism known by the title of the Liar<sup>22</sup>; especially if we may assume that it was directed against those who denied the knowledge of the truth to be possible. For against such as declared, it is impossible to utter the truth, it might well be urged, that they do not tell the truth when they say, the truth can not be declared. At any rate, it is with a like purpose that Plato advances a similar argument against Protagoras.<sup>23</sup> Nevertheless, the true application of this sophism, as well as of another called the Horned,<sup>24</sup> is not so well known as that of the others already considered. Probably they were only intended to inculcate the necessity of circumspection in the employment even of scien-

<sup>19</sup> Cf. Cic. Qu. Acad. ii. xvi. In Horat. Ep. ii. l. v. 47, the *ruens acervus* is the same as the *φαλακρός*. <sup>20</sup> Cf. Cic. ib. 28, sq.

<sup>21</sup> A still more distinct reference to this use of them will be found afterwards in Diodorus Cronos. <sup>22</sup> Cic. ib. 30.

<sup>23</sup> Theæt. p. 170. I have hazarded a different conjecture as to the true import of this sophism in my larger treatise, p. 233, <sup>24</sup> Diog. L. vii. 187.

tific thought; it is equally probable, that they were even misemployed in order to cast a doubt upon the validity of illative knowledge in general; on the whole, however, our only business at present is to make it probable that Eubulides stood nearly in the same relation to the Megarian as Zeno did to the Eleatic school.

Alexinus of Elea, of the school of Eubulides,<sup>25</sup> is stated to have opposed, by certain sophisms, Zeno,<sup>26</sup> the Stoic, induced in all likelihood by a wish to maintain the school doctrine of the unchangeable one, against the Stoical tenet of the "living development of the world." Some traces, at least, of such a design may be found in the argument which the former employs to prove that Zeno must, in conformity with his theory of the perfect life of the intelligent world, ascribe to it an efficient activity, and a practice of the arts.<sup>27</sup> Such an argument in the mouth of a Megarian philosopher, could have had no other object than to prove it an incongruity to attribute a vital energy to the perfect.

Among the Megarians, who succeeded Eubulides, the consideration of being gradually overbore that of thought. Among these was Diodorus, surnamed Cronus, originally of Jassus in Caria, who was instructed by Eubulides himself, and lived in the time of Ptolemy Soter in Egypt.<sup>28</sup>

<sup>25</sup> Ibid. ii. 109.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

<sup>27</sup> Sext. Emp. ix. 108. ἀλλ' ὅγε Ἀλεξίνος τῷ Ζήνωνι παρέβαλε τρόπον τῷδε· τὸ ποιητικὸν τοῦ μὴ ποιητικοῦ καὶ τὸ γραμματικὸν τοῦ μὴ γραμματικοῦ κρείττον ἐστὶ, καὶ τὸ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας θεωρούμενον κρείττον ἐστὶ τοῦ μὴ τοιούτου· οὐδὲ ἔν δὲ κόσμου κρείττον ἐστὶν ποιητικὸν ἄρα καὶ γραμματικὸν ἐστὶν ὁ κόσμος.

<sup>28</sup> Diog. L. ii. 111.

The arguments, by which he attempted to prove, that the necessary is alone possible, are particularly famous. This doctrine had been previously attributed to the Megarians by Aristotle, accompanied with the remark that its direct consequence must be the denial of all motion and generation.<sup>29</sup> In the reasoning advanced by Diodorus in support of his opinion, the distinction between possibility, actuality, and necessity—consequently, the very end in dispute—is assumed. This is perfectly agreeable to the indirect method of the Megarians. He set out with the position, that every proposition asserting a possibility must assert some truth; but that only is true, which actually is, or, at some certain time, will be true; and, consequently, that alone is possible, which either actually is or certainly will be. Further: that which is not actually becoming to be, is impossible, but whatever is actually becoming, is necessary, for of the true nothing can be changed into the false, nor of the false into the true. The ground of the necessity of the actual he appears to have drawn from this, that a thing can only actually come into being either in its connexion with the whole, or under determinate conditions of relation to the external world.<sup>30</sup> He also appealed to the impossibility of any thing which has actually happened, being undone, which, therefore, is necessary; so that

<sup>29</sup> Met. ix. 3. εἰσὶ δὲ τινες, οἳ φασιν οἷον οἱ Μεγαρίκοι, ὅταν ἐνεργῇ μόνον δύνασθαι, ὅταν δὲ μὴ ἐνεργῇ οὐ δύνασθαι — ὥστε οὗτοι οἱ λόγοι ἐξαιροῦσι καὶ κίνησιν καὶ γένεσιν.

<sup>30</sup> Arrian. Epict. diss. ii. 19.

in the past its necessity is apparent; whereas of the future, it is only because its immutability is not sensuously perceived, that it also is not held to be necessary.<sup>31</sup> It is well to notice how this doctrine is connected with the depreciation of the senses; as also how strikingly it exhibits the endeavour of this school to apprehend nothing individually, but to comprehend all in its systematic coherency. This, moreover, seems to have been the foundation of a dialectical position, ascribed to Diodorus, that a hypothetical proposition is only true when its second member is necessarily connected with the first;<sup>32</sup> for this condition is fatal to the truth of those hypothetical propositions the members of which are not reciprocally necessary.

No less closely connected with the general view of his school are his investigations into the nature of motion. For in addition to the arguments of

<sup>31</sup> Cic. de Fato 7. Ille enim id solum fieri posse dicit, quod aut sit verum aut futurum sit verum; et quicquid futurum sit, id dicit fieri necesse esse, et quicquid non sit futurum, id negat fieri posse. Ib. c. 9. Placet igitur Diodoro id solum fieri posse, quod aut verum sit, aut verum futurum sit. Qui locus attingit hanc quæstionem, nihil fieri, quod non necesse fuerit, et quicquid fieri possit, id aut esse jam, aut futurum esse, nec magis commutari ex veris in falsa ea posse, quæ futura sunt, quam ea, quæ facta sunt, sed in factis immutabilitatem apparere, in futuris quibusdam quia non apparent, ne necesse quidem videri. Plut. de Rep. Stoic. 46; Arrian. l. 1.

<sup>32</sup> Sext. Emp. adv. Math. viii. 115. The connexion between this position and the foregoing clearly follows from the Polemic of Chrysippus against the latter. See Cic. *ibid.* I know not upon what ground Tennemann maintains that Diodorus was led by Philo to this condition of hypothetical propositions, and for considering Philo a contemporary of Diodorus. By some he has, according to a passage of very doubtful meaning, been made the scholar of Diodorus, Diog. L. vii. 16; cf. Clem. Alex. Strom. iv. p. 523. This Philo appears to be very often confounded with others of the same name, and the little we know of him is utterly insufficient to justify us in forming any opinion as to his particular doctrine.

Zeno the Eleat,<sup>33</sup> he employed some which were original, in order to shew that there is no motion. One of the latter rests upon the divisibility of the moved body and the gradual communication of motion to its several parts. Thus he argued, if a body consists of several parts, the motion must first begin with one, and thence communicate itself to the others; as, for instance, a house is not raised all at once, but by parts first. If then a body had three indivisible parts, two of which were set in motion, while the third remained at rest, the whole body must be considered to move, since the moved portions preponderate. If now a fourth part be added, which is unmoved, this would not destroy the preponderance, since there would be three moved bodies against the additional unmoved one; and even supposing quiescent bodies to be continually added, the result would be the same, and we should have a system of 10,000 bodies set in motion by the only two of them actually moved, in virtue of the preponderance. But since this is absurd, it is impossible to shew that a body is in motion in its preponderating parts, and consequently much less so in its totality, since a body must first be moved as to the former, before it can be moved in the whole.<sup>34</sup> It is self-evident that this reasoning is coincident with the sorite; it is an attempt to shew that the notion of becoming

<sup>33</sup> Sext. Emp. adv. Math. x. 85, sq.

<sup>34</sup> Sext. Emp. *ibid.* 113, sq. I agree with Tennemann in thinking that the statement in Stob. Ecl. i. p. 308 and elsewhere, that Diodorus assumed the existence of indivisible bodies, must have grown out of this reasoning. It appears that he employed at other times also, the doctrine of Atoms. See Alex. Aphrod. Quæst. Nat. i. 14.

moved involves that of successive progress, and, consequently, in conformity with their general principle, is not tenable by true science. Another reasoning attempted to prove the impossibility of change, on the ground that it must be considered as a mean between two points of being. If, for instance, a wall is to cease to be such, this must be either when the stones, of which it is composed, are together, or when they have been separated: if the former, it would not cease to be, nor even in the latter case, so that it is impossible that it should cease to be.<sup>35</sup> These arguments are, it is true, sophisms; they were, nevertheless, well calculated to awaken attention to the truth, that the sensuous phenomenon of becoming does not really exist in the true sense of the word, and cannot therefore be regarded as an object of science; and that they were employed by Diodorus with this view is, from the general character of his school, unquestionable.

In the latter ratiocination it is singular that the collocation and the separate state of the stones are both admitted as possible, but not so the passage or movement from one to the other; it is still more surprising to find it advanced generally, as it was by Diodorus, in reference at least to the cessation of motion. He hesitated not to say, "Nothing is moved, but it has been moved."<sup>36</sup> The difficulty here is to understand how he could ascribe reality to finished motion, while he denied

<sup>35</sup> Ibid. 347.

<sup>36</sup> Sext. Emp. adv. Math. x. 85. *κινεῖται μὲν οὐδὲ ἐν, κινύηται δέ.*  
Stob. Ecl. i. p. 396.

it in the case of motion actually proceeding.<sup>37</sup> The cases adduced by Theodorus in support of his position, throw no light upon its enigmatical character, nevertheless there is much that appears well deserving of consideration. Thus, he advanced the opinion, "It is very possible that a matter may be true in the past, which, in the present time is false. If, for instance, one were to throw a ball to the top of a roof, it would be false to say, during the course of its flight, that the ball touches the roof, although when it has reached the roof, it is perfectly lawful to say, it has done so.<sup>38</sup> These and similar instances clearly convey the idea, that the case may be very different with the termination of motion and with motion itself: that even though the latter exists not, the former nevertheless may be real. In the defective state of our direct means for explaining this very obscure doctrine, we may perhaps be pardoned if we venture to interpret it conjecturally. The Megarians held that the good alone is the true and the real, which, as the morally perfect, they considered the end and aim of life. Of this good, as acquired by the motion or activity of life, they might say, that it certainly is,

<sup>37</sup> Ibid. 91. καὶ δὴ ξννοι μὲν ἀδύνατον εἶναι φασι, τῶν συντελεστικῶν ἀληθῶν ὄντων ψευδῇ τὰ παρατατικά τούτων.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid. 101. βαλλέσθω γάρ, φησί, σφαῖρα εἰς τὸν ὑποκείμενον ὄροφον, οὐκοῦν ἐν τῷ μεταξύ τῆς βολῆς χρόνῳ τὸ μὲν παρατατικὸν ἀξίωμα, ἔπτεται ἢ σφαῖρα τῆς ὀροφῆς, ψεῦδός ἐστιν· ἔτι γὰρ ἐπιφέρεται· ὅταν δὲ ἄψηται τῆς ὀροφῆς, γίνεται ἀληθὲς τὸ συντελεστικόν, τὸ ἥψατο ἢ σφαῖρα τῆς ὀροφῆς· ἐνδέχεται ἄρα ψεύδους ὄντος τοῦ παρατατικοῦ ἀληθὲς ὑπάρχειν τὸ συντελεστικόν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μὴ κινεῖσθαι μὲν τι παρατατικῶς, κενεῖσθαι δὲ συντελεστικῶς. Comp. Arist. Phys. vi. 1, 2.

whereas the motion itself and the acquisition of it are unreal and only a semblance.

This explanation imputes certainly to Diodorus the same view of morals as was taken by Euclid ; and that we are not wrong in supposing it to be still continued in the Megarian school, is clear from the accounts we have concerning Stilpo, one of its latest members, in reference to his views of life as well as his philosophy. He was originally of Megara, though we are told of his residing at Athens and at Alexandria in the court of Ptolemy Soter. His school was well frequented, its chief attraction being perhaps the personal character of the man, rather than the scientific excellence of his doctrine. The latter, at least, did not meet with the approbation of Chrysippus,<sup>39</sup> and if it had been of any great value we should undoubtedly have heard more of it ; on the other hand, he himself was in high estimation among the ancients for his moral character,<sup>40</sup> and, according to the testimony of contemporaries, his doctrines were mainly ethical and relative to virtue.<sup>41</sup> Still he advanced some dialectical positions, which were regarded as sophisms, and which Plutarch assumes were not intended seriously, although, according to the older testimony of Chrysippus, they would appear to have been put forward in good earnest.<sup>42</sup>

If we would consider his whole theory from its centre, we must commence our view of it

<sup>39</sup> Ap. Plut. de Stoic. Repugn. 10. His dialogues also are called *ψυχοί*. Diog. L. ii. 120.

<sup>40</sup> Cic. de Fato 5 ; Plut. adv. Colot. 22.

<sup>41</sup> Crates ap. Diog. L. ii. 118.

<sup>42</sup> L. i.



from its ethical aspect. This, as with the Cynics, is eminently negative; for the supreme good, he taught, is a mind free from all passivity. The sage is sufficient to himself; superior to pain and suffering, so that he not only conquers, but is even insensible to them.<sup>43</sup> This, though certainly mere apathy, it would be a bold measure to ascribe to any living man. And Stilpo even does not appear, in this doctrine, to speak of humanity, but of the supreme good, or of the good, which, according to Euclid, alone is, and which Stilpo might as well call the mind free from all passion, as Euclid God. As Stilpo then held this supreme good to be the end of man's labours, and perhaps described the wise man as perfectly free from pain, in all probability he proceeded on the fundamental doctrine of his school that the sensible in general, and therefore pain, has no real existence; whence it follows, that a man, so far as he really is,—*i. e.* so far as he is good and wise—will not be at all affected by pain. This is a stern system of morality, the influence of which is apparent in that opinion of his, that the faults of another, even of one nearest and dearest to us, are wholly indifferent to our own happiness.<sup>44</sup>

His logical doctrines seem to have been strictly

<sup>43</sup> Senec. Ep. 9. An merito reprehendat in quadam epistola Epicurus eos, qui dicunt, sapientem se ipso esse contentum et propter hoc amico non indigere, desideras scire. Hoc obicitur Stilponi ab Epicuro et his, quibus summum bonum visum est animus impatiens. Hoc inter nos (sc. Stoicos) et illos interest: noster sapiens vincit quidem incommodum omne, sed sentit, illorum ne sentit quidem.

<sup>44</sup> Plutarch Tranq. Anim. 6. What Plutarch relates as an anecdote appears to have originated in a dialogue of Stilpo inscribed Metrocles. Cf. Diog. L. ii. 120. Something similar is narrated by Diog. L. ii. 114.

consistent with his ethical theory. The sophism, "no one thing can be predicated of another, since nothing resembles another," has been ascribed to him<sup>45</sup>; in reflecting upon which it ought to be borne in mind that Euclid also maintained, "that the like to itself is alone the true and the good," and denied the legitimacy of the comparison between two things.

This of course renders the definition of terms impossible, as well as the reduction of a lower to a higher notion. This, too, agrees perfectly with his attack upon the ideas of Plato; his objections to which consist of two main points: 1. That they signify nothing, because they designate no particular object, neither one thing nor another; 2. That they do not admit of being applied to sensuous perception, because they pretend to indicate something from eternity.<sup>46</sup> Such an attack from a Megarian cannot excite surprise: and it is evidently directed against all doctrines which admit the existence of multiplicity.

Of the numerous scholars of Stilpo none arose to eminence with the exception of Zeno<sup>47</sup> of Cittium, who, however, opened to himself a peculiar road, and was the medium by which the logical investigations and rigorous morality of the Mega-

<sup>45</sup> Plut. adv. Colot. 23. Cf. Simpl. Phys. fol. 26. a. οἱ Μεγαρικοὶ — ὅτι ὅν οἱ λόγοι ἕτεροι ταῦτα ἕτερά ἐστι, καὶ ὅτι τὰ ἕτερα κεχώρισται ἀλλήλων. Consistent with this is the position of Diod. Cronos. No word is ambiguous. Gell. N. A. xi. 12.

<sup>46</sup> Diog. L. ii. 119. ἀνθρῆ καὶ τὰ εἶδη· καὶ ἔλεγε τὸν λέγοντα ἀνθρωπον εἶναι, μηδὲνα, οὔτε γὰρ τόνδε λέγειν, οὔτε τόνδε· τί γὰρ μᾶλλον τόνδε, ἢ τόνδε; οὔτε ἄρα τόνδε. καὶ πάλιν· τὸ λάχανον οὐκ ἐστὶ τὸ δεικνύμενον· λάχανον μὲν γὰρ ἦν πρὸ μυρίων ἐτῶν· οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶ τοῦτο λάχανον.

<sup>47</sup> Diog. L. vii. 2.

rian school were transferred to that of the Stoics. The former died off naturally, when its negative view was vivified with the richer ideas of the latter. The services it had rendered to philosophy consisted for the most part in the opposition it maintained against the common representations of things as inadequate and incomplete, and in its support of the immutability of the good and the true, against the vagueness and uncertainty of opinion. If in their zeal for the eternal truth they denied all production, and rejected the sensuous presentation, they did but as many others—they threw away the good with the bad.

The mode in which it was attempted to reconcile Socrates with the Eleatæ is easily conceivable. Faithful to his maxim, that no one is voluntarily wicked, Socrates looked upon whatever man desires as good, and was disposed to refer every true power to the supremacy of reason, not in the individual only, but also in the universe; he appeared, therefore, to have taken a similar course to that of the Eleatæ, who held that the true is only to be found in the one supreme and perfect intelligence, which guides and rules all. There was nothing consequently inconsistent in Euclid believing that he still continued true to the Eleatæ, even when he attached himself to Socrates; indeed he might, perhaps, see nothing more in the Socratic investigations than an enrichment and extension of Eleatic views. For even the Eleatæ, notwithstanding that the sole object of their investigations was a knowledge of the supra-sensible, as the real and the true, which can only be known by the

reason, nevertheless applied themselves to physical inquiries (in Empedocles we find a slight and subordinate consideration of the ethical,) for its discovery, and thought they could recognise the sole and pure being in fire, or necessity, or some other physical form. It was, therefore, very natural that the ethical researches of Socrates should appear to exhibit another aspect of the supra-sensible, and one indeed under which it more manifestly reveals itself. And in truth this was no deceptive illusion. For the Megarians arrived thereby at the result, that the good is the true; and in the same manner as the Eleatæ had previously laboured, by many close and precise definitions, to determine the nature of Being, they now proceeded and called it God, Reason, Virtue, Intelligence, intimating by these various terms one and the same. This good was, with them, the sum of all reality, for evil is a mere delusion, and nothing is possible which is not actually and necessarily. Apparently, however, they failed to remark how widely they deviated from the Socratic method when they reduced all notions to the immutable and constantly similar good; for it was in a living development of the reason, and in practice, and the conduct of life, that Socrates sought the knowledge of the good and the true; whereas the invariably similar good of Euclid and the impassive sage of Stilpo, can neither afford occasion to, nor be in any way concerned with, conduct and action.

We must further take a brief notice of two other Socratic schools, which, although of little importance, were apparently intimately allied to the

Megarian. Phædo of Elis, a scholar of Socrates, and whose name is given to one of Plato's dialogues, founded the Elian school, the nature of whose doctrines is generally inferred from the fact, that it gave rise to the Eretrian. The founder of the latter was Menedemus, of Eretria, who, it is stated, was taught by the disciples of Phædo. That its opinions coincided in many points with the Megarian, we find expressly asserted by ancient writers, who reckon Menedemus among the disciples and admirers of Stilpo.<sup>48</sup> The essential character of the Eretrian doctrine, like the Megarian, was its opinion respecting the oneness of the good,<sup>49</sup> which, Menedemus held, was not identical with the profitable,<sup>50</sup> and attempted to prove its oneness by denying the plurality and difference of virtues, and by shewing these differences to be merely nominal.<sup>51</sup> Like the Socratic philosophers, he made the good and the true to consist in reason and intelligence, by which the true is known,<sup>52</sup> whereby, perhaps, he may have merely intended to convey the idea, that a right insight into the good, is, of itself, sufficient to insure right prac-

<sup>48</sup> Chrysipp. ap. Plut. de Stoic. Rep. 10; Diog. L. ii. 126, 134. The statement that the doctrines of Menedemus (his dialectic excepted, in which he never appears to have been serious) comes at last to the Platonic, as Heraclides is represented (Diog. L. ii. 135,) to have said, can only have originated in misconception. To the contrary, cf. *ibid.* 134. The statement that he was a disciple of Plato was apparently a confusion of him with Menedemus of Pyrrhæ.

<sup>49</sup> Diog. L. ii. 129.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.* 134.

<sup>51</sup> Plut. de Virt. Mor. 2. *Μενέδημος μὲν ὁ ἐξ Ἐρετριᾶς ἀνὴρ τοῦ ἀρετῶν καὶ τὸ πλῆθος καὶ τὰς διαφοράς, ὥς μιᾶς οὐσης καὶ χρωμένης πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ σωφροσύνην καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ δικαιοσύνην λέγεσθαι, καθάπερ βροτὸν καὶ ἄνθρωπον.*

<sup>52</sup> Cic. Qu. Acad. ii. 42. Quorum (Eretriacorum) omne bonum in mente positum et mentis acie, qua verum cerneretur.

tice, and that there is no real difference between the good and the true. Accordingly, he must, like the Megarians, have made all truth to consist in the alone true; and in this view we are further confirmed by the negative character of his dialectic, which, throughout, corresponds to the Megarian. Thus he rejected all negative and complex propositions, and admitted the validity of the simple and affirmative alone.<sup>53</sup> The former he rejected as untenable, on the ground that there is no truth possible except what can be affirmed; as to the latter, he maintained, perhaps, the opinion of Diodorus, that all that is possible must be necessary. Finally, he refused to concede that aught can be predicated of another, only the same of each,<sup>54</sup> and herein he agreed with Stilpo. This is sufficient to prove that the same spirit prevailed in the Eretrian as in the Megarian school.

<sup>53</sup> Diog. L. ii. 135; cf. *Simpl. Phys.* fol. 20. a.

<sup>54</sup> *Simpl.* l. l.; *Porphyr.* ib. b.

## BOOK VIII.

### HISTORY OF THE SOCRATIC SCHOOL.

#### PART II.

#### PLATO AND THE WHOLE ACADEMY.

#### CHAPTER I.

##### PLATO'S LIFE AND WRITINGS.

OF the personal history and external circumstances of those, who, of old, were eminent in arts and science, the records of antiquity seldom afford any accurate and certain information. This, however, in the case of those whose works are preserved to us, leaves little really to regret, as their life is in their writings. It would be idle, therefore, to complain, that so little is recorded of Plato, and that that little is so inadequately attested<sup>1</sup>—for his works reveal to us the man.

Plato was born at Athens or Ægina, in 87—88th

<sup>1</sup> Of the life of Plato, we possess a few brief notices, and some larger biographies; of the latter we have one by Olympiodorus, one by an unknown author in the Gottinger Bibl. der alt. Litt. u. Kunst. 5. St. and one by Diogenes Laertius. The two first are scarcely more than copies of the last. The statements of Diogenes Laertius are confirmed by other writers, Strabo, Diodorus Siculus, Plutarch, Athenæus; but the sources from which they drew are almost all of late date, if we except such untrustworthy authorities as comedians, and Aristoxenus and Heraclides Ponticus. Of modern works, cf. *Sketch of Plato's Life with Remarks upon his Character as an Author and a Philosopher*; translated from the English, with notes by Morgenstern, Leipz. 1797. Tennemann, *Syst. d. Plat. Phil.* Leipz. 1792. 1 Bd. Ast, *Plato's Life and Writings*, Leipzig, 1816, very justly regards with great suspicion all the statements concerning Plato.

Olymp., about the time of Pericles' death.<sup>2</sup> His youth falls consequently in the time of the Peloponnesian war, and his whole life in the brilliant period in which Attic prose had attained its highest perfection. By birth he was connected with the most distinguished families of Athens, and thus related to most of the illustrious statesmen of his day.<sup>3</sup> In later ages, a blind spirit of veneration has led some to recount many wonders of his birth and boyhood, while an opposite feeling has induced others to relate many disreputable anecdotes of his conduct and manners. From his parents he is said to have received the name of Aristocles, though always called Plato, a surname which he probably acquired in his youth. His connexion with so many illustrious Athenians offered him many inducements to devote his time and talents to political affairs<sup>4</sup>; but, besides being disqualified by the weakness of his voice<sup>5</sup> for public speaking, his peculiar turn of mind early led him to other pursuits. The stories of his military achievements rest apparently on no good authority<sup>6</sup>; while the accounts of his youthful essays in poetry are far better attested.<sup>7</sup> The lively fancy, and powerful style, which his philosophical writings

<sup>2</sup> Diog. L. iii. 3; Athen. V. p. 217.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid. iii. 1. Conf. Ast, *Plato's Life and Writings*, 16, f.

<sup>4</sup> Sext. Emp. adv. Math. i. 258; Diog. L. iii. 4, c. not. Menag.

<sup>5</sup> Diog. L. iii. 5.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid. 8. These statements, taken apparently from Aristoxenus, do not agree with chronology. Cf. *Ælian*, Var. Hist. iii. 27.

<sup>7</sup> Diog. L. iii. 5; Olymp. v. Plat. auct. Anonym. v. P.; *ÆL* V. H. ii. 30. If he ever studied painting, as some accounts intimate, there is little trace of it in his works, since there is seldom an image in his *Mythi* drawn from that art.



so amply display, must naturally have early impelled him to make some attempts at composition, which were assuredly not without influence on the beautiful form of his later works. It is said he wrote epics, dithyrambics, and lyrics, and a few epigrams attributed to him are still extant. These attempts in so many different species of poetry, a practice so much at variance with the spirit of ancient poesy, would seem to prove, that his youthful essays were the issue, not so much of any powers of poetical invention, as of a profound study of the creations of earlier genius, and of an undirected and as yet vague longing to give forth the reflections of his own mind. His poetical labours were early associated with philosophical studies, for we learn from credible authority, that while yet a youth, he was a hearer of Cratylus, by whom he was instructed in the system of Heraclitus.<sup>8</sup> Still it was Socrates, with whom his acquaintance began in his twentieth year, that first effected a complete change in his pursuits. From this time he abandoned poetry, and devoted himself entirely to philosophy.<sup>9</sup> That Socrates exercised a powerful influence on his mind we may the more readily believe, as Plato nowhere denies the Socratic foundation of his system, but paints, in the most glowing colours, the almost irresistible control possessed by Socrates over the minds of his hearers. From this date to his death, a period of ten years, he remained with Socrates, who regarded him as one of his most faithful disciples.<sup>10</sup> The supposition,

<sup>8</sup> Arist. Met. i. 6.

<sup>9</sup> Diog. L. iii. 5, 6.

<sup>10</sup> There are two anecdotes, one representing Socrates' opinion of Plato to be very high—the other making him aware of the malice of his disciple. It is

that, during the whole of this time the Socratic philosophy exclusively engaged his attention, seems inconsistent with the active character of his mind and his general thirst for knowledge: moreover, if any faith can be placed in the old and almost proverbial statement, that of his dialogues the *Phædrus* and the *Lysis*, at least, were written before his master's death,<sup>11</sup> it becomes impossible to doubt, that even at this time, he had already directed his philosophical investigations to the opinions of the earlier philosophers, especially *Anaxagoras*, *Democritus*, and the *Pythagoreans*, and had laid the foundation of the peculiar development he subsequently gave to his own system. This was most assuredly the period of the formation of his mental character, for such works as appear to have been composed at this time exhibit the outlines of his entire and matured philosophy. For the same reason, we could scarcely question the propriety of referring to this date his intimacy with *Hermogenes*, from whom he is stated to have received his knowledge of the *Eleatic* doctrines,<sup>12</sup> were it not for the vagueness with which the statement is made, and for the abundant facility afforded by the school of *Socrates* to any one desirous of gaining an acquaintance with the principles of the *Eleatæ*. After the death of *Socrates*, *Plato* proceeded with the rest of the disciples to *Megara*; <sup>13</sup> afterwards, as we are

manifest how little reliance is to be placed upon such anecdotes. On the other hand, *Xenoph. Memor. iii. 6, nr. 1*, is good authority for what is advanced in the text.

<sup>11</sup> *Diog. L. iii. 35, 38*; *Anon. v. Plat. p. 11, 13*; *Olymp. v. P.*

<sup>12</sup> *Diog. L. iii. 6*, or *Hermippas Anon. v. Plat. p. 13*. Cf. *Ast's* not ill-grounded doubts, p. 20.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid. ii. 106*.

told, to Cýrene,<sup>14</sup> to visit Theodorus, the mathematician, whose acquaintance he had previously made at Athens; thence he went to Egypt, in order to profit by the instructions of its priests.<sup>15</sup> Here he is said to have gained, during a residence of thirteen years, a thorough insight into the mystical secrets of that body.<sup>16</sup> But his pretended travels did not end even here; he proceeded to Phœnicia, where he gained from the Jews a knowledge of the true God—in Babylonia he learned astronomy, of the Magi the doctrines of Zoroaster, and, further, among the Assyrians, he still increased his stock of wisdom.<sup>17</sup> In all this we easily recognise the exaggeration of later times, while the variations in the narrative prove the uncertainty of the story. The account of his visit to Egypt is better attested than the rest, but that his stay there extended to a period of thirteen, or even three years,<sup>18</sup> is highly incredible, especially as there is no trace in his works of Egyptian research. All that he tells us of Egypt indicates, at most, a very scanty acquaintance with the subject, and although he praises the industry of the priests, his estimate of their scientific attainments is far from favourable.<sup>19</sup> That he travelled to the Pythagoreans in Italy, seems to be established upon good authority, and many are expressly named as his teachers in the doctrines of

<sup>14</sup> The stories that he was requested by the Arcadians, Cyrenæans, and Thebans to draw up a code of laws are, as thoroughly improbable, unworthy of notice.

<sup>15</sup> Cic. de Fin. v. 29.

<sup>16</sup> Strabo, xvii. c. 1, p. 446, Tauchn.

<sup>17</sup> Clem. Alex. Protr. p. 46; Lact. Div. Inst. iv. 2; Anon. v. P. p. 14; Olymp. v. P.

<sup>18</sup> This is mere conjecture.

<sup>19</sup> De Rep. iv. p. 435.

that school. But this multitude of teachers is of itself sufficient to excite suspicion; and Plato was undoubtedly acquainted with the Pythagorean philosophy long previous to his Italian voyage. With his journey to Italy his visits to Sicily are closely connected. These statements receive but a very slight support from the correspondence between Plato and the younger Dionysius, and some of their friends, for these alone are the sources from which the statements of later writers have been derived. Now, there cannot be a question that the letters are spurious;<sup>20</sup> nevertheless, as they were evidently written with a view to the justification of Plato, in all probability they are, at least partially,<sup>21</sup> founded on facts. We shall therefore adduce the principal circumstances from this source, without, however, vouching for their truth. Plato, we are told, visited Sicily, for the first time, in his fortieth year, to see the island and Mount *Ætna*.<sup>22</sup> Here he became acquainted with the elder Dionysius, and with Dio, brother-in-law to the elder, and uncle of the younger Dionysius. By his free and independent spirit, it is said, he provoked the displeasure of the former tyrant, and incurred thereby no slight personal danger; on the other

<sup>20</sup> Cic. *ib.* *Tusc.* i. 17; *de Senect.* 12. Nearchus is the authority, who probably followed Aristoxenus, a source perfectly corrupt. Cf. *Athen.* xii. 64, p. 545. The work of Nearchus was a dialogue, according to Niebuhr, *Röm. Ges.* iii. p. 250.

<sup>21</sup> On this point there is almost perfect unanimity; Böckh, however, *Græ. Trag. Princ.* p. 163, and *de similitudine quam Plato cum Xenophonte exercuisse fertur*, p. 32, note 9, holds the eighth epistle to be genuine. Cf. Niebuhr. *ib.* 3 ed. i. p. 20, and Salomon *de Platonis que feruntur epistolis*. (*Programm. des Friedrichs-Gymnasium zu Berlin*, 1835.)

<sup>22</sup> *Athen.* xi. 116, p. 507; *Diog. L.* iii. 18.

hand, he acquired the friendship of the grave Dio, and made a convert of him to his philosophical principles of policy. His captivity, which was brought about by the agents of Dionysius the elder,<sup>23</sup> and the foundation of his school in the Academy, have been placed in chronological order.<sup>24</sup> Here he taught for a period of twenty-two years, prior to his second journey to Syracuse, which he undertook at the instigation of Dio, who hoped, by the lessons of Plato, to influence the character of the new ruler of Syracuse,—the younger Dionysius. This prince, it is said, had been brought up by his father wholly destitute of an enlightened education, and it was now the task of Plato to form his mind by philosophy. It seems, at the same time, to have been the plan of Dio and Plato to bring about, by philosophical instruction a wholesome reform of the Sicilian constitution, by giving it a more aristocratic character.<sup>25</sup> But what-

<sup>23</sup> Diod. Sic. xv. 7; Diog. L. iii. 19.

<sup>24</sup> Diod. L. iii. 20.

<sup>25</sup> My chief reason for considering this to be probable, is the passage of the *Laws*, iv. p. 709, e. sq., where Plato shews that the best means of introducing an enlightened system of legislation is when its author can find a young and noble minded tyrant, moderate and desirous of learning, whom he may set up to his fellow-citizens as a model of virtue. There are many allusions in this passage which seem to intimate that it was intended as a justification of Plato's connexion with the younger Dionysius. In the letters ascribed to Plato and his friends, there are many allusions to a confederation between the influential members of the aristocracy in Sicily, Italy, and Greece, which was apparently ratified by the sending of mysteries, and perhaps remounted in its origin to the Pythagoreans. It does not appear, however, that Plato took any part in this association; for such a step would be inconsistent with his openly expressed aversion for the Hetariæ and with the contempts for friendships arising from a common participation in the mysteries, as put into his mouth in the letters themselves. *Ep.* vii. p. 333, d. Moreover, no political act in Syracuse is attributed to Plato: only to Speusippus. *Vide* *Plut.* v. *Dion.* 22. Here those around Speusippus are several times spoken of as a party.

ever may have been their intentions, they were all frustrated by the weak and voluptuous character of Dionysius, who, however he might relish for a time the sage and virtuous lessons of Plato, soon found it more conformable to his personal interests to follow the counsel of Philiston, his father's friend and adviser. Dio hereupon became the object of the tyrant's suspicion, and being convicted of ambitious designs, was banished, without, however, forfeiting his possessions. In this conjuncture of affairs, Plato did not long remain in Syracuse, where his position would have been at best ambiguous. He returned to Athens, but in consequence of some fresh disagreement between Dionysius and Dio, with respect to the property of the latter, he was induced to take a third journey to Syracuse. The reconciliation, which it was his object to effect, completely miscarried; he himself came to a complete rupture with Dionysius. It does not appear that he took any part in the later conduct of Sicilian affairs, though his nephew and disciple, Speusippus, and others of the Academy,<sup>26</sup> rendered personal assistance to Dio, in a warlike expedition against Dionysius. From this time Plato appears to have passed his old age in tranquillity in his garden, near the Academy, engaged with the instruction of his numerous disciples, and the prosecution of his literary labours. He died while yet actively employed about his philosophical compositions, Olymp. 108.<sup>27</sup>

The character of Plato is, on the whole, most truly

<sup>26</sup> Plut. l. l.

<sup>27</sup> Diog. L. v. 9; Athen. v. 57, p. 217; Cic. de Senect. 5.

learned from his writings and philosophy ; nevertheless it is necessary to notice in the present place some of its more personal traits, which do not present themselves so distinctly in his works. Despite the disposition of the Greeks for calumny, there are but few evil rumours against which we have to vindicate the purity of his moral conduct.<sup>28</sup> We have already mentioned the objections, which have been urged against him, in consequence of his connexion with the Sicilian tyrants, and the misrepresentations which have confounded him with the parasites and favourites of absolute princes.<sup>29</sup> Equally unjust seems the imputation, that in his writings he availed himself, without acknowledgement, of the labours of others,<sup>30</sup> for one so richly gifted needed not such artifices. The reproaches with which Plato has been assailed, as having boasted that he could supply their master's place to his bereaved disciples,<sup>31</sup> but ill agrees with the pious affection with which he bewailed his death, and ascribed to him—as the fruits of his lessons—his whole philosophy. Nor can we help thinking, that there is much injustice in the charge brought against him, of malice and ill feeling towards his fellow scholars ;<sup>32</sup> though at the same

<sup>28</sup> We are equally indisposed to defer to such extreme laudatory statements as that of Heraclides in Diog. L. iii. 26, and to such poor authorities as the book *περὶ παλαιᾶς τροφῆς*, and the epigrams ascribed to him and to others in Diog. L. iii. 29, sq. Athen. xiii. 56, p. 589.

<sup>29</sup> Diog. L. vi. 27.

<sup>30</sup> Diog. L. iii. 37, 57 ; Athen. xi. 118, p. 508 ; Porphy. ap. Euseb. Pr. Ev. x. 3.

<sup>31</sup> Hegesander ap. Athen. xi. 116, p. 507.

<sup>32</sup> Conf. Boeckh de similitudine, quam Plato cum Xenophonte exercuisse fertur. Berol. 1811.

time we must admit, that, to all appearances, he did not cultivate a very intimate friendship with any one among them who afterwards became illustrious as philosophers :—nay more, it appears that he reviewed with some bitterness the doctrines of Aristippus, Antisthenes, and Euclid. To the more soaring flight of his own lofty views their incomplete and exclusive notions must unquestionably have appeared unworthy of the school of Socrates; and as they began by attacking his own system,<sup>33</sup> it was but natural that Plato should retaliate with some bitterness and warmth.<sup>34</sup> The by no means exalted opinion entertained by Plato of his philosophical contemporaries, necessarily became a further ground for the charge against him of overweening haughtiness;<sup>35</sup> and it would even appear that other causes existed for the imputation. A certain contempt for the mass of the people stands out prominently enough in his writings, while his commendation of philosophy, as opposed to common sense, might easily have been taken as personal. Besides all this, the splendour of his school, especially when compared with the simplicity and even poverty of the Socratic, seems to have betokened a degree of pretension and display, which naturally brought upon it the ridicule of the comic writers.<sup>36</sup> It cannot be dissembled that

<sup>33</sup> Antisthenes wrote a dialogue, *Sathon* against Plato (*Diog. L. iii. 35*; *Athen. xi. 115*, p. 507,) and attacked the theory of ideas: the latter was also opposed by the Megarians. There are many statements current to the effect that Aristippus and Æschines were far from being on friendly terms with Plato at the court of Syracuse. *Diog. L. ii. 61*; *iii. 36*. Cf. *Plut. de Adul. 26*.

<sup>34</sup> Cf. *Plat. Soph. p. 251*, 6; *Phil. p. 44*, c.; *de Rep. vi. p. 505* b.

<sup>35</sup> *Diog. L. vi. 7*, 26.

<sup>36</sup> *Athen. xi. 120*, p. 509.



Plato gave to philosophy, and to human culture in general, a tendency towards ornament and refinement—a splendour of language and form, far removed from the pristine severity and rigour, and greatly favouring the fast-growing spirit of effeminacy. His school was less a school of hardy deeds for all, than of polished culture for the higher classes, who had no other object than to enhance the enjoyment of their privileges and wealth.<sup>37</sup> But this reproach does not so much apply to Plato as to the age in which he lived, and to which nothing else was left than to moderate and retard the decline of morality by its intellectual progress and enlightenment. Nevertheless an individual ought to rise above the moral corruption of his age and country, and point, at least in thought and sentiment, to a higher and nobler object than it might be possible to realise in action; and this did Plato. His mission was not to excite a supine and enervated people to impotent endeavours, and so, by inevitable failure, to become, by a vain and hopeless conflict, a martyr to his political convictions. He may, perhaps, be open to the reproach of having too soon abandoned all hope of even partially saving his country, and that he looked to a

<sup>37</sup> It was a question among the ancients, whether the school of Plato had more tyrants than noble-minded politicians and assertors of liberty. There is a catalogue of the former in *Athen.* xi. 119, p. 508, sq.; of the latter, *Plut. adv. Colot.* 32: both admit of being enlarged. They only prove how many distinguished individuals frequented his school. As characterising the age in which he lived, I may notice that women also attended it, *Diog. L.* iii. 46; iv. 2. *Them. Orat.* xxiii. p. 295: one assumed a man's dress. It is impossible to consider them other than courtesans, who found it necessary to follow the general tendency of the age for the pleasures of taste and philosophy. Cf. *Athen.* vii. 10, p. 279.

wrong source for its salvation. But the history of his own and subsequent ages, evince, but too clearly, that generally, the ruin of his country was inevitable; and it was natural that the philosopher should look more to general than to partial measures. Thus, looking at the position and sentiments of his countrymen, he dared not to arrogate to himself or to any other individual, the power of arresting the progress of evil; and was fain to insist on the necessity of looking beyond the limits of the present time, and, in the extensive contemplation of the universal course of things, to derive confidence for the future, and comfort and consolation for the present. The circumstance that it was to the more enlightened of his day that his exhortations were directed, may probably have somewhat diminished their force, or at least their general influence; but the less enlightened could not possibly understand consolations like these drawn from the very depths of philosophy.<sup>38</sup>

<sup>38</sup> Niebuhr, in his *Kl. Hist. u. Philol. Schriften*, i. Samb. p. 470, etc., has passed a severe censure upon the political conduct and sentiments of Plato; and in candour it cannot be praised very highly. Still I do not think that there are sufficient grounds to justify his opinion that Plato, so highly gifted and well qualified to benefit his country, preferred to abandon it and retire to Megara, in consequence of being drawn by his relationship with Critias, into the party of the Thirty Tyrants. As to the gifts and talents of Plato, they do not appear to me to have been such as were necessary to a politician of that day. His eloquence, notwithstanding the opinion of Cicero, was not of a political cast. It is true, his hostility to Lysias may probably have grown out of political considerations, but the domination of the Thirty, as oligarchical and nefarious, was equally abominable to him as democracy. Vid. *Apol.* p. 32. In his retirement to Megara he was not alone, but many other Socraticists withdrew, not from fear of the Thirty alone, but also of the people, who were incensed against all philosophers. On the other hand, Niebuhr does not duly consider Plato's philosophical views. His pursuit of philosophy had withdrawn him from politics, not only because they deprived him of leisure, but princi-

The influence of Plato, however, must be estimated not so much by its effect upon his contemporaries as upon posterity and ourselves. This influence has been wrought principally by his writings. It rarely happens that a great thinker is rightly and fully understood by those who receive his inspirations directly from his own lips; time is requisite for a due and rightful appreciation of their import. All posterity gathers around him as his scholars, in the same manner as he had applied himself to all antiquity as his teacher. As to Plato, the ancients have, with great care, and often in an envious spirit, explored the sources from which he might have derived the system of his philosophy, and his artifice of language. We are told by his great disciple, Aristotle,<sup>39</sup> that he had diligently studied the doctrines of Heraclitus, Pythagoras, and Socrates; he might have added of Parmenides and Anaxagoras, for of Plato it may justly be said, that he reduced into a beautiful whole, the scattered results of the earlier Greek philosophy, reconciling their seeming differences and conflicting tendencies. From this fountain, as well as from the abundant sources of his own good powers, flowed the rich elements of his philosophy. In fact, when we compare the barrenness of the earlier philosophers with the fertility of Plato, that love, which Plato knows so well how to inspire in

pally because it had imparted to him a view of justice and honour wholly impracticable in the corrupt state of the Athenian constitution; and, moreover, all empirical knowledge, such as is indispensable to a politician, were, in his view, contemptible. These essential features of his habit of thought cannot be derived from any consideration of party.

<sup>39</sup> Met. i. 6.

us, warms almost to veneration : so rich, so varied, and so abundant are his observations, and so profound his knowledge of man and the world ! His acquisition of these intellectual stores, however, becomes at once conceivable, if we call to mind that he had the good fortune, in the freshness and energy of youth, to fall in with a Socrates, the success of whose excellent and happy method for the improvement of the man is singularly attested by the wonderful success with which he trained this his worthiest disciple to sound the innermost depth of the heart and mind, and the hidden principles of man's nature.

To such richness of materials Plato united the rarest skill of language and composition, to a degree which has never since been equalled. The models by which he formed his style have, in like manner, been sought out by the ancients. The dialogistic manner of Socrates was the chief object of his literary imitation, but he was neither the first to employ this form in the written exposition of philosophy, nor even to compose Socratic dialogues ;<sup>40</sup> yet he so far surpassed his predecessors in rhetorical power, and in grace and fulness of expression, that he has ever passed for the model of this form of composition. That he should have accomplished so much must not surprise us : for Attic prose was already entering upon its most perfect development, and the Comedies of Aristophanes and the Mimes of Sophron, are particularly men-

<sup>40</sup> Alexamenos, of Teos, and Sophron, were, according to Aristotle, the first to write dialogue. *Athen.* xi. 112, p. 505 ; *Diog. L.* iii. 48. Zeno, of Eleæ, seems to have been the first to apply this form of exposition to philosophy.

tioned as having exercised great influence on the formation of his style.<sup>41</sup>

We, however, are far from willing to sacrifice to any admiration of the man our right of passing judgment upon his human weaknesses. The Platonic works ought to be judged in reference to the end they were intended to serve. Now Plato himself speaks somewhat depreciatingly of written, in comparison with oral, instruction for philosophy. He gives us to understand that by conversation alone can the communication of philosophy be clear and well grounded, and that all written works are to be looked upon as a species of recreation, the only object of which is to recal the memory of what has been already spoken.<sup>42</sup> This assertion might well dispose us to consider even the Platonic writings as merely such *divertissements*, and to believe that they were intended solely to recal to the minds of his disciples the subjects and results of his conversations. We must, nevertheless, admit that we are little disposed to lay much weight upon these expressions, for otherwise we shall find that he diverted himself much too seriously and too immoderately,—in short, that he accomplished more by his sport than his seriousness. His compositions were not assuredly designed solely for remembrancers, but also for primary instruction, for if they had been intended for such a purpose, much simpler works would

<sup>41</sup> Anon. v. P. p. 11, 12; Olymp. v. P.; Diog. L. iii. 18; Athen. xi. 111. p. 504. Plato is reckoned among the first to collect books, and to bring them from foreign parts to Athens. Cf. Heracl. Pont. ap. Procl. in Plat. Tim. i. p. 28; Diog. L. viii. 15.

<sup>42</sup> Phæd. p. 276, c. sq.

have sufficed for any not totally ungifted minds and ordinary capacities.<sup>43</sup> But we must admit further,—that the object of his works was not confined to philosophical instruction, but that he evidently pursued in them an extreme artistical end; and that not simply in the sense in which every appropriate exposition of science may lay claim to the name of a skilful piece of art, but in the strict sense of a piece of fine art, which can have had nothing more than an outward connexion with his philosophy. To this Plato was led by the very form of dialogue, for while he introduces Socrates and his contemporaries disputing and conversing, we have represented before us a progressive action of living characters; a truly dramatic group is raised before the imagination, and awakens intense and deep interest. It is to this charm of composition, no doubt, that he is indebted for many of his admirers. He is a consummate master in painting those minute traits which constantly attract and detain the reader's attention, by bringing visibly before him the peculiarities of the speakers, and by the charm of trifling incidents in advancing the progress of the dialogue; and thus does he acquire the opportunity of displaying the splendour of his eloquence, and his skill to touch the heart as well as to inform the understanding. If, indeed, the only object of philoso-

<sup>43</sup> Plato had before him the example of Socrates, and wished to employ philosophy, not only for instruction, but for education: this is openly asserted in the *Phædon*, p. 277 especially. That this pædagogic application of philosophy cannot be made by writing is now admitted by all. Plato, however, was fortunately not led into errors of practice by his false theory.

phical composition be to lead and win the reader to inquiry, the merits of Plato in that respect would be beyond praise. But it is a question, whether the union of the two objects already noticed must not necessarily be prejudicial to one or the other, and we must confess that it does appear to us that such actually is the case. In confirmation of this opinion we shall not appeal to the fact, that the generality of readers see in most of his works an appearance of redundancy, a too much either for the imagination or the understanding: for to a mind truly informed and enlightened nothing, which may inform the understanding or delight the imagination, is alien and superfluous. Our judgment rests rather on the fact, that in his writings there is an apparent want, an occasional sacrifice made to one object, of something which was absolutely indispensable to the completeness of the other. In the case of composition as a work of art, this defect is chiefly shewn in the greater instructiveness of the Platonic dialogues in proportion as they lose the character of a living interchange of ideas. Then it is that the inferior speakers play by the side of Socrates, or whoever else leads the conversation, a merely passive part. But it is not with the composition so much as with the philosophical progress of the dialogue that we have to do; and this appears but too frequently to suffer from the dramatic conception of the piece. To support our opinion in detail would detain us too long, we shall therefore, passing over the less finished dialogues, refer briefly to the scientific portion of Gorgias, and the Philebos. Even in

the *Theatætus*, which, for the scientific execution, is one of the grandest pieces of art, the accurate enchainment of the thoughts seems at times to be sacrificed to the capricious license of the dialogue. In fact, this form of composition offers so many inducements to flights and digression that Plato may well be excused if occasionally he has yielded to its seductions.

Yet, perhaps, it is from a false point of view that we judge his writings, even when we regard them in the light of a scientific exposition of his system. They were assuredly, it may be said, composed neither in badinage nor for the sole purpose of recalling the memory of his oral instructions, but solely with a view to the excitement of a philosophical spirit, and are, as it were, the first initiation into philosophy; *i. e.* merely esoterical works, whereas the inner sanctuary of philosophy was only open to those who had been already proved and found true.<sup>44</sup> This opinion, which, weakly founded on a few passages of the Platonic Dialogues, some have sought to confirm by quotations from the spurious epistles, is connected with another opinion which has been formed respecting his so-called unwritten doctrines. These unwritten opinions, (*ἀγραφα δόγματα*), are expressly mentioned by Aristotle,<sup>45</sup> in such a manner as would appear to intimate that in them much was explained dif-

<sup>44</sup> Vide Tennemann's *Gesch. d. Phil.* Bd. ii. s. 205, f.; Krug. *Gesch. d. Ph. Alter Zeit*, s. 205. This view is still held by many who do not test the validity of the tradition, nor attempt to estimate rightly the relation of Plato to the age in which he lived, whereby alone a correct judgment on such points can be drawn.

<sup>45</sup> *Arist. Phys.* iv. 2.



ferently, or at least more definitely, than in the dialogues. In like manner we find mentioned certain divisions,<sup>46</sup> and written divisions,<sup>47</sup> in which the doctrines of Plato are said to have been contained. But all these allusions are too indefinite for us to form from them any but vague conjectures. It certainly does appear that in his oral instructions<sup>48</sup> he minutely explained to his pupils many points which in his dialogues are scarcely more than touched upon. On the other hand, it is certain that Aristotle, at least, knew nothing of any such esoterical doctrines, since he drew his statements of the genuine and true principles of his master, with few exceptions, from the dialogues, and not from any secret instructions; and if Aristotle, for so many years his scholar, admitted no other philosophy of his master than

<sup>46</sup> Arist. de Gen. et Corr. ii. 3.

<sup>47</sup> Arist. de Parte Anim. i. 2.

<sup>48</sup> The *ἄγρια φα δόγματα* are probably notes preserved of his lectures (*ἀκροάσεις*) upon Good, taken down by his scholars, and probably in a Pythagorean manner (*αλνυγματωδῶς*). Cf. Arist. de Anima, i. 2; Simpl. Phys. fol. 32, p.; Ioann. Philop. de Gen. Et. Corr. fol. 50, p.; Brandis de Perditis Aristotelis Libris. They possibly contained some things not to be found in his written works; instances will be met with hereafter. There were several works of Aristotle, Speusippus, Xenocrates, Hestæus, and Heraclides upon the doctrines of Plato they had heard in his lectures. If, then, they were intended to be kept secret, they were nevertheless made public by his disciples. But no one, not even the neo-Platonists have drawn any important doctrine from this source. The *διαίρεσεις* and the *γεγραμμέναι διαίρεσεις* may be the subjects of widely different conjectures. See Brandis, ib. p. 19, sq.; Trendelenburg de Ideis et Numeris Doctr. p. 19, sq. The first question to be determined is, whether the two titles indicate the same work. If so, I think that we must understand by it a collection of divisions in the spirit of Plato's philosophy, and probably put into his mouth by one of his disciples. In such a case *Ἰλάρων ἐν ταῖς διαίρεσιν*, a well-known phrase of Aristotle's, would be parallel with *Σωκράτης ἐν τῷ ἐπιγραφῇ* in the Rhetorick, iii. 14. It is well known that the school of Plato had the character of employing itself with such divisions. See Epicrates ap. Athen. ii. p. 59.

what is contained in his written works, we assuredly may very well be content to draw from the same sources.

The admiration which in all ages has attended the writings of Plato is proved by the rare fortune by which they have, so far as we can judge, come down to us complete.<sup>49</sup> Under his name we have rather too much than too little, for many dialogues ascribed to him are evidently spurious. But, as usually is the case, whenever a tradition has been shewn to be unworthy of credit, in any single point, the authenticity of many a work which bears the name of Plato has been questioned on no other ground than that it fell short of the standard of the lofty idea which has been formed of his divine art and philosophy. Criticism is the acknowledged prerogative of our age, and it has at times exercised its high privilege with great freedom if not license, yet at the same time it must be confessed that it has not been so chilled by the cold spirit of criticism but that it still cherishes many an idol in its bosom. From an early period has Plato been an object of veneration, and we cannot fail to see that the man has been often forgotten in the philosopher and the artist. But, according as the tendency to deification has di-

<sup>49</sup> The following dialogues, besides those still extant, were ascribed by the ancients to Plato: the *Alkyon*, which, however, seems to have been the work of the Academician Leon (*Ath.* xi. 114, p. 506; *Diog. L.* iii. 62). The *Cimon*, (*Ath.* xi. 115, p. 506,) which probably is the same as the *Gorgias*, the *Mido*, the *Phœacians*, the *Chelidon*, the *Hebdome*, though perhaps the two last indicate the same work, the *Epimenides* (*Diog. L.* ib.) They were all unanimously held to be spurious. This judgment may well be deferred to, since the ancients were rather too indulgent than over strict in such matters.

rected itself to this or that aspect of his character, the opinions raised as to the genuineness or falsity of the works transmitted to us under his name have fluctuated; so that we might safely hazard the assertion, that, the more his writings have been examined, the more has the decision of the question of their authenticity become complicated. Nevertheless it does not appear to us extremely difficult to form a tolerably correct judgment as to the genuineness of the Platonic writings, if with a free and unprejudiced mind we direct our chief attention to the artistical and philosophical character of each work throughout. The present is not the place to enter at length into any critical disquisition; nevertheless it is indispensable that we briefly indicate the works from which, as genuine, we have drawn our statement of the Platonic philosophy, and which, as spurious, we have omitted to defer to. For this purpose, however, it is only necessary to mention the dialogues, whose authenticity has, in our opinion, been without reason attacked or maintained in modern times. Most of the supposititious dialogues agree so little with the general diction of Plato, and the usual march of his ideas, as to preclude all doubt on the subject. Who, for instance, can fail at once to perceive that the dry manner of the dialogues on Justice and Virtue are poor and spiritless imitations of Socratic conversations, from the hand perhaps of the cobbler Simon, or of some other equally unskilful copyist?<sup>50</sup>

<sup>50</sup> Böckh, it is well known, has declared himself in favour of the former, (in *Platonis qui vulgo fertur Minoem*, p. 42.) See, on the other hand,

Who sees not that the Hipparchus, the Minos, the Anterastæ, and a few other of the shorter dialogues are elaborate and far from felicitous essays made by tyros in dialogistic composition? Others evince a more perfect, and more skilful hand, but are nevertheless unworthy to be ascribed to a Plato;—*e. g.* the Erixias, the Axiochus, and the second Alcibiades, which even ancient critics gave to other authors.<sup>51</sup> How these works could have got into the catalogue of his works we know not. It is more easy to explain the fact in the case of others which at least shew signs of a successful imitation of his style; while others may have been intentional forgeries. Such are some of his so-called epistles, and the Epinomis, which has been given to one of his scholars,—Philip of Opus,<sup>52</sup> the Theages, the Hippias Major, the first Alcibiades; works of which it is more than probable that they had their origin in the old Academy. Of these, the epistles, the Epinomis, and the first Alcibiades are alone of importance philosophically, but their character is such that they can only be considered in part unskilful imitations, in part illegitimate extensions of Socratic doctrines. On this point we do not fear that we shall meet with much difference of opinion among those who

Socher über Platons Schriften, § 187, ff., and Letronne, *Journal des Savans*, 1820, p. 675, sq.

<sup>51</sup> The Eryxias and Axiochus were held to be the works of the Socraticist Æschines; the second Alcibiades has by some been given to Xenophon. *Diog. L.* ii. 61; iii. 62; *Athen.* v. 62, p. 220; xi. 114, p. 506; *Suid.* s. v. *Αἰσχίνης*. Cf. on the other hand, Letronne, *ib.*

<sup>52</sup> *Diog. L.* iii. 37. Cf. *Suid.* s. v. *φιλόσοφος*.

are acquainted with the philosophy of Plato. On the other hand, there are several dialogues, the genuineness of which we must maintain against the doubts to which they have been subject, although the defence of some is far from easy. Of these works some have been rejected from too narrow a view of his philosophical acquirements; others from too exalted an opinion of his faultless skill, and the purely scientific and lofty aim of all his labours. From the first cause Socher<sup>53</sup> has rejected four of the most important,—the *Politicus*, *Parmenides*, the *Sophists*, and the *Critias*; in which decision he will not readily find one to agree with him. In his opinion, the three first were the productions of the Megarian school;<sup>54</sup> but it appears strange that the development of its philosophy should have arrived at such perfection in its forms, and yet its doctrines have been irretrievably lost and forgotten. Moreover, we think it impossible, that even the most intimate intercourse, such as Socher supposes to have existed between Plato and the Megarian author of these dialogues, could have produced such a perfect conformity, both in the language and the thoughts, as is exhibited in these and the other Platonic dialogues. But on this point we have already perhaps dwelt too long. Aste has condemned<sup>55</sup> a still greater number, but altogether they are not so important as those rejected by Socher. Nevertheless even among them the *Laches*, the *Charmides*, the *Lysis*, the *Euthydemus*, the *Meno*, and

<sup>53</sup> As above.<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.* p. 268, f.; 291.<sup>55</sup> *Plato's Life and Writings*, Leipz. 1816.

the Laws, deserve consideration in a philosophical point of view. Their condemnation arises from that over-estimate of the art and philosophy of Plato previously alluded to. But if only it be conceded that a long life like his may have called forth many occasional works of secondary importance and of hasty composition, we shall find no difficulty in defending their authenticity. Besides, we have the authority of Aristotle on our side.<sup>56</sup> The other works condemned by Aste are less important,—the Apology, the Crito, the Euthyphro, as also those rejected by Schleiermacher, the Hippias Minor, the Menexenus, although the genuineness of these two is established by the testimony of Aristotle,<sup>57</sup> and, lastly, the Ion. For our part we are disposed to hold as genuine even these inferior creations of Plato's mind; indeed we do not hesitate to defend the Clitophro,<sup>58</sup> upon the general consideration that no one ever attained at once to a mastery in his art, and exercised his powers with equal perfection at all times. As a general truth this is readily acknowledged by all; nevertheless it is often forgotten in the enthusiastic pursuit of particular inquiries, and in the warmth and animosity enkindled by controversy.

Dialogues were composed by Plato from his

<sup>56</sup> As to the authority of Aristotle as a witness to Platonic opinions, I refer to Trendelenburg, *Platonis de Id. et Numer. Doctr.* p. 13, sq. It is usually treated too lightly; the closer the intimacy with Aristotle's writings, the greater their authority becomes. The Meno is quoted, *Anal. Pr.* ii. 21; *Anal. Post.* i. 1. The Euthyden, *Soph. El.* 20. The Laws, *Polit.* ii. 6, 7, 9, 12.

<sup>57</sup> *Met.* v. 29; *Rhet.* iii. 14.

<sup>58</sup> We may regard it as a sketch of new opening to the republic. See *Diog.* l. iii. 37; *Dion. Hal. de Compos. Verb.* 25, p. 406, Schæf.

earliest youth up to the last years of his great age. Two of them, the *Phædrus* and the *Lysis*, we are told were composed before the death of Socrates,<sup>59</sup> and it is highly improbable that with such prolific talents and genius, as had already tempted him to take so bold a flight in poetry, he should have spent the rest of his youth idle and unproductive. On the other side, without taking the words of Cicero<sup>60</sup> to the letter, who makes him die in the act of writing, it is, nevertheless, in the highest degree probable, both from express statements of others, and from the condition of some of his works, that at his death he left a few unfinished.<sup>61</sup> As his literary labours were extended over so long a period, the investigation would well repay the trouble, if it were possible to trace his course as an author. In the attempt, however, we are abandoned almost entirely by outward testimony, and there is little of internal evidence in the dialogues themselves as to the dates of their composition, little too to lead to any important result. We are consequently forced to confine ourselves almost exclusively to the hazardous experiment of determining by their inner character the earlier and the later. Nevertheless, we must not allow ourselves to be deterred by the difficulty of the task, since it is of the utmost importance that we should be able to follow, through the several grades of his intel-

<sup>59</sup> Diog. L. iii. 35, 38. Our reason for neither absolutely rejecting, nor wholly adopting these notices, is, that they appear to us to possess some internal probabilities in their favour.

<sup>60</sup> De Senect. Cf. Dionys. de Compos. *ibid.*

<sup>61</sup> Hereto belong the *Laws* and the *Critias*. Cf. Diog. L. iii. 37.

lectual progress, one who has exercised so considerable an influence on the development of philosophy. We may not shrink from the labour of this task, however great, since it is rendered indispensable by the positiveness with which it has been asserted, that his opinions were very different at different periods of his life, and that the changes they underwent may be still traced in his writings.<sup>62</sup>

In modern times, since the Socratic philosophy has been better understood, it has been demanded, that among the dialogues of Plato, those in which he exhibits himself a pure Socraticist, should be distinguished from others which are so full of Heraclitic, Anaxagorean, Eleatic, and Pythagorean philosophemes, as to betray a greater and more accurate acquaintance with those systems than a true and faithful disciple of Socrates would ever aspire to and obtain. Those who are thus disposed to conceive the young Plato, in the first period of his philosophical development, as nothing more than a close copy of the Socratic mind, must, in all consistency, be of opinion that the dialogue in which he appears as such, were the earliest creations of his art, and that, on the contrary, all the others, which evince signs of a learned and searching examination of other theories, and of peculiar views of his own, must be assigned to a later date. To the former class have been assigned

<sup>62</sup> The objection of K. F. Hermann, in the *Heidel. Jahrb.* p. 1079, that I have neglected to give a genetic development of the Platonic system, renders it necessary to enter more at large upon this subject, although the investigation cannot naturally be exhausted in this place.



the *Lysis*, *Laches*, *Charmides*, *Protagoras*, *Euthyphro*, and the *Crito*,<sup>63</sup> besides some others, whose genuineness is questioned. Of these, moreover, the greater part are works of no great magnitude, and the general treatment of the dialogue and the dialectical working out of the thought, are so inferior in point of skill, that it has even been asserted, that it is inconceivable that Plato could have composed such works as *Lysis* and *Laches* after the *Phædrus*.<sup>64</sup> And, in fact, this consideration of art has had more influence in determining the judgment, than that, previously mentioned, of doctrine.

We shall, therefore, first of all, examine the validity of this inference from the less manifestation of skill to the earlier date of the composition. To refuse to allow any weight to this argument,

<sup>63</sup> Cf. Nitzsch, de Platonis *Phædro* Commentatis varia, (Kilia, 1833,) particularly p. 19, 30; Stallbaum, *Plat. Opp.* particularly lib. i. p. xxxiii.; K. F. Hermann, *ibid.* § 1086. "Plato was for a considerable period a strict Socraticist, before his acquaintance with other systems impressed his mind with the sense of a higher speculative want." Cf. his remarks against Schleiermacher, whom he reproaches with subjective formalising subtlety and incapability in the new *Jahrb. f. Philol. v. Pædag.* 1833, § 396, ff. The individuals above named differ, however, greatly in their respective views, and I am far from wishing to judge them all by the same standard. Stallbaum considers this period of Plato's authorship to have been peculiarly fertile, for he assigns to it also the *Meno*, *Gorgias*, *Cratylus*, and *Euthydemus*. In reply, I shall only remark that in the *Cratylus*, Plato's acquaintance with Philolaic writings is distinctly visible. Cf. *Craty.* p. 440, b. *καὶ ἐκ τούτου τοῦ λόγου οὕτε τὸ γνωσόμενον οὕτε τὸ γνωσθησόμενον ἂν εἴη*, and the *Frag.* of Philolaus in Böckh, p. 49. I shall avail myself of this opportunity to correct a mistake in the first part, p. 403. We must take *γνωσόμενον* as Böckh does, in a passive, and not in an active sense. There are still other allusions in the *Cratylus* to Pythagorean doctrines: *e. g.* p. 401, in the explanation of *ἰστία*, where the dialect belongs not, as Stallbaum supposes, to the Eleatæ, but to the Pythagoreans; similarly, also, p. 405, d. The Ideal theory, and the Platonic division of the Soul, are, it is acknowledged, to be found in the *Cratylus*.

<sup>64</sup> Stallbaum *ib. passim.* Hermann, in the new *Jahrb. ib.* particularly, p. 406.

would be as inconsiderate as to make it, without limitation or ulterior research, the sole standard of our decision. In the application, it is, in my opinion, essential to distinguish two points: the technical handling of the matter, and that enthusiasm of art which is enkindled by the master thought in which the work itself originated. That the artist's technical dexterity encreases up to the maturity of his years, is undeniable, and, consequently, whenever it is exhibited in its highest perfection, it is certainly correct to infer that the work was later than others, where, all other circumstances being the same, it is less perfect. On the other hand, the enthusiasm and inspiration of art has no such regularity of growth, but depends on many variable inciting causes, which, as it may be, suggest attempts of a higher or lower range of flight. Hence, generally, it is far from just to assert that the most perfect work of art is the latest production of the ripening age or maturity of the author. It would be superfluous to adduce instances of this, since they readily present themselves both in ancient and modern times. And, indeed, the very views, as to the chronological succession of the Platonic dialogues, which we are at present opugning, must, to a certain degree, assent to this; for external grounds compel them to admit, what, perhaps, in reliance upon their artistical tact, they would be prone to deny, that the *Euthyphro*, the *Crito*, the *Menexenus*, eminent neither for dialogistical nor for dialectical skill, were all written subsequent to, some long after, the death of *Socrates*; whereas, the *Protagoras*, on the contrary,

for the beauty of its style, and the wonderful art of the dialogue, is justly reckoned one of his most perfect works, but for its philosophical contents, one of the earliest.<sup>65</sup> There is, however, yet another point to be duly considered in the writings of Plato. Their excellence, as pieces of art, is two-fold: the rare imitative powers exhibited in the dialogue; and the acuteness with which philosophical matters are dialectically treated. No one will deny that these two qualities have only an outward connexion, and, consequently, that they cannot advance equally. With the philosopher, the latter is manifestly the more important, whereas the former is a matter of secondary consideration. The degree of perfection, therefore, in any dialogue, as such, affords, at most, a very uncertain mean for the determination of its date; whereas, the greatest weight in our present investigation ought to be laid on the dialectical skill. This, on the whole, has been generally admitted, though in detail it has seldom received its due and full appreciation. In reference to Plato's imitative skill, the *Protagoras*, the *Gorgias*, and the *Symposium*, must be classed among its most finished productions, next to which, but remotely, follow the *Phædrus* and the *Phædo*—works which, there is no doubt, were composed at

<sup>65</sup> How deceptive such opinions of art usually are, is proved by that of Stallbaum, that the *Euthyphro* and *Meno* were written while the process against Socrates was pending, (*Plat. Opp.* iv. 2, p. 289,) which seemingly is founded upon his low estimate of their excellence as pieces of composition. Moreover, he is inconsistent with himself, and he appears to have forgotten that he had asserted that the *Meno* must be older than the *Protagoras*, because of its inferiority in art. Our opinion upon the date of *Meno* will be given hereafter.

very distant epochs in his philosophical development. In the works which fall to the intermediate period, there is not an equal attention to the mere artistical arrangement, as was to be expected, where the dialectical form and the philosophical matter predominantly demanded consideration. It must, at least, be acknowledged, that his latest works, the Republic, the Timæus, and the Laws, which most explicitly contain his philosophical doctrines, belong to those in which there is the slightest trace of any effort to support his reputation for unequalled powers of imitation. As he abandoned poetry for science, because he was destined to reap, in the latter, the imperishable fruits of his labours and activity, so we may well suppose that he gradually arrived at a clearer conviction that his dramatic powers of composition, so near akin to the poetical, ought to give place to his skill in developing ideas and drawing from them instruction and scientific attraction.

These remarks give the principal grounds of my opinion that the degree of artistical excellence in the respective works of Plato are far from affording any standard for determining the order and date of their composition. The distinction we have drawn is fairly allowable, since in the imitative form of dialogue we have pure art; but, on the other hand, in the scientific skill to awaken reflection and to develop thought, there is undoubtedly an art, but one subordinate to the scientific end and aim. And here we would, by permission, wish to subjoin a few remarks, less for the purpose of

proof than of indicating our opinion on a few points which may be raised in consequence of what has been already advanced. Upon the first revision of the Platonic works, we are immediately struck with their varying merit as pieces of composition; some are on the highest, others on the lowest grade of that peculiar Platonic art, which is intermediate between the scientific and the dramatic. When we seek for the transition from one to the other, we find little that apparently belongs to that state. Perhaps, indeed, we might place there the Euthydemus and the Meno, which, in reference both to time and excellence, are intermediate between the most perfect and the least so of the Platonic dialogues. This great and marked difference between them has unquestionably given rise to a wish on the part of those who possessed a taste for the beautiful, to deny Plato's authorship of the inferior and more meagre dialogues. But without recourse to any such violent proceeding, it is possible to explain this singular phenomenon by the struggle between the scientific and the artistical for the mastery of Plato's mind, which appears never to have ceased during his life. At all events the story of the repeated corrections of the opening of the Republic is sufficient proof, that, even in his old age, he paid great attention to merely rhetorical perfection of style. Such a struggle must necessarily occasion him to enter upon many smaller works, intended rather for an exercise of artistical skill than qualified to awaken, by the scientific enthusiasm which a new idea might enkindle, a higher and more exalted effort of art; and also makes it

probable that in the course of his life several of his works underwent many revisions. The former circumstance satisfactorily accounts for our having from his hand, along-side of his greater works of profound and scientific importance, so many trifles, which, however, evince a trace of wonderful facility and artifice of composition, and moreover belong to the riper years of the philosopher—the Menexenus, for instance.<sup>66</sup> The second may afford an explanation why it is that the form of art is less finished in many of his less important works than in those of higher interest and more valuable subject. The conjecture has been often advanced in modern times, that Plato had submitted his works to a thorough revision,<sup>67</sup> which, in reference to some of them, is supported by the express testimony of Dionysius,<sup>68</sup> and, in reference to important alterations both of form and matter, is rendered the more probable, the more Plato impresses us with the idea of a man who laid great weight

<sup>66</sup> These lesser works are commonly regarded as occasional compositions; for instance, the objection that it was easier to censure than to surpass the political orators is made the occasion of the publication of the Menexenus. If this explanation be correct, the fact that he yielded to such provocations is a proof of his sensibility to praise and censure in matters purely of art.

<sup>67</sup> Wolf. Proleg. ad Hom. p. cliii. with whom, however, we cannot agree in the view that, in consequence thereof, it becomes impossible to trace the date of composition of the several dialogues; Schleier. Einleitung. p. 28.

<sup>68</sup> I shall adduce the writer's own words, since Stallbaum (Plat. Opp. iii. 1, p. lxvi. sq.) interprets them in too narrow a sense. De Comp. Verb. 25. ὁ δὲ Πλάτων τοὺς αὐτοῦ διαλόγους κτενίζων καὶ βοστρυχίζων καὶ πάντα τρόπον ἀναπλέκων οὐ διέλιπεν ὑγδοήκοντα γεγονώς ἔτη. πᾶσι γὰρ δήπου τοῖς φιλολόγοις γνώριμα τὰ περὶ τῆς φιλοπονίας τάνδρὸς ἱστορούμενα, τὰ τε ἄλλα καὶ δὴ τα περὶ τὴν δέλτον, ἣν τελευτήσαντος αὐτοῦ λέγουσιν εὑρεθῆναι ποικίλως μετακειμένην τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς πολιτείας ἔχουσαν τήνδε. κατέβην χθὲς εἰς Πειραιᾶ μετὰ Γλαύκωνος τοῦ Ἀρίστωνος. Cf. Quint. Inst. viii. 6, 64.

upon the little trifles of terms and verbal order, but still more upon exactness of thought, propriety in the arrangement of the parts, and their combination into a whole. It is, however, probable that the attention which, in his later years, he bestowed upon his earlier compositions, was not directed indiscriminately to all, but upon those mainly, if not solely, whose subject-matter was important; so that this, too, affords a probable explanation of the great difference in worth of the Platonic works.

If the preceding remarks have made it clear that in the investigation of their chronological succession little dependence can be placed on the pure artistical form of the dialogues respectively, a disposition may be felt to refer the decision of this point mainly to the differences of doctrine. For the special object of our work this difference is of the greatest consequence, since we have to do with the doctrine of Plato. If, that is, to speak clearly, such a difference can actually be pointed out in his writings, as, it has been assumed, would prove that, in his earlier years, he was a genuine Socraticist, and only subsequently, after he had become scientifically acquainted with other doctrines, such as, for instance, the Pythagorean, adopted a new system of thinking. We have already remarked upon the improbability of his not having made himself acquainted with the opinions of earlier philosophers during the ten years he spent in the society of Socrates; and to strengthen this we must further observe that it is equally unlikely that, in his thirtieth year, an age at which the scientific judgment generally arrives at matu-

rity,<sup>69</sup> he should never have attempted to remount an investigation to the grounds of those conflicting views and opinions which he found already existing; and we must, moreover, remind the reader, that it is upon the express testimony of a most objectionable witness, Aristotle, that we found our assertion, that at no period of his whole life was Plato a genuine Socraticist, but even before he came to Socrates he was intimately acquainted with the Heraclitic, and that he formed the view of things, he had derived there from it, into the ideal theory, impelled and encouraged by the lessons of Socrates.<sup>70</sup> What a perfect schoolboy must they conceive Plato to have been, who think that he could have lived up to that age in Athens, the centre of all the science of the times,—and yet was unable to do more than repeat word for word the doctrines of Socrates. It will, perhaps, be said, dialogues of his are still extant, in which he does nothing more than make several applications of the Socratic theory of virtue and science,

<sup>69</sup> Plato often puts into the mouths of very young men disquisitions of the greatest difficulty.

<sup>70</sup> I here adduce the words of Aristotle, because their value has, in these later times, been misunderstood. Met. i. 6. μετὰ δὲ τὰς εἰρημένους φιλοσοφίας ἡ Πλάτωνος ἐπεγένετο πραγματεία, τὰ μὲν πολλὰ τούτοις ἀκολουθοῦσα, τὰ δὲ καὶ ἴδια παρὰ τὴν τῶν Ἱταλικῶν ἔχουσα φιλοσοφίαν. ἐκ νέου τε γὰρ συνήθης γενόμενος πρῶτον Κρατύλῳ καὶ ταῖς Ἑρακλείτειοις δόξαις, ὥς ἀπάντων τῶν αἰσθητῶν αἰεὶ ρεόντων καὶ ἐπιστήμης περὶ αὐτῶν οὐκ οὔσης, ταῦτα μὲν καὶ ὕστερον οὕτως ὑπέλαβεν· Σωκράτους δὲ περὶ μὲν τὰ ἠθικὰ πραγματευόμενος, περὶ δὲ τῆς ὅλης φύσεως οὐθέν, ἐν μέντοι τούτοις τὸ καθόλου ζητοῦντος καὶ περὶ ὁρισμῶν ἐπιστήσαντος πρώτου τὴν διάνοιαν, ἐκεῖνον ἀποδεξάμενος διὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον ὑπέλαβεν ὥς περὶ ἑτέρων τοῦτο γιγνόμενον καὶ οὐ τῶν αἰσθητῶν τινός· ἀδύνατον γὰρ εἶναι τὸν κοινὸν ὅρον τῶν αἰσθητῶν τινός, αἰεὶ γε μεταβαλλόντων. οἷος μὲν οὖν τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ὄντων ἰδέας προσηγόρευσε.



and its capability of being taught,—*viz.* the Lesser Hippias, the Laches, the Charmides, and the Protagoras. Where are we to place these works? Admitting that they do not, in fact, contain any thing more than Socratic doctrines,<sup>72</sup> still, to conclude, therefore, that at the time he wrote these dialogues he knew no other philosophy but the Socratical, would be to give an undue extension to the inference from silence to ignorance. Might not his object, in the composition of these works, have been solely to disseminate Socratic doctrines,—to paint his master in the light he appeared to himself, and to purify his character from the exaggerations and misrepresentations of calumny, to which it was exposed, as after the death of Socrates he avowedly did in the *Apology*, the *Euthyphro*, and the *Crito*? Very different would the case be if in these dialogues he had advanced opinions of Socrates, which, at a later period, he himself held to be erroneous. Then it would, undoubtedly, be just to say that such an enunciation of Socratic doctrines is an infallible proof, that the works in which they are found belong to an earlier period of his authorship; for even for apologetic purposes Plato would hardly make his master maintain what he himself believed to be false. But it is far from so; on the contrary, he never opposed a single Socratic doctrine; and in the last and ripest develop-

<sup>72</sup> In my opinion this is not the case, except with the lesser Hippias and the Laches. In the Charmides, p. 166. c., the science of sciences is very different from the knowledge of self, and the ability to give a reason for one's convictions, which Socrates held to be necessary. In the Protagoras, the division of the soul is given as distinctly as it could be in a merely incidental notice of the subject.

ment of his own theory, he still admits as true, all the particular tenets of Socrates which are expressly advanced in the earlier works. It has been asserted that Plato, when he wrote these and some other dialogues, knew nothing of his own division of the soul into three faculties, and the classification of the virtues grounded upon it; but that, like Socrates, he held the virtues generally to be sciences. But if the proofs of this assertion are drawn from the mere fact of his adding a fifth to the four virtues in *Protagoras*,<sup>73</sup> and that, without giving distinctly the parts of virtue, he simply makes science a requisite for every particular virtue, we must at once declare that they are totally insufficient, since the determination of the parts of virtue is not the point at issue, but either no notice is taken of the subject, or it is tacitly assumed that there are parts of virtue. But even in his division of virtue, Plato did not abandon the true Socratic theory, that virtue is science, but the division is merely an addition to the doctrine;—*viz.* an implied reference in science to the several parts of the soul, and the view that science of the good cannot be rightly evolved, unless the natural conditions of its existence permit it,<sup>74</sup> an assumption which was implied

<sup>73</sup> *Vis. δούρης*, p. 229, c. sq. Vide Stallbaum, *Plat. Opp.* ii. 2, p. 15.

<sup>74</sup> K. F. Hermann. in his *Marburg. Lectiōnverz.* Winterg. 1832—3, expresses the opinion, that Plato once held all good to be founded on *φρόνησις*, and appeals to the *Euthyd.* p. 281, b. and *Meno*, p. 88, c. as proving that he thought differently at a later period of the Platonic system. This view exhibits a still worse misunderstanding; for the same doctrine is found in *Phædo*, p. 69; *de Leg.* iv. p. 710, and in other works, which are admitted to belong to the later period of his literary life; indeed, Aristotle does not deny that virtue is *φρόνησις*, but that it is *ἐπιστήμη*, *i. e.* consists merely in the improvement of the speculative reason. *Eth. Eud.* vii. 13; *Eth. Nic.* vi. 13.

in the Socratic doctrine, and which was only more fully developed by Plato.

By these remarks we are, however, far from denying that the system of Plato gradually matured itself, and that its progress may still be traced in his writings; our only object is to oppose that false notion of its gradual formation, which sees, in the younger Plato, a perfect copy of Socrates, but in the older man an abandonment of Socratic principles, for a different view of things drawn from the earlier philosophemes. The latter is perfectly groundless, since a correct insight into the historical value of his system, recognises in it nothing more than a wider development of Socratic principles. This he obtained, partly by acquiring a more comprehensive knowledge of the olden philosophy than Socrates could ever attain, who, at most, maintained towards it a merely negative position, and partly by extending the philosophical reflection over a field of inquiry, which was far removed from the common notions of philosophy, and, therefore, also the Socratic sphere of inquiry. Accordingly, the progress which we shall have to follow in the Platonic philosophy, is of such a nature that we shall find its author at first occupying himself exclusively with the consideration of the notion of science in general, and its method, the two being conceived under their most general features and in their mutual connexion; next, we shall find him, impelled by the difficulty of reconciling the different aspects of science in its methodical development, and by the refutation of the partial views of the earlier

philosophers, endeavouring to establish a more accurate method of dialectic; and, finally, after grounding himself as thoroughly as was permitted him in the right principle, he was able to direct his mind to an extensive application of it, in a consideration of the multiplicity which is submitted to human cognition. This is in perfect conformity with the course of philosophical development. Beginning, first of all, with a review of science and truth as comprised in one general scheme,<sup>75</sup> it proceeds to defend its own against all opposite directions, the truth of which it cannot absolutely deny, but which, conceived in an exclusive point of view, necessarily renders it wavering and unstable in its own. Accordingly, the philosophical activity invariably gives rise to the critical, at first limiting and impeding, but eventually leading the inquirer to a more accurate completion of the philosophical domain. It is only when he has passed through this period of criticism, that he is able to give free scope to the universal development of the reason. If, on the contrary, he were to begin with special investigations, he might possibly, it cannot be denied, arrive at science; still, in such researches, he would exhibit himself less as a philosopher than as a critic labouring to open for himself a road to philosophical development.<sup>76</sup> It may fairly be assumed, that Plato had

<sup>75</sup> Herein I agree entirely with Schleiermacher, when he says, in the introduction to the *Phædrus*, § 75, "certainly every one acquainted with facts, and self-experienced, will admit that philosophy does not commence with any single speculation, but with a conception, at least, of its whole. *Plat. de Rep.* vii. p. 537, ὁ μὲν γὰρ συνοπτικὸς διαλεκτικὸς, ὁ δὲ μὴ οὗ.

<sup>76</sup> This necessary distinction is, to all appearance, overlooked by K. F. Hermann, in the *Neu. Jahrb.* *ibid.* 399; and he is, at all events, in error, in

been such a critic even before he became a philosopher; but his critical labours were of very mediate influence on his philosophy, and it is highly improbable that, in this critical career, he proceeded through a very long and complete series of works,<sup>77</sup> since the domain of criticism had already been surveyed by Socrates, and among the many advantages which Plato derived from his eminent predecessor, was the incalculable one, that he had merely to finish, in some particular points, a work already generally in progress, though he was, it is true, not a little disturbed by the attacks upon the Socratic principles, which had made themselves an entrance even into the Socratic schools, by the many mistakes as to the correct method.<sup>78</sup>

These are the general principles in conformity with which we shall form our estimate of the course of the scientific formation of Plato's mind. In so doing we cannot place much reliance upon uncertain, and in part, improbable assertions,—such as that which would refer to a late date, his first acquaintance with the Pythagorean philosophy, or which maintains the *Phædrus* was his earliest work, and that the *Lysis* was composed during the life of Socrates, and the *Gorgias* in that of Gorgias, but that the *Laws* were not published till

the counter-position he advances to that of Schleiermacher, that every philosopher begins with such partial investigations as are immediately connected with the labours of their predecessors. Many instances might be adduced to shew that this assertion is far too general for the truth.

<sup>77</sup> The *Lysis*, perhaps, alone belongs to this æra.

<sup>78</sup> This point has been noticed sufficiently while we considered the Dialectic of the Cyrenaics, Megarians, and Cynics.

after the author's death.<sup>79</sup> Our only course, therefore, is to trace out, with great diligence, all the occasional allusions in the works themselves, which seem to indicate their date and mutual connexion, and, where we are abandoned by such internal evidences, to be guided by the opinion already advanced, as to the general progress of his intellectual enlightenment. We are far from pretending that the arrangement of the Platonic works, we shall by these means arrive at, will be absolutely unquestionable. For we are unwilling to assert that he necessarily composed his works in the same order that he acquired his philosophical character. Composition does not invariably follow the same course as the thought.

It is in the case of some of the smaller dialogues which, by tacit agreement, are generally made to follow each other, that our judgment must be most vague;—*viz.* the *Lysis*, the *Laches*, the *Charmides*, to which may be added the *Lesser Hippias*. The three last bear the evident impress of the Socratic character, but the *Charmides* exhibits more peculiar features than the other two. In an examination of the Platonic philosophy these dialogues are of little value, since they contribute but little to a knowledge of his peculiar sentiments. Consequently, the question so often mooted in modern times, whether they were composed before or after the *Protagoras* and *Phædrus*, appears not

<sup>79</sup> Upon these two points, cf. *Diog. L.* iii. 37; *Athen.* xi. 113, p. 505. The other statements have been already noticed: Stallbaum defers to them, but, in his usual manner, gives to them a very arbitrary acceptance, consistent with his own hypothesis. *Plat. Opp.* iv. 1, p. xx. sq.

only difficult to answer, but also of little importance. Much more so is the question, what is the relation of the Protagoras and the Phædrus both one to another, and also to the other works of Plato. The former is generally admitted to belong to the dialogues written before the death of Socrates, and for the most part deliver a doctrine quite in keeping with Socratic principles, although, according to our judgment already given, traces occur in it of peculiarly Platonic modes of thought. That the eminent skill of dramatic composition which it exhibits affords no presumption against its early composition we have already observed. As to the relation of the Phædrus to the Protagoras, it appears unquestionable, that it was the earlier of the two; for a matter which, in the Phædrus, is proved at great length—the inadequacy of long written treatises for instruction—is slightly touched upon in the Protagoras, where it is supposed to be an established point, and is extended to long oral discourses;<sup>80</sup> so that the result of the Phædrus serves for illustration of the question in the Protagoras. Moreover, the manner in which, in the Phædrus, Plato makes Socrates entertain good hopes of the philosophical mind of the young Isocrates, if it has any propriety in it, was only allowable at a time when Isocrates was so young as to justify the entertainment of

<sup>80</sup> Protag. p. 329, a. Cf. Phædr. p. 275, sq. Compare herewith Plato's very different mode of treating the position, that Virtue is not teachable, because there are no teachers of it; which position is again discussed in the Meno. In the former passage it is examined at such length, that he does not refer at all to the Meno.

higher hopes than he afterwards fulfilled;<sup>81</sup> so that, from all these considerations, we are driven to reckon the Phædrus among the earliest works of Plato. We shall not enter at large into all the remarks advanced by ancient and modern judges of art, as to the traces of the author's youthfulness betrayed by the rhetorical and dialectical treatment of the matters discussed in the Phædrus.<sup>82</sup> On the other hand, we must call attention to the fact that the Phædrus and the Protagoras perfectly correspond, as far as regards their philosophical importance, to what we have already intimated to be the point of transition in the mental development of Plato. The object of both is to give a general description of the idea of philosophy, from which, with Plato, the love of the divine and the pursuit of the good were inseparable, and of its right method as opposed to sophistical and rhetorical modes of teaching, which naturally enough lead to a description of the supra-sensible world in which the philosopher lives, and of the philosophical soul. All this, however, in these two dialogues, is sketched in very undefined outline; indeed, wherever, as in the Phædrus, he enters upon details, the immaturity and incompleteness of the fundamental conception is strikingly manifest.<sup>83</sup> On the other hand, there are no traces

<sup>81</sup> Phædr. p. 278, e. sq. Schleierm. Einl. zum. Phædr. p. 7, lays great weight upon this. Hermann's objection (ibid.) is of no consequence.

<sup>82</sup> As such I consider the jokes against the political leaders as being *λογόγραφοι*, because they wrote laws, and the commendation of Pericles' eloquence, because it was derived from the lessons of Anaxagoras (p. 269, e. sq.), notwithstanding the new explanation given thereof by Hermann, ib. p. 409.

<sup>83</sup> This holds particularly of the fourfold division of madness, p. 244, sqq.; and of the division of the lot of humanity, p. 248.



of those dialectical investigations which he must necessarily have passed through before he could maintain the validity of his doctrine of ideas against the Heraclitic and Eleatic philosophy; and even though the Phædrus betrays some acquaintance with Pythagorean doctrines, it is only of a very general nature, and is very far from amounting as yet to his peculiar theory of the One, of the great and the little, and of numbers, by means of which he sought, in his later years, to open a passage from his ideal world into the world of sense. That, which we miss in the Phædrus and the Protagoras, afforded the means by which he arrived at a larger development of his philosophy, and, accordingly, we have a whole series of dialogues which, belonging to the second æra of his career, as an author, are mainly occupied with reconciling the contradiction between the sensuous presentation and the demands of the reason; and, accordingly, Protagoras is confronted with the Eleatæ, and Heraclitus, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and the Pythagoreans receive a due appreciation. Before, however, Plato entered upon this period of literary activity, he appears to have devoted himself to the interests of his master and teacher, and produced the Apology, the Crito, and the Euthyphro, the date of which is invariably placed shortly subsequent to the death of Socrates, by all who admit them to be works of Plato. He betook himself to the task as any thing else than a genuine Socraticist, for, in the Euthyphro, the Ideal theory is implied in all of its most essential points.<sup>84</sup> Next, in time,

<sup>84</sup> P. 6, sq.

we are disposed to place the *Gorgias*, which, on the one hand, refers us back to the *Protagoras* and the *Phædrus*, since it completes the defeat of the sophists and orators in a purely Socratical mode, by opposing to their immoral principles the philosophical feeling, and thereby introduces, on the other hand, certain disquisitions calculated to lead to a right distinction between sense and reason. This tendency is exhibited in the investigations into the nature of pleasure, which, however, are far from being so fully worked out, as they afterwards were in his later years. The principal compositions of this second æra, during which his *Dialectic* was fully evolved, and perfectly established by controversy, are the *Theætetus*, the *Sophist*, and the *Politicus*, which are also externally connected by the speakers in the dialogue. The *Parmenides*, however, which we look upon as his first commencement in controversy, must have preceded them, while by the nature of their contents, the *Euthydemus*, the *Meno*<sup>85</sup>, and the *Cratylus* must be classed with them, although it would be difficult, indeed, to determine precisely their respective places. In the composition of these dialogues Plato found terms and expressions for the most important points of his dialectical system, and overcame, so far as was possible for him, the difficulties which he had to encounter in carrying out his view. Wherever the difficulty was insuperable, he attempted to supply the defi-

<sup>85</sup> The mention of the treasury of *Ismenias* gives *Olymp.* 96, 2 circ. as the date of the *Meno*. Vide *Schleier. Anm. zum. Menon.* § 537; *Letronne Journ. d. Savans*, 1820, p. 679. *Socher* has questioned this, p. 180, ff., without, however, satisfactorily explaining the passage.

ciency of exact terms by formulæ drawn evidently from the Pythagoreans, and belonging, without doubt, to the later development of his theory. These Pythagorean formulæ occur, occasionally, in the above-named dialogues, but, in the *Phædo* and *Philebus*, they present themselves more frequently and obviously, and, accordingly, we shall place these two dialogues at the close of this period of his literary life. They further support their claim to this position by the fact, that, in them, as a result of previous investigations, the dialectical is considered merely as a general basis for a complete and extensive application of philosophy to *Physics* and *Ethics*.

The *Symposium* also must be assigned to this period, to judge from chronological grounds,<sup>86</sup> where-with the subject-matter very well consists, although it does not, it is true, exhibit very distinctly the grade of philosophical enlightenment, at which Plato had then unquestionably arrived. Lastly, that complete system of *Ethics* and *Physics*, which the *Phædo* and the *Philebus* had prepared, is found in the *Republic*, the *Timæus*, and the *Laws*, which are almost invariably regarded as his latest productions. They appear, moreover, to have followed in the order we have mentioned them, and represent the third period of his literary career.

These investigations have not, we must in candour admit, led to a result which may justly lay claim to perfect validity in every respect: accordingly we shall only be the more cautious how we permit

<sup>86</sup> The mention of the dispersion of the Arcadians by the Lacedæmonians, p. 193, a., proves that it was composed after *Olymp.* 98. 4.

our judgment to be influenced by it in our review and estimate of the Platonic philosophy. Very different would have been the consequence of acceding to the opinion that some of his dialogues were composed in a pure Socratic feeling, which, however, was subsequently abandoned ; for in that case we should have to neglect such writings entirely, since our only object is to gather what he contributed to the further development of philosophy. Such a narrowing of the field of our investigation would greatly increase its difficulty. Moreover, we do not consider our view of the gradual evolution of Plato's opinions sufficiently accurate to enable us to make it the basis of a description of the progressive advancement of his theory. Such a precise history of the philosophical development, however desirable, is impossible, both in the case of Plato and other philosophers. We must be content with being able to point out certain epochs in the progress of philosophy: the transition from one to another may indeed be obscurely conjectured, but never historically traced.

## CHAPTER II.

### PLATO'S OPINION AS TO PHILOSOPHY AND ITS PARTS.

IN the Platonic Dialogues the most diversified elements are, as was to be expected from the form of composition, mingled together; mythical conceits closely verging on the religious domain, poetical images and fictions, doctrines drawn from mathematics and other special sciences, and, lastly, common-sense maxims of public and private economy. At times the discussion proceeds upon mere assumptions, which are capable, no doubt, of philosophical confirmation, of which, however, we are not told by Plato whether he had so established their sufficiency. It is from this heterogeneous medley that we must endeavour to extract what, agreeably to the Platonic ideas, constituted philosophy.

The first object, with a faithful disciple of Socrates, would naturally be to determine the notion of science, and therein all his powers of philosophy and reflection must have centred. Now to this problem, the definition of science, Plato has devoted an entire dialogue, the *Theætetus*. The result, however, seems to be only negative, inasmuch as it shews that all attempts to define science either by sensation (*αἰσθησις*) or by opinion (*δόξα*) are unsuccessful, and we are left utterly at a loss how it is rightly to be defined. On the other

hand, there are passages in his other works which apparently define science by opinion, since they draw a distinction between right opinion and science, making the former merely an uncertain possession of the soul, which is easily lost; whereas the latter, on the contrary, is a right opinion firmly established by being referred to some principle of the reason.<sup>1</sup> When, however, we go back to the *Theætetus*, we are compelled to admit that Plato himself did not believe that he had gained any thing by this distinction, for the explanation of science, by correct opinion firmly established by some rational principle, is ultimately rejected, upon the ground that the rational principle, if it is to conduct to science, must itself be knowledge or science, and consequently, to give such a definition of science by science, is only to reason in a circle.<sup>2</sup>

The question, therefore, naturally arises, what, then, properly, is the end of this discussion upon the notion of science? Now as Plato, although he rejects every exposition of science by right opinion, nevertheless believes himself justified in indicating its true relation to right opinion, it must be evident that his sole object must have been to shew, that all the attempts to define it

<sup>1</sup> *Meno*, p. 98, a. αἰτίας λογισμῶ. — ἐπειδαν δὲ δεθῶσι (sc. αἱ ἀληθεῖς δόξαι), πρῶτον μὲν ἐπιστήμαι γίνονται, ἔπειτα μόνιμοι. Cf. *Euthyphr.* p. 11, c; *Phæd.* p. 96, b; *de Rep.* iv. p. 431, c; *Tim.* p. 51, d. δύο δὴ λεκτόν ἐκείνω (sc. νοῦν καὶ δόξαν ἀληθῆ), διότι χωρὶς γεγόνατον, ἀνομολῶς τε ἔχον· τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν διὰ διδαχῆς, τὸ δ' ὑπὸ πειθοῦς ἡμῖν ἐγγίγνεται· καὶ τὸ μὲν αἰεὶ μετὰ ἀληθοῦς λόγου, τὸ δὲ ἄλογον· καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀκίνητον πειθοῖ, τὸ δὲ μεταπειστόν. *Phil.* p. 59.

<sup>2</sup> *Theæt.* p. 209, d. sq. καὶ παντάπασί γε εὐθες, ζητούντων ἡμῶν ἐπιστήμην, δόξαν φάναι ὀρθὴν εἶναι μετ' ἐπιστήμης, εἴτε διαφορότητος εἴτε ὁμοουῶν.

cannot possibly lead to any other result than to point out its limits and extent, as contrasted with some other analogous department of mind; and that otherwise the notion cannot be made clearer than it is in itself. Moreover, an explanation of science is unnecessary, inasmuch as the notion presents in itself its own verification, and is such, that without reference to other opinions, we can set out from it with the fullest certainty.<sup>3</sup> Hence he denies that it is possible to determine the notion of false opinion, without first establishing that of science.<sup>4</sup> Consequently he rejected as idle all attempts to discover a science of science and its contrary, on the ground that they would lead to endless and interminable discussion,<sup>5</sup> since there is no other standard of science than itself, and because it is impossible to talk of it without using terms such as knowledge, conviction, insight, and the like, all of which imply the notion.<sup>6</sup> Accordingly, Plato appears

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Phæd. p. 99, e. sq. Schleiermacher's Introduction to the Theætetus, sub init.

<sup>4</sup> Theæt. p. 200, c. ἄρ' οὖν ἡμῖν, ὦ παῖ, καλῶς ὁ λόγος ἐπιπλήττει καὶ ἐνδείκνυται, ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς ψευδῇ δόξαν προτέραν ζητοῦμεν ἐπιστήμης, ἐκείνην ἀφέντες· τὸ δ' ἐστὶν ἀδύνατον γινῶναι, πρὶν ἂν τις ἐπιστήμην ἱκανῶς λάβοι τί ποτ' ἐστίν;

<sup>5</sup> Ibid. b. ἢ πάλιν αὐτοὶ μοι ἔρεῖτε, ὅτι τῶν ἐπιστημῶν καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνων εἰσὶν αὐτὴ ἐπιστήμη, ὃς ὁ κεκτημένος ἐν ἑτέροις τισὶ γελοίοις περιστρεφῶσιν ἢ κηρίνοις πλάσμασι καθείρξας, ἕωσπερ ἂν κεκτῇται, ἐπίσταται, καὶ ἂν μὴ προχείρους ἔχῃ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ; καὶ οὕτω δὴ ἀναγκασθήσεσθε εἰς ταύτην περιτρέχειν μυριάκις οὐδὲν πλέον ποιοῦντες;

<sup>6</sup> Theæt. p. 196, e. ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, πάλαι ἐσμέν ἀνάπλεω τοῦ μὴ καθαρῶς διαλέγεσθαι. μυριάκις γὰρ εἰρήκαμεν τὸ γινώσκομεν καὶ οὐ γινώσκομεν, καὶ ἐπιστάμεθα καὶ οὐκ ἐπιστάμεθα, ὥς τι συνιέντες ἀλλήλων ἐν ᾧ ἔτι ἐπιστήμην ἀγνοοῦμεν. εἰ δὲ βούλει, καὶ νῦν ἐν τῷ παρόντι κεχρήμεθ' αὐτῷ ἀγνοεῖν τε καὶ συνιέναι, ὥς προσῆκον αὐτοῖς χρῆσθαι, εἰ περ στερόμεθα ἐπιστήμης. Θεαίτ. 'Ἀλλὰ τίνα τρόπον διαλέξει, ὦ Σώκρατες, τούτων ἀπεχόμενος; Σωκρ. Οὐδὲνα ὧν γε ὃς εἰμὶ· εἰ μέντοι ἢ ἀντιλογικῶς κ. τ. λ.

to have regarded the notion itself as the ultimate criterion to which all scientific inquiry must be referred, and, therefore, cannot itself be measured by any ulterior standard.

After this reference to the Socratic doctrine of pure intelligence, as the ultimate end of all mental activity, some wonder may perhaps be felt, that in the *Theætetus* no notice should have been taken of the connexion and oneness of all scientific thought, which it was equally the object of all the labours of Socrates to establish. This omission, however, is easily explained by the limited design of the dialogue, for elsewhere we find him faithfully adhering on this point also to his master's opinions. On this subject his doctrine is strictly in accordance with what we have already noticed as his opinion of the absoluteness of pure intellectual science. For in the consideration of special sciences, although he objects to them that they proceed independently of each other, and by a method determined rather by a recorded observation of the usual practice than by a knowledge of the nature and principle of things,<sup>7</sup> he is, nevertheless, far from denying their utility, but shews, from these imperfections, that they stand in need of a regulative superintendent, which, from the knowledge of the eternally true, may indicate to each its proper object.<sup>8</sup> This regulator, which is to determine the value of each special science, he calls—using a Socratic term—Dialectic,<sup>9</sup> and

<sup>7</sup> *Gorg.* p. 500, e. sq.

<sup>8</sup> *De Rep.* vii. p. 528, b.; *Polit.* p. 304, 305.

<sup>9</sup> *De Rep.* vii. p. 534, e. ἄρ' οὖν δοκεῖ σοι ὥσπερ θριγκὸς τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἡ διαλεκτικὴ ἡμῖν ἐπάνω κεῖσθαι; *Ibid.* pag. 537, c. ὁ μὲν γὰρ συνοπτικὸς (sc. τῶν μαθημάτων) ὁ διαλεκτικὸς.



ascribes to it the science of all other sciences.<sup>10</sup> We have here distinctly stated the position which in other passages is advanced cautiously and with hesitation, that all sciences are comprised and held together by a single science, which is able not merely to distinguish the right and wrong, but which, as taking cognisance of the others, is also cognisant of itself.<sup>11</sup> That herein he posited the true unity of all science, is further clear from his shewing, that the cognition of another's knowledge is impossible without the cognition of that which is the object of his knowledge<sup>12</sup>; since otherwise, for sake of illustration, without being a physician, a man would be able to estimate the correctness of certain judgments upon the objects of medical science. While, however, he decidedly rejects the idle distinction between knowledge and its subject-matter, he also shews, both from a consideration of the objects of science, and also of the tendency of the human mind to science, that all knowledge must be considered as a unity, for the particular cannot be known without the universal; for instance, without the nature of the all, the cognisant soul itself cannot be known; <sup>13</sup> and the demand for science does not direct itself to this or that particu-

<sup>10</sup> Phileb. p. 57, e. ἀλλ' ἡμᾶς, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ἀναίνοιτ' ἂν ἡ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δύναμις, εἰ τινα πρὸ αὐτῆς ἄλλην κρίναιμεν. Τίνα δὲ ταύτην αὐ δεῖ λέγειν; Δῆλον ὅτι ἢ πᾶσαν τήν γε νῦν λεγομένην γνῶνι.

<sup>11</sup> Charm. p. 166, c. αἱ μὲν ἄλλαι πᾶσαι ἄλλον εἰσὶν ἐπιστῆμαι, ἑαυτῶν δ' οὐ· ἡ δὲ μόνη τῶν τε ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶ καὶ αὐτῇ ἑαυτῆς. If we bear in mind the general nature of the Platonic investigations, we shall not be misled by the fact that *σωφροσύνη* is here treated of.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid. p. 169, d. sq., with Schleiermacher's note.

<sup>13</sup> Phaedr. p. 270, c. ψυχῆς οὖν φύσιν ἀξίως λόγου κατανοῆσαι οἷα δυνατόν εἶναι ἄνευ τῆς τοῦ ὅλου φύσεως; κ. τ. λ. Cf. Phil. p. 29, sq.; de Rep. vi. p. 486, a.

lar knowledge, but to knowledge in general.<sup>14</sup> And after a due consideration of these points, he does not hesitate to declare that no truly intellectual mind will enter upon any particular investigation, whether of greater or less importance, for its own sake, but only with a view to strengthen and advance itself in that one sole science which embraces all—Dialectic.<sup>15</sup>

With these investigations of Plato into the nature of science, his discussions upon practical life are so intimately connected, that it is difficult to separate the two questions; indeed it would be ill-advised to do so, in any sincere attempt, to represent the true sense and spirit of his doctrine, for it is exactly in this close union of the scientific and the practical that the beautiful proportion, which regulated his labours, is most strikingly exhibited. The whole series of dialogues which are occupied with the notions of particular virtues, or of virtue in general, have for their object to prove that the notion of virtue cannot be separated from that of science. Thus the manifest purport of the Charmides is to shew that the notion of temperance (*σωφροσύνη*) cannot be determined unless that of science has been previously established; <sup>16</sup> and in the Laches we have it plainly declared that valour is nothing else than knowledge, and virtue the knowledge of the good in general, what

<sup>14</sup> De Rep. v. p. 475. οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸν φιλόσοφον σοφίας φήσομεν ἐπιθυμητὴν εἶναι, οὐ τῆς μὲν, τῆς δ' οὐ, ἀλλὰ πάσης;

<sup>15</sup> Polit. p. 285, c. seq.

<sup>16</sup> This is the object of the most essential part of the Charmides, from p. 165 to the end, but even in the preceding portion there are constant references hereto.

was, is, and ever shall be, and that, consequently, all virtue is one, in the same manner as science.<sup>17</sup> For with Plato science is not, as with the many, a powerless thing—which, though it may be in a man, is yet unable to control him; like a slave, he may be shamefully overborne by fear and hope, by love and lust—on the contrary, it has the power and energy to govern the man, who, if he has a right knowledge of good and evil, cannot do otherwise than obey when science commands, since she is sufficiently strong to protect him against his irrational impulses.<sup>18</sup> Similarly, he shews that it is only from ignorance that man does evil, since his submission to the irrational desires is brought about solely by a false estimate of good and evil, in which one is mistaken for the other.<sup>19</sup> In all this again Plato does no more than maintain and follow out the doctrine of Socrates—“No one who is evil is voluntarily evil.”<sup>20</sup> This proposition, however, forms a complete parallel and counterpart to that other, “Only against his will is a soul ignorant or in error.”<sup>21</sup> Both,

<sup>17</sup> Pag. 199, d. δοκεῖ οὖν σοι ἀπολείπειν ἂν τι ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀρετῆς, εἴπερ εἶδείη τὰ τε ἀγαθὰ πάντα καὶ παντάπασιν, ὡς γίγνεται καὶ γενήσεται καὶ γέγονε, καὶ τὰ κακὰ ὡσαύτως;

<sup>18</sup> Prot. p. 352, b. δοκεῖ δὲ τοῖς πολλοῖς περὶ ἐπιστήμης τοιοῦτόν τι· οὐκ ἰσχυρόν, οὐδ' ἡγεμονικόν, οὐδ' ἀρχικόν εἶναι, οὐδὲ ὡς περὶ τοιούτου αὐτοῦ ὄντος διανοοῦνται, ἀλλ' ἐνούσης πολλάκις ἀνθρώπῳ ἐπιστήμης οὐ τὴν ἐπιστήμην αὐτοῦ ἄρχειν, ἀλλ' ἄλλο τι, τοτὲ μὲν θυμόν, τοτὲ δὲ ἡδονήν, τοτὲ δὲ λύπην, ἐνίοτε, δὲ ἔρωτα, πολλάκις δὲ φόβον, ἀτεχνῶς διανοοῦμενοι περὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης, ὥσπερ περὶ ἀνδραπόδου, περιελαομένης ὑπὸ τῶν, ἄλλων ἀπάντων, κ. τ. λ.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid. 357, e. ὥστε τοῦτ' ἔστι, τὸ ἡδονῆς, ἥτιω εἶναι, ἀμαθία ἢ μεγίστη, Gorg. p. 460.

<sup>20</sup> Prot. p. 345, d.; de Leg. v. p. 731, d.; ix. p. 861, sq. Tim. p. 86, d. κακὸς μὲν γὰρ ἐκὼν οὐδεὶς.

<sup>21</sup> Soph. p. 228, c., de Rep. ii. p. 382, a.; iii. p. 412, e. sq.

however, are based upon the general principle, that where science is, there too is morality; there too a perfect insight into the true is invariably to be found. Consequently, knowledge, according to Plato, is inseparable from right conduct; indeed, wherever he consistently can, he makes the notion of knowledge subordinate to that of practice,<sup>22</sup> as similarly he discovers in the pursuit of knowledge, a striving after good.<sup>23</sup> It is, however, only a perception of the strict accordance of this doctrine with the Platonic view of science and good in general, that will enable us to penetrate its extent and importance. To explain this fully would here be inappropriate; nevertheless it will be necessary to recall to mind the general character of the Socratic doctrine, and to anticipate our history by stating that, according to Plato, all science has good for its object, since the true is also the good, and the good the true, for he taught that knowledge must be both good and beautiful, that without a knowledge of the good all knowledge must be unprofitable, since no one would understand how rightly to employ it, since all possessions are valueless without that of the good.<sup>24</sup> By this he means, that if the philosopher looks to

<sup>22</sup> It is necessary to notice how the terms *ποίημα*, *ποιεῖν*, and *δράν* are here used in the same sense.

<sup>23</sup> Phædr. p. 237, e. *ἐπικτητος δόξα ἐπιειμένη τοῦ ἀρίστου*. Here *δόξα* stands for knowledge generally; *ἐπικτητος* is opposed to *ἐμφυτος*, and indicate the acquisitions made by the activity of the reason.

<sup>24</sup> Charm. p. 174, a. sq.; Conv. p. 210, sq.; de Rep. vi. p. 505, a. *ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα μέγιστον μάθημα—ἥ καὶ δίκαια καὶ τὰλλα προσχρησάμενα χρήσιμα καὶ ὠφέλιμα γίνονται—εἰ δὲ μὴ ἴσμεν (sc. αὐτὴν), ἀνευ δὲ ταύτης εἰ ὅτι μάλιστα τὰλλα ἐπιστάμεθα, οἴσθ' ὅτι οὐδὲν ἡμῖν ὄφελος, ὥσπερ οὐδ' εἰ κεκτήμεθά τι ἀνευ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ*.

the eternal and unchangeable dispensations of good, in which there is neither injustice nor wrong, but all is disposed in the fairest order and according to reason, he will be irresistibly led to imitate their goodness and beauty, and to assimilate himself to them as much as possible, since no one can associate with those whom he loves and admires, without feeling a desire and an impulse to become like them.<sup>25</sup> When now we consider this science relatively to what is elsewhere so called, we find that it is superintending science—the Dialectic, of which we have already seen, that its province is to assign to each special science its appropriate task. For the other sciences, such as Mathematics and Astronomy, are compared by Plato to sportsmen who seize whatever prey presents itself, even without being able to make any use of it: it is Dialectic that must teach the use of them:<sup>26</sup> accordingly, true science is that which combines its practice with a knowledge of the utility of its objects.<sup>27</sup>

Absolute science, therefore, is the pure self-consciousness of the reason—the conviction it has of itself—which assures to every special science its value and right import, and is at the same time versed in them all and combines into a whole their various branches. It is that which first gives to life its intellectual energy, by affording a de-

<sup>25</sup> De Rep. vi. p. 500, c. ἀλλ' εἰς τεταγμένα ἅττα καὶ κατὰ ταῦτ' ἀεὶ ὀρώντας καὶ θεωμένους, οὐτ' ἀδικούντα οὐτ' ἀδικούμενα ὑπ' ἀλλήλων, κοσμῶ δὲ πάντα καὶ κατὰ λόγον ἔχοντα, ταῦτα μιμεῖσθαι τε καὶ ὅτε μάλιστα ἀφομοιοῦσθαι. ἢ οἷε τινὰ μηχανὴν εἶναι, ὅτ' τις ὁμιλεῖ ἀγόμενος, μὴ μιμεῖσθαι ἐκεῖνο;

<sup>26</sup> Euthyd. p. 290, b. sq.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid. p. 288, d. sq. ἡ δὲ γε φιλοσοφία κτῆσις ἐπιστήμης —, ἥ τις ἡμᾶς δνήσει, — ἐν ᾗ συμπέπτωκεν ἅμα τό τε ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι χρῆσθαι τούτῳ, ὃ ἂν ποιῇ.

finite end to whatever the soul enters upon and accomplishes with a consciousness of its import, while it contemplates the supreme truth,—the true good of the soul and of all things.

This perfect science, however, is hard to find; and, even if it were found, it would be difficult to impart it to others.<sup>28</sup> Its object is the eternal truth—the unchangeable, unborn, and imperishable—of which all that can be truly said, is, that it is.<sup>29</sup> This eternal and unchangeable being we call God. Now this complete and perfect insight is possible one alone—the Deity himself; Wisdom belongs exclusively to God—philosophy is the highest portion of humanity<sup>30</sup>, for human science is ever imperfect; man has always something still to learn, and as all else in man is in a continual change, alternately beginning and ending, and nothing is permanent except so far as it is continually renewed—the body as well as that which is in the soul, so too man's science is never the same, but is ever produced anew, whereas true and eternal persistency is the attribute solely of the Divine.<sup>31</sup> According to this representation,

<sup>28</sup> Tim. p. 28, c. τὸν μὲν οὖν ποιητὴν καὶ πατέρα τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς εὐρεῖν τὲ ἔργον καὶ εὐρόντα εἰς πάντας ἀδύνατον λέγειν.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid. p. 37, e. τῇ δὲ (sc. αἰδίῳ οὐσίᾳ) τὸ ἔστι μόνον κατὰ τὸν ἀληθῆ λόγον προσήκει. Ibid. p. 27, d.; 29, b.; de Rep. v. p. 479, e.; Soph. p. 253, d. sq.

<sup>30</sup> Parm. p. 134, c.; Phaed. p. 278, d. τὸ μὲν σοφὸν (sc. αὐτὸν) καλεῖν ἔμοι γε μέγα εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ θεῷ μόνῳ πρέπειν· τὸ δὲ ἡ φιλόσοφος ἢ τι τοιοῦτον μᾶλλον γε ἀν' αὐτῷ καὶ ἀρμόττοι καὶ ἐμμελεστέως ἔχοι. Ibid. p. 246, a.; Phaed. p. 65, a. sq.

<sup>31</sup> Conn. p. 207, e. πολὺ δὲ τούτων ἀτοπώτερον ἔτι, ὅτι καὶ αἱ ἐπιστήμαι μὴ ὅτι αἱ μὲν γίνονται, αἱ δὲ ἀπόλλυνται ἡμῖν καὶ οὐδέποτε οἱ αὐτοὶ ἔσμεν οὐδὲ κατὰ τὰς ἐπιστήμας, ἀλλὰ καὶ μία ἐκάστη τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ταυτὸν πάσχει. ὃ γὰρ καλεῖται μελετᾶν, ὡς ἐξιούσης ἐστὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης, λήθη γὰρ ἐπιστήμης ἔξοδος· μελετῇ δὲ πάλιν καινὴν ἐμποιούσα ἀντὶ τῆς ἀπιούσης μνήμην σώζει τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ὥστε τὴν αὐτὴν δοκεῖν εἶναι.

the idea of science is unreal for man, but nevertheless the ideal to which the efforts of the rational soul should be directed, for although it cannot possess fully and perfectly, it may nevertheless attain very nearly to this high end and aim of its endeavours.<sup>32</sup> This is the basis of his notion of philosophy: it exists not for the gods nor for any other who is truly wise; for all who are already so, have neither a want or desire of it; love dwells not with him who is without a want. Neither, on the contrary, is it for the ignorant, for it is their miserable lot to delude themselves as to their real condition, and, though deprived of wisdom, to believe in their own sufficiency: It is the rational and intelligent mind alone that can philosophise; since, proceeding from a right view, it perceives its own insufficiency and need of a fuller, purer, and more perfect science, which is the truly beautiful and good, and the ultimate end and aim of all intellectual pursuit.<sup>33</sup>

By keeping constantly in mind this distinction between the ideal of science and science, we shall be able to reconcile many seeming contradictions and difficulties in the scientific

τούτῳ γὰρ τῷ τρόπῳ πᾶν τὸ θνητὸν σώζεται, οὐ τῷ παντάπασι το αὐτὸ δεῖ εἶναι, ὥσπερ τὸ θεῖον, ἀλλὰ τῷ τὸ ἀπὸν καὶ παλαιούμενον ἕτερον νέον ἐγκαταλιπεῖν, οἷον αὐτὸ ἦν.

<sup>32</sup> De Rep. vi. p. 505, a.; de Leg. vii. p. 803, c.; Conv. p. 211, b. sq. σχεδὸν ἂν τι ἄπτοιο τοῦ τέλους.

<sup>33</sup> Conv. p. 204, a. θεῶν οὐδεὶς φιλοσοφεῖ οὐδ' ἐπιθυμεῖ σοφὸς γενέσθαι· ἔστι γάρ· οὐδ' εἰ τις ἄλλος σοφός, οὐ φιλοσοφεῖ. οὐδ' αὖ οἱ ἀμαθεῖς φιλοσοφοῦσιν, οὐδ' ἐπιθυμοῦσιν σοφοὶ γενέσθαι. αὐτὸ γὰρ τοῦτο χαλεπὸν ἀμαθία, τὸ μὴ ὄντα καλὸν κάγαθον μηδὲ φρόνιμον δοκεῖν αὐτῷ εἶναι ἱκανόν. οὐκ οὖν ἐπιθυμεῖ ὁ μὴ οἶόμενος ἐνδεὴς εἶναι, οὗ ἂν μὴ οἴηται ἐπιδεῖσθαι. Lys. p. 218, a.

development of Plato's system. When, for instance, we find him advancing the opinion, which in the mouth of Socrates had given so much offence, *viz.*, "it is ill-advised to give any attention to pursuits and studies which have not the good of the state for their immediate object,"<sup>34</sup> under which prohibition he included a profound acquaintance with the mathematical sciences,<sup>35</sup> it must not be forgotten that human science was all that he intended thereby, as he himself expressly intimates.<sup>36</sup> In other passages, on the contrary, we find him firmly maintaining the idea of one universal science; especially where he is describing the necessity of withdrawing from the consideration of base and common objects, in order to rise to higher and nobler contemplations, as characteristic of youth and inexperience; whereas, the true philosopher, disregarding all human opinions as to great and little, contemns nothing.<sup>37</sup> Still more necessary is it to remember this distinction when we find Plato classing science among the ideas of relation, since science both generally and individually is the science of some being to which it is relative.<sup>38</sup> For it is only when

<sup>34</sup> De Leg. vi. p. 771, a.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid. vii. p. 818, sq.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid. vi. p. 770, c. He inquires, ὅπως ποτὲ ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς γίγνεται ἂν τὴν ἀνθρώπων προσήκουσαν ἀρετὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἔχων. Cf. p. 818, a.

<sup>37</sup> Parm. p. 130, d. νέος γὰρ εἰ ἔτι, φάναι τὸν Παρμενίδην, ὃ Σώκρατες, καὶ οὐπω σοῦ ἀντειληπταὶ ἡ φιλοσοφία, ὡς ἔτι ἀντελήψεται κατ' ἐμὴν δόξαν, ὅτε οὐδὲν αὐτῶν ἀτιμάσεις· νῦν δὲ ἔτι πρὸς ἀνθρώπων ἀποβλέπεις δόξας διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid. p. 134, a. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐπιστήμη, φάναι, αὐτὴ μὲν ὃ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη τῆς ὃ ἔστιν ἀλήθεια, αὐτῆς δὲ ἐκείνης εἴη ἐπιστήμη; Πάνυ γε. Ἐκάστη δὲ αὐτῶν ἐπιστημῶν, ἢ ἔστιν, ἐκάστου τῶν ὄντων, ὃ ἔστιν, εἴη δὲ ἐπιστήμη. ἢ οὐ; Ναί. De Rep. iv. p. 438, c.; v. p. 476, e.



he thus views human science in its opposition to the divine, that it appears in this light.<sup>39</sup> When he looks to the ideal he describes it in very different colours; for the soul, he says, arriving at its place above the heavens, contemplates science, not such as it is here, subject to change and imperfection, and which exhibits itself differently in the different objects which we call beings, but such as it exists in that which truly and absolutely is,<sup>40</sup> where it is independent of all relation in which, however, as human knowledge, it stands to some other distinct entity. Human cognition has an object external to itself, which it strives to attain, whereas the divine is one and the same with that which truly is.

This distinction must constantly be kept in view, in every investigation into Plato's opinions, as to the relation of philosophy to the other species of human knowledge. We have seen that he entertained the idea of a science which not only reviews and overlooks all others, but also, in order to do so, understands them, and comprises them within itself: and, moreover, that he made right conduct to be dependent on right knowledge. Now it is scarcely conceivable that any other sound consciousness can co-exist along-side of this science. This impossibility was to his mind so clear that he employed the terms Science and Reason or Mind indifferently in the same sense,

<sup>39</sup> Ibid. b. sq.

<sup>40</sup> Phædr. p. 247, d. καθορᾷ δὲ ἐπιστήμην, οὐχ ἣ γένεσις πρόσεστιν, οὐδ' ἣ ἐστὶ που ἑτέρα ἐν ἑτέρῳ οὔσα, ὣν ἡμεῖς νῦν ὄντων καλοῦμεν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐν τῷ, ὃ ἐστὶν ὄν ὄντως, ἐπιστήμην οὔσαν.

even when he was opposing science to opinion; <sup>41</sup> and, accordingly, he made Dialectics to be the science, which is cognisant of all notions, in their respective differences and affinities, and whose object is being in general.<sup>42</sup> It appeared to him as the science which, guided by the idea of good, orders and disposes all things, can discourse of every thing, and answer every question; and presides not only over thought, but also the correct utterance of it in language.<sup>43</sup> Looking to this ideal, Plato was unwilling to vouchsafe the name of science to any other art or knowledge, however precise and accurate it might be—mathematics, and their applications to music and astronomy.<sup>45</sup> When, however, it is further admitted that not the science itself but a love and pursuit of it is possible for man, it becomes difficult to say what can be right and sound in those human labours which are not undertaken and pursued from a love of it; and, in matters of science especially, it would seem that Plato positively denied the value and legitimacy of all thought, in which the true end of the scientific pursuit was not kept constantly in view. Hence we find him never hesitating to speak of philosophy and curiosity as identical,<sup>46</sup> evidently meaning, that a real desire of knowledge is a truly philosophical impulse, and that therefore the soul which aspires to the posses-

<sup>41</sup> Tim. p. 51, d.; de Rep. vi. p. 511, d.

<sup>42</sup> Phædr. p. 226, b.; Soph. p. 253, d.

<sup>43</sup> Soph. p. 254, a.

<sup>44</sup> Crat. p. 390, e. sq.

<sup>45</sup> De Rep. vii. p. 533, d.

<sup>46</sup> Lys. p. 213, d.; de Rep. ii. p. 376, b. *τό γε φιλομαθὲς καὶ φιλόσοφον ταὐτόν.* Phæd. p. 82, b. c. not. Heind.

sion of the beautiful, or some art of the muses, and, filled with a pure love thereof, is invariably placed by him in the same rank with the philosophical.<sup>47</sup>

But while, in all these different statements, every pure impulse of the soul is referred by Plato to philosophy, it is evident that he had the ideal of science exclusively in his view, and the right method of its attainment. On the other hand, he was not forgetful of the weakness of humanity, which has rendered necessary many divisions and subdivisions, the grounds of which do not exist in the objects themselves, but are merely relative to the mind of man. For it is almost impossible to find an individual who is a perfect master of any two sciences,<sup>48</sup> and yet man stands in need both of a pure philosophical art, which alone is suited to a liberal mind, but also of such impure arts, which must be carried on by practical and mathematical skill more than by science.<sup>49</sup> And in making this remark, Plato must have felt himself constrained to admit, that, as man is unable to give himself up entirely to the dictates of his intellectual nature, but is forced to listen to the demands of his animal wants, there are, in addition to truly philosophical pursuits, many other mental exercises highly commendable, not, indeed, as having the beautiful for their object, but the needful.

In this regard we find many classifications in Plato, wherein philosophy is associated with many other sciences and human pursuits, as of less im-

<sup>47</sup> Phædr. p. 248, d.

<sup>48</sup> De Leg. viii. p. 846, d.

<sup>49</sup> Phil. p. 62, a. sq.

port and value, it is true, but, nevertheless, as of real importance to human improvement. Thus he distinguishes philosophical science from the non-philosophical, without, however, denying to the latter some scientific value.<sup>50</sup> Thus too a two-fold Geometry, of which one measures the great in its ratio to the little, the long in that to the short, and therefore every thing relatively to its opposite, while the other adopts for its standard that which truly and legitimately is :<sup>51</sup>—the latter being evidently philosophy ; thus, again, he contrasts that art of Music, which belongs to philosophy,<sup>52</sup> to Gymnastic, not, indeed, intending that the latter, when practised rightly and in its highest sense, is separable from the former, but nevertheless treating them as two distinct arts ;<sup>53</sup> thus, lastly, he admits of a distinction between such arts as respect practical life, and those which, remote from practice, are only subservient to knowledge,<sup>54</sup> and he paints the philosopher as one who is little qualified for the common affairs of life, in consequence of his contempt for little things, resulting from his exclusive attention to higher and better things ;<sup>55</sup> and is of opinion,

<sup>50</sup> Ibid. p. 56, a. sq. I am perfectly aware that φιλοσοφεῖν is here taken in a wider acceptance ; but when the passage is taken with the context it is sufficient to justify what is advanced above.

<sup>51</sup> Polit. p. 284, e.

<sup>52</sup> φιλοσοφία as the μεγίστη μουσική is opposed to the δημόδης μουσική (Phæd. p. 61, a.) Elsewhere it is also called ἀληθινὴ μουσική. De Rep. viii. p. 548, b.

<sup>53</sup> De Rep. iii, especially, p. 410. The combination of these two in the musical art is asserted, p. 412, a. τὸν κάλλιστ' ἄρα μουσικῇ γυμναστικὴν κεραννύντα καὶ μετριώτατα τῇ ψυχῇ προσφέροντα, τοῦτον ὀρθότατ' ἂν φαῖμεν εἶναι τελείως μουσικώτατον καὶ εὐαρμωστότατον. Cf. Laches, p. 118, c.

<sup>54</sup> Polit. p. 258, d.

<sup>55</sup> Theæt. p. 172, c. sq.

that such a one can only with extreme reluctance take any share in public affairs.<sup>56</sup> Nevertheless, when we examine more closely into the meaning of these passages, we shall find on the one hand merely the expression of the strong contempt he felt for the adroit ignorance of the leading politicians of the day, since he might, with good reason, have thought that no upright and honest man could condescend to take part in the administration of a state so degraded and corrupt; <sup>57</sup> while, on the other hand, he was indulging in a conception of the philosophical character in its highest perfection, and wholly abstracted from human interests and affairs, such as he could hardly have hoped to find realised among men. His real opinion is, however, expressed more clearly and more fully in other passages, where the philosopher is represented as possessing a profounder knowledge and experience of life than all men, and therefore better qualified to be entrusted with the administration of the state.<sup>58</sup>

From these distinctions it is clear that Plato did not deny the excellence and utility of many developments of mind which are wholly devoid of a philosophical consciousness. In order, however, to determine the relation which he supposed to subsist between them, it is necessary to examine the several grades he supposed in the development of mind relatively to philosophy. His remarks on this head apply equally to knowledge and to ac-

<sup>56</sup> De Rep. vii. p. 519, d.; 540, b. οὐχ ὥς καλόν τι, ἀλλ' ὥς ἀναγκαῖον.

<sup>57</sup> Cf. Gorg. p. 486, a. sqq.

<sup>58</sup> Re Rep. vi. in.

tion. In respect to the latter, he observes, that the greater part of what is rightly and prudently accomplished in life, has for its authors men who are utterly incapable of teaching or explaining the principles of their art, and consequently its success is not attributable to science, but merely to right opinion.<sup>59</sup> Such he compares to soothsayers and poets, who, in the moment of inspiration, unconsciously utter much that is excellent: nay, more, he calls them god-like, and god-impelled, so that the virtue which resides in them is, as it were, a divine gift enjoyed with a consciousness of its value.<sup>60</sup> He often speaks of a divine enthusiasm of poets and soothsayers—of a reverie of the muses, without which no one can be a true poet, and which he regarded as an influence not of reason but of nature.<sup>61</sup> We do not pretend that the commendation he bestows upon these several states is unconditional and unqualified; on the contrary, it is often ironical. It is well known that he banished poets from his republic, and generally expressed no very favourable opinion of them, and moreover asserted unconditionally that no one in frenzy can be a friend of the gods,<sup>62</sup> that he who is master of his reason can never be

<sup>59</sup> Meno. p. 96, d. sqq.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid. p. 99, d. ὁρθῶς ἂν οὖν καλοῖμεν θεῖους τε, οὓς νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, χρησµφδοὺς καὶ μάντις καὶ τοὺς ποιητικοὺς ἅπαντας· καὶ τοὺς πολιτικοὺς οὐχ ἥκιστα τούτων φαῖμεν ἂν θεῖους τε εἶναι καὶ ἐνθουσιάζειν, ἐπίπνους ὄντας καὶ κατεχομένους· ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ, ὅταν καθορθῶσι λέγοντες πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα πράγματα, μηδὲν εἰδότες, ὧν λέγουσι. — ἀρετὴ ἂν εἴη — θεία μοῖρα παραγιγνομένη, ἄνευ νοῦ, οἷς ἂν παραγίγνηται. Allusions to this doctrine are found Pol. p. 269, d.; 270, a.; 273, b. sq.; de Leg. iv. p. 708, e. sq.

<sup>61</sup> For brevity's sake I refer to Nitzsch. Prol. in Plat. Ionen, c. 4.

<sup>62</sup> De Rep. ii. p. 382, e.

truly and really a prophet ;<sup>63</sup> and, further, that he expressly terms frenzy a disease of the soul, and a species of mental aberration :<sup>64</sup> and in all these disparaging observations the objection invariably recurs, that inspiration and frenzy, and even right opinion, are destitute of sound judgment and prudent self-control.<sup>65</sup> As then Plato held with Socrates that self-consciousness is the height of excellence, and that to know oneself is true philosophy, he might well say, that he who performs a right act merely from an opinion that it is right, is but as a shadow to a substance, when contrasted with the man who acts upon conviction and knowledge.<sup>66</sup> Still we must not be deterred by all this from ascribing to Plato similar sentiments to those of Socrates in regard to divine intimations ; for it is far from being implied in this censure that right opinion, humanly considered, is not a good. In fact, Plato distinguished two states of unconsciousness—the left and the right as he termed them. The latter, he held, is divinely inspired, and leads to a true love of the beautiful, being the source of all that is excellent in humanity.<sup>67</sup> Similarly whenever he opposes a calm consciousness<sup>68</sup> to frenzy, it must be taken in a double sense, as applicable both to the

<sup>63</sup> Tim. p. 71, e.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid. p. 86, p.

<sup>65</sup> The Epinomis, however, recognises a combination of *θεῖον* with the *σῶφρον* (p. 992, e.) as Plato does (de Rep. x. p. 598, e.) between the poet and certainty.

<sup>66</sup> Meno. p. 99, e.

<sup>67</sup> Phæd. p. 265, e. Cf. p. 244, a. sq.

<sup>68</sup> *σωφροσύνη*. The word is used in this sense when it is said *πρὸ τοῦ κεινημένου τὸν σῶφρονα*. Phædr. p. 245, p. I must here observe, generally, that it is impossible to render the same German word invariably by the same English one.

calm consciousness of the wise and to that of the ignorant man, who is insensible to his ignorance, and uninfluenced by the love of wisdom. It was natural that Plato should thus refer all human excellence to some mental emotion, since philosophy itself has its name from love;—not, indeed, that sensual love which attaches itself to some particular object of material beauty, but which seeks the universal good and beautiful—such as they are found exhibited in works of art—in sciences, and in laws—in short, as the beautiful of one absolute science.<sup>69</sup> But love aspires after that of which it feels its need, and stimulates the soul to actions by which it may obtain the object of its wants and desires.<sup>70</sup> Now even though this may be a love, and consequently a desire, of the beautiful and good, it does therefore necessarily become any thing more than not hateful and not evil, for there is a mean between the good and the evil, the beautiful and the hateful, just as there is between wisdom and ignorance, *viz.* right opinion.<sup>71</sup> As this is incapable of giving a reason for itself, it cannot be science, with which, however, it has this property in common, that it hits upon truth, and is thereby distinguished from ignorance.<sup>72</sup> Right

<sup>69</sup> Conv. p. 210, a. δὲ γὰρ τὸν ὀρθὸν ἰόντα ἐπὶ τοῦτο πρᾶγμα ἀρχεσθαι μὲν νέον ὄντα ἵνα ἐπὶ τὰ καλὰ σώματα—μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τὸ ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς κάλλος τιμωτέρον ἡγήσασθαι τοῦ ἐν τῷ σώματι—ἵνα ἀναγκασθῇ αὐθιγὰς τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἐπιτηδεύμασι καὶ τοῖς νόμοις καλόν, καὶ τοῦτ' ἰδεῖν, ὅτι πᾶν αὐτὸ αὐτῷ ξυγγενές ἐστι, ἵνα τὸ περὶ τὸ σῶμα καλὸν μικρόν τι ἡγήσῃται εἶναι. μετὰ δὲ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα ἐπὶ τὰς ἐπιστήμας ἀγαγεῖν—ἕως δὲ ἐνταῦθα ῥωσθεὶς καὶ αὐξήθεις κατὶδῇ τινὰ ἐπιστήμην μίαν τοιαύτην, ἥ ἐστι καλοῦ τοιοῦδε.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid. p. 200, a. sq.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid. p. 201, a. sq.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid. p. 202, a. τὰ ὀρθὰ δοξάζειν καὶ ἀνευ τοῦ ἔχειν λόγον δοῦναι οὐκ οἶδ', ὅτι οὔτε ἐπίστασθαι ἐστὶν (ἀλογον γὰρ πρᾶγμα πῶς δὲ εἶναι ἐπι-



opinion is moreover the source of philosophy in the human mind, for as science is associated with a consciousness of knowledge, so ignorance is accompanied with an unconsciousness of its own deficiencies: the ignorant man is therefore without a desire for knowledge, since he alone can desire science, who, while he has it not, is conscious of his want, and consequently is in an intermediate state between science and ignorance.<sup>73</sup> Plato, accordingly, faithful to the doctrine of Socrates, recommends that the soul should first be purified from its errors, and brought to a perception of its ignorance, in order that there may be room for implanting the desire, at least, of science;<sup>74</sup> for the soul passes from error to truth, so soon as it becomes conscious of its relation to science, which it recognises to be something different from merely right opinion, by reason of the uncertainty with which the latter is beset. Of like import is his assertion, that a feeling of wonder is the first step to philosophy,<sup>75</sup> *i. e.*, wonder at the vagueness and uncertainty of right opinions, especially when they appear to be at issue with each other.<sup>76</sup>

Nevertheless, as is clear from all that has preceded, no mental tendency or development was

στήμη); οὐτε ἀμαθία (τὸ γὰρ τοῦ ὄντος τυγχάνων πῶς ἂν εἴη ἀμαθία); ἐστὶ δὲ δήπου τοιοῦτον ἡ δρθὴ δόξα μεταξὺ φρονήσεως καὶ ἀμαθίας.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid. p. 204, a. Τίνες οὖν, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὦ Διοτιμα, οἱ φιλοσοφοῦντες, εἰ μήτε οἱ σοφοί, μήτε οἱ ἀμαθεῖς; Δῆλον δὲ, ἔφη, τοῦτό γε ἡδὴ καὶ παιδί, ὅτι οἱ μεταξὺ τούτων ἀμφοτέρων, ὧν ἂν καὶ ὁ ἔρω. Cf. Soph. p. 230, a.

<sup>74</sup> Soph. p. 230, b.

<sup>75</sup> Theæt. p. 155, d. μάλα γὰρ φιλοσόφου τοῦτο το πάθος, τὸ θαυμάζειν· οὐ γὰρ ἄλλη ἀρχὴ φιλοσοφίας ἢ αὕτη.

<sup>76</sup> De Rep. vii. p. 523. b. sq.

admitted by Plato to be legitimate and right, which did not contain a germ of, or a tendency to philosophy: and looking at all in this light he might justly consider them to belong to philosophy in its widest acceptation. Considering this to be the highest development of human consciousness, he regarded all other efforts of the soul, however sound and healthy, merely as so many preparatory exercises, or means of philosophical education.<sup>77</sup> In a passage already cited, he describes the course of an individual gradually advancing from a state in which the sensual predominates, and employs it to illustrate the progressive development of philosophy. Beginning with the love and contemplation of beauty in particular forms, it rises to a perception of corporeal beauty in general, from which, gradually impressed with a feeling of its little worth, it advances to that of the soul. And even when directed to the intellectual, the sense of beauty attaches itself at first to the contemplation of individual minds, in communion with whom it creates thoughts and images of beauty; afterwards it proceeds to examine the pursuits and inventions of man, the laws and institutions of humanity, from which it rises to the beauty of the sciences, and contemplating them both in their collectivity and unity, the soul is at last absorbed in the science of the one eternal beauty.<sup>78</sup> Thus

<sup>77</sup> Thus poems and the works τῶν δημιουργῶν ὅσοι λέγονται εὐρετικὰ εἶναι Conv. p. 209, a. and laws, such as those of Solon and Lycurgus, *ibid.* d. e., and also the manual arts, Phil. p. 55, c., are considered as introductions to philosophy.

<sup>78</sup> Conv. p. 210.

would Plato lead from the sensible and the individual to the intellectual and universal.

Now, as Plato admitted right opinion to be a point of transition to philosophy, it was indispensable to show wherein lies the necessity of passing beyond it. To this end he distinguishes two kinds of opinion: one of which forms a tolerably accurate and certain estimate of its objects, the other not.<sup>79</sup> The latter is the case when opinion is forced to ascribe opposites to one and the same—both hard and soft, thick and thin, etc. etc., and so is constrained to distinguish one from another, and thereby to posit two, whereas it is again forced to posit one, since the same may admit of two opposite predicates. Hereby the soul is led to inquire, what one is absolutely in itself;<sup>80</sup> an inquiry belonging to arithmetic, but, at the same time introductory to philosophy, by leading the view from changeable qualities to immutable truth. Similarly, all mathematical sciences, geometry, both plane and solid, as well as astronomy and music, so far as, being grounded on abstract notions, they are objects of immutable truth, are considered so many means of forming the soul to philosophy.<sup>81</sup> Thus Plato held mathematics to be intermediate between right opinion and philosophy, and a necessary step in the

<sup>79</sup> De Rep. vii. p. 523, a. sq.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid. p. 524, d. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἱκανῶς αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ ὁρᾶται ἢ ἄλλη τινὶ αἰσθήσει λαμβάνεται τὸ ἓν, οὐκ ἂν ὀλκὸν εἶη ἐπὶ τὴν οὐσίαν· — εἰ δ' αἰεὶ τι αὐτῷ ὁρᾶται ἐναντίωμα, ὥστε μηδὲν μᾶλλον ἓν ἢ καὶ τοῦναντίον φαίνεσθαι, τοῦ ἐπικρινούστος δὴ δέοι ἂν ἡδὲ καὶ ἀναγκάζουτ' ἂν ἐν αὐτῷ ψυχῇ ἀπορεῖν καὶ ζητεῖν κινουσα ἐν αὐτῇ τὴν ἐννοίαν καὶ ἀνερωτᾶν, τί ποτ' ἔστιν αὐτὸ τὸ ἓν.

<sup>81</sup> Ibid. p. 526, c. sq.

scale of knowledge, without which it is impossible to advance to the latter.<sup>82</sup> They are not, however, themselves philosophy; for they proceed upon an assumption of their primary notions, which they take for granted to be evident to all, and give no account of principles, a method which is not allowable in science; moreover, they employ in their demonstration visible figures, for the sake of illustration, although these are not the objects of which they treat, but rather that which is visible to the intellect alone.<sup>83</sup> On this account Plato refuses to them the name of science, in its strict sense, but, inventing for them a peculiar term, prefers to call them a cognition (*διάνοια*), which is clearer, indeed, than opinion, but obscurer than science.<sup>84</sup>

Now it would almost appear that, by thus excluding from philosophy whatever is founded on experience, and belongs not only to opinion, but also to the mathematics, that Plato intended to limit it to a very small portion of science. But a closer examination will quickly dissipate this error. Undoubtedly it cannot be denied that he views much as lying without the range of philosophical certainty, assigning it to human opinions concerning forms and phenomena (*εἰκαστα*), or to the definitions of mathematics; but this is done solely under the conviction, which is usually averred in the most positive manner, that he is making an unavoidable concession to the weakness of

<sup>82</sup> Cf. *Phil.* p. 55, sq.; *de Rep.* v. p. 475. b. sq.; vii. p. 536, d.

<sup>83</sup> *De Rep.* vi. p. 510, b. sq.; cf. *Euthyd.* p. 290, b.

<sup>84</sup> *De Rep.* vii. p. 533, d. However, Plato's usage of this term is not in any way fixed: thus, *ἀληθὴς διάνοια* is employed to designate wisdom absolutely. *Theæt.* p. 170, b.

humanity. On the other hand we discover the clearest intimations, that in his opinion philosophy ought to pervade and embrace every branch of knowledge. Of mathematics, in the first place, this can scarcely be doubted, for he expressly places the ground of their imperfection as a science solely in their method of proceeding upon assumed principles, and representing, by sensible types, what is only conceivable by reason. For this imperfection may be removed, by representing the diagrams to be what they really are, and by ultimately submitting the assumptions themselves to inquiry, and exhibiting the grounds on which they rest: which procedure Plato admits to be truly philosophical.<sup>85</sup> For the assertion, that every right minded and intelligent student of mathematics or other science must refer to the dialectician for the right use of them,<sup>86</sup> clearly intimates that philosophy must admit them within her domain, and develope them to perfect conviction. When, further, we combine these remarks with other, obscurer, passages of the Platonic dialogues, it becomes incontestible that he admitted mathematical ideas within the sphere of philosophy. For instance, we find him both incidentally, and in discussions directly bearing upon the mathematical sciences, assigning such a rank to the ideas about which they are conversant, relatively to the true essence of things, as evidently belong only to a higher knowledge and philosophical apprehension of them. It is in this sense that

<sup>85</sup> Phæd. p. 101, d.; de Rep. vi. p. 510, b.; 511, b.

<sup>86</sup> Euthyd. p. 299, c.

he speaks of the circle and the sphere as being in themselves divine and admitting of absolute knowledge,<sup>87</sup> and that he treats of the great and the little, of unity and duality, absolutely and relatively to ideas;<sup>88</sup> again, that he places ideas and numbers parallel,<sup>89</sup> that he requires that a right perception should be had of the nature of numbers,<sup>90</sup> and an idea be formed of a unity without parts and indivisible;<sup>91</sup> and, lastly, in his conception of an astronomy, which should furnish a knowledge of the true and real rapidity and retardation in all true numbers, and figures.<sup>92</sup> But there are traces of his having gone still further: even in the sensuous presentation, which otherwise is ascribed to opinion, he appears inclined to find an element which may become an object of pure intellectual knowledge, and thereby of true philosophy. Thus he attempts to determine the absolute essence, and the *idea* of the warm and of the cold,<sup>93</sup> of motion and of rest,<sup>94</sup> of fire and of the other elements.<sup>95</sup> This is indeed in perfect conformity with his principle, that nothing, however small and contemptible, is to be despised by the philosopher; but, nevertheless, it must not be so understood as if he were of opinion that the sensible in itself admits of an accurate definition, but merely that

<sup>87</sup> Phil. p. 62, a. κύκλου μὲν καὶ σφαίρας αὐτῆς τῆς θείας τὸν λόγον ἔχων compared with φρονῶν αὐτῆς περὶ δικαιοσύνης.

<sup>88</sup> Phæd. p. 100, b. sq.

<sup>89</sup> Tim. p. 53, b.

<sup>90</sup> De Rep. vii. p. 525, c. sq.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid. p. 529, c.

<sup>94</sup> Parm. p. 129, d.

<sup>91</sup> Ibid. d. sq.

<sup>93</sup> Phæd. p. 103, d.

<sup>95</sup> Tim. p. 51, b. sq.

for every representation some ultimate ground which corresponds to it must be found.

Thus then the basis of the Platonic notion of philosophy is the reference of all to the universal science, which, when complete, embraces the truth of all thoughts, and indeed of all self-conscious life. Undoubtedly he does at times make the object of philosophy to be special; *e. g.*, the effort to discover man's nature, and his peculiar faculties, affections, and duties, as distinct from all other species;<sup>96</sup> but these occasional remarks may be easily reduced to their legitimate sense, by observing that the soul being, with Plato, the most important element in man, he says, that a right knowledge of it is impossible without that of universal nature.<sup>97</sup> It is true, he admits that the imperfection of human nature renders it necessary to distinguish between practice and theory, between that which by the idea of perfect science is reduced to pure knowledge, and that which is still the portion of vague and wavering opinion or—*i. e.*, of those single sciences which have not yet attained to their ultimate and all-sufficient grounding, nor their assumption into the one universal science. Nevertheless he is far from representing this distinction as definitive and permanent; it is only valid in the flux of human life, and there is a term, when, free from these distinctions, inquiry will be brought to perpetual rest;<sup>98</sup> to the attainment of this end all

<sup>96</sup> Theæt. p. 174, b.

<sup>97</sup> Phædr. p. 270, c.

<sup>98</sup> De Rep. vii. p. 532, c. οἱ ἀφικόμενοι ὥσπερ ὁδοῦ ἀνάπαυλα ἀν εἶη καὶ τέλος τῆς πορείας.

the efforts, and all the wishes of man ought to be directed, as well in thought as in deed. This is Dialectic, *i. e.*, that perfect science which defines every notion and every species. It is only so far as they conduce to accomplish this end that the sciences, which Plato most highly estimates, the mathematical, for instance, are of value; but if failing to perceive their proper unity and mutual relations, they neglect to contribute to its consummation, they become at once vain and unprofitable.<sup>99</sup>

Having thus determined the notion of Philosophy, the next question is to determine, what, if any, were the parts into which he divided it. That he admitted a division of it is unquestionable since he advanced in the most positive manner, the question, what are its parts, without however proceeding to discuss it in the series of investigations he was then occupied with.<sup>100</sup> But in the absence of any precise and definitive statement, a variety of opinions have been maintained on this subject. Particular passages have led many to conclude that Plato divided philosophy into two parts, theoretical and practical; <sup>101</sup> in support of which view the division

<sup>99</sup> De Rep. vii. 531, c. where of the sciences of *διάνοια* it is said: *οἶμαι δὲ γε καὶ ἡ τοῦτων πάντων, ὧν διεληλύθαμεν, μέθοδος ἴαν μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀλλήλων κοινωνίαν ἀφίκεται καὶ ξυγγένειαν καὶ συλλογισθῇ τὰυτα, ἣ ἐστὶν ἀλλήλοις οἰκέα, φέρειν τι αὐτῶν, εἰς ἃ βουλόμεθα, τὴν πραγματείαν καὶ οὐκ ἀνόνητα πονεῖσθαι· εἰ δὲ μή, ἀνόνητα.*

<sup>100</sup> De Rep. vii. p. 532, e.

<sup>101</sup> See Krug's Hist. of Ancient Phil. p. 209, 1 ed., with whom agrees essentially Reinhold, Manual of the Hist. of Phil. 1 vol. p. 193. Different herefrom is the division of philosophy into *πρακτικόν*, *ποιητικόν* and *θεωρητικόν*. Diog. L. iii. 84; cf. Polit. p. 258, e.; Soph. p. 219, b.



of the sciences, already noticed, into those of action and cognition,<sup>102</sup> may very fairly be adduced. On the other hand, it is contradicted by all his doctrines previously noticed concerning the unity of thought and action, and especially by his mode of considering Dialectic as the science which embraces all thought, and teaches the use and application of all other knowledges. There is another division of philosophy, ascribed to Plato, which will most probably be favourably received by those who in their review of the old philosophy find it difficult to free themselves from their modern associations: that of the good, the beautiful, and the true, which apparently coincides with the division of the soul into the faculties of feeling, desire, and knowing.<sup>103</sup> But from our previous remarks it must be clear, that the separation of the good from the true is untenable, while that of the good from the beautiful is still more opposed to the sentiments of Plato, which in the olden spirit held them to be inseparably combined, and it would be difficult to adduce a single passage from his dialogues which could justify any separation of the two. Among ancient writers we find a division of the Platonic philosophy into the science about the nature of the universe and of divine things; the philosophy of human things and logic<sup>104</sup>: which is, however, open to very grave objections, both with respect to the

<sup>102</sup> Polit. ib.

<sup>103</sup> Van Heusde *initia Philosophiæ Platoniciæ*, 1827, ps. 1<sup>a</sup> p. 71.

<sup>104</sup> Aristocles ap. Euseb. Pr. Ev. xi. 3.

order in which the parts are respectively placed, and as touching the impossibility of keeping them distinct. For instance, it is difficult for logic to maintain its position after the two other parts which apparently comprise the whole of philosophy, since it is difficult to say what is left for it to accomplish, unless a merely negative task of indicating the errors and attacks of adversaries. Such a view is wholly alien from the mind of Plato. But the position of logic in this division is not accidental; it is justified by a reference to the opinion of Plato, that human things can never be rightly understood without a previous meditation upon the divine.<sup>105</sup> This thought, however, which has given rise to the previous division and order of the parts, is only semi-Platonic, although it may have grown out of Platonic expressions; for it was undoubtedly Plato's opinion on the one hand that human things can only be rightly interpreted by a knowledge of the divine, but, on the other hand, that the latter can only be known by our rising to the contemplation of them from a human point of view;<sup>106</sup> so that it is impossible, without doing violence to the Platonic theory, to separate the science of divine from that of human things. Finally, we must not omit to notice the faultiness of the division thus imputed to Plato in which the human is opposed

<sup>105</sup> L. 1. ἡξίον γὰρ μὴ δύνασθαι τὰ ἀνθρώπεια κατιδεῖν ἡμᾶς, εἰ μὴ τὰ θεῖα πρότερον ὁφθείη.

<sup>106</sup> Phæd. p. 101, d.; de Rep. vi. p. 510, b. sq. That in these passages the ἱκανον and ἀρχὴ ἀνυπόθετος designates the divine, and their contraries the human, stands not in need of proof.

to the divine without however logic being included in the former.<sup>107</sup>

But while all these divisions appear inconsistent with the Platonic theory, there is yet one which strongly enforces itself on our adoption, and which while it finds some support in ancient testimony, is still further recommended by the disposition of the subjects of inquiry in the writings of Plato. As, touching the former, we are distinctly told that he was the first to combine into a whole the detached elements of philosophy, and to establish its three parts, logics, physics, and ethics.<sup>108</sup> On the other hand, it is said, apparently with strict fidelity to traditional truth, that he was indeed the first to start the idea of such a division of philosophy, but that the merit of having distinctly established it belongs to his disciples Xenocrates and Aristotle.<sup>109</sup> To a certain point we may well assent to the latter statement, nevertheless it is very vaguely expressed, and stands in need of a closer determination, in order to its being rightly understood.

The most important point is to determine the true import and extent of the three parts respectively. As to Plato's notion of ethics, it is difficult to entertain a doubt, for his investigations on this head were so closely interwoven with those upon the state, that it is impossible to attempt even to

<sup>107</sup> In this division the science of human things is confined solely to politics, which is purely arbitrary, it is very probable that it had in view the correct division into logic, physics, and ethics, but gave to these parts a wrong signification, arising partly from the stoical views of physics, and partly from the neo-Platonic logic.

<sup>108</sup> Cic. Acad. i. 5; Atticus ap. Euseb. Pr. Ev. xi. 2: Apulei de Doctr. Plat. 1, p. 3, ed. Elmeul.

<sup>109</sup> Sext. Emp. adv. Math. vii. 16.

separate them, and we may, therefore, take it as clear, that his ethics comprised politics. In like manner, his notion of physics appears to be pretty clearly defined : it did not embrace his doctrine of the super-natural, of God, and the general laws and properties of real being, since he made this the basis of his philosophy,<sup>110</sup> but was limited to a statement of properties and orders of physical objects.

But the determination of his idea of logic admits of the greatest diversity of opinion. Generally the ancients did not make a distinction between Logic and Dialectic.<sup>111</sup> In Plato, the latter, and equivalent terms, occur frequently, but not in any exclusive sense, or as applicable to any peculiar doctrine. Nevertheless, assuming that he treated of Nature as a part of philosophy, and then observing the distinction he draws between it and Dialectic, we must admit that he considered the latter a particular branch. For, while he represents this as the perfect science of the eternal and immutable, he remarks that the science of Nature (*i. e.* of what never actually, only inchoately is,) must resemble the mutability of its object, and therefore be incapable of attaining to the certainty and precision of Dialectic.<sup>112</sup> In like manner, we may venture to assert, that the latter science is, to a

<sup>110</sup> In this way Tennemann also appears to have misunderstood the Platonic notion of physics. *Gesch. d. Phil.* bd. 2, § 267, f.

<sup>111</sup> Unquestionably this does not hold without exception. The ancients, however, when enumerating the parts of philosophy, at times employ logic, and others dialectic, and this clearly proves the unsettledness of their phraseology on this point.

<sup>112</sup> *Phileb.* p. 59, a.; *Tim.* p. 27, d.; 296, sq.; 37, a. sq.

certain degree, distinct from that of the good; not indeed as considered absolutely and in itself, but as conditionally exhibited in the moral habit and opinions of individuals and communities; since, as already observed, he represents it as a degradation of the dialectician, to occupy himself with political affairs, as a matter not of beauty, but of necessity.<sup>113</sup> This is further confirmed by many passages which expressly intimate that the doctrine of human conduct and morality is susceptible of many modifications and changes, whereas Dialectic, which treats of the eternal, must be equally stable and immutable in its doctrines. Accordingly, Plato, in all probability, regarded dialectic in its higher sense as philosophy, with which it was necessary to combine physics and ethics, as two sciences of subordinate and inferior certainty, and, so to speak, not as yet perfect philosophy.<sup>114</sup>

With respect to the notion or term, dialectic or logic, Plato at times adheres to its most ordinary acceptation, and indicates by it the art of evolving knowledge colloquially,<sup>115</sup> on which account he assigns to the dialectician the right arrangement of speech, for conveying instruction by question and answer.<sup>116</sup> That this mode of communication by dialogue—which Plato represents to be the most perfect, while all others are devoid of information—is, at the same time, the art of

<sup>113</sup> De Rep. vii. p. 540, b.

<sup>114</sup> That Plato should not refer ethics to the less perfect sciences so decidedly as he does physics, is, to my mind, explicable, by his making it a part of Dialectic to investigate the nature of the Good absolutely.

<sup>115</sup> De Rep. vii. p. 534, d.

<sup>116</sup> Cratyl. p. 390, c. sq.

right thinking, is unquestionable; since, with him, language and thought are identical, with this sole difference, that the latter is a dialogue in the soul without sound.<sup>117</sup> Viewed in this light the Dialectic of Plato coincides with the Logic of later philosophers. Only it would be an error to suppose that, like them, he made a distinction between the form and the matter:<sup>118</sup> for when he describes dialectic as the art of speaking methodically, and of rightly classifying and dividing the genera of things,<sup>119</sup> he does not draw the principles of division, and classification from the form alone, but also from the object-matter of the notions. And that this was not to exclude any reference to the objective, is clear from his representing dialectic as the science of the being, the true, and the constant,<sup>120</sup> as the science which is cognisant of the essence of things,<sup>121</sup> and which, generally, has a universal insight into the nature of all sciences.<sup>122</sup> Consequently, the dialectic of Plato is the science which has for its object thought and being, in so far as they are susceptible of eternal and immutable determinations.

<sup>117</sup> Soph. p. 263, e. οὐκοῦν διάνοια μὲν καὶ λόγος ταῦτόν, πλὴν ὁ μὲν ἐντὸς τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς αὐτὴν διάλογος ἄνευ φωνῆς γιγνόμενος, τοῦτ' αὐτὸ ἡμῖν ἐπωνομάσθη διάνοια.

<sup>118</sup> K. F. Hermann, it would seem, likewise, takes the notion of Dialectic in this later, non-Platonic, sense.

<sup>119</sup> Soph. p. 253, b. sq.; Phædr. p. 266, b.

<sup>120</sup> Phil. p. 57, e. ἀλλ' ἡμᾶς, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ἀναίνοιτ' ἂν ἡ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δύναμις, εἴ τινα πρὸ αὐτῆς ἄλλην κρίναιμεν. Τίνα δὲ ταύτην αὐ δεῖ λέγειν; Δῆλον ὅτι ἢ πᾶσαν τήν γε νῦν λεγομένην γνοίῃ· τήν γὰρ περὶ τὸ ὄν καὶ τὸ ὄντως καὶ τὸ κατὰ ταῦτόν ἀεὶ πεφυκὸς πάντως ἔγωγε οἶμαι ἡγεῖσθαι ζύμπαντας, ὅσοις νοῦ καὶ σμικρὸν προσήρηται, μακρῷ ἀληθεστάτην εἶναι γνῶσιν. Cf. de Rep. vi. p. 511, b. sq.; vii. p. 532, a.

<sup>121</sup> De Rep. vii. p. 534, b.

<sup>122</sup> Ibid. p. 537, c.; Euthyd. p. 290, c.

With this division of philosophy the order of the Platonic dialogues, as already observed, evidently correspond. For although there are many in which more or less of logic, ethics, and physics are combined, in others, and those the most important—in a philosophical respect—the combination of the three elements is so subordinate, that the predominance of some particular one is distinct and evident enough. Thus the predominant character of the *Timæus* is physical, while the *Republic* and the *Laws* are as decidedly ethical. Now among the works of Plato we do not find, it is true, any treating so extensively, not to say completely, of dialectic, nevertheless, those who are persuaded of the intentional disposition of his writings, as a whole, cannot fail to recognise a common purpose in the *Theætetus*, the *Sophist*, and the *Politicus*, which pursue a single end, and to which series the *Parmenides* attaches itself in so far as that the dialogue is there, as in the two latter, lead by an Eleat. Moreover, the matter of these four dialogues is evidently dialectical, since they treat of the ideas of science, and of being as its object, and shew that right science is the only foundation of right conduct.<sup>123</sup> No one surely will venture to assert that this body of scientific discussions were purely the result of chance, and unintentionally pursued without a consciousness or suspicion of their connexion and difference; since the course of the earlier development of philosophy must of necessity have led Plato to distinguish these

<sup>123</sup> The *Politicus* even only exhibits the union of knowledge and action, and connects both with the supreme ground of all being.

three parts. In the Ionian and Pythagorean schools, the physical branch had so clearly established its claims as a science that it was impossible to doubt or overlook its importance. In Socrates and his followers, ethical inquiries, as distinct and separate from physics, had been cultivated extensively, at least, if not scientifically, while the dialectical investigations of the Eleatæ into pure being, and the species of thought as distinguished into opinion and pure science, presented an especial order of inquiry to which the labours of Socrates on science and its forms naturally attached themselves. All, therefore, that was required was a mind capable of embracing the whole region of science, in order to discover its parts and their mutual relations. This merit and qualification no one will deny to Plato.

As we have all along been proceeding on the tradition that Plato did no more than admit the possibility of such a division of philosophy, it becomes necessary to explain the sense in which the statement is here adopted. Plato does not, we see, make use of this division in his dialogues; and even the conjectures we are justified in forming as to the nature of his connected lectures upon his doctrine, do not favour the opinion that he employed it in them; <sup>124</sup> indeed the titles of the several parts are either seldom to be met with in his writings, or else not used in any precise and definite sense. Nevertheless we are obliged to assume that Plato distinctly acknowledged the division, and that thus its common employment in his school must be

<sup>124</sup> The title "of the Good" is apparently employed in a very general sense



accounted for. For as it was employed by Xenocrates<sup>125</sup> who, however, could not deviate from his master upon such a point without giving a wholly different form to his entire doctrine, it is inconceivable that he had it not from Plato; and it strongly confirms our view upon this head, to find Aristotle adopting this division as one universally recognised.<sup>126</sup>

The previous investigation into the parts of the Platonic philosophy gives rise to the further question, in what order they are duly to be arranged. As, however, Plato has nowhere expressly explained himself on this point, a full and satisfactory answer can only be derived from the general consideration of his system of doctrines. This much, however, we may safely premise. Dialectic must have appeared to him the basis of all philosophy, since, generally, he insists upon the necessity of commencing inquiry with establishing the idea of that which is to be its object, and in particular, he rejects all investigations as untenable which commence with a physical assumption.<sup>127</sup> It is not so easy to determine whether ethics or physics more justly possess the second place, since there are many passages in his physics which presuppose certain ethical principles, and conversely in his ethics where physical ones are implied. When, however, we reflect that the essential division of the soul, on which his theory of virtue rests, and his disposition of rational

<sup>125</sup> In respect to Dialectic, this has already been shewn; the terms physics and ethics do not occur in the Platonic writings.

<sup>126</sup> Top. i. 14; Anal. Post. i. 33, fin.

<sup>127</sup> Phæd. p. 99, d. sq.

politics, are the results of his investigations into the ensouling power of Nature, it is difficult to doubt that he gave the precedence to physics. This, then, is the order in which the Platonic doctrine can alone be satisfactorily examined: we must consider, in the first place, his Dialectic as the basis of all philosophy, then physics as grounded and established thereby, and on their side furnishing the principles of ethics, which must be considered, in the last place, as the close and complement of the entire system.

Nevertheless, before we proceed to the elucidation of these several parts, we must not neglect a hint he himself furnishes as to the right method of philosophy, in order that we may be able to distinguish what, in his idea, was a pure philosophical result from what was only accessory and subordinate to the subject of inquiry. This distinction is constantly made by Plato himself, and materially influences his conception of the dialogue; so that, if not duly considered, it will often involve the reader in great but groundless doubt, in those passages even which appear to him the clearest and most intelligible.

The present is the most appropriate place to discuss this question, both because it is desirable to remove all unnecessary doubts, and because the correct notion of philosophy is the only means of arriving at a right understanding of its peculiar mode of development.

When Plato demanded, as a necessary preparation for philosophy, that the soul should be purified from all absurd prejudices and er-

roneous opinions, in order that it might perceive its deficiencies in science, he was very far from wishing to bring about or to recommend a groundless doubt and disputatious confusion of all opinion;<sup>128</sup> on the contrary, he advises men to adhere by what in opinion appears to be true, and, by a skilful testing of its validity, to make a commencement in philosophy. Such an opening appeared to be furnished by defining the terms employed in popular opinion. According to Plato, the first question in every inquiry is to determine the subject of dispute, *i. e.* to give a definition of the word or term.<sup>129</sup> However he does not regard this explanation of the term or notion as amounting to scientific certainty, but merely as an hypothesis requiring further examination before it can attain a true philosophical insight. For in and by itself it gives no account of itself; still it is not therefore to be at once rejected, but we must inquire what does or does not consist with it.<sup>130</sup> Now, as already observed, the unphilosophical element in mathematics, according to Plato, is this assumption of certain principles or axioms, on which, without being able to

<sup>128</sup> Phæd. p. 90, b. *καὶ μάλιστα δὴ οἱ περὶ τοὺς ἀντιλογικοὺς λόγους διατρίψαντες οἷσθ' ὅτι τελευτῶντες οἴονται σοφώτατοι γεγονέναι τε καὶ κατανενοηκέναι μόνοι, ὅτι οὔτε τῶν πραγμάτων οὐδενὸς οὐδὲν ὑγίης οὐδὲ βέβαιον, οὔτε λόγων.* Ibid. p. 101, d. *ἔμα δὲ οὐκ ἂν φύροιο, ὥσπερ οἱ ἀντιλογικοί, περὶ τε τῆς ἀρχῆς διαλεγόμενος καὶ τῶν ἐξ ἐκείνης ὥρμημένων, εἴπερ βούλοιό τι τῶν ὄντων εὐρεῖν.*

<sup>129</sup> Phædr. p. 237, b. *περὶ παντός, ὃ παῖ, μία ἀρχὴ τοῖς μέλλουσι καλῶς βουλευέσθαι· εἰδέναι δέῃ, περὶ οὗ ἂν ᾗ ἡ βουλὴ, ἡ ἅπαντος ἀμαρτάνειν ἀνάγκη.* τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς λέληθεν, ὅτι οὐκ ἴσασι τὴν οὐσίαν ἐκάστου. Afterwards the ὕρος is determined, which is to explain the οὐσία. Meno, p. 86, d.

<sup>130</sup> Meno, l. 1.; Phæd. l. 1.

account for them and their origin, they proceed to their end, *i. e.* the solution of the problem proposed.<sup>131</sup> Mathematical science, therefore, in common with philosophy, is occupied in the analysis of general terms; but it is peculiar to the latter that, not content with these definitions, it investigates their reasons, and, having found such in some higher assumption, *i. e.* higher notion, it still does not even rest there, but proceeds until it discovers some principle furnishing its own ground and reason—a beginning independent of all hypothesis or assumption.<sup>132</sup> Accordingly, Plato makes every single truth in philosophy to be dependent on the supreme and ultimate truth, gradually ascending thereto from lower and individual genera, which, again, are tested by this last and highest truth. It is evident that it was his object to establish a perfect system of ideas which should furnish of themselves the principle and authority of their truth; and, accordingly, we can only admit that to be a result of his philosophy of which it can be clearly shewn that it has found an appropriate place in his system of ideas.

<sup>131</sup> De Rep. vi. p. 510, c. d.

<sup>132</sup> Phæd. p. 101, d. 'Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐκείνης (sc. ὑποθέσεως) αὐτῆς δέοι σε δίδοναι λόγον, ὡσαύτως ἀν διδοίης ἄλλην αὖ ὑπόθεσιν ὑποθέμενος, ἥτις τῶν ἀνωθεν βελτίστη φαίνοιτο, ἕως ἐπὶ τι ἱκανὸν ἔλθοις. De Rep. vi. p. 510, b. s. Τὸ τοίνυν ἕτερον μάθανε τμήμα τοῦ νοητοῦ λεγόντά με τοῦτο, οὗ αὐτὸς ὁ λόγος ἀπτεται, τῇ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δυνάμει τὰς ὑποθέσεις ποιούμενος, οὐκ ἀρχάς, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι ὑποθέσεις, ὅλον ἐπιβάσεις τε καὶ ὁρμάς, ἵνα μέχρι τοῦ ἀνυποθέτου ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ἀρχὴν ἴω, ἀψάμενος αὐτῆς, πάλιν αὖ ἐχόμενος τῶν ἐκείνης ἐχομένων, οὕτως ἐπὶ τελευτὴν καταβαίῃ, αἰσθητῶ παντάπασιν οὐδενὶ προσχρῶμενος. De Rep. vii. p. 521, c. s.; p. 533. Ideas are the proper object of philosophy; on this point consult Theæt. p. 175, b. s.; 185, d.

## CHAPTER III.

### DIALECTIC OF PLATO.

As the Dialectic of Plato was founded on his idea of science, and, indicated on the one hand, the legitimate forms of thought in which a true certainty is contained, and, on the other, the different species of being which can be exhibited under them, it was at once the science of thought and of being. To separate these two would, therefore, be to do violence to his views.

It is manifest that his system was formed in opposition to two conflicting theories, which had exercised considerable influence on the earlier development of philosophy—the Heraclitic doctrine of perpetual flux, and the Eleatic theory of immutable being.<sup>1</sup> The refutation of these is, as it were, the key-stone of the system, and it consequently forms the main object, and takes up the greater portion of the *Theætetus* and the *Sophist*, the two dialogues in which dialectical considerations predominate.

The Heraclitic doctrine was directly opposed to Plato's notion of science, as an idea which is, in itself, its own ground and authority; and, in order to establish the validity of his own views, it was necessary to demonstrate the error and delusion of the former. This was the more imperative, as it

<sup>1</sup> Vid. *Theæt.* p. 180.

had been corrupted and modified into the sophistical dogma of Protagoras, that all knowledge is sensation. The former, therefore, is invariably discussed in connexion with the latter, inasmuch as with Plato the consideration of thought is inseparable from that of being, which is its object.

Admitting fully the flexibility of the dialogistic form of exposition, we must, nevertheless, maintain that the dialogue in which he combats the opinions of Protagoras, and, by awakening a full consciousness of its import, draws out of it its own refutation, stands unrivalled as a piece of art. Protagoras had, however, himself prepared the way by the just remark, that the reference of all knowledge to sensation necessarily leads to the conclusion, that man is the measure of whatever is; so that for every one that, of which he is sentient, exists and contrariwise, for sensation and perception are identical;<sup>2</sup> if, therefore, each sensation be a knowledge, every sensation and perception must be infallible and true, and each object must be to each such as it is perceived, or, in other words, as it appears to him. If, consequently, an object appears to one man to be cold, to him it is really cold; if warm to another, it is for him warm. From this it further followed, that nothing has a nature of its own, and cannot rightly be called either this or that, and is, at most, but in a state of transition towards that which we say it actually is.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Thæet. p. 152, c. φαντασία ἄρα καὶ αἴσθησις ταυτόν, ἐν τε θερμοῖς καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid. p. 152, d. ἐγὼ ἔρω καὶ μάλ' οὐ φαῦλον λόγον· ὥς ἄρα ἐν μὲν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ οὐδέν ἐστιν, οὐδ' ἂν τι προσείποις οὐδ' ὁποιονοῦν τι, ἀλλ' ἔαν ὥς μέγα προσαγορεύης, καὶ μικρὸν φανῇται, καὶ ἔαν βαρὺ, κοῦφον.

This Plato further supports by an analysis of sensation. He shews how incorrect it is to speak of true or false sensations, whether happening in health or sickness, in sleep or in waking, to the rational or irrational; for sensation is nothing more than the perception, that some active agent causes an impression on some passive object, and this impression is truly present in him who experiences it, so that wine is not less truly bitter to the invalid than it is sweet to the healthy man. Then, considering it under its most general view, he shews that the representation formed of the object in sensation, is nothing more than the result of two motions, *viz.*, of the sentient and of the sensible, which is only explicable by the states of both the concurrent motions, and is not either of them singly, neither the exciting nor the excited, but a resulting state intermediate to both.<sup>4</sup> This theory, therefore, leads not merely to the denial of the reality of colour, warmth, and other sensible qualities, whether supposed to exist in the soul within, or in outward objects, but also (on the supposition that knowledge is nothing more than sensation) tends to prove, that nothing really persists,

ξύμπαντά τε οὕτως, ὡς μηδενὸς ὄντος ἑνός, μήτε τινός, μήτε ὁποιοῦν·  
ἐκ δὲ δὴ φορᾶς τε καὶ κινήσεως καὶ κράσεως πρὸς ἄλληλα γίγνεται πάντα,  
ἃ δὴ φαμεν εἶναι, οὐκ ὀρθῶς προσαγορεύοντες· ἔστι μὲν γὰρ οὐδέποτε· οὐδὲν,  
ἀεὶ δὲ γίγνεται.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid. p. 153, d. ὑπόλαβε τοίνυν, ὦ ἄριστε, οὕτως κατὰ τὰ ὅμματα  
πρῶτον· ὃ δὴ καλεῖς χρῶμα λευκόν, μὴ εἶναι αὐτὸ ἕτερόν τι ἔξω τῶν σῶν  
ὀμμάτων, μηδ' ἐκ τοῖς ὅμμασι.—καὶ ἡμῖν οὕτω μέλαν τι καὶ λευκὸν καὶ  
ὀτιοῦν ἄλλο χρῶμα ἐν τῇ προσβολῇ τῶν ὀμμάτων πρὸς τὴν προσήκουσαν  
φορὰν φανέεται γεγεννημένον, καὶ ὃ δὴ ἕκαστον εἶναι φαμεν χρῶμα, οὔτε τὸ  
προσβάλλον, οὔτε τὸ προσβαλλόμενον ἔσται. ἀλλὰ μεταξύ τι ἐκάστω ἰδίου  
γεγονός. κ. τ. λ.

neither that which experiences the sensation, nor that which excites it. It was perfectly consistent with these views to consider the human, and every other individual, as a collection of particular sensuous impressions,<sup>5</sup> and to acknowledge no unity of being which should combine and hold them together. But the principle, on which they rested, admitted of a further application to overthrow the absoluteness of all-being, whether conceived as composite or simple. For if sensation alone is knowledge, then the impression felt is the only being which is the object of knowledge. But the sensible object and the sensation are so intimately allied to each other as to be inseparable, since sensation is a mere relation to the sensible, and contrariwise the latter to the former; and as the sensation is but *becoming* and inchoate, so, too, the sensible is only in inchoation. For instance, if sensation be explained as the concurrence of two motions, *e. g.*, that of colour by the motion of the coloured object towards that of the seeing eye, it is clear that the sensation or seeing of the eye is produced by the concurrence of the two, and, therefore, also its object, the colour: in both alike there is an action of the sensible and a passion of the object; in such wise, however, that neither the sentient nor the sensible is anything in itself or permanently, for the latter only becomes, for instance, a coloured thing by the means of sensation, and the former, in like manner, a sentient, *e. g.*,

<sup>5</sup> Ibid. p. 157, b. δὲ δὲ καὶ κατὰ μέρος οὕτω λέγειν καὶ περὶ πολλῶν ἀθροισθέντων, ᾧ δὴ ἀθροίσματι ἀνθρωπὸν τε τίθεται καὶ ἕκαστον ζῶον τε καὶ εἶδος. Ibid. 166, b.



a seeing eye.<sup>6</sup> According to this, it is distinctly asserted, that the sentient is neither this nor that, and that it does not remain one and the same; but that it is constantly changing in sensation, so that it is not one, but many and infinite, *e. g.*, that Socrates sick is one, and Socrates in health another.<sup>7</sup> In like manner is the unity of the sensible destroyed—whether as a coloured object, or sweet or bitter; since it only becomes what it is said to be by falling in with a passive and sentient object. Even the distinction between active and passive must not be considered as constant and invariable, since the active is such only by meeting with the passive, whereas, in a different case, it might become passive.<sup>8</sup> In short, nothing is absolutely but only relatively to some other; for it is impossible to be a sentient without being sentient either of some bitter, or sweet, or other sensible quality,

<sup>6</sup> Ibid. p. 156, a. τῆς δὲ κινήσεως δύο εἶδη, πλήθει μὲν ἄπειρον ἐκότερον, δύναμιν δὲ τὸ μὲν ποιεῖν ἔχον, τὸ δὲ πάσχειν. ἐκ δὲ τῆς τούτων ὁμολίας τε καὶ τρίψεως πρὸς ἀλλήλα γίγνεται ἕκγονα, πλήθει μὲν ἄπειρα, δίδυμα δέ, τὸ μὲν αἰσθητόν, τὸ δὲ αἰσθησις, αἰεὶ συνεκπίπτουσα καὶ γεννωμένη μετὰ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ.—ἐπειδὴν οὖν ὄμμα καὶ ἄλλο τι τῶν τούτῳ συμμέτρων πλησιάσαν γεννήσῃ τὴν λευκότητά τε καὶ αἰσθησιν αὐτῇ ξύμφυτον, ἃ οὐκ ἂν ποτε ἐγένετο, ἐκατέρου ἐκείνων πρὸς ἄλλο ἐλθόντος, τότε δὴ μεταξὺ φερομένων, τῆς μὲν ὀψεως πρὸς τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν, τῆς δὲ λευκότητος πρὸς τοῦ συναποτικτοντος τὸ χρῶμα, ὃ μὲν ὀφθαλμὸς ἄρα ὀψεως ἐμπλεως ἐγένετο καὶ ὀρᾷ δὴ τότε, καὶ ἐγένετο οὕτι ὀψις, ἀλλὰ ὀφθαλμὸς ὀρᾷ τὸ δὲ ξυγγενήσαν τὸ χρῶμα λευκότητος περιεπλήσθη καὶ ἐγένετο οὐ λευκότης αὖ, ἀλλὰ λευκόν, εἴτε ξύλον εἴτε λίθος εἴτε ὅτιον συνέβη χρῆμα χρωσθῆναι τῷ τοιούτῳ χρώματι. Cf. *ibid.* p. 160, d. sq.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid. p. 166, b. ἡ (sc. δοκεῖς τινά σοι) δώσειν ποτέ, τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι τὸν ἀνομοιούμενον τῷ πρὶν ἀνομοιοῦσθαι ὄντι; μᾶλλον δὲ τὸν εἶναι τινα, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ τοῦς, καὶ τούτους γιγνομένους ἀπείρους, ἐάνπερ ἀνομοιώσις γίγνεται; Cf. *ibid.* p. 159, b.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid. p. 157, a. ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν εἶναι τι καὶ τὸ πάσχον αὖ τι, ἐπὶ ἐνὸς νοῆσαι, ὥς φασιν, οὐκ εἶναι παγίως· οὔτε γὰρ ποιοῦν ἐστὶ τι, πρὶν ἂν τῷ πάσχοντι ξυνέλθῃ, οὔτε πάσχον, πρὶν ἂν τῷ ποιοῦντι· τό τε τινα ξυνελθὺν καὶ ποιοῦν ἄλλῃ ἂν προσπεσὸν πάσχον ἀνεφάνη.

just as it is impossible to be sensible unperceived by some sentient being. But, really and absolutely, things are nothing of all this; but by the concurrence of their motions they become one thing to one, another to another, not being anything of themselves, but becoming so either by the action of, or relatively to, some other.<sup>9</sup> Thus did Plato shew, that the theory which would reduce all knowledge to sensation, necessarily coincides with the one which teaches that all is a constant state of becoming, and is nothing absolutely and of itself, but merely becomes so for some other.

Plato attacks this doctrine by pointing out the contradictions it involves, for which purpose he successively considers it under the two phases it exhibits. Thus he shews, in the first place, that knowledge cannot be merely sensation, and, in the next, that the object of the latter, purely becoming, cannot be the object of the former. The first part of his refutation rests principally on two points; there are, however, two more which, although they must have been to his mind of no little importance, are, nevertheless, only slightly and incidentally noticed. These we are unwilling to leave entirely out of sight, however sophistical the aspect they present. Thus, for instance, he argues that if every sensation (seeing, hearing, or any other) be

<sup>9</sup> Ibid. p. 160, a. ἀνάγκη δὲ γε ἐμέ τε τινος γίνεσθαι, ὅταν αἰσθανόμενος γίγνομαι· αἰσθανόμενον γάρ, μηδενὸς δὲ αἰσθανόμενον, ἀδύνατον γίνεσθαι. ἐκεῖνό τε τινι γίνεσθαι, ὅταν γλυκὴ ἢ πικρὸν ἢ τι τοιοῦτον γίγνηται· γλυκὴ γάρ, μηδενὶ δὲ γλυκὴ ἀδύνατον γίνεσθαι· — ὥστε εἴτε τις εἶναι τι ὀνομάζει, τινὶ εἶναι, ἢ τινός, ἢ πρὸς τι, ῥητέον αὐτῷ, εἴτε γίνεσθαι· αὐτὸ δὲ ἐφ' αὐτοῦ τι ἢ ὃν ἢ γιγνόμενον, οὔτε αὐτῷ λεκτέον, οὔτ' ἄλλου λέγοντος ἀποδεκτέον.

a knowing, it would follow, that a man could at the same time know and not know; if, for instance, he saw with one eye and not with the other, or remembered an absent object; and, indeed, it may be said, in the same manner that, as there is a strong and a weak sight, there may be also a strong and a weak knowledge.<sup>10</sup> These objections, although they were well calculated to lead to the distinction between knowledge and its sensuous cause, were, nevertheless, dropt by Plato, who perceived that it was requisite to establish the above distinction by other means, before the Sophist would hesitate to deny its validity.<sup>11</sup> For similar reasons, he does not insist on the objection, that if sensation be knowledge, that a person hearing an unknown tongue, for the first time, must immediately understand it, and so too, one who had never been taught his letters would know them at first sight;<sup>12</sup> and yet it is obvious that these arguments were well adapted to awaken attention to the difference between the mere perception of a phenomenon, and the knowledge of what it signifies.<sup>13</sup>

But the main strength of his argument lies not in these points, but is drawn rather from the Protagorean position itself. For, as it asserted, that every one who has a sensation also understands that of which he is sentient; it was a natural consequence that man alone is not the standard of

<sup>10</sup> Ibid. p. 163, d. sq.

<sup>11</sup> In answering these objections in the spirit of Protagoras, Plato does not hesitate to advance a palpable contradiction.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid. p. 163, b.

<sup>13</sup> Schleiermacher, *ibid.* gives a different and more subtle explanation of Plato's view.

truth, but whatever is endowed with powers of sense—consequently the sentient animal as much as man, or even as the Deity.<sup>14</sup> This doctrine, therefore, elevating the animal to the high dignity of judging of truth and falsehood, neglects entirely the rational, which, however, is the source of the dialectical art. Now if it should be replied that this is a futile objection, since the theory denies the alleged distinction between the brutal and the human, or even the divine,<sup>15</sup> still it recurs again in a different shape, and with greater force. For it would result from such a doctrine, that all men are equal in knowledge, and participate equally in truth as in sensation. From this again, it may fairly be concluded that no one can be wiser than another, or a teacher of others.<sup>16</sup> But this was a conclusion which Protagoras, who set up for a teacher of men, could least of all admit. There was, it is true, an escape still left by which he might avoid the stringency of this inference, by having recourse to a forced and subtle distinction. Thus he asserted, the difference in men's knowledge does not consist in the greater or less degree of correctness in the thought or sensation, but the difference arises merely from the mode of apprehension, in which the same object appears good to one and evil to another, and that the right cultivation of the soul is nothing more than the transformation of their bad and disagreeable sensations into good and agreeable; on which account the sage or teacher may be aptly compared with the

<sup>14</sup> Ibid. p. 161, c. sq.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid. p. 162, d. sq.; 166, c.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid. p. 161, d. Cf. Crat. p. 386.

physician, the only difference being, that while the latter has recourse to medicine for their cure, the former employs language and persuasion.<sup>17</sup> The inadequacy of this explanation to vindicate the idea of the sage, is manifest from its forced and artificial character, since it makes wisdom to consist not in the perfection of knowledge, but in a knack of changing the affections of the soul. But even this refinement is inconsistent with the principle of Protagoras, which admitted not merely matters of action, but also of science. For in advancing his position, that to every one, that is true, which he feels, or which appears to him to be, he pretended he was establishing a doctrine universally valid and applicable to all thinking beings. But hereby he unconsciously contradicts his own opinion, since the truth, which it attributes to every conception, must belong equally to the one directly opposite to itself. For it cannot be denied that it is possible to conceive that the individual is not the measure of truth, and that every sensation is not a knowledge; and consistently with his own principles, Protagoras could not refuse to admit that this thought, when once conceived, is true and valid for him who entertains it; on the contrary, he must allow his own position, if entertained by none, to be without truth for any. Indeed this doctrine may be exhibited in a still more singular light, as proving that, on the principle that nothing is true except for those who admit it to be such, it is not true for its author, since he admitted the opinion opposed to his own

<sup>17</sup> Ibid. p. 166, d. sq.

to be true for those who hold it,<sup>18</sup> Thus did Plato shew that the doctrine, that knowledge is sensation, by overthrowing the universality of knowledge, controverts itself.

Plato, however, proceeds to offer another refutation of the Protagorean theory. Universal propositions, he argues, are valid not only for the time being, but also for the future. Now, if all knowledge be derived from sensation alone, nothing can be asserted of the future, for sensation refers solely to the present. Consequently, either a knowledge of the future is impossible, or else sensation is not the exclusive source of all knowledge. But the former consequence Plato shews to be inadmissible, by directing attention to those arts whose successful practice is founded on a forecasting regulation of life. For even though it must of force be conceded that, what to each appears to be just and good, is to him good and just, or contrariwise, still it cannot be admitted that to each, whatever seems to him profitable or hurtful, will prove really hurtful or profitable. Upon such a point, he alone is capable of coming to a right decision who is well versed and experienced in the art, to whose particular province it belongs to determine the matter in hand. Thus the agriculturist alone can

<sup>18</sup> Theæt. p. 169, d. sq. ἐξ ἀπάντων ἄρα ἀπὸ Πρωταγόρου ἀρξαμένων ἀμφισβητήσεται, μᾶλλον δὲ ὑπὸ γε ἐκείνου ὁμολογήσεται, ὅταν τάναντία λέγοντι ξυνχωρῇ ἀληθῇ αὐτὸν δοξάζειν, τότε καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας αὐτὸς ξυγχωρήσεται, μήτε κύνα, μήτε τὸν ἐπιτυχόντα ἀνθρωπον μέτρον εἶναι, μηδὲ περὶ ἐνός, οὗ ἂν μὴ μάθῃ οὐχ οὕτω; Οὕτω. Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ ἀμφισβητεῖται ὑπὸ πάντων, οὐδενὶ ἂν εἴη ἡ Πρωταγόρου ἀλήθεια ἀληθής, οὔτε τινὶ ἄλλῳ, οὐτ' αὐτῷ ἐκείνῳ.

decide upon what is or not useful in agriculture, the physician in healing; and, lastly, Protagoras himself, when he sets up as a teacher and professor of eloquence, must suppose that no one is so well qualified as himself to judge what is most useful and adapted to persuasion. All these arts, therefore, imply man's ability to form a judgment of the profitable, but the profitable implies a calculation of the future: there is therefore, a science which judges of the future, but as sensation can decide nothing as to it, there is, therefore, a science not resulting from sensation.<sup>19</sup> This argument, notwithstanding that it proceeds upon certain assertions with respect to the arts of life, and contemplates only a particular province of thought, was regarded by Plato as of general application and importance. For, as the profitable stands with him for the future, in consequence of the peculiar controversial position he was obliged to maintain relatively to Protagoras, so the knowledge of the future is equivalent to that of the eternal, the true essence of things which is the object of all science.<sup>20</sup>

But in order to establish the true object of science, in opposition to the Protagorean theory,

<sup>19</sup> Theæt. p. 172, a. sq.; 177, c. sq. *περὶ δὲ ἀγαθοῦ οὐδένα ἀνδρεῖον ἔθ' οὕτως εἶναι, ὥστε τολμᾶν διαμάχεσθαι, ὅτι καὶ ἂν ὠφέλιμα οἰηθείσα πόλις ἑαυτῇ θῇται, καὶ ἔστι τοσοῦτον χρόνον, ὅσον ἂν κέηται, ὠφέλιμα. — — ἔτι τοίνυν ἐνθὲνδε ἂν μᾶλλον πᾶς τις ὁμολογήσειε ταῦτά ταῦτα, εἰ περὶ παντὸς τοῦ εἶδους ἐρωτῶ, ἐν ᾧ καὶ τὸ ὠφέλιμον τυγχάνει ὅν' ἔστι δὲ πού καὶ περὶ τὸν μέλλοντα χρόνον.*

<sup>20</sup> Hereto refers the episode in which the relation of the philosopher to the political orator is determined, p. 172, sq., especially the allusions to the difference between apparent and real good; the latter being the true essence of things and also of the future.

it was not sufficient to shew that there is another species of knowledge besides that which is furnished by sensation, but it must also be shewn that the latter, as bringing to the consciousness nothing more than states of transition and incipency, is incapable of affording real science. With a view to this, Plato directed consideration to the objects which, in sensation, are presented to the consciousness. Now even admitting the conclusion arrived at by the foregoing discussions, that sensation does not furnish us with a knowledge of the universal and of the eternal, it might still be urged that it does afford information of the present condition of every object, and is therefore the arbiter of what is sweet, or dry, or warm to the individual.<sup>21</sup> Plato admits at once the validity of this objection, and then proceeds to limit its value and extent. From the position already established, that sensation is nothing more than a reciprocal motion of an action and a passion, it followed that the actual condition of an object, at any moment, is only an inchoate and imperfect state. Now there are two sorts of motion and inchoation, or becoming—motion in space and change of condition. But if sensation expresses merely an inchoation, whatever it represents can only be conceived as an inchoation, whether in respect to movement in space, or to change of state. So that sensation is not the expression of any thing that actually is or persists—neither a real colour nor real vision, but that which is sensuously perceived, in consequence

<sup>21</sup> This is the result attained by the first two discussions in the *Theætetus*, p. 171, e.; 179, c.



of its changing continually, is both perceived and not perceived; and even the sensation itself does not persist, but as it is constantly transforming itself, is equally sensation and non-sensation, and if sensation be science, then it is both science and non-science. Thus the position that sensation is the source of science, is proved to be absolutely and unconditionally untenable. For in that case it would follow that every question may, with equal regard to truth, be both affirmed and denied; either answer is equally legitimate, for of every object it may be asserted that it is so, and is not so, or more correctly (for the term *being* might seem to imply persistency) becomes so, and becomes not so; and also, (for the latter expression might indicate an actual condition) both not so, and not *not so*; so that nothing remains to be said by those who resolve knowledge into sensation, or are disposed to maintain the doctrine of the perpetual flux of things, than that things exist in no wise soever.<sup>22</sup> Thus does Plato demonstrate that that which is apprehended in sensation, in and by itself, is something absolutely inexpressible and inconceivable, and that the theory which derives all knowledge from sensation, must put an end to all language.

In passing to his refutation of the Eleatic theory

<sup>22</sup> Theæt. p. 181, b. sq. τὸ δ', ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐφάνη, εἰ πάντα κινεῖται, πᾶσα ἀπόκρισις, περὶ ὅτου ἂν τις ἀποκρίνηται, ὁμοίως ὁρθῇ εἶναι, οὕτω γ' ἔχειν φάναι καὶ μὴ οὕτως, εἰ δὲ βούλει, γίγνεσθαι, ἵνα μὴ στήσωμεν αὐτοὺς τῷ λόγῳ. Ὅρθῳς λέγεις. Πλήν γε, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ὅτι οὕτω τε εἶπον καὶ οὐχ οὕτω· δὲ δὲ οὐδὲ τοῦτο οὕτω λέγειν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ἔτι κινοῖτο οὕτω· οὐδ' αὖ μὴ οὕτω· οὐδὲ γὰρ τοῦτο κίνησις· ἀλλὰ τιν' ἕλλην φωνὴν θετέον τοῖς τὸν λόγον τοῦτον λέγουσιν· ὡς νῦν γε πρὸς τὴν αὐτῶν ὑπόθεσιν οὐκ ἔχουσι ῥήματα, εἰ μὴ ἄρα τὸ οὐδ' ὅπως. Crat. p. 439, d. sq.; Soph. p. 249, b. sq.

we might, perhaps, be justified in expecting that the method of the controversy would be similar to that observed against the counter-doctrine of Protagoras, and that, starting from the notion of intellectual knowledge, he would point out the intimate connection between it and the doctrine, that there is neither multiplicity or becoming, but but that all is, and remains, ever one unchangeable, but that ultimately he would shew that this theory likewise contradicts itself, and renders knowledge absolutely impossible. This, however, is not the mode in which we find the controversy managed in the dialogue of Plato, whose reasons, perhaps, for adopting a different method, were partly the different value he set upon intellectual knowledge and the sensuous presentation, and partly because the historical development of the Eleatic theory afforded no opening to such a procedure. He preferred, therefore, to follow the course which the Eleatæ had themselves pursued, and from a consideration of the objective, from which their own reasonings were almost exclusively drawn, endeavoured to shew that their very method of investigation is unsound and untenable.

For this purpose it was necessary to consider their two doctrines; first, That All is one, and there is no multiplicity; secondly, That All is one immutable being, and there is no becoming. The negative portions of these two doctrines were naturally the only objects of his attack, which, in this respect, forms a counterpart to his previous investigations into the nature of sensation. The result of the Eleatic doctrine was ultimately to reject

all sensuous knowledge, and to account for the belief we have of a perception of multiplicity and production by the delusions of appearance. To this Plato objects, that even a delusive opinion, which gives rise to a false image or conception, implies the possibility of conceiving the false or not true, *i. e.*, the non-being, whereas the whole theory rests on the assumption, that the non-being neither is any thing, nor can be conceived, either as multiplicity or as unity. This, indeed, is the great difficulty in the conception of non-being, that both he who denies and he who affirms its reality is driven to contradict himself. For although it is inexpressible and inconceivable either as one or many, nevertheless, when speaking of it, it is unavoidable to attribute to it both being and multiplicity—whether we assert that the non-being is not, or that non-existent things can neither be expressed nor conceived.<sup>23</sup> In the admission that there is such a thing as a false opinion, it is implicitly conceded that the conception at least of what is not, is possible, for no opinion can be said to be false, except it supposes either the non-being to be, or makes that, which is not, to be.<sup>24</sup> But furthermore; the actual existence of the non-existent,

<sup>23</sup> Soph. p. 239, a. φαμὲν δὲ γε δεῖν, εἴπερ ὁρθῶς τις λέξει, μήτε ὡς ἔν, μήτε ὡς πολλὰ διορίζεν αὐτό (sc. τὸ μὴ ὂν), μηδὲ τὸ παράπαν αὐτὸ καλεῖν ἔν τι γὰρ ἤδη καὶ κατὰ ταύτην ἂν τὴν πρόσρῃσιν προσαγορεύοιτο.

<sup>24</sup> Soph. p. 240. ψευδὴς δ' αὖ δόξα ἔσται τάναντία τοῖς οὖσι δοξάζουσα, ἢ πῶς; Τάναντία. Λέγεις ἄρα τὰ μὴ ὄντα δοξάζειν τὴν ψευδῇ δόξαν; Ἀνάγκη. Πότερον μὴ εἶναι τὰ μὴ ὄντα δοξάζουσιν, ἢ πῶς εἶναι τὰ μηδαμῶς ὄντα; Εἶναι πῶς τὰ μὴ ὄντα δεῖ γε, εἴπερ ψεύσεται ποτὶ τίς τι καὶ κατὰ βραχύ. Τί δ'; οὐ καὶ μηδαμῶς εἶναι τὰ πάντως ὄντα δοξάζεται; Ναί. Καὶ τοῦτο δὲ ψεῦδος. Καὶ τοῦτο. Καὶ λόγος, οἶμαι, ψευδὴς οὕτω κατὰ ταῦτα ταῦτα νομισθήσεται τὰ τε ὄντα λέγων μὴ εἶναι καὶ τὰ μὴ ὄντα εἶναι.

independently of its conception, is thereby implied ; for as the false representation is a deceptive image of the true, and the true alone is really being, (*ὄντως ὄν*) there remains nothing for the non-being really to be, except a really non-being.<sup>25</sup> Thus did Plato exhibit the inconsistency of the theory, which, maintaining that all truth is one, nevertheless proceeded to combat a false representation as something collateral to the truth ; for such a conception cannot exist within the truth, but must have a being elsewhere.

With this refutation, however, as attaching itself merely to an indirect consequence of the doctrine, Plato is not content. He proceeds, therefore, to shew directly out of the doctrine itself, that it is full of contradictions and inconsistent. To demonstrate this was indispensable, since his object was not the refutation merely of the Eleatic theory, but to separate from it that right principle, which, however partially considered, is the source of its plausibility, and to elevate it to a true method and a true science. For this purpose, taking up this investigation from the notion of being, he examines relatively thereto the doctrine that All is One. As the Eleatæ had arrived at this result in the course of their controversy against other

<sup>25</sup> Ibid. τί δῆτα, ὦ ξένη, εἰδῶλον ἂν φαῖμεν εἶναι πλὴν γε τὸ πρὸς τὰ ληθινὰ ἀφωμοιωμένον ἕτερον τοιοῦτον ; ἕτερον δὲ λέγεις τοιοῦτον ἀληθινόν, ἢ ἐπὶ τίνι τὸ τοιοῦτον εἶπες ; Οὐδαμῶς ἀληθινόν γε, ἀλλ' εἰκόδες μὲν. Ἄρα τὸ ἀληθινὸν ὄντως ὄν λέγων ; Οὕτως. Τί δαί ; τὸ μὴ ἀληθινὸν ἄρ' ἐναντίον ἀληθοῦς ; Τί μήν ; Οὐκ ὄν ἄρα λέγεις τὸ εἰκόδες, εἴπερ αὐτό γε μὴ ἀληθινὸν ἔρεῖς. ἀλλ' ἔστι γε μήν. Πῶς ; Οὐκ ὄν ἀληθῶς γε φῆς ; Οὐ γὰρ οὐν. πλὴν γ' εἰκὼν ὄντως. Οὐκ ὄν ἄρ' οὐκ ὄντως ἐστὶν ὄντως ἦν λέγομεν εἰκόνα ; Κινδυνεύει τοιαύτην τινὰ πεπλῆχθαι συμπλοκὴν τὸ μὴ ὄν τῷ ὄντι, καὶ μάλα ἄτοπον.

systems, Plato follows them step by step, and shews, that although entity may be posited as a plurality of things; *e. g.*, as warm and cold, its unity, nevertheless, is not therefore denied; for the warm and the cold are both alike *a being*, in such a manner that both, inasmuch as *being* is not posited as a third something, independent of them, but, on the contrary, comprises the two, can only be thought of as one being.<sup>26</sup> If, on the other hand, the one alone is asserted to be being, in that case there are at least two names predicated of that which is,—being and one, since it would be ridiculous, even on the assumption that there is but one being, to admit further that there is but one name. For assuming that there is one name of the one, then it must either be allowed that the name of the one is something different from the one itself, and, consequently, that there is not only the one, or that the name is in no wise distinct from the one itself, from which it would follow that the name of one is the one of the one, or name of the name.<sup>27</sup> This argument is further prosecuted, and it is shewn that even the one, if the one alone actually is, cannot be thought of as the whole,

<sup>26</sup> Soph. p. 243, sq.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid. p. 244. τὸ δὲ δύο ὀνόματα ὁμολογεῖν εἶναι μηδὲν θέμενον πλὴν ἓν καταγελαστόν που. Πῶς δ' οὐ. Καὶ τὸ παράπαν γε ἀποδέχεσθαι τοῦ λέγοντος, ὥς ἐστιν ὄνομα τι, λόγον οὐκ ἂν ἔχον. Πῇ; Τιθεῖς τε τοῦνομα τοῦ πράγματος ἕτερον δύο λέγει πού τινε. Ναί. Καὶ μὴν ἂν ταῦτόν γε αὐτῷ τιθῇ τοῦνομα, ἢ μηδενὸς ὄνομα ἀναγκασθήσεται λέγειν· εἰ δὲ τινος αὐτὸ φήσῃ, συμβήσεται τὸ ὄνομα ὀνόματος ὄνομα μόνον, ἄλλου δὲ οὐδενὸς ὄν. Οὕτως. Καὶ τὸ ἓν γε ἐνδὸς ἓν ὄν μόνον, καὶ τοῦτο ὀνόματος αὐτὸ τὸ ἓν ὄν. Parm. p. 142, sq. ἓν εἰ ἐστιν, ἄρα ὁλόν τε αὐτὸ εἶναι μέν, οὐσίας δὲ μὴ μετέχειν; Οὐχ ὁλόν τε. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ οὐσία τοῦ ἐνδὸς εἴη ἂν οὐ ταῦτόν οὐσα τῷ ἐνί. οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐκείνη ἦν ἐκείνου οὐσία, οὐδ' ἂν ἐκείνο τὸ ἓν ἐκείνης μετέχεν, ἀλλ' ὅμοιον ἂν ἦν λέγειν ἓν τε εἶναι καὶ ἓν ἓν. κ. τ. λ.

nor can have aught else attributed to it, since, thereby, the plurality of being would invariably be implied. And then he proceeds to draw the conclusion, that being, cannot any more than non-being, be an object of language or of thought, the usual form in which Plato expresses the untenableness of any doctrine.

It is of importance to bear in mind that the leading thought in this refutation of the Eleatic doctrine of the unity of being is, that in every scientific mind a distinction must clearly be drawn between the thought itself which is expressed in the proposition or name, and the object of it—or the entity—and that the neglect of this distinction must necessarily entail the confusion of all science. This consideration evidently influences much of his reasoning against the second part of the doctrine, that, *viz.* all being is permanent. It proceeds however on the assumed refutation of the first part, so that properly the controversy is not directed against the Eleatæ, but against those who, admitting the plurality of things, consider that which is true in them as unchangeable, and for ever and permanently identical. Plato here contrasts two conflicting opinions: the one maintaining that alone to be true which the outward senses can apprehend—the corporeal—the other taking its stand in the invisible and incorporeal, and the mere ideas of the understanding, and assuming that in them alone is the true essence of things. The former materializing doctrine is treated somewhat contemptuously, and Plato asserts that its advocates

must be made better men before they can be enlightened as to their error, and that then only will they be able to recognise within them the truth and reality of the soul, and of justice, and reason, and confess that there are realities which are neither tangible nor visible. He does not formally attack it but mixes up its refutation with his reasoning against the opposite doctrine. Now the first opinion, if traced back to its source, evidently takes for granted that the essence of things consists in a faculty of doing and suffering, of producing and receiving impressions; the second, on the contrary, makes a difference between becoming and essence, on the ground that man becomes conscious of the former through the body, by means of the senses, of the latter through the soul, by means of thought, since the difference of the two consists in this, that the true essence is ever, whereas becoming is different at different times. It is necessarily implied in this view, that the action and passion belong to becoming, but not to the real essence of things. This is however inconsistent with the hypothesis that we can become cognisant of the true essence of things through the soul by means of thought. For while the cognition of the essence is possible to the soul, as an act, its becoming known must be an accident of the essence as a passion and as a motion. It might however be denied that the eternally resting and ever identical essence of things can be known, but in that case the true essence of things would be without soul

and vitality, knowledge and reason, properties which have ever been highest in the estimation of philosophy<sup>28</sup>. We are, therefore, on the one hand, forced to attribute to that which really is, both reason and motion; and, consequently, to reject, as untenable, the second position of the Eleatæ;<sup>29</sup> and, on the other, the inevitable result of the previous investigations into the nature of being, is the necessity of admitting acknowledging the reality both of becoming, and of permanent being.

This result Plato further confirms by an examination of the forms of language, in which judgments or propositions may be expressed. For this purpose he observes, that the combination of words into sentences is not arbitrary, but follows certain laws and principles. He then distinguishes the words which express actions (*πραξεις*), and those which express active objects, verbs and nouns, and shews that it is indispensable in every combination to unite the two, since the shortest sentence contains both a noun and a verb.<sup>30</sup> In such sentences it is shewn of some entity either that is becoming, or has or will

<sup>28</sup> Soph. p. 245, sq.; p. 248, d. *μανθάνω τὸδε γε, ὡς τὸ γινώσκειν εἴπερ ἔσται ποιεῖν τι, τὸ γινωσκόμενον ἀναγκαῖον αὐτὸ συμβαίνει πάσχειν. τὴν οὐσίαν δὲ κατὰ τὸν λόγον τοῦτον γινωσκομένην ὑπὸ τῆς γνώσεως, καθ' ὅσον γινώσκεται, κατὰ τοσοῦτον κινεῖσθαι διὰ τὸ πάσχειν, ὃ δὴ φαμεν οὐκ ἂν γενέσθαι περὶ τὸ ἡρεμοῦν.*

<sup>29</sup> Ibid. p. 248, e. *τί δαὶ πρὸς Δίος; ὡς ἀληθῶς κίνησιν καὶ ζωὴν καὶ ψυχὴν καὶ φρόνησιν ἢ ῥαδίως πεισθησόμεθα τῷ παντελῶς ὄντι μὴ παρῆναι, μηδὲ ζῆν αὐτὸ μηδὲ φρονεῖν, ἀλλὰ σεμνὸν καὶ ἄγιον νοῦν οὐκ ἔχον ἀκίνητον ἐστὸς εἶναι; κ.τ.λ.* Phil. p. 28, d.

<sup>30</sup> Soph. p. 261, sq. *οὐδεμίαν γὰρ οὔτε οὕτως οὐτ' ἐκείνως πράξιν οὐδ' ἀπραξίαν οὐδὲ οὐσίαν ὄντος οὐδὲ μὴ ὄντος δηλοῖ τὰ φωνηθέντα, πρὶν ἂν τις τοῖς ὀνόμασι τὰ ῥήματα κεράσῃ. τότε δ' ἡρμოსέ τε καὶ λόγος ἐγένετο εὐθύς ἢ πρώτη συμπλοκή, σχεδὸν τῶν λόγων ὁ πρῶτος καὶ μικρότατος.*



become something,<sup>32</sup> so that by the necessity of this combination of nouns with verbs, Plato shews it to be impossible to separate the action from the agent, becoming from being; without annulling all the laws of language.

Nevertheless, the question what is being and non-being, is far from being satisfactorily answered by these disquisitions. For even though it may have been shewn in respect to being, that it is partly motion, and partly quiescence, this does not afford a full and perfect explanation of its nature,<sup>32</sup> and is nothing more than an enumeration of certain differing and opposite conditions which are accidents of it. If, however, we proceed from these to determine the notion of being, it will follow that it is neither motion nor rest, but a third something which nevertheless cannot in any wise be conceived by us, since we are constrained to conceive as resting that which is not moved, and what is not at rest as moving.<sup>33</sup> We arrive, therefore, at the result that being is as indefinable, as non-being, although from directly opposite causes; since the non-being, in whose domain the practised but unscientific Sophist displays his subtlety and skill, is invisible on account of its obscurity, whereas being cannot be contemplated by reason of the effulgent light which

<sup>31</sup> Soph. p. 262, d. δηλοῖ γὰρ ἤδη που τότε περὶ τῶν ὄντων ἡ γιγνομένων ἡ γεγονότων ἡ μελλόντων καὶ οὐκ ὀνομάζει μόνον, ἀλλὰ τι περαίνει συμπλέκων τὰ ῥήματα τοῖς ὀνόμασι. The words γιγνομένων ἡ γεγονότων ἡ μελλόντων evidently refers to the tenses of the verb, but τῶν ὄντων to the noun.

<sup>32</sup> Soph. p. 249, d. sq.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid. p. 250, d. εἰ γὰρ τι μὴ κινεῖται, πῶς οὐχ ἔστηκεν; ἡ τὸ μηδαμῶς ἐστὸς πῶς οὐκ αὖ κινεῖται; τὸ δὲ ὄν ἡμῖν νῦν ἐκτὸς τούτων ἀμφοτέρων ἀναπέφανται.

environs it, the eyes of the many being unable to endure the splendour of the divine.<sup>34</sup>

As, however, this is nothing more than a rejection of certain erroneous views, and not a correct answer to the proposed question, it is important to discover some way by which we may arrive at the requisite solution. For this purpose the inquiry opens with a review of human thought, and its enunciation in language. Thinking is shewn to be a talking of the soul with itself<sup>35</sup>—it being indifferent whether the thought is cherished silently, or becomes audible through the voice. All speech, however, is a combination of one word with one or many others,<sup>36</sup> and since every word has a meaning, similarly, thinking must be a combining of one thought with another. This proves, in the first place, the absurdity of those who will not allow that different names can be employed for one and the same thing, on the ground that the one is ever one, as also the manifold is invariably manifold. For, at all events, it is possible to predicate of every individual, whatever may be its nature, that it is, thereby attributing to it being, in addition to that particular nature which it has.<sup>37</sup> Now a communion being thus established between words, and consequently between thoughts also, the question necessarily arises whether all can be combined with all. Now, to combine, or to mingle all with all,

<sup>34</sup> Ibid. p. 253, e. sq. ὁ δὲ γε φιλόσοφος, τῇ τοῦ δυτος αἰ διὰ λογισμῶν προσκείμενος ἰδέα, διὰ τὸ λαμπρὸν αὐτῆς χώρας οὐδαμῶς εὐπετῆς δφθηναι· τὰ γὰρ τῆς τῶν πολλῶν ψυχῆς ὁμματα καρτερεῖν πρὸς τὸ θεῖον ἀφορῶντα ἀδύνατα.

<sup>35</sup> Theæt. p. 189, e.; Soph. p. 263, e.

<sup>36</sup> Soph. p. 259, e. sq.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid. p. 251, sq.

would be no less fatal to the art of language, than a wish to separate all from all. And, indeed, that which is thought, or the notion, is of such a nature, that it cannot possibly enter into combination with its contrary;<sup>38</sup> for instance, the even can never become odd. Moreover, that to which a particular idea invariably attaches, can never, so long as it is itself, assume the contrary to that idea: *e. g.*, the number two, to which the idea of even invariably attaches, can never assume that of odd.<sup>39</sup> And, finally, so long as any object invariably admits a particular idea in a particular relation, it can never in that particular relation be subject to the opposite idea.<sup>40</sup> Thus did Plato advance the principle of contradiction in all its most essential features. But if all notions are neither absolutely incapable of being combined, nor yet of being joined together indifferently, it inevitably follows that some may be joined with some and not with others, and there must be a science to teach what may be combined, and what not—the science of Dialectic.<sup>41</sup>

Plato then proceeds to shew, simply by way of exemplification, in the case of the ideas of being, motion, and rest, what are the results of the combination of these ideas, and of their reciprocal self-exclusion. The ideas of motion and rest cannot well be joined together, although both of them may be

<sup>38</sup> Phæd. p. 103. *ξυνωμολογήκαμεν ἄρα, ἥ δ' ὅς, ἀπλῶς τοῦτο, μηδέποτε ἐναντίον ἐαυτοῦ τὸ ἐναντίον ἔσεσθαι.* Soph. p. 252, d; 259, c.

<sup>39</sup> Phæd. l. l.

<sup>40</sup> De Rep. iv. p. 436, b. sq. *οὐδὲ μᾶλλον τι πείσει, ὥς ποτέ τι ἂν τὸ αὐτὸ δν ἕμα κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ τάναντία πάθοι ἢ καὶ εἴη ἢ καὶ ποιήσειεν.* Cf. Soph. p. 230, b.

<sup>41</sup> Soph. p. 252, e. sq.

joined with that of being, since both are ; and each of the three ideas is different from the other two, but considered in itself is the same. From this comparison, therefore, arises two other ideas—those of difference and identity, of which two each is different from the four others, although the three first may nevertheless be united with either of the two last, for each of the three, relatively to itself, is the same, but different in respect to another, and not of its own proper nature, but because it has part in the idea of *other*, or difference. Accordingly, we must not be offended when we hear it said, that motion is both the same, and not the same—since this is in different relations, for, on the one hand, it participates in the same and yet is not identical, but participates in *the other*. Since, however, each idea partakes of being, and all, with the exception of being, are different from, or, in other words, are not being, but other than being, therefore each of them is a non-being, so far, *i. e.*, as they are other than being ; moreover, in so far as being itself is other than the rest, in so many respects it is not ; and as the *other* is not, it is truly one, but not infinite in number.

In all these cases the non-being appears to admit of being combined with, and to be as much a being as any of the others, not, indeed, as expressing the contrary to being, but merely something different from it.<sup>42</sup> Thus did Plato shew, by the distinction

<sup>42</sup> Soph. p. 254, sq. ; p. 257, a. καὶ τὸ δὲ ἄρ' ἡμῖν, ὅσα πέρ ἐστι τὰ ἄλλα, κατὰ τσαῦτα οὐκ ἔστιν. ἐκεῖνα γὰρ οὐκ ἔν μὲν αὐτό ἐστιν, ἀπείρα ντα δὲ τὸν ἀριθμὸν τὰλλα οὐκ ἔστιν αὐ. This expresses, in the most forcible manner, the opposition of the Platonic view to that of the Eleatæ.

which invariably holds among ideas, that the non-being, in reference to some other, is a necessary conception, since every idea expresses not only some entity, but also a non-entity, in so far as it indicates a difference from all other ideas.<sup>43</sup>

To establish the legitimacy of the idea of non-being appeared indispensable for vindicating the general idea of methodical thought, in opposition to that unskilful employment of ideas and the errors resulting from their abuse: of the necessity of such a course Plato was the more sensible the more entangling were the verbal subtleties of the Sophists, which it was his object to refute. If there be an art to regulate dialectically the classification of ideas, the confusion of them must be possible; and if the former educes science and correct opinions, the latter can lead to nothing but error and delusion. Here, however, the difficulty arises of rightly explaining the possibility of the idea of non-being, for if knowledge be to think what really is, then error is to think what is not. Every thought, however, is of something as being, and it is impossible for any one to think and yet think of nothing. If, therefore, there is any act of thought contained in erroneous and false opinion, it must have for its object some being, but the non-being cannot be conceived either by

<sup>43</sup> Ibid. p. 258, a. ἡ θατέρου φύσις ἐφάνη τῶν ὄντων οὐσα. — ἡμεῖς δὲ γε οὐ μόνον ὥς ἔστι τὰ μὴ ὄντα ἀπεδείξαμεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ εἶδος, ὃ τυγχάνει ὄν τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἀπεφηνάμεθα· τὴν γὰρ θατέρου φύσιν ἀποδείξαντες οὐσάν τε καὶ κατακεκρηματισμένην ἐπὶ πάντα τὰ ὄντα πρὸς ἄλλα, τὸ πρὸς τὸ ὄν ἕκαστον μῦθον αὐτῆς ἀντιτιθέμενον ἐτολήσαμεν εἰπεῖν, ὥς αὐτὸ τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὄντως τὸ μὴ ὄν.

itself nor of the being.<sup>44</sup> Consequently, the existence of false opinion can only be accounted for by maintaining, that although absolute non-being is inconceivable, yet it is possible to conceive non-being relatively to something else which is intermediate between absolute being and absolute non-being.<sup>45</sup>

We do not find that Plato attempted any similar explanation of being. Indeed the scope of his investigations was not to discover a positive definition of the idea of being; they were confined to the refutation of certain partial and exclusive theories, and in no respect belie this purely negative character. The object which induced him to attack Protagoras and Heraclitus on the one hand, and the Eleatæ and their sophistical followers on the other, was merely to clear and open the field of dialectical discussion, and to defend it against certain erroneous views which were calculated to involve all thought and language in inextricable confusion. With this view the inquiry is carried back to an investigation into the nature of language, which it is shewn both makes of necessity a distinction between certain ideas and yet combines them together. And then, proceeding to call attention to the fact that the idea always expresses the same, he herewith connects the doctrine that in thought it is impossible to get rid of the conception of a something invariable and identical, and then

<sup>44</sup> Theæt. p. 189, b. οὐκ ἄρα οἶόν τε τὸ μὴ ὂν δοξάζειν, οὔτε περὶ τῶν ὄντων, οὔτε αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό. De Rep. v. p. 478.

<sup>45</sup> De Rep. i. l.

noticing on the other hand, that the soul advances from one idea to another, and deriving the ideas of action and passion, from the correlation of knowing and being known, he proves that the conception of becoming, or incipency, is equally inseparable from the sphere of scientific thought; and that, on the contrary, the necessity of combining it with being, is incontestably proved by the manner in which in propositions a noun is necessarily joined with a verb. This result, it is true, is nothing more than that which had been previously established by Socrates against the Sophists: with him, however, it was a mere consequence of his firm attachment to, and belief in the possibility of truth, whereas in Plato it is obtained by a regular and skilful development of the contradictions in which an unlimited scepticism is in every direction involved.

After this attempt to dispel the unsubstantial mists which had gathered round a self-satisfied and contented ignorance, he was able to turn his endeavours to the attainment of a more stable position for philosophy, and for that purpose to revert to the consideration of opinion, through which, as already observed, lies the road to philosophy, so soon as man arrives at the conviction that it does not furnish him with certainty and truth. According to Plato, opinion is grounded on sensation, and becoming. That which is at yet inchoate and becoming is accessible to opinion only by means of irrational

sensation.<sup>46</sup> The faculty of sensation is necessary to man, since the soul is implanted in the body, itself a composite thing, subject to continual decay and reproduction, from which results a constrained suffering and change of the soul, so that, forced to adjust itself to that which is never constant and identical, it also becomes wavering and unsettled, and totters as it were with intoxication.<sup>47</sup> The communion between the soul and the body consists in the reciprocal communication of action and passion, by means of their respective faculties.<sup>48</sup> According to this view a passion of the body is transferred to the soul. It is indeed possible that a particular action on the body may terminate there, and not be carried further to the cognitive faculty of the soul, certain motions of the body are, however, imparted to the soul, and make known to it the force of the moving cause. In the former case the soul remains insensible, in the latter sensation is awakened within it.<sup>49</sup>

<sup>46</sup> Tim. p. 28, a. τὸ δ' αὖ δόξῃ μετ' αἰσθήσεως ἀλόγου δοξαστὸν γιγνώμενον καὶ ἀπολλύμενον.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid. p. 42, a. ὁπότε δὴ σώμασιν ἐμφυτῆθεῖεν (sc. αἱ ψυχαί) ἐξ ἀνάγκης, καὶ τὸ μὲν προσίοι, τὸ δ' ἀπίοι τοῦ σώματος αὐτῶν, πρῶτον μὲν αἰσθησὺν ἀναγκαῖον εἶη μίαν πᾶσιν ἐκ βιαιῶν παθημάτων ξύμφυτον γίγνεσθαι. Soph. p. 248, a. καὶ σώματι μὲν ἡμᾶς γενέσει δι' αἰσθήσεως κοινωνεῖν. Phæd. p. 79, c. τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι τὸ διὰ τοῦ σώματος, τὸ δι' αἰσθήσεως σκοπεῖν τι.

<sup>48</sup> Soph. l. l.

<sup>49</sup> Phileb. p. 33, d. θές τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἡμῶν ἐκάστοτε παθημάτων τὰ μὲν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἀποσβεγγόμενα πρὶν ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν διεξελθεῖν, ἀπαθῆ ἐκείνην ἔασαντα, τὰ δὲ δι' ἀμφοῖν ἰόντα καὶ τινα ὥσπερ σεισμὸν ἐντιθέντα ἰδίῳ τε καὶ κοινῷ ἐκατέρῳ. — ὅταν ἀπαθῆς αὕτη (ἡ ψυχὴ) γίγνηται τῶν σεισμῶν τῶν τοῦ σώματος — ἀναισθησίαν ἐπονόμεσον. — τὸ δὲ ἐν ἐνὶ πάθει τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὸ σῶμα κοινῇ γιγνόμενον κοινῇ καὶ κινεῖσθαι, ταύτην δ'



According to this representation, sensation is regarded as an effect operated by the union of the soul with its body, and the close connexion subsisting between this doctrine and the explanation already given of sensation by the concurrent action of the sentient and the sensible must be obvious to all. This concurrence he usually illustrates by the manner in which the corporeal organ is set in motion by some external agent, and thereupon becomes itself active;<sup>50</sup> and thus he usually reduces sensation to the mere perception of some corporeal quality, colour, for instance, or taste; although this does not by any means exclude the possibility of its also apprehending an internal state which does not affect the external organs, even though this may be only relative to the union of body and soul. In this respect does Plato speak of temperance, whenever it exists in a man, as necessarily giving rise to a sensation.<sup>51</sup> Nevertheless it must certainly be admitted that the Platonic theory of sensation is far from being complete, and uniformly developed, since by sensation he in the main understands nothing more than a perception of the qualities of body; as is particularly observable when he defines the soul, or the incorporeal, as that which cannot be apprehended by the organs of sense—in short, as a non-sensible;<sup>52</sup> still he did not wholly fail to observe that we may also be sentient of certain

*αὐτὴν τὴν κίνησιν ὀνομάζων αἰσθῆσιν οὐκ ἀπὸ τρόπου φθέγγοι' αὖν.* Cf. *ibid.* p. 43, b.; *Tim.* p. 64, a.

<sup>50</sup> *Theæt.* p. 153, e.

<sup>51</sup> *Charm.* p. 159, a.

<sup>52</sup> *De Leg.* x. p. 898, d.; *Polit.* p. 285, c.

internal states of the soul which have not any immediate reference to the corporeal.

It is of importance for rightly understanding this investigation, that the distinction should be known, which Plato drew between that through which and that by which we have a sensation. The organs of sense are merely the mean through which we become sentient; for we are not, like wooden horses, furnished with many senses, which are separate and independent, but they are all carried to and meet together in a soul by which, through the organs belonging to the body, we become sentient of the sensible.<sup>53</sup> By each organ we receive the sensations proper to it—sound through the ears, colour through the eyes, etc.; but no one can enable us to perceive that which it is the peculiar province of another to seize and apprehend: through the ears we cannot see, nor hear through the eyes. The thought, therefore, which refers to two or more sensations through different organs, cannot be made complete by any one singly; on the contrary, in every case where such a thought occurs, we complete it, independently of the organs of sense, by the faculty which through them is sentient. Now, it is undeniable that we can think of two sensations received through different organs, for we can think of both as being; of each singly as one, in and by itself, and of both together as two, and then consider the points of resemblance and difference, and so arrive at a knowledge of the

<sup>53</sup> Theæt. p. 184, d. δεινὸν γάρ που, εἰ πολλαὶ τινες ἐν ἡμῖν, ὥσπερ ἐν δουρείοις ἵπποις, αἰσθήσεις ἐγκάθηνται, ἀλλὰ μὴ εἰς μίαν τινὰ ἰδέαν, εἴτε ψυχὴν, εἴτε ὃ τι δεῖ καλεῖν, πάντα ταῦτα ζυντείνει, ᾗ διὰ τούτων ὅλον ὁργάνων αἰσθανόμεθα, ὅσα αἰσθητά.

common character which belongs to all thoughts in general. We must, therefore, attribute to the soul, which receives sensations through the sensuous mechanism, a power of investigating by itself the common properties of all sensations, in addition to that which it exercises through the instrumentality of the bodily organs.<sup>54</sup>

If, then, it has been satisfactorily shewn that the soul possesses a faculty of its own, independently of the senses, that of investigating the common and the general, the question will next arise, what are the particular ideas which it originates in the human soul. With a view to determine this point, Plato distinguishes that which is apprehended by sensation, and that of which we become cognisant by means of reflexion (*διάνοια*), through the understanding or rational contemplation (*λογισμός, νοῦς, νόησις*).<sup>55</sup> Now, that which is apprehended by the senses, is, according to Plato, limited to the perpetual change or flux of *becoming*, the purely momentary, which is a constant transition, through the present condition, from a former to a future state; <sup>56</sup> in contrast with this, that which the intellect apprehends, is represented to be constant and permanent, unproduced and imperishable, and ever identical with itself—the immovable, which neither receives aught else from aught else, nor itself moves

<sup>54</sup> Theæt. p. 185, b. οὔτε γὰρ δι' ἀκοῆς, οὔτε δι' ὄψεως οἶόν τε τὸ κοινὸν λαμβάνειν περὶ αὐτῶν. — ἀλλὰ μὰ Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔγωγε οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιμι εἰπεῖν, πλὴν γ' ὅτι μοι δοκεῖ τὴν ἀρχὴν οὐδ' εἶναι τοιοῦτον οὐδὲν τούτοις ὄργανον ἴδιον ὥσπερ ἐκείνοις, ἀλλ' αὐτὴ δι' αὐτῆς ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ κοινὰ μοι φαίνεται περὶ πάντων ἐπισκοπεῖν.

<sup>55</sup> Parm. p. 129, e.; Phæd. p. 65, c.; de Rep. vii. p. 532, a. etc.

<sup>56</sup> Parm. p. 152.

to another.<sup>57</sup> The soul, as thinking purely of and by itself, apprehends every pure and absolute entity, without being impeded by the motion of sensation, which distracts the soul in its acquisition of the truth.<sup>58</sup> If the soul could purify and free itself from the agitations and hindrances of body, it would then behold things absolutely in themselves.<sup>59</sup> Whatever is thus the object of the soul's thought, through and by itself, was comprised by Plato in the idea of the essence (*οὐσία*), which indicates, in a very general manner, the constant and the invariable in our thoughts.<sup>60</sup> To this idea all true science and philosophy has reference. As thought, however, implies multiplicity, the cognition of the essence by the intellect leads to a knowledge of like and unlike, same and other, unity and number, and many other notions which, as general ideas, participate in the essence,<sup>61</sup> and are conceptions of the intellect.

It is certainly impossible to deny that in the

<sup>57</sup> Tim. p. 51, e. *τούτων δὲ οὕτως ἔχόντων ὁμολογητέον, ἓν μὲν εἶναι τὸ κατὰ ταῦτα εἶδος ἔχον, ἀγέννητον καὶ ἀνώλεθρον, οὔτε εἰς ἑαυτὸ εἰσδεχόμενον ἄλλο ἄλλοθεν, οὔτε αὐτὸ εἰς ἄλλο ποιῶν, ἀόρατον δὲ καὶ ἄλλως ἀναίσθητον, τοῦτο δ' ἡ νοήσις εἰληχεν ἐπισκοπεῖν.* Ibid. p. 27, d.; Phæd. p. 79.

<sup>58</sup> Phæd. p. 65, e. — *αὐτῇ καθ' αὐτὴν εἰλικρινεῖ τῇ διανοίᾳ χρώμενος αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ εἰλικρινὲς ἕκαστον* —.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid. p. 66, d. *ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι ἡμῖν δέδεικται, ὅτι εἰ μέλλοιμὲν ποτε καθαρῶς τι εἶσεσθαι, ἀπαλλακτέον αὐτοῦ (sc. τοῦ σώματος) καὶ αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ θεατέον αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα.*

<sup>60</sup> Theæt. p. 186, a. *ποτέρων οὖν τίθης τὴν οὐσίαν; τοῦτο γὰρ μάλιστα ἐπὶ πάντων παρέπεται. Ἐγὼ μὲν, ὣν αὐτῇ ἡ ψυχὴ καθ' αὐτὴν ἐπορέγεται.* Cf. Phæd. p. 247, c. sq.; Crat. p. 386. *βεβαιότης τῆς οὐσίας* and *βέβαιος οὐσία*. De Rep. vii. p. 526. e. *γένεσις* and *οὐσία* are opposed to each other. But Plato is far from employing this term invariably in this sense; see, e. g. Parm. p. 142, c. sq.

<sup>61</sup> Theæt. i. l.

development of these thoughts, there is evidently a much greater inclination to follow out the consideration of the eternal essence of things, than to establish and to demonstrate the truth of becoming. This characteristic feature of the Platonic theory is more distinctly traceable in its general aspect than in particular passages, which often, indeed, assert the nothingness of becoming, considered absolutely, and in itself, but, for the most part, leave the reader in doubt how far the assertion is unconditional or not. We shall, therefore, first of all enter upon an examination of his opinions upon the permanent, or what he calls *the being* or eternal essence of things, and then proceed to his theory of generation or becoming, so far as it admits of a general or dialectical consideration.

The intimate connexion between the Platonic theory and the Socratic examination of the Idea, and its definition, cannot be mistaken. In the Republic Plato calls the investigation, which sets out from the idea, the customary method.<sup>62</sup> He usually commences with the noun or name which is attributed to a plurality of objects, and seeks an explanation of this name by which we may arrive at its idea.<sup>63</sup> To the same effect exactly is the precept to open every investigation by settling the nature of the object of dispute;<sup>64</sup> for this question cannot be completely answered except by a statement of its essence, and the

<sup>62</sup> De Rep. x. p. 596, a.

<sup>63</sup> L. l. εἶδος γὰρ πού τι ἐν ἑκάστων εἰώθαμεν τίθεσθαι περὶ ἑκαστα τὰ πολλά, οἷς ταῦτόν ὄνομα ἐπιφέρομεν. De Leg. x. p. 89, d.

<sup>64</sup> Phædr. p. 237, b.; Laches, p. 185, b.; Meno, p. 71. ὁ δὲ μὴ οἶδα τί ἐστι, πῶς ἂν ὁποῖόν γέ τι εἰδείην;

essence of an entity is expressed in the definition of its idea.<sup>65</sup> When, now, we further call to mind, that with Plato the essence of things is that which in them is permanent and fixed,<sup>66</sup> it appears quite natural that he should set out from this point in his attempt to arrive at a knowledge of the real and the true.

The only difference, perhaps, in this respect between the master and the disciple is, that the latter established and asserted in general terms what the former only sought and attempted to shew by particular instances, and practically. For Plato has enumerated, with the greatest precision, the different species of scientific procedure by which it is possible to pass either from the multiplicity of particulars to the unity of the idea, or conversely. Not only does he maintain that division and classification according to the nature of objects are indispensable to correct thinking,<sup>67</sup> but in a truly philosophical spirit he also insists upon the necessity of carrying out this process, on the one hand, from the lowest to the highest genera,<sup>68</sup> and on the

<sup>65</sup> Phædr. l. i. *περὶ παντός, ὃ παῖ, μία ἀρχὴ τοῖς μέλλουσι καλῶς βουλευέσθαι· εἰδέναι δὲ περὶ οὗ ἂν ᾗ ἡ βουλή·—τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς λέληθεν, ὅτι οὐκ ἴσασι τὴν οὐσίαν ἐκάστου.*—*ἐγὼ οὖν καὶ σὺ—δμολογίᾳ θέμενοι ὅρον, εἰς τοῦτ' ἀποβλέποντες καὶ ἀναφέροντες τὴν σκέψιν ποιῶμεθα, κ. τ. λ.* Cf. *ibid.* p. 263. De Leg. l. i., where λόγος indicates the explanation of the idea.

<sup>66</sup> Crat. p. 386, d. *δηλον δὲ, ὅτι αὐτὰ αὐτῶν οὐσίαν ἔχοντά τινα βεβαίῳν ἐστι τὰ πράγματα.*

<sup>67</sup> Phædr. p. 265, d. sq. *εἰς μίαν τε ἰδέαν συνορῶντα ἄγειν τὰ πολλαχῇ διεσπαρμένα, ἵν' ἕκαστον ὀριζόμενος δηλον ποιῇ, περὶ οὗ ἂν αἰεὶ διδάσκειν ἐθέλῃ.*—*τὸ πάλιν κατ' εἶδη δύνασθαι τέμνειν, κατ' ἄρθρα, ᾗ πέφυκε, καὶ μὴ ἐπιχειρεῖν καταγνῶναι μέρος μηδέν.* Soph. p. 253.

<sup>68</sup> Phædr. p. 277, b. *κατ' εἶδη μέχρι τοῦ ἀτμήτου τέμνειν.* Polit. p. 285, a.; Philib. p. 16, sq. *δεῖν οὖν ἡμᾶς—αἰεὶ μίαν ἰδέαν περὶ παντὸς ἐκάστω*

other, from the highest genera down to the lowest multiplicity. From this it is clear that according to Plato the scientific method must invariably attach itself to ideas. Hence he expressly insists that some general idea is indispensable to a right division,<sup>69</sup> and while he allows that every species comprised in the higher, is a part of that idea, he denies that, conversely, every part is also a species.<sup>70</sup> Furthermore, he describes the right method of proceeding with ideas, and shews on the one hand, that it is indispensable to a correct definition, that some general term comprising a multiplicity of objects,<sup>71</sup> should first be given, and that then it should be pointed out, wherein the idea to be explained differs from others, which have part with it, in the same genus;<sup>72</sup> on the other, he advances certain rules for the division of ideas. Thus he forbids the dividing a small portion from a great mass, and then, designating the remainder by a peculiar

θεμέλιους ζητεῖν· εὐρήσειν γὰρ ἐνοῦσαν. ἐὰν οὖν καταλάβωμεν, μετὰ μίαν δύο, εἰ πως εἰσὶ, σκοπεῖν, εἰ δὲ μὴ, τρεῖς ἢ τινα ἄλλον ἀριθμόν, καὶ τῶν ἐν ἐκείνων ἕκαστον πάλιν ὡσαύτως, μέχρι περ ἂν τὸ κατ' ἀρχὰς ἐν μὴ ᾗτι ἐν καὶ πολλὰ καὶ ἄπειρά ἐστι μόνον ἴδη τις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὀπόσα· τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀπείρου ἰδέαν πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος μὴ προσφέρειν, πρὶν ἂν τις τὸν ἀριθμόν αὐτοῦ πάντα κατ' ἰδὴ τὸν μεταξὺ τοῦ ἀπείρου τε καὶ τοῦ ἐνός. — ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν ὁτιούν, εἰ τίς ποτε λάβῃ, τοῦτον, ὥς φάμεν, οὐκ ἐπ' ἀπείρου φύσιν δεῖ βλέπειν εὐθύς, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τιν' ἀριθμόν, οὕτω καὶ τοῦναντίον ὅταν τις τὸ ἀπείρου ἀναγκασθῇ πρῶτον λαμβάνειν, μὴ ἐπὶ τὸ ἐν εὐθύς, ἀλλ' ἐπ' ἀριθμόν αὐτὴν πλῆθος ἕκαστον ἔχοντά τι κατανοεῖν τελευτᾶν τε ἐκ πάντων εἰς ἐν.

<sup>69</sup> Polit. p. 262, a.; de Rep. v. p. 454, a.

<sup>70</sup> Polit. l. i.; p. 263, b.

<sup>71</sup> Euthyphr. p. 6, d.; Theæt. p. 146, d. sq.; p. 185, d. sq.

<sup>72</sup> Euthyphr. p. 11, e. sq.; Theæt. p. 208, d. ὡς ἄρα τὴν διαφορὰν ἐκάστου ἂν λαμβάνῃς, ἣ τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρει, λόγον, ὥς φασὶ τινες, λήψει, ἕως δ' ἂν κοινοῦ τινὸς ἐφάπτη, ἐκείνων περὶ σοι ἔσται ὁ λόγος, ὃν ἂν ἡ κοινότης ᾗ.

name; in the manner, for instance, that the ignorant many divide the small body of the Hellenes from the rest of the human race, whom they take to be a peculiar species, and call it the Barbarian. On the contrary, he insists that some idea is absolutely necessary to a correct division, and considers it to be safe to divide through the middle, since this method is at least likely to lead to some general idea.<sup>73</sup> This, however, is not given as a general rule,<sup>74</sup> and it is only occasionally that we find him making divisions of this kind into two equal parts. Thus did Plato give a general exposition of the system of his master, with rules for its application, and it is certainly allowable to suppose that he had developed these rules still more fully than would appear from the occasional allusions to this subject in his dialogues.

It is this method of ideas that, according to Plato, constitutes true science. In this view he looked chiefly to the fact that these ideas invariably indicate one and the same, and that all the diversity of special determinates, which may be predicated of them in and by themselves, are always applicable to them, so that in themselves they are unchangeable, and do not admit of opposite predicates. It is in this respect that he is able to say of science in general, which seeks in the ideas to seize the essence of things, that its object is to exhibit what every thing is, of

<sup>73</sup> Polit. p. 262, a. sq. *διὰ μέσων δὲ ἀσφαλέστερον ἔναι τέμνοντας καὶ μᾶλλον ἰδίαις ἂν τις προστυγχάνοι.* Ibid. p. 265, a.

<sup>74</sup> Cf. Phileb. p. 16, the passage cited above.



and by itself, or absolutely (τὸ αὐτὸ ἑκαστον, τὸ αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό),<sup>75</sup> but that the ideas, considered absolutely, do not admit of opposite determinations, so far as they are ideas, but invariably maintain their proper nature and character.<sup>76</sup> All else, therefore, that may exist besides ideas, has only so far a reality as it has part in them; by participation in these (μέθεξις, παρουσία, κοινωνία) things are what they are,<sup>77</sup> for all is formed out of ideas and numbers;<sup>78</sup> or, in other words, as Plato usually expresses himself, things have merely a resemblance to ideas, and, relatively to them, are like copies to originals.<sup>79</sup>

As, however, in the midst of these logical or dialectical disquisitions, we have fallen upon that which, from of old, has ever been considered at once the centre and the difficulty of the Platonic system—his theory of ideas, it is indispensable to ascertain precisely the true Platonic sense of the term *idea*. This is the more necessary, the greater the disposition that has been evinced in modern times to take a very partial view of the subject, and to explain the ideas either by the general properties of objects, or by the general notions of genus and species, and even to confine them ex-

<sup>75</sup> De Rep. vi. p. 493, e.; Phæd. p. 102, a.; Soph. p. 265, b. εἰδῶλων,—ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτῶν ἑκάστων. Parm. p. 128, e.

<sup>76</sup> Phæd. l. l.; Parm. p. 129, a. εἰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὰ τὰ ὁμοιά τις ἀπέφαιεν ἀνόμοια γιγνόμενα ἢ τὰ ἀνόμοια ὁμοία, τέρας ἂν, οἶμαι, ἦν.

<sup>77</sup> Phæd. p. 100, c. sq.; Euthyd. p. 300, e. sq.; Conv. p. 210, e. sq.

<sup>78</sup> Tim. p. 53, b.

<sup>79</sup> Phædr. p. 250, a. τῶν ἐκεῖ ὁμοίωμα. De Rep. x. p. 597, a. οὐ τὸ ὄν, ἀλλὰ τι τοιοῦτο οἶον τὸ ὄν. Tim. p. 28, a. ὁ δημιουργὸς πρὸς τὸ κατὰ ταῦτά ἔχον βλέπων ἀεὶ τοιοῦτῳ τινὶ προσχρώμενος παραδείγματι. Ibid. p. 49, d. Also, without this reference to God, Euthyphr. p. 6, e.

clusively to the ideal conceptions of the good, the beautiful, and the just. The expressions of Plato, however, far transcend all these narrow limitations, and there is no species of true being which he does not comprise within his *Ideæ*. In order, however, to determine from his own writings the extent of the term as employed by him, it is necessary to bear in mind that he speaks in the same sense of his *ideæ*, and of the permanent essence, unity, or absolute being, which, to his mind, indicated the objective of the ideas.<sup>80</sup> Now, we find that he comprises therein not merely the highest and most perfect within his own knowledge, the beautiful and the good, justice and science, but even their contraries—every species of vice, evil, and injustice.<sup>81</sup> Moreover, he speaks of ideas of resemblance and difference, of the one and the manifold, of magnitude, of health and strength, and even of speed and slowness;<sup>82</sup> so, too, of the unity of man and of beast, of the sphere, in and by itself, the circle, in and by itself; of a bed and a table, even of the name or the noun.<sup>83</sup> And lest, perchance, this should

<sup>80</sup> On this point, as on many others, Plato's phraseology is very loose. Vid. Ast, Lex. Plat. s. v. *εἶδος* and *ἰδέα*. Richter de ideis Platonis makes a distinction between *ἰδέα* and *εἶδος*, which, however, cannot be shewn to be either expressly drawn or clearly maintained throughout. Even the distinction so expressly taken in the *Phædo*, p. 102, b., between *πᾶγμα* and notion, is far from being invariably observed in the loose language of Plato. Cf. *Crat.* p. 386, d.; *Phæd.* p. 99, e. He even employs the Aristotelian term *μορφή* for *ἰδέα*, without, however, attaching any particular importance to it. *Phæd.* p. 103, e.; 104, d.; de *Rep.* ii. p. 380, b. sq.

<sup>81</sup> De *Rep.* iii. p. 402, c.; v. p. 475; *Theæt.* p. 186, a.

<sup>82</sup> *Parm.* p. 128, e.; p. 130, e.; *Phæd.* p. 65, d.; p. 100, c.; de *Rep.* vii. p. 529, d.

<sup>83</sup> *Phileb.* p. 15, a.; p. 62, a.; de *Rep.* x. p. 596, a.; *Crat.* p. 389, d.; p. 390, e. In the passage of *Arist. Met.* xii. 3, διὸ δὲ οὐ κακῶς ὁ Πλάτων εἶφη ὅτι εἶδη ἐστὶν ὅποσα φύσει must be understood very largely to be taken in a Platonic sense. Vid. *Conv.* p. 210, e.; cf. 211, e.

be misunderstood to refer merely to the general character of genus and species,\*the individual soul is represented as an idea; <sup>84</sup> and what Socrates is, and what Simmias is, is distinguished from what is common to both.<sup>85</sup> What, however, is still more calculated to excite surprise, is the attribution of an essence even to the sensible and the inchoate, so that it is requisite to consider as an *Idea*, that which, to all appearance, is the most opposite to its nature. Thus an essence is attributed to a colour and a sound,<sup>86</sup> and prototypes are given to the different species of life,<sup>87</sup> and a permanence

<sup>84</sup> Theæt. p. 184, d. The correctness of my interpretation of this passage has been recently questioned by Ed. Müller, in his *Gesch. d. Theorie d. Kunst. b. d. Alten*, p. 249, etc. It is so much the habit of Plato to hint rather than detail his views, that there is scarcely a single passage in which his ideal theory is alluded to, that taken by itself is not ambiguous. But that Plato does consider the individual soul to be an *idea*, clearly follows from his regarding it as imperceptible, and consequently a non-sensible, and as νοητόν. De Leg. x. p. 898, d. ἡλίου μὲν πᾶς ἄνθρωπος σῶμα μὲν ὁρᾷ ψυχὴν δὲ οὐδεὶς· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλου σώματος οὐδενὸς οὔτε ζῶντος οὔτε ἀποθνήσκοντος τῶν ζώων, ἀλλὰ ἐλπίς πολλή τὸ παράπαν τὸ γένος ἡμῶν τοῦτο ἀναίσθητὸν πάσαις ταῖς τοῦ σώματος αἰσθήσεσι περιπεφυκέναι, νοητὸν δὲ εἶναι. It further follows, from the view that every single soul is immortal, an imperishable unity, which, however it may appear in its sensuous existence to be mixed up with much that is impure and foreign to its nature, is, nevertheless, in truth a being perfectly pure from all that so appears in the sense. De Rep. x. p. 611, a. sqq. Cf. Phæd. p. 76, d.; 79, e. where the idea of the individual soul is associated with those of the good and the beautiful; and it is said of it, that in the region of idea it enjoys an absolute existence in thought, and only becomes participant in incipency and change by being united by body.

<sup>85</sup> Phædo, p. 102, b. Cf. Crat. p. 386, d. My explanation of these passages is likewise objected to by Müller, without, however, touching upon the essential point of the question in hand. If the individual soul is an idea, it is self-evident that the same must be the case with the individual of man and beast. I rest my view, however, principally on the passage in the Soph. p. 263, a., where Theætetus is adduced as an instance of ὄνομα, which in every case indicates an *idea*, according to a passage hereafter to be cited. Even Aristotle, Met. i. 9; xiii. 5, admits of an idea of Socrates in a Platonic sense.

<sup>86</sup> Crat. p. 423, e.

<sup>87</sup> De Rep. x. p. 617, d.; 618, a.

of essence is ascribed, not merely to things, but also to their actions and activities.<sup>88</sup> This is, however, perfectly consistent with the comprehensive and searching character of Plato's mind, which would not allow of science being limited to any close and narrow domain, or of aught being excluded from the sphere of right knowledge. This extensive view of science is exhibited in a manner truly philosophical, in the reproof which the young Socrates is made to receive from Parmenides, for evincing a disinclination to recognise, as possible, the reality of the ideas of man, fire, water, nay, even of hair, and of clay, and other equally mean and paltry objects; for Parmenides observes, it is unbecoming a true philosopher to defer to the opinion of the many, and to consider any object as wholly despicable.<sup>89</sup> In another sense, the Platonic acceptation of Idea is still more extensive, for among the ideas after which the sensible world was formed, he even reckons the tribes of mortal

<sup>88</sup> Crat. p. 386, d. *δηλον δὲ ὅτι αὐτὰ αὐτῶν οὐσίαν ἔχοντά τινα βέβαιον ἐστὶ τὰ πράγματα, οὐ πρὸς ἡμᾶς ὄντα οὐδὲ ὑφ' ἡμῶν ἐλκόμενα ἄνω καὶ κάτω τῷ ἡμετέρῳ φαντάσματι, ἀλλὰ καὶ καθ' αὐτὰ πρὸς τὴν αὐτῶν οὐσίαν ἔχοντα ἡπερ πέφυκε. Δοκεῖ μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτως ἔχειν. Πότερον οὖν αὐτὰ μὲν ἂν εἴη οὕτω πεφυκότα, αἱ δὲ πράξεις αὐτῶν οὐ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον; ἢ καὶ αὗται ἐν τι εἶδος τῶν ὄντων εἰσὶν, αἱ πράξεις; Πάνυ γε καὶ αὗται. It is only the flux, which is still inchoate and proceeding, and not as yet attained to any special interruption, and thereby assumed a determinate and conceivable form, that is without ideas. Hence it is, that while ideas are attributed to sensations and their respective elements, that of smell is excepted. Tim. p. 66, d. *περὶ δὲ δὴ τὴν τῶν μυκτήρων δύναμιν εἶδη μὲν οὐκ ἐνι. τὸ γὰρ τῶν ὁσμῶν πᾶν ἡμιγενές, εἶδει δὲ οὐδενὶ ζυμβέβηκε ζυμμετρία πρὸς τό τινα σχεῖν ὁσμὴν.* This leads the way for Aristotle's distinction between *ἐνέργεια* and *κίνησις*.*

<sup>89</sup> Parm. p. 130, c. sq. *νέος γὰρ εἰ ἔτι, φάναι τὸν Παρμενίδην, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ οὐ πῶ σου ἀντειληπται φιλοσοφία, ὥς ἔτι ἀντειλήψεται κατ' ἐμὴν δόξαν, ὅτε οὐδὲν αὐτῶν ἀτιμάσεις· νῦν δὲ ἔτι πρὸς ἀνθρώπων ἀποβλέπεις δόξας διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν.*

creatures,<sup>90</sup> which, however, to his mind, indicate nothing more than different grades in the development of one and the same living essence, since the soul, in its migration, passes from one to the other.<sup>91</sup> Hence we may clearly infer, that the Ideas may indicate certain natural grades of development—and not merely the essence of things which, in every possible relation, invariably remains identical with itself. We have, however, from Plato himself, as general a determination of the province of Ideas as could be desired; for he expressly declares, that an Idea may be attributed to whatever, as a plurality may be indicated by the same name.<sup>92</sup> It must be manifest to all whose notions of the theory are tolerably clear and precise, that this expression cannot be understood as exclusively referring to species and genera, which, in the individual, appear as the manifold, but also to such individuals as, expressed by one common name, exhibit themselves in many phenomena.<sup>93</sup> Furthermore, it could not escape Plato's observation,

<sup>90</sup> Tim. p. 41, b.

<sup>91</sup> The passages which support our view will be adduced in another place, where the theory of ideas will be considered more at large.

<sup>92</sup> De Rep. x. p. 596, a. *εἶδος γάρ πού τι ἐν ἑκαστῷ εἰσάμεν τίθεσθαι περὶ ἕκαστα τὰ πολλὰ, οἷς ταῦτ' ὄνομα ἐπιφέρομεν.*

<sup>93</sup> Theæt. p. 157, a. sq., where the doctrine of Protagoras is contrasted with the theory of ideas. *τὸ δ' οὐ δεῖ, ὥς ὁ τῶν σοφῶν λόγος, οὔτε τι ξυγχωρεῖν οὔτε του οὔτ' ἐμοῦ οὔτε τῷδε οὔτ' ἐκείνου, οὔτε ἄλλο οὐδὲν ὄνομα ὃ τι ἂν ἴσθῃ, ἀλλὰ κατὰ φύσιν φθέγγεσθαι γιννόμενα καὶ ἀπολύμενα καὶ ἀλλοιούμενα· ὥς ἂν τί τις στήσῃ τῷ λόγῳ, εὐέλεγκτος ὁ τοῦτο ποιῶν. δεῖ δὲ καὶ κατὰ μέρος οὕτω λέγειν καὶ περὶ πολλῶν ἀθροισθέντων, ᾧ δὴ ἀθροίσματι ἀνθρωπὸν τε τίθενται καὶ λίθον καὶ ἕκαστον ζῶόν τε καὶ εἶδος.* Cf. the expression in Tim. p. 49, d., and the passage of Theæt. p. 166, c., where Protagoras defends his own views by arguing that there cannot be an individual of the one, only of the many. Therefore a permanent essence is attributed to things even. Crat. p. 386, a.

that every property, every condition, and every relation of things, expressed by a term, can be valid of many; and, finally, that even the variable activities, as also generation or becoming, can be expressed by a noun, and combined with many verbs; so that, in fact, it must be admitted, that according to him there is nothing which does not participate in Ideas, or may not be comprehended in an Idea.<sup>94</sup>

<sup>94</sup> As my explanation of what Plato understood by Idea differs materially from the opinion generally entertained of the ideal theory, I was well prepared for its being the subject of many objections. In those, however, which have as yet reached me, there is not much weight. The difficulty, most frequently felt, arises from the usual view which regards the ideas as universal in their nature. On this point Plato's expressions are very clear. See Theæt. p. 185, sq. But what his notion of a universal was, is not so clear. The common opinion of the individual is not usually regarded as general, and Plato is erroneously made to share in this opinion. According to the passages adduced in Notes, 84, 85, 88, and 93, there are ideas of individuals, and even of their faculties and parts: if, therefore, they can be notionally distinguished without violating the true members (Polit. p. 263, b.; Phæd. p. 263, e.), it is naturally assumed that individual things, and also the parts of their life, are grounds of different phenomena, and, therefore, relatively to these, are universals. Plato's most usual formula for the universal is *ἐν καὶ πολλά*. Soph. p. 251; Parm. 129; Phil. p. 16, c. p. 17, d.; Phædr. p. 266, b. Aristotle, in the Met. i. 9; xiii. 4, employs *ἐν ἐπὶ πολλῶν* as the formula for it, according to the Platonic theory. Conf. Anal. Post. i. 11. Now as an *ἐν καὶ πολλά*, Socrates, in the above cited passage of the Parmenides, adduces his ego, and this holds, of all notions, since the *ἐν καὶ πολλά* is nothing more than the subject of which many predicates may be asserted, or which appears as manifold. De Rep. v. p. 476, a. Another difficulty, in the way of a right understanding of the ideal theory, is the manner in which Plato considers the ideas as *παράδειγματα*, after which God formed the universe. Now, it is urged, among these it is impossible to reckon the ideas of un-Virtue and others, *e. g.*, of a table. Nevertheless they are expressly enumerated by Plato as ideas. To remove this difficulty, it is necessary to assume a point which will be established hereafter in a more appropriate place. Plato appears to have perceived this difficulty, and to have attempted to get rid of it, by distinguishing two species of *παράδειγματα*, the *κατὰ ταῦτ' ἔχον*, and the *γεγονός* or *γεννητὸν παράδειγμα*, (Tim. p. 28,) with which must be compared the *θεῖον* and *ἄθεον παράδειγμα* (in Theæt. p. 176, e. Cf. Euthyph. p. 6, e., where there is a similar phraseology). It is only after the eternal type that God forms the universe, whereas the *ζῶον θνητὸν* and the *εἶδος ψυχῆς θνητὸν*,

Now, that the term idea should have been used by Plato in this wide and general sense, will surprise no one who has considered, however slightly, the basis on which his whole ideal theory rests. This, indeed, is the idea of science, for the reality of which that of the Ideas is indispensable.<sup>95</sup> If, then, Plato maintained that there must necessarily be ideas to exhibit the unalterable and eternal truth of the objects of every science, in order that the science itself should be possible, he was constrained to find ideas wherever there is a true essence, and scientific investigation is possible. But what was there to which, in Plato's opinion, scientific inquiry might not attach itself, or in which some truth might not be found? For, consistently with the comprehensive view he entertained of science, he must have clearly seen, that there is a truth to be discovered, even in individuals, even in the qualities and properties of things, and in all that comes into being, and that consequently an idea must be found for them all. We must, therefore, dismiss all narrow views of the Platonic *Ideæ*, and understand by them whatever exhibits an eternal truth,—a persistent

Tim. p. 69, e., which are formed by the created gods, are copies of the *γεννητὸν παρὰδειγμα*. This, however, is nothing more than an expedient, to which Plato has recourse, in order to represent imperfection and evil as not the immediate effects of the divine agency, although he is unable to deny that ultimately all must be referred to God as its source. For these created gods are in their operations dependent on the universal prototype, which contains in itself the *ζῶα θνητὰ*, and whatever they form is according to the intelligence imparted to them by God, since he assuredly would not withhold the knowledge, which he imparts to souls, from those to whom he makes known the laws of fate and the nature of All. Tim. p. 41, e.

<sup>95</sup> Parm. p. 135, c.; Phæd. p. 95, e. — 102, a.; Tim. p. 51, d. *εἰ μὲν νοῦς καὶ δόξα ἀληθὲς ἔστων δύο γένη, παντάπασιν εἶναι καθ' αὐτὰ ταῦτα, ἀναίσθητα ὑφ' ἡμῶν εἶδη, νοουμένα μόνον, κ. τ. λ.*

something which forms the basis of the mutability of the sensible. As the ideal theory was the conjoint result of the controversy against the sensuous presentation, as interpreted by the Sophists, and against the denial of all distinction to which the Eleatic theory manifestly tended, there were two points, principally, which it was of importance to it to establish clearly and firmly,—first, that the sensible is not the true, but that science alone, which teaches that there is an unchangeable truth, can adequately express the unchangeable essence of things; and, secondly, that truth, or the real and true being, is not so indistinguishably one and identical but that it comprises a multitude of separate notions every one of which expresses in a manner peculiar to itself, the eternal essence of things, and although it constitutes in itself a true unity, nevertheless, in reference to others, appears as a multiplicity.<sup>96</sup>

But there is yet a third point which is immediately implied in the Ideal theory, that, *viz.*, the true and the real is exhibited in general notions as elements of science, which are so related to each other that every higher notion embraces and combines under it several lower; consequently, that the elements of truth cannot be so separated from each other as not to be nevertheless held together by some higher bond. Now, as Plato maintained this coherency of ideas to be indispensable to science, he naturally proceeded to shew that all those theories are subversive of it, which consider any special truth to exist absolutely in and of itself. This connexion

<sup>96</sup> De Rep. v. p. 475, e.



of the individual essences he supposed to be similar to that by which individual ideas are comprehended under the more general; which in his mind is a true and real connexion, and not merely conceptual. Here, then, we have the reality of the general, expressly asserted, which however is not a mere abstract generality, but one in which the special and the individual are comprised. That this must possess a verity, and consequently reality, needs not, according to Plato, any other voucher than the truth and reality of science, of which the general is the constituent.

If, then, the lower ideas are held together by the higher, the question arises, whether there is not ultimately a supreme idea, which comprises all the subordinate, and consequently exhibits in itself the sum and harmony of all? That in the spirit of Plato this question ought to be affirmatively answered admits not of doubt, so soon as we call to mind the manner in which he insists upon the unity and coherence of science in all its parts. This is clearly confirmed by the opinion he advanced that, inasmuch as all nature is intimately related, any one starting from a single idea may eventually discover all, if he be but a bold and unwearied inquirer.<sup>97</sup> But that inquiry necessarily leads on from one idea to another, implies also that a single idea cannot independently and by itself afford complete satisfaction to the inquiring mind until it is fully understood in its

<sup>97</sup> Meno, p. 81, c. ὅτι γὰρ τῆς φύσεως ἀπάσης συγγενοῦς οὐσης, — οὐδὲν κωλύει ἐν μόνον ἀναμνησθέντα, ὃ δὴ μάθησιν καλοῦσιν ἄνθρωποι, τὰλλα πάντα αὐτὸν ἀνευρεῖν, εἰάν τις ἀνδρεῖος ᾗ καὶ μὴ ἀποκάμνη ζητῶν.

relation to, and dependence upon, the whole system. Upon this account Plato regards individual ideas as hypothetical notions, for which a true ground can only be given by a higher hypothesis; *i. e.*, an idea which does not require to be explained and confirmed by some higher supposition or idea.<sup>98</sup> Now that this mental satisfaction is, in fact, the beginning of all knowledge and being, is clear from a passage in which dialectic is said to make use of the assumed notions, not as first principles, but actually as mere assumptions, as so many grades and progressions in order to arrive at the unassumed—the principle of all things, but which, when it has once seized upon it, returns to insist upon the tenableness of that which is dependent thereon, and in this manner it only employs ideas in order to proceed from one idea to another.<sup>99</sup> Accordingly it can-

<sup>98</sup> Phæd. p. 100, a. s. Ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐκείνης (sc. τῆς ὑποθέσεως) αὐτῆς δεοί σε διδόναι λόγον, ὡσαύτως ἀν διδοίης, ἄλλην αὖ ὑπόθεσιν ὑποθέμενος, ἥτις τῶν ἀνωθεν βελτίστη φαίνοιο, ὥς ἐπὶ τι ἵκανον ἔλθοις. What we ought to understand by ἵκανον is plain from the Phileb. p. 20, d., Τί δὲ; ἵκανόν τάγαθόν; Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; καὶ πάντων γε εἰς τοῦτο διαφέρει τῶν ὄντων.

<sup>99</sup> De Rep. vi. p. 511, b. Τὸ τοίνυν ἔτερον μάθανε ἑμῆμα τοῦ νοητοῦ λέγοντά με τοῦτο, οὐ αὐτὸς ὁ λόγος ἄπτεται τῇ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δυνάμει, τὰς ὑποθέσεις ποιούμενος οὐκ ἀρχάς, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι ὑποθέσεις, οἷον ἐπιβάσεις τε καὶ ὁρμάς, ἵνα μέχρι τοῦ ἀνυποθέτου ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ἀρχὴν ἰὼν, ἀψάμενος αὐτῆς, πάλιν αὖ ἐχόμενος τῶν ἐκείνης ἐχομένων, οὕτως ἐπὶ τελευτῇ καταβαίῃ αἰσθητῷ παντάπασιν οὐδενὶ προσχωρῶμενος, ἀλλ' εἶδεναι αὐτοῖς δι' αὐτῶν εἰς αὐτά, καὶ τελευτᾷ εἰς εἶδη. I must, in candour, acknowledge that Schleiermacher understands this passage very differently. He sees in it an allusion to Homer and the Pythagoreans, although in fact its only object is to explain the difference between mathematics, as conversant indeed about ideas, but as taking them for granted without deducing them from their ground and source, and dialectic, which only employs ideas grounded and established by other ideas. The parallel passage already quoted from the Phædo, seems to me to place the matter in the very clearest light. The passage de Rep. vi. p. 510, c. sq., also amounts to the same. The same distinction is also taken by Aristotle, Met. vi. i. p. 121, 19, Brandis.

not be doubted that he wished, through the cognition of the lower ideas, to rise to a knowledge of the highest, which represents the principles of all things,—the idea of God, in order thereby to establish the truth and reality of the lower. In opposition therefore to the system of Protagoras, he makes God, instead of man, the measure of all things.<sup>100</sup> If, now, we bear in mind that with Plato the knowledge of the good is the highest possession, indeed the only true knowledge, since without it all knowledge is worthless, and also that he delighted in painting God as the good, we cannot fail to recognise the same thought in the passage where the idea of good is called the ultimate limit of all knowledge.<sup>101</sup> Therefore God embraces the beginning, the middle, and the end of all things,<sup>102</sup> and therefore, lastly, the universe is not merely a type of the ideas, but also a type and a resemblance of God; <sup>103</sup> for this reason, namely, that the idea of God comprises all others. \* Accordingly, we cannot hesitate to affirm that with Plato the idea of God was the supreme idea, which, as the highest, both is and contains in itself all others, and that consequently God is the unity which in itself comprises the true essence of all things.

<sup>100</sup> De Leg. iv. p. 716, c. 'Ο δὲ θεὸς ἡμῖν πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἀνείη μάλιστα.

<sup>101</sup> De Rep. vii. p. 517, b. 'Ἐν τῷ γνωστῷ τελευταία ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα.

<sup>102</sup> De Leg. iv. p. 715, e.

<sup>103</sup> Tim. Fin. "Ὅδε δὲ κόσμος—εἰκὼν τοῦ νοητοῦ θεοῦ (Steph. θεοῦ) αἰσθητός. Ibid. p. 29, c. 'Ἀγαθὸς ἦν, ἀγαθῷ δὲ οὐδεὶς περὶ οὐδενὸς οὐδεποτε ἐγγίγνεται φθόνος· τούτου δ' ἐκτὸς ὧν πάντα ὅτι μάλιστα γενέσθαι ἐβουλήθη παραπλήσια· ἑαυτῷ. De Rep. vi. p. 508, b. Of the sun, as the representative of the sensible world, is said : ὃν τάγαυθὸν ἐγέννησεν ἀνάλογον ἑαυτῷ.

Now, viewing the idea of good in this light, he naturally considered it the original hypothesis, or rather fundamental notion of the self-conscious reason, since it indicates the true object of science, which is equally necessary with science itself. When, therefore, a proof of the existence of the Deity is required, it is with embarrassment, and as it were unwillingly, that Plato proceeds to the task, and observes that such a demonstration would be unnecessary, except for certain prejudices which are extensively diffused among mankind.<sup>104</sup> In the same spirit he asserts that man is secretly and insensibly led, by his affinity with the gods, to believe in their existence, and to honour them;<sup>105</sup> indeed, that which has been usually regarded in his dialogues as a proof that there is a God, consists in fact of nothing more than a refutation of false opinions, which are in direct contradiction to the true philosophical conviction.<sup>106</sup> This refutation rests upon two points; that the origin of things must not be looked for in the corporeal but in the intellectual; and that the power which actuates and governs the universe reduces all to perfection and harmony, and in conformity to ideas of order and beauty.<sup>107</sup> In support of the first, he appeals

<sup>104</sup> *De Leg.* x. p. 887, c.; p. 891, b. That Plato should here speak of gods, and not of a god, is easily accounted for by the popular character of the investigation. Similarly Socrates in *Xenophon*.

<sup>105</sup> *Ibid.* x. p. 899, d.

<sup>106</sup> Tennemann, *Gesc. d. Phil.* p. 381, thinks, that according to *de Leg.* x. p. 887, b., Plato only ascribes probability to his arguments on this head. His opinion is in part correct: for Plato asserted that scientific Atheism rested on a perversity of sentiment which was ~~more~~ likely to be moved by reasoning. To this perverted sentiment refers also *Soph.* p. 246, d.

<sup>107</sup> *De Leg.* xii. p. 966, d. sq.

to the idea or the essence of soul, which alone has a faculty of self-movement; <sup>108</sup> whereas the bodily is without this power, and cannot, except when impelled by some other body, set another in motion. For whatever has this property of self-impulsion, must necessarily be the source of motion; whereas that, which requires something else to set it in motion, must derive its motion from the self-impelling. <sup>109</sup> On this account, those who look to the material and bodily for the causes of whatever is effected, are unable to distinguish the true first cause from the secondary causes or the means. <sup>110</sup>

But in the philosopher, who trusts to the reason alone, it is certainly an incongruous thing to suppose that all had its origin in matter and chance, for, in support of his own dignity, he ought to maintain the supremacy and unlimited power of reason, and to derive all things from the operation of a divine and intellectual cause. <sup>111</sup> This undoubtedly was, in Plato's mind, the strongest and most important of all his arguments; for whatever he advances against such as deny and deride the doctrine of a Deity, grows immediately out of it. All in the world is for the sake of the rest, and the place of the single parts are so ordered as to subserve to the preservation and excellence of the whole. <sup>112</sup> Now the entire world of things, sensible and bodily, is generate and produced, and consequently must have a source and cause of its

<sup>108</sup> Ibid. x. p. 895, e.; Phæd. 245, c.

<sup>109</sup> De Leg. x. p. 896, a.; Phædr. l. 1.

<sup>110</sup> Phæd. p. 99, b.

<sup>111</sup> Soph. p. 248, sq.; Phileb. p. 28, c.; cf. Prot. p. 352, a sq.

<sup>112</sup> De Leg. x. p. 903, b.

production.<sup>113</sup> But since the corporeal cannot be produced out of itself, but has its motion from the intellectual, it is only the spiritual that can be regarded as the formative cause. This may, however, be of two kinds, either beneficent or malevolent, according as the motion of the universe be, or not, regulated by reason. But the difference between the rational and irrational, is that the latter, by not invariably moving in the same direction, but continually changing, reduces all to disorder, and by confusing all things, brings about destruction and decay ; whereas the rational, looking to the invariably constant and uniform, which is immortal and indissoluble, forms all things in agreement with an unalterable type. If, then, an irrational spirit should attempt to regulate productions, then would all move without order, and nothing be permanent ; if, on the contrary, a rational spirit regulate all the motions of the universe, all will proceed aright, motion and order will be constant and invariable, and agreeably to the incorruptible pattern of beauty. Now the latter is the case, the universe being the perfection of beauty, and the stars revolving in orderly motions, and regular orbits ; therefore no rational man can come to any other conclusion than that an intelligent spirit, a sovereign reason, moves and regulates the universe.<sup>114</sup>

<sup>113</sup> Tim. p. 28, b.

<sup>114</sup> De Leg. x. p. 896, e. sq. ; Tim. p. 28, b., where the *γεννητὸν παράδειγμα*, as opposed to the *παράδειγμα κατὰ ταῦτά καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχον*, is the type of unreason, or the irrational. Here reciprocally the goodness of the first cause is inferred from its beauty, and its beauty from the goodness of the cause. Cf. Polit. p. 269, a. sq. Of like nature is the argument which, in the

God, then, being the supreme object of science, and the sum of ideas, is, in reference to the universe, the pattern after whom all is fashioned, and to whom all mundane things tend. He may, therefore, in this respect be represented by those conceptions which indicate the ideal of human efforts, for which purpose the beautiful and good (for the most part considered as equivalent or as intimately allied) are usually employed by Plato: In this light, human life appears as a pursuit or desire of what is agreeable to the soul (*οἰκεῖον*), or of what is good;<sup>115</sup> and this desire or love is the bond which unites the mortal nature with the divine;<sup>116</sup> or rather, to speak more accurately, there are two species of desire and love, of which one proceeds from the unlike to unlike, from that which is needy and empty, to that which satisfies and fills, in which case the gratification produces sensual pleasure; the other is directed from like to like, and being ever in due measure, tends to the good and the godlike, the true measure of all things.<sup>117</sup> The

Phileb. p. 26, d. sq., is drawn from the necessity of a cause of the coherency of the limit, and the limited in things; for the limit is the regulating measure, but the limited is the ordered mass of the corporeal, and both are, in individual things, derived from and subordinate to the whole.

<sup>115</sup> Lys. p. 221, e.; Conv. p. 205, e. οὐ γὰρ τὸ ἐαυτῶν, οἶμαι, ἕκαστοι ἀσπάζονται, εἰ μὴ εἰ τις τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν οἰκεῖον καλεῖ καὶ ἐαυτοῦ, τὸ δὲ κακὸν ἀλλότριον· ὥς οὐδὲν γε ἄλλο ἐστίν, οὗ ἑρῶσιν ἄνθρωποι, ἢ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. De Rep. ix. p. 586, e.

<sup>116</sup> Conv. p. 202.

<sup>117</sup> De Leg. viii. p. 837, a. φίλον μὲν πού καλοῦμεν ὅμοιον ὁμοίῳ κατ' ἀρετὴν καὶ ἴσον ἴσῳ, φίλον δ' αὖ καὶ τὸ δεόμενον τοῦ πεπλουτηκότος, ἐναντίον δὲ τῷ γένει. ὅταν δὲ ἐκάτερον γίγνηται σφοδρόν, ἔρωτα ἐπονομάζομεν. Ὁρθῶς. Φιλία τοίνυν ἢ μὲν ἀπὸ ἐναντίων δεινῇ καὶ ἀγρία καὶ τὸ κοινὸν οὐ πολλάκις ἔχουσα ἐν ἡμῖν, ἢ δ' ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων ἡμέρος τε καὶ κοινὴ διὰ βίου. Ibid. iv. p. 716, d. τίς οὖν δὴ πρᾶξις φίλη καὶ ἀκολούθος θεῶ; μία καὶ ἓνα λόγον ἔχουσα ἀρχαῖον, ὅτι τῷ μὲν ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὅμοιον ὄντι μετρίῳ

first is not truly love, but merely a sensual longing, whose only object is the pleasure of the lover; Plato, therefore, terms it *love sinister*; <sup>118</sup> the latter, on the contrary, invariably seeks and tends to produce the beautiful and the good in the soul of the lover, and thereby operates in it a true immortality; for the mortal can only maintain itself by a continual renovation, and this is impossible, except by means of the befitting, which is the beautiful alone. <sup>119</sup> Accordingly, the resemblance of the desired object is a part of love, <sup>120</sup> and every true love is closely allied with the resemblance to the ideal; <sup>121</sup> its proper aliment is the contemplation of the beautiful; for beauty is the brightest copy of whatever in the world of ideas we formerly contemplated, such as it appears to us through the clearest of our senses, the sight, in order that, reminded of earlier wisdom and incorrupt existence, we may, by the contemplation of it, call to mind the thoughts of absolute beauty, of which we here behold a likenamed copy. <sup>122</sup> God, therefore, is the

φίλον ἂν εἴη, τὰ δ' ἄμετρα οὐτ' ἀλλήλοις, οὔτε τοῖς ἐμμέτροις· ὁ δὲ θεὸς ἡμῖν πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἂν εἴη μάλιστα. Phileb. p. 64, e.

<sup>118</sup> Phædr. p. 266, a.; cf. ibid. p. 240, e. sq.; de Rep. iii. p. 403, a.

<sup>119</sup> Conv. p. 206, a. ἔστιν ἄρα ξυλλήβδην, ἔφη, ὁ ἔρως τοῦ τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτῷ εἶναι ἀεί· — καὶ τοῦτο ἐν θνητῷ ἔστι τῷ ζῶντι ἀθάνατον ἐνεσθαι, ἢ κύησις καὶ ἡ γέννησις. ταῦτα δ' ἐν τῷ ἀναρμόστῳ ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι· ἀναρμόστον δ' ἐστὶ τὸ αἰσχροὺς παντὶ τῷ θεῷ, τὸ δὲ καλὸν ἀρμόττον.

<sup>120</sup> Phileb. p. 35, d. Τὴν ἄρ' ἐπάγουσαν ἐπὶ τὰ ἐπιθυμούμενα ἀποδείξας μνήμην ὁ λόγος ψυχῆς ἐξυμπασαν τὴν τε δορμὴν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ ζώου παντὸς ἀπέφημεν.

<sup>121</sup> Phædr. p. 249, d. s.

<sup>122</sup> Ibid. p. 250, c. περὶ δὲ κάλλους, ὥσπερ εἶπομεν, μετ' ἐκείνων τε ἔλαμπεν ἰόν, δευρὸ τε ἐλθόντες κατελήφμεν αὐτοὺς διὰ τῆς ἐναργεστάτης αἰσθήσεως τῶν ἡμετέρων στίλβον ἐναργέστατα. ὅψις γὰρ ἡμῖν δευράτη τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἔρχεται αἰσθήσεων, ἣ φρόνησις οὐχ ὁράται· δεινὸς γὰρ ἂν παρῆχεν ἔρωτας, εἴ τι τοιοῦτον αὐτῆς ἐναργὲς εἰδῶλον παρῆχετο



really beautiful and good, in short, the true aim and pattern, by striving after which the mortal may participate in the beautiful and the real, and so become good.<sup>123</sup>

In the same manner as the idea of good represents the objects of desire generally which the human mind strives to obtain,<sup>124</sup> the idea of good usually stands for God; God alone is good, all that is permitted to human nature is to become good.<sup>125</sup> For absolutely the Deity alone is invariably the same.<sup>126</sup> And however clearly this unchangeableness of the divine nature may follow from the view which regards him as the object of pure science, and as the sum of ideas, nevertheless Plato gives a special proof of it drawn from the idea of good. The more beautiful and perfect anything is, the less liable is it to be changed by another; and God, as the best and most beautiful absolutely, cannot absolutely be changed by aught else. Still less can he be changed by himself, for being perfect in goodness and beauty, he could only transform himself into something worse and more ugly; and since nothing good voluntarily becomes worse, he consequently must remain for ever simply in his own form.<sup>127</sup> Since, then, the good is not in

εις ὅψιν ἰόν, καὶ τὰλλα ὅσα ἐραστά. νῦν δὲ κάλλος μόνον ταύτην ἔσχε μοῖραν, ὥστ' ἐκφανέστατον εἶναι καὶ ἐρασμιώτατον· ὁ μὲν οὖν μὴ νεοτελῆς ἢ δειφθαρμένος οὐκ ὀξέως ἐνθὲνδε ἐκείσε φέρεται πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ κάλλος, θεώμενος αὐτοῦ τὴν τῆδε ἐπωνυμίαν.

<sup>123</sup> Ibid. p. 246, d. τὸ δὲ θεῖον καλόν, σόφον, ἀγαθόν καὶ πᾶν ὃ τι τοιοῦτο.

<sup>125</sup> Prot. p. 344, c.

<sup>124</sup> Conv. p. 206, e. sq.

<sup>126</sup> Conv. p. 208, a.

<sup>127</sup> De Rep. ii. p. 380, d. sq. πᾶν δὴ τὸ καλῶς ἔχον ἢ φύσει ἢ τέχνῃ ἢ ἀμφοτέροις ἐλαχίστην μεταβολὴν ὑπ' ἄλλου ἐνδέχεται. "Βοικεν. Ἀλλὰ

production, therefore the pleasure or pain which arises from the preservation or destruction of animal life are alien from the Deity.<sup>128</sup> But nevertheless, even without pleasure and pain, the divine nature is eternally blissful, since it ever participates in good.<sup>129</sup> It is unnecessary here to detail at length the grounds on which Plato proves that all sensuous conditions of space and time are inapplicable to the Deity;<sup>130</sup> which, however, is a necessary consequence of his views of the ideal world. There are many other negative determinations of the divine nature which result from this idea, and are presented in the course of his controversy against all humanizing conceptions of the Deity. It is this which constitutes the essential point in his attack upon the poets, especially Homer and the Epic writers; for he clearly saw that their poems had at least nurtured and fostered the polytheistic conception of the human sentiments and actions of the gods. In all this Plato did but continue the war which earlier philosophy had declared and waged against poetry. He insists that man ought

*μὴν ὁ θεός τε καὶ τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ πάντα ἄριστα ἔχει. Πῶς δ' οὐ; Ταύτη μὲν δὴ ἤκιστα ἀν πολλὰς μορφὰς ἴσχοι ὁ θεός. "Ἡκιστα δὴτα. 'Αλλ' αὐτὸς αὐτὸν μεταβάλλει ἀν καὶ ἄλλοιοι; Δῆλον, ἔφη, ὅτι, εἴπερ ἄλλοιοῦται. Πότερον οὖν ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον τε καὶ κάλλιον μεταβάλλει ἑαυτὸν ἢ ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον καὶ τὸ αἰσχίον ἑαυτοῦ; 'Ανάγκη, ἔφη, ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον, εἴπερ ἄλλοιοῦται· οὐ γάρ που ἐνδεᾶ γε φήσομεν τὸν θεὸν κάλλους ἢ ἀρετῆς εἶναι. 'Ορθότατα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λέγεις· καὶ οὕτως ἔχοντος δοκεῖ ἂν τίς σοι ἐκὼν αὐτὸν χεῖρον ποιεῖν ὁπποῦν θεῶν ἢ ἀνθρώπων; 'Αδύνατον, ἔφη. 'Αδύνατον ἄρα, ἔφην, καὶ θεῷ ἐθέλειν αὐτὸν ἄλλοιοῦν, ἀλλ' ὥς ἔοικε, κάλλιστος καὶ ἄριστος ὢν εἰς τὸ δυνατόν ἕκαστος αὐτῶν μένει ἀεὶ ἀπλῶς ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ μορφῇ.*

<sup>128</sup> Phileb. p. 32, e. sq.

<sup>129</sup> Theæt. p. 176, d. sq.

<sup>130</sup> Tim. p. 37, e.; 52, a. sq.

not to form any conception of God except as purely good, inexorable to the prayers or offerings of the unrighteous,<sup>131</sup> having no portion with evil, nor indeed being the cause of evil,<sup>132</sup> for God is without envy;<sup>133</sup> and since he is omniscient and omnipotent,<sup>134</sup> he wills good to all so far as each is capable of receiving it, and provides for all things alike, the great and the little, without which the great cannot be.<sup>135</sup> Thus uniting in himself all wisdom and all virtue, God is reason, not human reason, for that is not good, but the true and divine.<sup>136</sup> Since, however, reason and wisdom cannot exist without a spirit, a sovereign soul and a sovereign reason belong to the divine nature.<sup>137</sup> In the consideration of these and similar expressions there is much need of caution, lest we fall into the error of supposing the divine soul, which is merely intended to indicate the living energy of God, to be of like nature with the human.

In a dialectical point of view it is, however,

<sup>131</sup> De Leg. x. p. 905, d. s.

<sup>132</sup> De Rep. ii. p. 379; x. p. 617, e.

<sup>133</sup> Phædr. p. 247, a.; Tim. p. 29, d.

<sup>134</sup> Tim. p. 68, d.

<sup>135</sup> De Leg. x. p. 900, c. sq. ἀλλ' οὐδὲν τάχ' ἂν ἴσως εἴη χαλεπὸν ἐνδείξασθαι τοῦτό γε, ὥς ἐπιμελεῖς σμικρῶν εἰσὶ θεοὶ οὐχ ἥττον ἢ τῶν μεγέθει διαφερόντων. ἤκουε γάρ που καὶ παρῇν τοῖς νῦν δὴ λεγομένοις, ὥς ἀγαθοὶ γε ὄντες πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν τὴν τῶν πάντων ἐπιμέλειαν οἰκειωτάτην αὐτῶν οὖσαν ἐκτελῆνται. — οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄνευ σμικρῶν τοὺς μεγάλους φασὶν οἱ λιθολόγοι λίθους εὖ κείσθαι.

<sup>136</sup> Phileb. p. 22, a. sq.

<sup>137</sup> Ibid. p. 30, d. σοφία μὴν καὶ νοῦς ἄνευ ψυχῆς οὐκ ἂν ποτε γενοίσθην. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. Οὐκοῦν ἐν μὲν τῇ τοῦ Διὸς ἐρεῖς φύσει βασιλικὴν μὲν ψυχὴν, βασιλικὸν δὲ νοῦν ἐγγίγνεσθαι διὰ τὴν τῆς αἰτίας δύναμιν. That the energy of αἰτία should here be made superior to God, cannot, it is to be hoped, prove a difficulty to any one familiar with Plato's mode of exposition.

highly important to follow the determinations which Plato advances of the idea of good, or of God, in reference to science and the object of science. We have already seen that beauty, not the beauty of body, or of art, or science, but that which is superior to all these, as the source from which they derive their beauty, is with Plato the object of science and not of the sciences.<sup>138</sup> If, then, beauty be the object of science, it cannot be distinct from the true essence of all things, which he also makes its object. Viewed in this light, even the sciences have a beauty of their own, and if they are not called beauty itself, it is merely because they are not science itself, but merely have a part with science. In the spirit of Plato it would be perfectly justifiable to say that the one divine science has not merely for its object the beautiful and the essence, but is even beauty and being itself. Here, again, we have clearly asserted the unity of being and thought, which is the foundation of the ideal theory. Plato illustrates his views on this head by a beautiful image :— in the same manner as the sun is the cause of sight, and the cause not merely that objects are visible, but that they grow and are produced, so the good is of such power and beauty that it is not merely the cause to the soul of science, but is also the source of being and reality to whatever is the object of science ; and as the sun is not itself sight, nor the object of sight, but presides over both, so the good is not science, and the truth or the essence, but is superior to both, which are not the

<sup>138</sup> Conv. p. 210, sq. ; de Rep. iii. p. 402, sq.

good itself, but merely of a goodly nature.<sup>139</sup> To the like effect is the position, that the idea of good is not merely the cause of sensible phenomena, but also of whatever is merely cognisable by the understanding alone, and that it is the source of all truth and reason.<sup>140</sup> This, then, is the ultimate basis of the Platonic system, that truth or being, which indicate the object of science, and that science and reason, which are cognisant of truth and being, and, therefore, the knowing and the known, mutually correspond, because they are both united in the highest idea and the highest entity.

As, however, we invariably find the consideration of human insufficiency closely associated with this rigorous idea of science, it is natural to expect to meet with it in the present place, where he is treating of the highest object of science, which, properly, is not the object of science, but the unity, which is above both science and truth. On this point there is very great discrepancy in the expres-

<sup>139</sup> De Rep. vi. p. 506, e. sq. τοῦτο τοίνυν τὸ τὴν ἀλήθειαν παρέχον τοῖς γιγνώσκομένοις καὶ τῷ γινώσκοντι τὴν δύναμιν ἀποδιδόν τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέαν φάθι εἶναι, αἰτίαν δ' ἐπιστήμης οὖσαν καὶ ἀληθείας ὡς γιγνώσκομένης διανοοῦ, οὕτω δὲ καλῶν ἀμφοτέρων ὄντων, γνώσεως τε καὶ ἀληθείας, ἄλλο καὶ κάλλιον ἔτι τούτων ἡγούμενος αὐτὸ ὁρθῶς ἡγήσει· ἐπιστήμην δὲ καὶ ἀλήθειαν, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ φῶς τε καὶ ὄψιν ἡλιοειδῆ μὲν νομίζειν ὁρθόν, ἥλιον δὲ ἡγεῖσθαι οὐκ ὁρθῶς ἔχει, οὕτω καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἀγαθοειδῆ μὲν νομίζειν ταῦτ' ἀμφοτέρα ὁρθόν, ἀγαθὸν δὲ ἡγεῖσθαι ὀπότερον αὐτῶν οὐκ ὁρθόν. ἀλλ' ἔτι μείζονος τιμητέον τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἕξιν. — Καὶ τοῖς γιγνώσκομένοις τοίνυν μὴ μόνον τὸ γινώσκεισθαι φάναι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ παρῆναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ εἶναι τε καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ὑπ' ἐκείνου αὐτοῖς προσεῖναι, οὐκ οὐσίας ὄντος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἀλλ' ἔτι ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας πρεσβεία καὶ δυνάμει ὑπερέχοντος.

<sup>140</sup> Ibid. vii. p. 517, c. ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα — ἐν τε ὁρατῷ φῶς καὶ τὸν τούτου κύριον τεκοῦσα, ἐν τε νοητῷ αὐτῇ κυρία, ἀλήθειαν καὶ νοῦν παρασχομένη.

sions of Plato. At times it would seem as if he thought that the idea of the good, or God, is difficult indeed to contemplate, but, nevertheless, even though it cannot be revealed to all, not absolutely impossible<sup>141</sup>; at other times he merely appears to limit the difficulty to the inadequacy of the investigation in hand.<sup>142</sup> Nevertheless, there are, on the other hand, many passages, which broadly and distinctly assert that a perfect knowledge of truth is unattainable by mortals, and reasons are given for this opinion, which is advanced unconditionally, and without any reference to particular methods of inquiry, but as forming the principle and foundation of his philosophy. Thus he confesses that man cannot attain to a certainty, except, perhaps, after death,<sup>143</sup> and complains of his incompetency to receive truth, and his being, as it were, the mere plaything of God, in comparison with whom he is worthless and contemptible.<sup>144</sup> Again, speaking of the philosopher, he will not, in consequence of his human nature, concede to him more than an approximation to a knowledge of truth, or the Deity.<sup>145</sup> In the same spirit he represents the idea of good as only attainable by soothsaying;<sup>146</sup> meaning, perhaps, that its realisation lies yet in the deep future; for this interpretation is in accordance with his views of inspiration, which encroach far

<sup>141</sup> De Rep. i. l. *ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα — μόγις ὁρᾶσθαι, ὀφθεῖσα δὲ, κ. τ. λ.*  
Tim. p. 28, e. *τὸν μὲν οὖν ποιητὴν καὶ πατέρα τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς εὐρεῖν*  
*τε ἔργον καὶ εὐρόντα εἰς πάντας ἀδύνατον λέγειν.*

<sup>142</sup> De Rep. vi. p. 506, e.

<sup>143</sup> Phæd. p. 66, e.

<sup>144</sup> De Leg. vii. p. 803, c. sq.

<sup>145</sup> De Rep. vi. p. 484, c. *θεώμενοι ὡς οἶόν τε ἀκριβέστατα.*

<sup>146</sup> Phileb. p. 64, a. *τίνα ἰδέαν αὐτὴν εἶναι ποτε μαντευτόν.*

upon the domain of philosophy. Lastly, the most scientific expression in the Platonic dialogues for the idea of good, is that where it is painted as the unity, which is the source of truth and knowledge to all beings; which manifestly implies that the idea, as transcending truth or the knowable, can never be known fully and in its proper nature. Accordingly, there cannot be a doubt that Plato was clearly convinced that the idea of God is of such a kind, as, in its unity, can never be apprehended in complete scientific strictness. He therefore describes as hopeless the attempt of the philosopher, to comprise in one general term the idea of the good, since it immediately reveals itself in another; wherefore, as unable to embrace it in one, Plato exhibits it under three,—*viz.*, beauty, proportion, and truth.<sup>147</sup> This exposition of the idea of the good does not essentially differ from the one already noticed, and only gives to it a different relation to others. Both rest upon the doctrine, that the Deity cannot be known in himself, but only in some type<sup>148</sup> or manifestation, either truth or reason, beauty and proportion, or generally in all ideas considered absolutely, and whose cause is God. Accordingly, the nature of the Deity may be illustrated differently, and under different relations, whether ethical, as in the passage of the *Philebus*, or dialectical, as in the *Republic*. Ad-

<sup>147</sup> *Phileb.* p. 64, e. οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ μᾶλλον δυνάμεθα ἰδέσθαι το ἀγαθὸν θεωρεῖσθαι, σὺν τρισὶ λαβόντες, κάλλει καὶ ἑυμετρίᾳ καὶ ἀληθείᾳ, κ. τ. λ.

<sup>148</sup> *De Leg.* x. p. 897, d. μὴ τοίνυν ἐξ ἐναντίας οἷον εἰς ἥλιον ἀποβλέποντες νύκτα ἐν μεσημβρίᾳ ἐπαγόμενοι ποιησώμεθα τὴν ἀπόκρισιν, ὥς νοῦν ποτὲ θνητοῖς ὁμμασιν ὀψόμενοι τε καὶ γνωσόμενοι ἱκανῶς· πρὸς δὲ εἰκόνα τοῦ ἑρωτωμένου βλέποντες ἀσφαλέστερον ὁρᾶν.

mitting this to be the correct exposition of Plato's opinions, the only explanation that can be given of the passages, where the knowledge of God, in himself, is apparently assumed to be possible, to suppose them to refer only to a knowledge of God in his works,<sup>149</sup> or else to a divine, not a human knowledge;<sup>150</sup> or lastly, that they were intended to dispose of a subject inappropriate to the question in hand.

Thus, then, did the ideal theory gradually develop itself, exhibiting the invariable as the essence of all variable phenomena, and the essence, in all essences and ideas, as ultimately comprised in the one idea of good or God; and shewing, moreover, that God, simply as good, can have no part in incipency or becoming. To such a theory the difficulty must have been great to find some point in true being, to which the truth of becoming, or of the changeable things of the sensible world might attach itself. However, the reality of incipency and change in the soul is the hypothesis on which the whole system rests. In order, therefore, to place in as clear a light as possible this obscure point, which is, perhaps, the greatest difficulty in the Platonic theory, it is necessary to ascertain what, in general, he understood by the sensible world, and particularly in what manner he determined the relation of sensuous perception to the intellectual conception of the true. The Ideal theory had posited the plurality of being; for, as

<sup>149</sup> Thus, perhaps, de Rep. vii. p. 517, c.; and also Tim. p. 28, e.

<sup>150</sup> Thus I explain de Rep. vi. p. 506, only that here the idea of good is more strongly distinguished from Plato's opinion of it.



already shewn, one of its most essential problems was to shew that the idea of God, as the highest possible, is not destructive of multiplicity, but, on the contrary, comprehends it in itself. But now each single idea is to the sensible, in the same relation, as a comprehensive unity is to the phenomena comprehended by it, consequently, as a universal to a particular. For even those ideas which indicate individuals, soul, for instance, or man, comprise a collection of sensuous representations. On this account the sensible, as contrasted with the ideal, is called simply the manifold, (*τὰ πολλὰ, τὰ πολλὰ ἕχαστα*).<sup>151</sup> Now the sensible merely as the manifold may admit opposites, for although in virtue of itself the opposite cannot be its opposite, nevertheless a thing which in its nature is multiple, may very well admit of opposite determinations<sup>152</sup>. Connected herewith is the doctrine that ideas, as being ever one and identical, are indivisible, whereas the sensible, which is capable indeed of having a part in the idea, and consequently in the indivisible, is nevertheless as multiple a divisible.<sup>153</sup> Now, with Plato, this divisible is the corporeal, which is therefore invariably treated of in connexion with the sensible.<sup>154</sup> It is here of import-

<sup>151</sup> Parm. p. 129, a.; de Rep. vi. p. 493, e.

<sup>152</sup> Phæd. p. 103, b: τότε μὲν γὰρ ἐλέγετο, ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου πράγματος τὸ ἐναντίον πρᾶγμα γίνεσθαι· νῦν δέ, ὅτι αὐτὸ τὸ ἐναντίον ἑαυτῷ ἐναντίον οὐκ ἂν ποτε γένοιτο, οὔτε τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν, οὔτε τὸ ἐν τῇ φύσει. Here πρᾶγμα indicates the thing only in appearance. De Rep. x. p. 596, a.; vii. p. 524, c. μέγα μὲν καὶ ὄψις καὶ σμικρὸν ἑώρα, φαμέν, ἀλλ' οὐ κεχωρισμένον ἀλλὰ συγκεχυμένον τι.

<sup>153</sup> Tim. p. 35, a. τῆς ἀμερίστου καὶ ἀει κατὰ ταῦτα ἐχούσης οὐσίας καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς περὶ τὰ σώματα γιγνομένης μεριστῆς, τρίτον ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἐν μέσῳ ξυγκεράσατο οὐσίας-εἶδος. Cf. *ibid.* p. 37, a. sq.

<sup>154</sup> L. l.; Polit. p. 269, d.

ance to bear in mind, that the contempt for the corporeal, which we found so prevalent among the earlier philosophers, and in Socrates especially, was anything but alien to Plato. With the idea of the corporeal that of incipency is, in Plato, most intimately connected, for the nature of body can never remain identical with itself, or invariably maintain the same relations.<sup>155</sup> The sensible, therefore, is always in inchoation,—in motion. It is here that we are first able to perceive fully the necessity he was under of attempting to establish the reality of incipency or becoming, in order not to divest the sensible entirely of truth. For as the only object of his ideal theory was to insure the recognition of something eternally true in all perishable things, it was necessary to establish the truth of the incipient. On this account we find him connecting, in the phenomena of sensation, the ideas with actions and activities,<sup>156</sup> which, exhibited by the verb, indicate becoming.<sup>157</sup> Similarly there is perpetual change in the perishable, since incipency is the medium between opposites, and opposite can only produce opposite.<sup>158</sup> The perishable in maintaining itself suffers a perpetual loss, and in the effort to preserve itself, strives after incipency; so that it may be said of every living being, “it lives and is the same,” not because it is ever the same, but because losing the old it ever becomes new, not merely in the body, in the par-

<sup>155</sup> Polit. I. I. τὸ γὰρ κατὰ ταῦτα καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχειν δεῖ καὶ ταῦτόν εἶναι τοῖς πάντων θεοτάτοις προσήκει μόνοις, σώματος δὲ φύσις οὐ ταύτης τῆς τάξεως.

<sup>156</sup> De Rep. v. p. 476, a.

<sup>157</sup> Soph. p. 261, sq.

<sup>158</sup> Phæd. p. 70, d. sq.

ticles of which there is a constant decay and reproduction, but also in the soul, in which fear and hope, joy and grief, opinions and sentiments, are continually changing. Even the possession of science is not less fluctuating and unstable; at most we but possess it in an inchoate state, since science is often lost by forgetfulness, and recovered by recollection as a new acquisition.<sup>159</sup>

These are the most general determinations which Plato advances of the sensible. There are, however, many other modes of indicating it, which, although apparently they were only intended to exhibit particular aspects of the manifold phenomena of sense, are nevertheless of importance, as tending greatly to throw light upon his system. We have already seen that Plato saw nothing in the sensuous impression beyond the expression of a certain relation of one object to another; accordingly he distinguished that which is in and by itself from the sensible, as that which can only

<sup>159</sup> CONN. p. 207, d. ἐνταῦθα γὰρ τὸν αὐτὸν ἐκείνῳ λόγον ἢ θνητὴ φύσει ζητεῖ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν αἰετὲ εἶναι καὶ ἀθάνατος. δύναται δὲ ταύτῃ μόνον τῇ γενέσει, ὅτι αἰετὴ καταλείπει ἕτερον νέον ἀντὶ τοῦ παλαιοῦ, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐν ᾧ ἐν ἑκάστῳ τῶν ζώων ζῆν καλεῖται καὶ εἶναι τὸ αὐτό, οἷον ἐκ παιδαρίου ὃ αὐτὸς λέγεται ἕως ἂν πρεσβύτης γένηται· οὗτος μέντοι οὐδέποτε τὰ αὐτὰ ἔχων ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὅμως ὁξ αὐτὸς καλεῖται, ἀλλὰ νέος αἰετὴ γιγνόμενος, τὰ δὲ ἀπολλύς, καὶ κατὰ τὰς τρίχας καὶ σάρκα καὶ ὀστέα καὶ αἷμα καὶ ξύμπαν τὸ σῶμα. Καὶ μὴ ὅτι κατὰ τὸ σῶμα, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν οἱ τρόποι, τὰ ἡθῆ, δόξαι, ἐπιθυμίαι, ἡδοναί, λύπαι, φόβοι, τούτων ἑκάστα οὐδέποτε τὰ αὐτὰ πάρεστιν ἐκάστῳ, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν γίγνεται, τὰ δ' ἀπόλλυται. πολὺ δὲ τούτων ἀτοπώτερον ἐστὶ, ὅτι καὶ αἱ ἐπιστήμαι μὴ ὅτι αἱ μὲν γίγνονται, αἱ δὲ ἀπόλλυνται ἡμῖν, καὶ οὐδέποτε οἱ αὐτοὶ ἐσμεν οὐδὲ κατὰ τὰς ἐπιστήμας· — τούτῳ γὰρ τῷ τρόπῳ πᾶν τὸ θνητὸν σώζεται, οὐ τῷ παντάπασιν τὸ αὐτὸ αἰετὲ εἶναι, ὥσπερ τὸ θεῖον, ἀλλὰ τῷ τὸ ἀπὸ τῶν παλαιούμενων ἕτερον νέον ἐγκαταλείπειν οἷον αὐτὸ ἦν.

be conceived in some relation to another;<sup>160</sup> and since the particular relation in which the sensible is, must be conceived to be relative to the sentient, he represented the relation between the ideal and the sensible to be such, that while the ideal has an essence in and of itself, the sensible has merely a nexistence relatively to man—the sentient being—whose representations of the sensible are different at different times.<sup>161</sup> They therefore, he affirms, who acknowledge nothing but the sensible, must deny that there is anything in and for itself, but only for and in relation to some other.<sup>162</sup> In all this there is manifestly a tendency to consider the sensible as something which is merely in the conception, which becomes still more evident when it is remembered that the *other*, in relation to which the sensible is, was previously represented as the relatively nought. Plato, therefore, does not hesitate to describe the sensible as a compound of the identical which indicates the *Ideæ*, and of the other, or the non-being;<sup>163</sup> and as he considers the changeable to be the object-matter of vague opinion, he places it intermediate between ignorance and knowledge, so that it thus appears to be a something which at the same time is and

<sup>160</sup> Soph. p. 255, c. ἀλλ' οἶμαι σε συγχωρεῖν τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν αὐτὰ καθ' αὐτά, τὰ δὲ πρὸς ἄλληλα ἀεὶ λέγεσθαι.

<sup>161</sup> Crat. p. 386, d.

<sup>162</sup> Theæt. p. 160, b. ὥστε εἴ τί τις εἶναι τι ὀνομάζει, τινὶ εἶναι ἢ τινὸς ἢ πρὸς τι ῥητέον αὐτῷ, εἴ τε γίνεσθαι αὐτὸ δὲ ἐφ' αὐτοῦ τι ἢ ὃν ἢ γιγνόμενον οὔτε αὐτῷ λεκτέον, οὔτ' ἄλλον λέγοντος ἀποδεκτέον, ὥς ὁ λόγος, ὃν διέληλύθαμεν, σημαίνει.

<sup>163</sup> Tim. p. 35, a. τὴν θατέρου φύσιν δύσμικτον οὔσαν εἰς ταῦτόν ξυναρμόττων βίᾳ. Ibid. p. 37, a.

is not.<sup>164</sup> The sensible, therefore, has only a relative being, since it contains the other, or the non-being. Now, remembering that, according to Plato, we are to consider the non-being merely as the mode in which one idea is distinguished from another, we then arrive at the results that the sensible must be a combination of different ideas, which, taken together, form one essence. On this account, we find in the *Timæus* not only the identical and the different, but also the essence enumerated, as the constituents of which physical things are composed<sup>165</sup>. For it is the nature of the sensible to comprise opposites within it, the beautiful and the ugly, the half and the double, the heavy and the light, the great and the little,<sup>166</sup> which sensible perception does not distinguish, but invariably sees them in greater or less confusion.<sup>167</sup> Hence, Plato says that it is not merely by having part with the corporeal and with the changeable activities, but also with one another that the ideas appear to be universally manifold.<sup>168</sup> Accordingly,

<sup>164</sup> De Rep. v. p. 477, a. εἰ δὲ τι οὕτως ἔχει ὡς εἶναι τε καὶ μὴ εἶναι, οὐ μεταξὺ ἂν κείτοιο τοῦ εἰλικρινῶς ὄντος καὶ τοῦ αὐτῷ μηδαμῇ ὄντος; Μεταξύ. Ibid. p. 479, b. πότερον οὖν ἔστι μᾶλλον ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ἕκαστον τῶν πολλῶν τοῦτο, ὃ ἂν τις φῇ αὐτὸ εἶναι;

<sup>165</sup> Tim. p. 35, a. μινυγνὺς δὲ μετὰ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ ἐκ τριῶν ποιησάμενος ἔν. Ibid. p. 37, a.

<sup>166</sup> De Rep. v. p. 479, a. sq.

<sup>167</sup> Ibid. vii. p. 524, c. μέγα μὴν καὶ ὀψις καὶ σμικρὸν ἑώρα, φαμέν, ἀλλ' οὐ κεχωρισμένον, ἀλλὰ συγκεχυμένον τι.

<sup>168</sup> De Rep. v. p. 476, a. καὶ περὶ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου καὶ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ καὶ πάντων τῶν εἰδῶν περὶ ὃ αὐτὸς λόγος, αὐτὸ μὲν ἔν ἕκαστον εἶναι, τῇ δὲ τῶν πράξεων καὶ σωμάτων καὶ ἀλλήλων κοινωνίᾳ πανταχοῦ φανταζόμενα πολλὰ φαίνεσθαι ἕκαστον. Hermann, in the *Heidelb. Jahrb.* 1813, p. 1091, refers this passage to the eternal and invisible of the idea, but he is opposed both by the context of the whole passage and the particular expression, φανταζόμενα πολλὰ φαίνεσθαι. Cf. *Soph.* p. 259; συμμίνυνται τε ἀλλήλοις τὰ γένη καὶ τό τε δὴν καὶ θάτερον διὰ πάντων, κ. τ. λ. — διὰ γὰρ τὴν

one might perhaps be justified in assuming, that Plato saw nothing in the sensible beyond a mixture of ideas with each other, not, indeed, according to an orderly distinction, but in such wise as they are confusedly presented by the sensuous perception, which unites good with evil, the being with the non-being into a seeming entity, by forced and irregular combinations.

According to this, the sensible would appear to exist merely in the conception, nevertheless its determinate reality is assumed on the other hand by the admission, that it contains in itself, or has part in, the ideas. Still even this expression of a participation in, or a communion with, ideas,<sup>169</sup> is liable to the objection that it is calculated to excite a very vague notion of the truth and reality of sensation; for although it is manifest that this phraseology was suggested partly by logical investigations into the necessity of combining general notions, or of allowing them to have part one with another;<sup>170</sup> and partly by a con-

ἀλλήλων τῶν εἰδῶν συμπλοκὴν ὁ λόγος γέγονεν ἡμῖν. Where there is allusion to the union of the *ὄνομα* with the *ῥῆμα*, or of the *οὐσία* with the *πρᾶξις*. The mode in which the ideas have part in one another through the *πρόσ τι*, and thereby in the phenomenon, is most fully and precisely explained in the *Phædo*. p. 102, b. οὐ γὰρ που πεφυκέναι Σιμμίαν ὑπερέχειν τούτῳ τῷ Σιμμίαν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τῷ μεγέθει, ὃ τυγχάνει ἔχων· οὐδ' αὖ Σωκράτους ὑπερέχειν, ὅτι Σωκράτης ὁ Σωκράτης ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ὅτι σμικρότητα ἔχει ὁ Σωκράτης πρὸς τὸ ἐκείνου μέγεθος; Ἀληθῆ. Οὐδὲ γε αὖ ὑπὸ Φαίδωνος ὑπερέχεσθαι τῷ ὅτι Φαίδων ὁ Φαίδων ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ὅτι μέγεθος ἔχει ὁ Φαίδων πρὸς τὴν Σιμμίον σμικρότητα, ἔστι ταῦτα. Οὕτως ἄρα ὁ Σιμμίας ἐπυνυμίαν ἔχει σμικρὸς τε καὶ μέγας εἶναι ἐν μέσῳ ὧν ἀμφοτέρων, κ. τ. λ. To be great or little is here tantamount to be sensible as hereafter will be shewn; this arises from the proportional consideration of ideas.

<sup>169</sup> Arist. *Met.* i. 9, p. 33. τὸ γὰρ μετέχειν οὐδὲν ἐστίν. Ibid. viii. 6, p. 174, 14, Brand. καὶ τί τὸ μετέχειν ἀποροῦσιν.

<sup>170</sup> In the *Sophist* the terms *κοινωνεῖν* and *μετέχειν* are always used of the connexion and interdependence of idea. Very vague is the definition given,

sideration of the indistinctness and confusion with which general notions are apprehended by sensuous perception; it is nevertheless impossible to deny that the mode in which the sensible is to have part with the ideas, is left involved in great obscurity. The obscurity of his system on this point becomes still more palpable, when he regards the ideas as the prototypes of the sensible, and agreeably therewith concedes to the sensible merely a resemblance with the ideas,<sup>171</sup> although he was fully aware of the consequence which necessarily follows from such a view, that since the ideas alone indicate the really being, the sensible is not an entity, but merely a something resembling it.<sup>172</sup> It is impossible to deny, as Plato did not fail to perceive, that sensible objects have a resemblance to ideas merely through their having in some respect a likeness to them,<sup>173</sup> still the notion of resemblance is one that requires some nicer determination for its right appreciation. Moreover, this resemblance is susceptible of degrees which, consequently, may vary through greater and less to infinity. The idea, therefore, of infinity or indeterminateness attaches itself to that of the sensible. The merging of true being within the sensible, is described by Plato as an entrance into the

Soph. p. 248, a. τὸ κοινωνεῖν — πάθημα ἢ ποίημα ἐκ δυνάμεως τινος ἀπὸ τῶν πρὸς ἄλληλα ξυνιόντων γιγνόμενον.

<sup>171</sup> Phædr. p. 250, a. τῶν ἐκεῖ ὁμοίωμα. Tim. p. 28, a. ὁ δημιουργὸς πρὸς τὸ κατὰ ταῦτά *ἴχον* βλέπων αἰ τοιοῦτῳ τινὶ προσχρώμενος παραδείγματι. Ibid. p. 49, d. sq.

<sup>172</sup> De Rep. x. p. 597, a. οὐ τὸ ὄν, ἀλλὰ τι τοιοῦτο οἶον τὸ ὄν, ὄν δὲ οὐ.

<sup>173</sup> Euthyd. p. 301, a.; Phæd. p. 100, e. sq. In these passages *παρουσία* and *κοινωνία* or *μέθεξις* are used as equivalent. According to Conv. p. 211, e. οὐκ εἰδὼλα ἀρετῆς — ἀλλ' ἀληθῆ abide in man.

infinite space of dissimilarity,<sup>174</sup> and he then, after the manner of the Pythagoreans, distinguishes in that which is the object of thought, the limited and the unlimited or infinite,—understanding by the former the true and good and the intellectually knowable; by the latter, the sensible quality which is in a perpetual undulation between the more and the less, and can never be made an object of true knowledge.<sup>175</sup> In opposition to such a more and less, which has no definite measure, he places that which is contained in the idea which is described, as the like, the constant, and the sufficient,<sup>176</sup> whereas the sensible, on the contrary, appears as what at one moment surpasses, at another falls short of the due measure; for as opposites are involved in its nature, it is now comparatively great, and again comparatively little.<sup>177</sup> It has occasionally excess, occasionally deficiency (*ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις*) in relation to ideas, since it only resembles them and never reaches to exact likeness. We have here then a double standard advanced, of which one measures sensible by sen-

<sup>174</sup> Polit. p. 273, d. God has care for the sensible world, *ἵνα μὴ χεῖμασθεις ὑπὸ παραχῆς διαλυθεις εἰς τὸν τῆς ἀνομοιότητος ἀπειρον ὄντα τόπον δύνῃ.*

<sup>175</sup> Phileb. p. 23, §p. 23, c. sq.; cf. also p. 24, d. *προχωρεῖ γὰρ καὶ οὐ μένει τό τε θερμότερον ἀεὶ καὶ τὸ ψυχρότερον ὡσαύτως· τὸ δὲ πᾶσιν ἔσται καὶ προῖον ἐπαύσατο. — ὁπόσ' ὃν ἡμῖν φαίνεται μᾶλλον τε καὶ ἥττον γινόμενα καὶ τὸ σφόδρα καὶ ἡρέμα δεχόμενα καὶ τὸ λίαν καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, πάντα εἰς τὸ τοῦ ἀπειρου γένος ὡς εἰς ἓν δεῖ πάντα ταῦτα τίθεναι.* The other as the one only participates in the *πέρας* by participating in the one, otherwise it is *ἀπειρον*. Parm. p. 157, b. sqq.; Soph. p. 256, e. sq. Plato also has regard to the divisible nature of the corporeal. De Rep. vii. p. 525, a. *ἅμα γὰρ ταῦτόν ὡς ἓν τε ὁρῶμεν καὶ ἀπειρα τὸ πλῆθος.*

<sup>176</sup> Phæd. p. 74, a sq.; 93, d.; 101, e.

<sup>177</sup> Phæd. p. 102, b.



sible, and comparative greatness with littleness,—evidently the mathematical science of measuring;—the other, a higher philosophical art, which measures incipency in its relation to the supra-sensible standard of the good, and likewise its gradations, whereby there is found in the sensible a resemblance with the ideal.<sup>178</sup> For the due measure of the ideal may be transgressed infinitely by the actuality of sense,<sup>179</sup> on the two sides of littleness and greatness. This view of the sensible had evidently regard to that aspect of the theory of ideas which represents the ideal in all things as the end and aim of the rational activity. Accordingly, the necessity of this philosophical geometry is deduced from the necessity of certain arts of life, especially the political.

The tendency of Plato's whole theory is evidently to this side, and it is chiefly herein that the influence of the sentiments of Socrates upon the mind of his disciple is discernible. We must, however, confess, that the result of this tendency was to render his conception of the sensible very ambiguous and doubtful. Production or becoming, notwithstanding that it embraces the whole domain of the sensible, only exists, according to Plato, for the sake of the good and the beautiful, which are to be produced by it; it is a pursuit of wisdom, in it phi-

<sup>178</sup> Polit. p. 283, e. sq. διέλωμεν τοίνυν αὐτὴν (sc. τὴν μετρητικὴν) δύο μέρη. — τὸ μὲν κατὰ τὴν πρὸς ἄλληλα μεγέθους καὶ σμικρότητος κοινωνίαν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ τὴν τῆς γενέσεως ἀναγκαίαν οὐσίαν. — διττας ἄρα ταύτας οὐσίας καὶ κρίσεις τοῦ μεγάλου καὶ τοῦ σμικροῦ θετέον, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὥς ἔφαμεν ἄρτι πρὸς ἄλληλα μόνον δεῖν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ νῦν εἴρηται, μᾶλλον τὴν μὲν πρὸς ἄλληλα λεκτέον, τὴν δ' αὖ πρὸς τὸ μέτριον.

<sup>179</sup> L. l. ὡς ὄντως γιγνόμενον.

losophy is to form herself, and by it all that is good to be cultivated and improved. For there are two sorts of things,—that which is by and for itself, and that which is ever striving after another; the former is ever most excellent, but the latter wanting in excellence;—further, that which seeks another, only comes into being for the sake of that other, that, *viz.*, which is of and by itself. If, now, we place in mutual opposition, that which permanently is, and that which becomes, it will be evident that the being is not for the sake of the becoming, but contrariwise, and that for whose sake the becoming and the conditional constantly becomes, must, of necessity, be reckoned as a species of the good; the becoming, on the contrary, must belong to an opposite species.<sup>180</sup> On this account Plato recognises no other ground of what is produced or happens, than the idea of the best; and in his opinion those who assign material causes for whatever is or becomes, do so from an incapacity to distinguish between the true cause and the mean which must be employed in order to realise acknowledged good.<sup>181</sup>

<sup>180</sup> Phileb. p. 53, d. ἐστὸν δὴ τινε δύο, τὸ μὲν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό, τὸ δὲ αἰεὶ ἐφίεμενον ἄλλου.—τὸ μὲν σεμνότατον αἰεὶ πεφυκός, το δ' ἑλλιπες ἐκείνου.—τὸ μὲν ἕνεκά του τῶν ὄντων ἐστ' αἰεὶ, τὸ δ' οὐ χάριν ἐκάστοτε τὸ τινὸς ἕνεκα γιγνόμενον αἰεὶ γίγνεται.—δύο δὴ τάδε ἕτερα λάβωμεν. Ποῖα; Ἐν μὲν τι γένεσιν πάντων, τὴν δὲ οὐσίαν ἕτερον ἔν.—Φημί δὴ γενέσεως μὲν ἕνεκα φάρμακά τε καὶ πάντα ὄργανα καὶ πᾶσαν ὕλην παρατίθεσθαι πᾶσιν, ἐκάστην δὲ γένεσιν ἄλλην ἄλλης οὐσίας τινὸς ἐκάστης ἕνεκα γίγνεσθαι, ζύμπασαν δὲ γενέσιν οὐσίας ἕνεκα γίγνεσθαι ζυμπάσης.—τό γε μὴν οὐ ἕνεκα τὸ ἕνεκά του γιγνόμενον αἰεὶ γίγνεται ἄν, ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μοίρᾳ ἐκεῖνο ἐστὶ· τὸ δὲ τινὸς ἕνεκα γιγνόμενον εἰς ἄλλην, ὧ ἄριστε, μοῖραν θετέον.

<sup>181</sup> Phæd. p. 97, b. sq.; p. 99, b. τὸ γὰρ μὴ διελέσθαι οἷόν τ' εἶναι, ὅτι ἄλλο μὲν τί ἐστι τὸ αἴτιον τῷ ὄντι, ἄλλο δ' ἐκεῖνο, ἄνευ οὗ τὸ αἴτιον οὐκ ἂν ποτ' εἴη αἴτιον.

Accordingly, Plato seems to have regarded the sensible merely as a means for the realization of good in the world of sense, and he consequently distinguishes between the true and first cause which are contained in the idea of good, and the second causes which are of a sensuous nature, and are requisite to the consummation, so far as possible, of the idea of good in the world.<sup>182</sup> But here the question naturally arises, whence is the necessity for the secondary causes in the production of good in the sensible world? This Plato resolves into the necessity of one body being set in motion by another already in motion, and therefore mechanically.<sup>183</sup> Accordingly, he distinguishes two species of causes, one the Divine, which forms and fashions all to good,—and necessary causes, which, at first irregular, are brought into form and order by the ideas, by which alone man is enabled to acquire and to know the truth; <sup>184</sup> indeed, he calls the entirety of these necessary causes the nature of necessity, and seems to have conceived the possibility that this nature might exhibit itself in oppo-

<sup>182</sup> Tim. p. 46, c. ταῦτ' οὖν πάντ' ἐστὶ τῶν ξυναίτιων, οἷς θεὸς ὑπηρετοῦσι χρηταὶ τὴν τοῦ ἀρίστου κατὰ το δυνάτὸν ἰδέαν ἀποτελῶν· δοξάζεται δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν πλείστων οὐ ξυναίτια, ἀλλ' αἰτία εἶναι τῶν πάντων, ψύχοντα καὶ θερμαίνοντα, πηγνύντα τε καὶ διαχέοντα καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα ἀπεργαζόμενα. Phileb. p. 27, a. Cf. Polit. p. 281.

<sup>183</sup> Tim. p. 46, d. τὸν δὲ νοῦ καὶ ἐπιστήμης ἐραστὴν ἀνάγκη τὰς τῆς ἐμφρονος φύσεως αἰτίας πρώτας μεταδιώκειν, ὅσαι δὲ ὑπ' ἄλλων κινουμένων, ἕτερα δ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης κινουμένων γίνονται, δευτέρας.

<sup>184</sup> Ibid. p. 68, d. sq. διὸ δὴ χρὴ δὴ αἰτίας εἶδη διορίζεσθαι, τὸ μὲν ἀναγκαῖον, τὸ δὲ θεῖον, καὶ τὸ μὲν θεῖον ἐν ἡπασί ζητεῖν κτήσεως ἕνεκα εὐδαίμονος βίου, καθ' ὅσον ἡμῶν ἢ φύσις ἐνδέχεται, τὸ δὲ ἀναγκαῖον ἐκείνων χάριν, λογιζομένους ὡς ἄνευ τούτων οὐ δυνατόν αὐτὰ ἐκείνα, ἐφ' οἷς σπουδάζομεν, μόνον κατανοεῖν, οὐδ' αὖ λαβεῖν, οὐδ' ἄλλως μετασχεῖν. It is out of these divine and necessary causes that Plato makes perishable things to be composed.

sition to the formative power of the ideas.<sup>185</sup> Now from this it would almost follow that Plato supposed the cause of the world to be twofold, and of opposite natures. But before we draw any conclusions from these and similar isolated expressions, we ought to remember that, wherever he speaks of the opposite to the ideal as endued with powers of its own, the forms of expression employed by him betray at once their mythical character. Thus, for instance, in the myth, where he talks of a corporeal nature in the composition of the universe, which, in itself, possessed of an irregular motion, and opposed to the divine order and arrangement, produces all the evil and injustice in the world, of necessity, and with an innate tendency impels it directly contrary to the divine order.<sup>186</sup> From

<sup>185</sup> Ibid. p. 56, c. ὅπῃπερ ἡ τῆς ἀνάγκης ἐκούσα πεισθεῖσά τε φύσις ὑπέειπε, κ. τ. λ.

<sup>186</sup> Polit. p. 268, e. sq. It is of importance to notice the following passage: τοῦτο δὲ αὐτῷ (sc. τῷ παντί) τό ἀνάπαλιν ἔναι διὰ τόδ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἔμφυτον γέγονεν.—τὸν δὲ δὴ κόσμον πάλιν ἀνέστρεφεν εἰμαρμένη τε καὶ ξύμφυτος ἐπιθυμία.—τούτων δὲ αὐτῷ τὸ σωματοειδὲς τῆς συγκράσεως αἰτιον, τὸ τῆς πάλαι ποτὲ φύσεως ξύντροφον, ὅτε πολλῆς ἦν μετέχον ἀταξίας πρὶν εἰς τὸν νῦν κόσμον ἀφικέσθαι. παρὰ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ συνθέντος πάντα τὰ καλὰ κέκτηται, παρὰ δὲ τῆς ἐμπροσθεν ἕξεως, ὅσα χαλεπὰ καὶ ἄδικοι ἐν οὐρανῷ γίνονται, ταῦτα ἐξ ἐκείνης αὐτός τε ἔχει καὶ τοῖς ζώοις ἐναπεργάζεται. Thus, too, in the *Timæus*, the question is of the *φορά* τῆς θατέρου φύσεως. Very different is the nature of his observation concerning an evil mundane soul, de Leg. x. p. 896, and it is merely a supposition which he then proceeds to refute. Hermann, *Heidelb. Jahrb.* 1832, p. 1086, sees a reference hereto in the passage of the *Rep.* ii. p. 379, c. sqq., which runs thus: οὐκ ἔρα πάντων γε αἰτιον τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν εὖ ἔχόντων αἰτιον, τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἀναίτιον. Παντελῶς γ', ἔφη. Οὐδ' ἄρα ἦν ὃ ἐγώ, ὁ θεός, ἐπειδὴ ἀγαθός, πάντων ἂν εἴη αἰτιος, ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ λέγουσιν, ἀλλ' ὀλίγων μὲν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις αἰτιος, πολλῶν δὲ ἀναίτιος· πολλὴ γὰρ ἐλάττω τὰ ἀγαθὰ τῶν κακῶν ἡμῖν. καὶ τῶν μὲν ἀγαθῶν οὐδένα ἕλλον αἰτιατέον, τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἄλλ' ἅττα δεῖ ζητεῖν τὰ αἰτία ἀλλ' οὐ τὸν θεόν. There is, however, no reference here to the sensible and to matter, and there is much more pertinency in Stallbaum's quotation ad h. l. of the passage in the *Rep.* x. p. 617, e.

such mythical statements, as authorities for the system of Plato, it is only allowable to infer, that the sensible and mortal nature is from some necessity or other, invariably attended by evil and imperfection, even because it is sensible and mortal.<sup>187</sup>

This is at once clear, when, in reference to cognition, it is asked to which species of being does becoming belong? When, for instance, we find Plato considering the sensible and the corporeal nature of the *other*, as a mean to a higher end, we might feel disposed to blame him as having invented a mean disproportioned to his end, or at least of hesitating whether to praise the mean as a mean, or to depreciate it as not being the end. With Plato, the end is, in a dialectical point of view, science—*i. e.*, the pure cognition of ideas. Now, we have seen that, in his mind, the sensuous representations which we arrive at, by means of the material portion of our corporate nature, are not of themselves absolutely worthless for the purpose of knowledge; nevertheless, he advances, on the other hand, so many objections against the presentation of sense, as almost to make it appear that he looked upon it as a hindrance and limitation rather than a furtherance of right knowledge. Thus he says that

(*αἰτία ἐλομένην, θεὸς ἀναίτιος*), in which case it is not matter, but the freedom of the will that must be made the second cause. Moreover, the limitation to which the power of the Deity is here subjected ought to have excited consideration, as to the manner in which it might be reconciled with his providence, which regards alike the little and the great.

<sup>187</sup> Theæt. p. 176, a. ἀλλ' οὐτ' ἀπολέσθαι τὰ κακὰ δυνατόν, ὃ θεόδωρε· ὑπεναντίον γάρ τι τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἀεὶ εἶναι ἀνάγκη· οὐτ' ἐν θεοῖς αὐτὰ ἰδρῦσθαι, τὴν δὲ θνητὴν φύσιν καὶ τόνδε τὸν τόπον περιπολεῖ ἐξ ἀνάγκης. So, too, according to de Leg. x p. 906, a., there is ἀθάνατος μάχη between good and evil.

the efflux and influx of sensuous perceptions render the soul, at its first union with a perishable body, irrational, and that it is only when the flux of nurture and growth has diminished, that it becomes capable of a rational consideration of the identical and the different.<sup>188</sup> Thus, too, the world is said to have had at first a more perfect remembrance of the instructions of its artificer and father, which subsequently became weaker under the influence of the corporeal element in its composition.<sup>189</sup> But the Phædo is the principal seat of these complaints against the nature of human sensations, where the philosopher's pursuit of knowledge is described as a longing after death, with a view to escape from sensation, which is the great impediment to pure cognition.<sup>190</sup> As long as the soul has a body, and is united with such evil, it is unable to attain to a complete possession of the truth.<sup>191</sup> For the body is the occasion of many obstacles to investigation: in the first place, the necessity of providing the means of its subsistence, and secondly, its liability to sickness and disease, then its passions and desires, its hopes and fears, and all its strange delusions, its frivolity and trifling, render it utterly

<sup>188</sup> Tim. p. 44, a. καὶ διὰ πάντα τὰ πάθη νῦν κατ' ἀρχὰς ἄνους ψυχὴ γίγνεται, κ. τ. λ.

<sup>189</sup> Polit. p. 273, b. — τὴν τοῦ δημιουργοῦ καὶ πατρὸς ἀπομνημονεύων διδασχὴν εἰς δύναμιν κατ' ἀρχὰς μὲν οὖν ἀκριβέστερον ἀπετέλει, τελευτῶν δὲ ἀμβλύτερον· τούτων δὲ αὐτῇ τὸ σωματοειδὲς τῆς συγκράσεως αἴτιον.

<sup>190</sup> Phæd. p. 64, a. sq. κινδυνεύουσι γὰρ ὅσοι τυγχάνουσιν ὁρθῶς ἀπτομενοι φιλοσοφίας, λεληθέναι τοὺς ἄλλους, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄλλο αὐτοὶ ἐπιτηδεύουσιν ἢ ἀποθνήσκειν τε καὶ τεθνάναι.

<sup>191</sup> Phæd. p. 66, b. — ὅτι ἕως ἂν τὸ σῶμα ἔχωμεν καὶ συμπεφυρμένη ᾗ ἡμῶν ἢ ψυχῇ μετὰ τοῦ τοιούτου κακοῦ, οὐ μήποτε κτησόμεθα ἱκανῶς, οὐ ἐπιθυμοῦμεν, φάμεν δὲ τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ ἀληθές.

impossible for man to gain any insight into truth.<sup>192</sup> Accordingly, the body is represented as a real hindrance to knowledge, and the sensuous impressions through the body as perfectly worthless; for even the sight and hearing do not furnish any accurate and certain information, but, on the contrary, are weak and deceptive; and, if these are not serviceable in the investigation of truth, still less so are the still more imperfect senses.<sup>193</sup> Hence, then, the longing of the philosopher for death, in the hope that it will free him from the lets and hindrances of the body; in the present life, his first object must be to limit, as much as possible, his relation to and dependence upon the body, in order to approximate the nearer to certainty.<sup>194</sup>

Nevertheless, we ought not to give undue weight to these and similar expressions, and to be dismayed at not finding in this doctrine full concurrence with the general train of Plato's ideas; for, on the one hand, a mythical view of things has led him to more positive images than was consistent with the truthfulness of the Platonic system,<sup>195</sup> and partly there is in the whole a degree of exaggeration which belongs, perhaps, to the rhetorical colouring of his

<sup>192</sup> L. l.

<sup>193</sup> Phæd. p. 65, a. τί δαι δὴ περὶ αὐτὴν τὴν τῆς φρονήσεως κτῆσιν, πότερον ἐμπόδιον τὸ σῶμα ἢ οὐ, ἐάν τις αὐτὸ ἐν τῇ ζητήσει κοινωνὸν συμ- παραλαμβάνῃ; ὅλον τὸ τοῖονδε λέγω· ἄρα ἔχει ἀλήθειάν τινα ὅπως τε καὶ ἀκοῇ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἣ τὰ γε τοιαῦτα καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ ἡμῖν αἰεὶ θρυλλοῦσιν, ὅτι οὐκ ἀκούομεν ἀκριβὲς οὐδὲν οὔτε ὁρῶμεν; καίτοι εἰ αὐταὶ τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα αἰσθήσεων μὴ ἀκριβεῖς εἰσὶ μὴδὲ σαφεῖς, σχολῇ αἱ γε ἄλλαι· πᾶσαι γὰρ πονοῦντων φανυλότεραί εἰσιν, κ. τ. λ.

<sup>194</sup> Phæd. p. 67, a. καὶ ἐν ᾧ ἂν ζῶμεν, οὕτως, ὥς ἔοικεν, ἐγγυτάτω ἐσόμεθα τοῦ εἰδέναι, ἐάν ᾗτις μάλιστα μὴδὲν ὁμιλῶμεν τῷ σώματι, μὴδὲ κοινωνῶμεν, ᾗτις μὴ πᾶσα ἀνάγκη.

<sup>195</sup> This is the case in the *Politicus*, and partly also in the *Timæus*.

language.<sup>196</sup> But, above all, it is necessary, as previously remarked, to bear in mind that the limitations necessarily resulting from the nature of the perishable, must, of course, react upon the means employed to remedy its deficiencies. If this limitation be indispensable, the mean itself cannot be perfect, and its faultiness must be a further source of human imperfection. Finally, the insufficiency of the mean may further manifest itself in liability to abuse, and it is against such a misemployment that most of Plato's complaints of the sensible are directed.

Accordingly, even in despite of such lamentations, we firmly maintain that Plato regarded sensation as a medium for knowledge. This conclusion is favoured by most of Plato's expressions, whether indirect or direct, with regard to sensuous perception. Thus he extols the gift of sight especially, as the greatest good, which enables man to investigate the nature of all, and without which even philosophy itself were impossible;<sup>197</sup> and, however great may be the pre-eminence which Plato attributes to vision over the other senses, still he does not overlook or deny the importance of the latter as aids to knowledge and as incentives to philosophy.<sup>198</sup> Undoubtedly it is beyond the power of the senses to furnish a true and pure knowledge, for truth and the highest and most beautiful are incorporeal, and cannot be made manifest by any image or any sensation, but only by intellectual speech, which

<sup>196</sup> So in the *Phædo*.

<sup>197</sup> *Tim.* p. 46, e. sq.; *Phædr.* p. 250, d. sq.; *de Rep.* vi. p. 507, c. sq.

<sup>198</sup> *Tim.* p. 47, c. sq.; *de Rep.* vii. p. 523, b.



again can only be comprehended by intellect.<sup>199</sup> So, too, the properties of things possess neither colour nor shape, nor aught else of a sensible nature,<sup>200</sup> so that they cannot be discovered by sensation. If, then, the impressions of sense do not exhibit the essence of things, and are, nevertheless, to be looked upon as means to knowledge, they can only operate as such, either by reminding us of the essence, or by becoming the occasion of inquiry. Thus is the doctrine of recollection of ideas closely connected with Plato's ideal theory and his his view of the sensuous system.

This doctrine is, indeed, diversely intertwined with all his opinions. But it attached itself most closely to his refutation of the sophistical proposition, that man cannot investigate what he does not know already.<sup>201</sup> For how can a matter be made the object of investigation, of which the inquirer absolutely knows nothing? How can such a matter be advanced distinctly and clearly for examination? and even supposing the unknown object to be found, how can the inquirer be certain that this is the object of his unwitting research?<sup>202</sup> All these questions Plato meets by assuming that human investigation or learning is nothing more than a recollection of the previously known; for under this hypothesis, the searching of the obscure traces in our memory of previous knowledge, may

<sup>199</sup> Polit. p. 285, e. sq.

<sup>200</sup> De Rep. v. p. 477, c.

<sup>201</sup> This, as the principal point, is brought prominently forward both at the beginning and end of the Meno. p. 80, c.; p. 86, b.

<sup>202</sup> Meno, p. 80, d. *καὶ τίνα τρόπον ζητήσεις ὃ μὴ οἶσθα τὸ παράπαν, ὃ τι ἔστι; ποῖον γάρ, ὃν οὐκ οἶσθα, προθέμενος ζητήσεις; ἢ εἰ καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα ἐντύχοις αὐτῷ, πῶς εἴσει, ὅτι τοῦτό ἐστιν, ὃ σὺ οὐκ ᾔδησθα;*

very well be connected with the consciousness that we have to look for or have found a particular object, and need but to recognise again what we had already been conscious of.<sup>203</sup> Plato justifies this hypothesis by actual experiment, and shews, in the case of mathematics, that it is possible by reflection to evolve general principles from the individual observations of experience.<sup>204</sup> He supports it, however, in a general manner, by asserting the presence in the soul of certain general principles, which, at the beginning of life, are not as yet matters of consciousness and actual cognition, but existing only potentially, are afterwards, when elicited by observation and inquiry, evolved into actuality.<sup>205</sup> Here Plato has evidently in view the ideas to which no one of all the objects of sensuous cognition perfectly corresponds. He shews in detail, that in the world of sense there is no perfect likeness, but that an object, which at one time appears like, is at another thought to be unlike, and is, therefore, defective in completeness of resemblance, and at most has but a tendency thereto.<sup>206</sup> The same is the case with the beautiful, the good, the just, and the holy, and with all that has a true

<sup>203</sup> Comp. herewith what is said of Memory in Theæt. p. 191, c. and of the distinction between *κῆσις* and *δυνάμις*, and the *ἐξίς τῆς ἐπιστήμης*; as also the distinction between *μνήμη* and *ἀνάμνησις*, which, however, is not brought clearly out. Phileb. p. 34, b. sq.

<sup>204</sup> Meno, p. 82, a. sq.

<sup>205</sup> Phæd. p. 73, a. — ὅτι ἐρωτώμενοι οἱ ἄνθρωποι, ἂν τις καλῶς ἐρωτᾷ, αὐτοὶ λέγουσι πάντα, ὃ ἔχει· καίτοι εἰ μὴ ἐτύγχανεν αὐτοῖς ἐπιστήμη ἐνοῦσα καὶ ὁρθὸς λόγος, οὐκ ἂν οἱ τ' ἦσαν τοῦτο ποιεῖν. ἔπειτα ἂν τις ἐπὶ τὰ διαγράμματα ἀγῇ ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων, ἐνταῦθα σαφέστατα κατηγορεῖ, ὅτι τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει.

<sup>206</sup> Phæd. p. 74, a. sq.

being; in the sensible world there is nothing exactly resembling them, merely similar or dissimilar; all, however, that possesses any degree of correspondence with these true species of being, is perceived by us through the senses, and thereby reminds man of what truly is. From this it is clear that he had previously seen it somewhere, or been conscious of it,<sup>207</sup> and as this could not have been in the present, it must have been in some earlier state of existence.<sup>208</sup> In this respect there is a close connexion between this doctrine and the view of sensible objects, which represents them as mere copies or resemblances of the supra-sensible truth; for even in perception a feeling arises upon the mind, that all that we see or hear is very far from reaching to a likeness to that which is the true being—the absolutely like; but that striving to attain, it ever falls short of perfect resemblance, and, consequently, the impressions of the sense are mere tokens of the eternal ideas, whose similitude they bear, and of which they are copies.<sup>209</sup>

<sup>207</sup> Phæd. p. 76. δυνατόν γὰρ δὴ τοῦτό γ' ἐφάνη, αἰσθόμενον τι ἢ ἰδόντα ἢ ἀκούσαντα ἢ τινα ἄλλην αἰσθησιν λαβόντα ἑτερόν τι ἀπὸ τούτου ἐννοῆσαι, ὃ ἐπέλεληστο, ᾧ τοῦτο ἐπλησίαζεν ἀνόμοιον ὃν ἢ ᾧ ὅμοιον.

<sup>208</sup> Phæd. p. 75, b.

<sup>209</sup> Phæd. p. 74, e. ἀναγκαῖον ἄρα ἡμᾶς προειδέναι τὸ ἴσον πρὸ ἐκείνου τοῦ χρόνου, ὅτι τὸ πρῶτον ἰδόντες τὰ ἴσα ἐννοήσαμεν, ὅτι ὁρέγεται μὲν πάντα ταῦτ' εἶναι οἷον τὸ ἴσον, ἔχει δὲ ἐνδεστέρω. "Ἔστι ταῦτα. Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τόδε ὁμολογοῦμεν μὴ ἄλλοθεν αὐτὸ ἐννοηκέναι, μηδὲ δυνατόν εἶναι ἐννοῆσαι, ἀλλ' ἢ ἐκ τοῦ ἰδεῖν ἢ ἄψασθαι ἢ ἐκ τινος ἄλλης τῶν αἰσθήσεων." ταῦτόν δὲ πάντα ταῦτα λέγω. — ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ ἐκ γε τῶν αἰσθήσεων δεῖ ἐννοῆσαι, ὅτι πάντα τὰ ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν ἐκείνου τε ὁρέγεται τοῦ ὃ ἔστιν ἴσον, καὶ αὐτοῦ ἐνδεστέρα ἔστιν. ἢ πῶς λέγωμεν; Οὕτως. Πρὸ τοῦ ἄρα ἄρξασθαι ἡμᾶς ὁρᾶν καὶ ἀκοῦειν καὶ τᾶλλα αἰσθάνεσθαι τυχεῖν ἔδει που εὐδηφότας ἐπιστήμην αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἴσου, ὃ τι ἔστιν. εἰ ἐμέλλομεν τὰ ἐκ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἴσα ἐκείσε ἀνοίσειν, ὅτι προθυμεῖται μὲν πάντα τοιαῦτα εἶναι οἷον ἐκεῖνο, ἔστι δὲ αὐτῶ φανλότερα. Ἀνάγκη ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων, ὧ

This doctrine of the remembrance of the ideas is, in the writings of Plato, associated in various ways with many mythical traditions of the past and future life of the soul,<sup>210</sup> so that the conjecture is at least plausible, that in the doctrine itself there is also much which ought to be taken in a merely mythical sense. It is, therefore, the more necessary to separate from such mythical accompaniments whatever Plato considered to be of a truly scientific character. We should certainly feel disposed, at times, to refer to a mythical embellishment of the composition, the doctrine that the soul had enjoyed a previous existence; but that Plato's general mode of expressing himself on this subject, is no wise favourable to the conjecture, notwithstanding that he does occasionally exhibit the doctrine under purely mythical images. For the grounds of this position, that the soul is immortal and indissoluble, and that, therefore, it must exist both antecedently and subsequently to this present life, are not drawn from mythical story or tradition, but it is argued with the greatest seriousness and earnestness possible. The soul, he says, is the principle of motion, and, as such, eternally self-moving; it can neither be produced nor decay;<sup>211</sup> and as the notion of movement is necessary to and implicitly contained in it, so, too, the idea

*Σώκρατες.* Οὐκοῦν εὐθὺς ἐρωτῶμέν τε καὶ ἠκούομεν καὶ τὰς ἄλλας αἰσθήσεις εἶχομεν; Πάνυ γε. Ἔδει δέ γε, φαμέν, πρὸ τούτων τὴν τοῦ ἴσου ἐπιστήμην εἰληφέναι; Ναί. Πρὶν γενέσθαι ἄρα, ὥς ἔουκεν, ἀνάγκη ἡμῖν αὐτὴν εἰληφέναι.

<sup>210</sup> Especially in the *Meno*, p. 81, a., and the *Phædr.* p. 246, sq.

<sup>211</sup> *Phædr.* p. 246, c. sq. οὕτω δὴ κινήσεως μὲν ἀρχὴ τὸ αὐτὸ αὐτὸ κινεῖν. τοῦτο δὲ οὐτ' ἀπόλλυσθαι, οὐτε γίνεσθαι δυνατόν.

of life is inseparable from it.<sup>212</sup> It would, therefore, seem, that in Plato's mind the eternal existence of the soul is a truth without and beyond the domain of the mythical;<sup>213</sup> but whether he considered individual souls to be eternally existing, is quite another question. But even this must be answered in the affirmative, for with Plato the immortal is definite in number, and it is impossible that there should be more than there actually are;<sup>214</sup> so that whatever be the number of souls, all must have existed from eternity. On the other hand, we are apparently justified in referring to the mythical character of the exposition, the hypothesis that the individual soul had passed a life of sense previous to its present existence; for the distinction, which is the ground of this reference, between the sensuous and the supra-sensuous life of the soul, appears to have taken deep root in the philosophy of Plato. Not merely are allusions constantly made to it in mythical figures,<sup>215</sup> but the whole doctrine of the remembrance of the ideas is evidently founded on the supposition that souls, enjoying a perfect life, free from the obstructions of sense, were formerly in a condition to recognise the truth immediately in itself, and without any recourse to the sensuous organs. This is made still more apparent by the mode in which the possi-

<sup>212</sup> Phæd. p. 105, c.

<sup>213</sup> See also Phæd. p. 76, d. sq.

<sup>214</sup> De Rep. x. p. 611, a. — *ὅτι ἀεὶ ἂν εἶεν αἱ αὐταὶ* (sc. *ψυχαί*). *οὔτε γὰρ ἂν ποὺ ἐλάττους γίνοντο μηδεμίας ἀπολλυμένης, οὔτε-αὖ πλείους· εἰ γὰρ ὁτιοῦν τῶν ἀθανάτων πλείον γίγνεται, οἷσθ' ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ θνητοῦ ἂν γίγνεται καὶ πάντα ἂν εἴη τελευτῶντα ἀθάνατα*; — This is the ground of the argument in the Phædon, p. 72, c. Cf. also Tim. p. 41, d.

<sup>215</sup> Phædr. p. 248, a.; de Rep. x. p. 615, a.; Phæd. p. 84, a.

bility of learning is derived from a previous possession of ideas. For, as in the present sensuous life, ideas are only attainable by reminiscence, so, too, in every earlier state of sensuous existence, the same means must have been necessary, *i. e.*, the ideas would never arise on the soul, unless the soul had once had an immediate perception or possession of them in a non-sensuous existence. That this is not a mere inference from the principles of Plato, which he himself did not fully foresee, is clear, both from the forementioned mythical allusions, and is also intimated, though somewhat more covertly, in Plato's fiction of the Deity revealing to the soul, before its union with the body, the nature of the universe;<sup>216</sup> and in his doctrine, that the soul first becomes irrational at its birth;<sup>217</sup> *i. e.*, that before birth it participates in reason; and lastly, in his almost invariable custom of designating reason—the immortal portion of the soul—as divine and heaven-born.<sup>218</sup> Such is the soul naturally as an idea,<sup>219</sup> which has part in eternity.

Accordingly, the only point in this doctrine of reminiscence, which may justly be regarded as mythical, is the supposition that we had recognised the idea in an earlier sensuous life; whereas, in fact, it is in a supra-sensuous existence of the soul that alone they can be recognised.<sup>220</sup> Still it

<sup>216</sup> Tim. p. 41, e.

<sup>217</sup> Tim. p. 44, a.

<sup>218</sup> Tim. p. 90, a. sq.

<sup>219</sup> See also Theæt. p. 184, d. Phædr. p. 249, e. *πᾶσα ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴ φύσει τεθεῖται τὰ ὄντα.*

<sup>220</sup> That the Ideas must be contemplated in the ideal world is obvious, since they themselves belong to that world, for like can only be known by like.

does not, therefore, follow that the present reminiscence is the first,—it may be the second, or even the third,—and it is possible that we have passed through several states of sensuous existence before attaining to this present. This, however, was a question which Plato might very well regard as of little importance, in a scientific point of view; all his statements regarding it are clothed in a mythical garb; and even though it may be not improbable that he did admit that the soul had migrated through several states of sensuous existence, the present is not the fitting place to decide upon the question.<sup>221</sup>

We shall now proceed to sum up the results of these investigations. To the mind of Plato ideas are real existence; all else, which is a mere similitude,—a resemblance to the ideas—is the sensible, which is perceived in time and space, comprehending the ideas, it is true, but still only in impurity and confusion. Since, then, ideas are the whole of real being, they are, consequently, the perfection and the measure of all being, so that sensible things exist only by the relation in which they stand to the true measure,—the ideas. This relation is not a likeness, but merely a resemblance, which is variably greater or less, and implies excess and deficiency in objects. Man himself, the cognisant soul, immersed in the flux of sensuousness, simply participates in the ideas, and, however he may, in infinite progression, assimilate himself, can never attain to their high excellency;

<sup>221</sup> The doctrine of the sensuous existence of the soul belongs to *Physics*, where Plato's opinion concerning it will be discussed more at large.

hence arises the necessity of the means, of which man avails himself for the purposes of life. Through these he enjoys sensuous perception, which again becomes the medium by which he acquires a knowledge of the ideas, since, by furnishing a resemblance to the real measure of things, it reminds him of his divine origin, and impels him, by pure reflection, to decompose the ideas which are confusedly blended in the sensible, and so to discover in himself, and in the eternal essence of things, the true measure and the true likeness. It is, therefore, in consequence of the sensuous perception becoming the occasion of evolving the ideas originally existent in the human mind, that true science results from sensuous cognition,<sup>222</sup> appearing, indeed, to be original and immediate, but being, in fact, acquired mediately through the senses.

Having thus attained to a clear understanding of Plato's opinions concerning the world of ideas and that of sense, we may now return to the question how and wherein he discovered a stable point, on which to rest the existence of the sensible world, and in what light he conceived the collateral existence of the two. The difficulty is obvious; for if the world of ideas comprises all being, and is the sole object of science, how can it be correct to speak of any other? Those, indeed, who are disposed to understand literally the statement in the *Timæus*, respecting the formation of the sensible world, may easily get rid of this diffi-

<sup>222</sup> *Meno*, p. 97, e. αἱ δόξαι αἱ ἀληθεῖς — οὐ πολλοὶ ἀξιαί εἰσιν, ὥς ἂν τις αὐτὰς δῆσῃ αἰτίας λογισμῷ· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ — ἀνάμνησις.



culty. In these statements God is represented as giving form to the world, and the leading conception is that the ideas are the archetypes of which sensible things are the copies; wherein it is naturally implied, that, besides ideas, there must be a something fitted to be the recipient of these images. This recipient is compared by Plato to the matter which is fashioned by the artificer;<sup>223</sup> and this illustration, which was subsequently employed by his successors as a fitting indication of the corresponding notion, is the basis on which his exposition of the subject rests throughout. This something, so difficult to indicate, and of which he does not pretend to have given a precise indication,<sup>224</sup> is essentially indeterminate and formless, but nevertheless fitted to receive all forms; for which very reason it does not bear any particular form, since, otherwise, it would but badly imitate the others.<sup>225</sup> It is an insensible<sup>226</sup> and figureless species, receiving all, partaking most incomprehensibly in the intelligible, and most difficult to be apprehended.<sup>227</sup> It is also represented

<sup>223</sup> Tim. p. 69, a.

<sup>224</sup> Tim. p. 48, c. Cf. Phileb. p. 54, c.

<sup>225</sup> Tim. p. 50, d. πλὴν ἄμορφον ὃν ἐκείνων ἀπασῶν τῶν ἰδεῶν, — ὅμοιον γὰρ ὃν τῶν ἐπισιόντων τιπὶ τὰ τῆς ἐναντίας τά τε τῆς τὸ παράπαν ἄλλης φύσεως, ὁπότ' ἔλθοι, δεχόμενον κακῶς ἂν ἀφομοιοῖ, τὴν αὐτοῦ παρεμφαίνον ὕψιν. διὸ καὶ πάντων ἐκτὸς εἰδῶν εἶναι χρεῶν τὸ τὰ πάντα ἐκδεχόμενον ἐν αὐτῷ γένει.

<sup>226</sup> If, in the Timæus, p. 30, a.; cf. 69, b., a visible matter, moving itself disorderly, is supposed, this supposition is, in the course of investigation, afterwards refuted as false and untenable. See *ibid.* p. 48, e.

<sup>227</sup> Tim. p. 51, a. ἀλλ' ἀόρατον εἶδος τι καὶ ἄμορφον, πανδεχές, μεταλαμβάνον δὲ ἀπορώτατά πῃ τοῦ νοητοῦ καὶ δυσαλωτότατον αὐτὸ λέγοντες οὐ ψευσόμεθα. This passage belongs certainly to the *δυσαλωτάτοις* in Plato; for it stands in direct contradiction, not only to that formerly adduced, but also to itself, inasmuch as it is impossible to say how that which is *ἄμορφον* can be

as the mass susceptible of every species of corporeal being, which, while the imparted forms are continually changing, remains constantly the same, however different it may appear at different times, in consequence of being moved and transformed by the several forms it enters into.<sup>228</sup> On this subject, however, Plato elsewhere expresses himself in a manner somewhat differently. Thus, according to a former statement, the corporeal is in something else, in which alone it has its production and decay. Now that in which it has this generation and corruption is space, which is incorruptible, and, subsisting always in the same manner, affords merely a locality to all the changeable modes which are generable and corruptible.<sup>229</sup>

an εἶδος, and how that which is παντῶν ἐκτὸς εἶδων may nevertheless be μεταλαμβάνον ἀπορώτατά πῃ τοῦ νοητοῦ. It has been shrewdly conjectured, that in this passage Plato intentionally availed himself of contradictory statements in order to indicate the inconceivableness of whatever is opposed to the ideas.

<sup>228</sup> Tim. p. 50, b. ὁ αὐτὸς δὴ λόγος καὶ περὶ τῆς τὰ πάντα δεχομένης σώματα φύσεως· ταυτὸν αὐτὴν αἰεὶ προσρηττόν· ἐκ γὰρ τῆς εὐανθῆς τὸ παράπαν οὐκ ἐξίσταται δυνάμει· δέχεται τε γὰρ αἰεὶ τὰ πάντα καὶ μορφήν οὐδεμίαν ποτὲ οὐδενὶ τῶν εἰσόντων ὁμοίαν εἰληφεν οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς· ἐκμαγεῖον γὰρ φύσει παντὶ κεῖται κινούμενόν τε καὶ διασχηματιζόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν εἰσόντων· φαίνεται δὲ δι' ἐκεῖνα ἄλλοτε ἄλλοιον. On the other hand, there is yet another passage in the Timæus, besides the one adduced, where Plato ascribes a disorderly motion to matter before the cosmopæia. It is in this same passage that he supposes traces in matter of the four elements, p. 52, d. sq.; cf. Polit. p. 273, b. This, to my mind, does not relate to pure matter, but is merely an hypothesis introduced to display more forcibly the ordering activity of God.

<sup>229</sup> Tim. p. 52, a. αἰσθητόν — γιγνόμενόν τε ἐν τινι τόπῳ καὶ πάλιν ἐκεῖθεν ἀπολλύμενον. — τρίτον δὲ αὐτὸ γένος ἐν τῷ τῆς χώρας αἰεὶ, φθορὰν οὐ προσδεχόμενον, ἔδραν δὲ παρέχον ὅσα ἔχει γένεσιν πᾶσιν, αὐτὸ δὲ μετ' ἀναισθησίας ἄπτον λογισμῷ τινὶ νόθῳ, μόγις πιστόν. Cf. Arist. Phys. iv. 2. K. F. Hermann translates λογισμῷ τινὶ νόθῳ by "approximative reasoning," (Heidlb. Jahrb. 1832, p. 1092,) which can hardly be correct. Nearer to the truth, perhaps, is the "Analogy" of Richter, de Id. Plat. p. 45. The phraseology is purposely so chosen as to render it impossible to associate with it any precise and determinate notion. We must be careful not to confound, as Richter has done, this conception with that formerly noticed.

Now, finding as we do, these different modes of view coexisting in the same scientific development, we cannot do otherwise than reject at once the opinion which has so often been maintained, under so many different forms, that Plato conceived matter to be an essence somehow existing, or a self-subsisting entity. For, as he compares matter with space, it must be obvious that he only sought for a somewhat whereby, and not wherein, the corporeal qualities may have a locality,—not a thing in which, but a condition by which, the sensible may be. Space, in which the different qualities are, by participation in the ideas, to be formed, must be conceived as a vacuum and nullity, which only is so far as it can so participate. In the next place, particular attention is due to the mythical character of his cosmogenical theory, and especially to the very strange expressions with which he introduces what he calls matter. While ideas are that which is knowable by the intellect, matter is represented as most incomprehensibly participating in the intelligible; and in order to indicate the operation by which the mind apprehends matter, which can neither be apprehended by the sense nor by the understanding, he employs a singular combination of terms, and invents for it the name of “bastard reasoning.”<sup>230</sup> Furthermore, the suspicion which these and similar expressions are calculated to awaken, that the

<sup>230</sup> Ibid. μετ' ἀναίσθησίας ἀπτόν λογισμῶ τινὶ νόθῳ, μόγις πισόν. That this punctuation of Bekker's is the correct one, is clear from the parallel between the object and the mode of cognition which runs through the whole of this disquisition.

cosmogenical statements, where matter is spoken of as a necessary mean, do not admit of a literal interpretation, is strongly confirmed, not only by a general consideration of his whole theory, but likewise by a more accurate examination of his doctrine of the relation subsisting between ideas and the sensible.

The process by which Plato arrived at this image or conception of matter, is far from enigmatical. After attributing to the world of sense a resemblance to the ideas, or, in other words, describing them as a copy of the ideal world, it followed that there must necessarily be something else wherein the copy could be formed, and this other something is matter. But as the ideal world is the totality of all truth, no truth or reality remains; whatever, therefore, is opposed to it, and consequently its copy, can only be so far real and true, as it has adopted into itself the idea, and has thereby a resemblance to it. This Plato clearly perceived, and he therefore boldly proceeds to shew in what manner this resembling image of the true is exhibited in a rare combination of entity and non-entity.<sup>331</sup> Now it is evident that the true and real element in this combination, is that which is imparted by the ideas to the sensible image; but

<sup>331</sup> Soph. p. 240, a. τί δῆτα, ὦ ξένη, εἰδῶλον ἂν φαῖμεν εἶναι πλὴν γε τὸ πρὸς τᾷ ἀληθινὸν ἀφωμοιωμένον ἕτερον τοιοῦτον; ἕτερον δὲ λέγεις τοιοῦτον ἀληθινόν, ἢ ἐπὶ τίνι τὸ τοιοῦτον εἶπες; Οὐδαμῶς ἀληθινόν γε, ἀλλ' εἰκόδες μὲν. Ἄρα το ἀληθινὸν ὄντως ὄν λέγων; Οὔτως. Τί δαί; τὸ μὴ ἀληθινὸν ἄρ' ἐναντίον ἀληθοῦς; Τί μὴν; Οὐκ ὄν ἄρα λέγεις τὸ εἰκόδες, εἶπερ αὐτό γε μὴ ἀληθινὸν ἐρεῖς. ἀλλ' ἔστι γε μὴν. Πῶς; Οὐκ ὄν ἀληθῶς γε φῆς. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν πλὴν γ' εἰκῶν ὄντως. Οὐκ ὄν ἄρ' οὐκ ὄντως ἐστὶν ὄντως ἢν λέγομεν εἰκόνα; Κινδυνεύει τοιαύτην τινὰ πεπλῆσθαι συμπλοκὴν τὸ μὴ ὄν τῷ ὄντι, καὶ μάλα ἄτοπον. Cf. de Rep. x. p. 597, a.

that the untrue and unreal, on the contrary, is that in which the copy is effected, or in which the ideas impress themselves, matter. It was principally this contradistinction that was the source of the Platonic system of ideas, and also of his doctrine of matter. Looking at the sensible, Plato could not but admit that it does not purely express the true, and yet, on the other hand, is not absolutely void of truth; and he consequently attempted the difficult task of distinguishing in the sensible that which is true from what is merely apparent; the former he considered to be the ideas; what remained, after excluding these from the sensible, must, according to the Platonic view of things, be regarded as the merely phenomenal and non-being.

In the *Timæus* itself there is much that justifies us in ascribing this view to Plato; for we there find the nature of the identical opposed to that of the *other*,<sup>232</sup> with which contradistinction we had previously become acquainted in the *Sophist*. If, then, as is clear from the distinction itself, the nature of the other stands for matter, in that case whatever is said of it must apply equally to matter. Now the idea of other is only used in relation to some particular entity, and indicates merely what this entity is not; therefore, generally a non-entity in relation to some other thing, and when thought of absolutely, in contrast to the ideas taken absolutely, it can only indicate absolute non-en-

<sup>232</sup> *Tim.* p. 35, a.; p. 37, a. sq. ἡ αὐτοῦ φύσις καὶ ἡ θατέρου. *Ibid.* p. 38, d. sq. ἡ θατέρου περίοδος, ἡ θατέρου φορά.

tity.<sup>233</sup> The result, therefore, of these considerations is evidently to regard the material as the negation of entity, and matter itself as absolute negation. And bearing in mind that, with Plato, the sensible, as contrasted with the determinate ideas, was regarded as the indeterminate and infinite, we shall discover a similar tendency to the same conclusion in his assertion, that in each of the ideas there is a multitude of entities, but an infinity of non-entities; but of entity itself, that it is truly one, and not infinite in number.<sup>234</sup>

From these passages it is clear that Plato admitted of no positive entity besides ideas, but, on the contrary, sought to derive from them alone whatever there is of truth in the phenomena of sense. It is also evident that the idea of relation is the medium of transition from the ideal to the sensible world, since the ideas of non-being and other can only be conceived under some relation. Now this representation, on the one hand, reminds us that the sensible itself is merely a relation,

<sup>233</sup> Soph. p. 238, c. συννοεῖς οὖν, ὡς οὔτε φθέγξασθαι δύνατον ὀρθῶς οὔτ' εἰπεῖν οὔτε διανοηθῆναι τὸ μὴ ὂν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό. Ibid. p. 257, b. ὁπόταν τὸ μὴ ὂν λέγωμεν, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐκ ἐναντίον τι λέγομεν τοῦ ὄντος, ἀλλ' ἕτερον μόνον. Ibid. p. 258, b. sq. καὶ δεῖ θαρρόυντα ἤδη λέγειν, ὅτι τὸ μὴ ὂν βεβαίως ἐστὶ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν ἔχον. — ἡμεῖς δὲ γε οὐ μόνον, ὡς ἐστὶ τὰ μὴ ὄντα ἀπεδείξαμεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ εἶδος δ' τυγχάνει ὂν τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἀπεφηνάμεθα· τὴν γὰρ θατέρου φύσιν ἀποδείξαντες οὐσάν τε καὶ κατακερματισμένην ἐπὶ πάντα τὰ ὄντα πρὸς ἀλλήλα, τὸ πρὸς τὸ ὂν ἕκαστον μόριον αὐτῆς ἀντιτιθέμενον ἐτολμήσαμεν εἰπεῖν, ὡς αὐτὸ τοῦτό ἐστιν ὄντως τὸ μὴ ὂν. Cf. Arist. Phys. i. 9.

<sup>234</sup> Soph. p. 256, e. περὶ ἕκαστον ἄρα τῶν εἰδῶν πολὺ μὲν ἐστὶ τὸ ὂν ἅπειρον δὲ πλήθει τὸ μὴ ὂν. — Καὶ τὸ ὂν ἄρ' ἡμῖν, ὅσαπέρ ἐστὶ τὰ ἄλλα, κατὰ τοσαῦτα οὐκ ἐστίν· ἐκεῖνα γὰρ οὐκ ὂν ἐν μὲν αὐτό ἐστιν, ἀπέραντα δὲ τὸν ἀριθμὸν τᾶλλα οὐκ ἐστὶν αὐτό.

inasmuch as the perceptible is only conceivable as relative to a percipient; but on the other, leads to several important applications in regard to ideas. In general, this idea of relation is of great importance in the mind of Plato. How great soever may be this domain of ideas, as conceived by Plato, he does not seem to have attempted to make his account of them the clearer by any precise and accurate division; all that he deemed indispensable, was to give some distinctive character for their recognition, and this appeared to him to be presented by the distinction between such ideas which possess an absolute essence, and those which are what they are merely in relation to some others.<sup>235</sup> And in reference hereto he raises the question, as one among the many difficulties involved in the doctrine of ideas, how, if the ideas are to be posited absolutely, a knowledge of them can be possible, for being absolutely in and by themselves, they cannot be in the sentient man.<sup>236</sup> Even those ideas which are only relative to others have an absolute essence in themselves, and not merely in relation to that which in the objects of our cognition resembles them, since this again is a something absolutely subsisting.<sup>237</sup> Moreover, when we attribute to God the idea of perfect science and perfect rule, and yet suppose these ideas to be absolute in themselves, the consequence fairly follows, that the science of God takes no cognition

<sup>235</sup> Parm. p. 133, c. ὅσαι τῶν ἰδεῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλας εἰσὶν, αἱ εἰσιν.

<sup>236</sup> Parm. p. 133, c. ὅτι οἶμαι ἂν καὶ σὲ καὶ ἄλλον, ὅστις αὐτὴν τινα καθ' αὐτὴν τίθεται εἶναι, ὁμολογῆσαι ἂν πρῶτον μηδεμίαν αὐτῶν εἶναι ἐν ἡμῖν.

<sup>237</sup> L. 1.

of us, since it subsists absolutely and in itself, and also that his power reaches not to us.<sup>238</sup> These difficulties point out very clearly their own solution. As they arose out of the supposition that these absolute ideas are without relation, either to each other or to us, they can only be removed by ascribing to them this double relativity. The mutual relation of ideas is, as shewn in the Sophist, indispensable to science, since without it both assertions and propositions would be impossible. It is, however, the reference of ideas to things that principally concerns us at present, in this attempt to ascertain Plato's real opinion as to the relation subsisting between the ideal and the sensible; for the latter is a mere relation to the sentient,—i. e. to man.

That Plato should have admitted the mutual relation of ideas can surprise no one; for as his whole ideal theory rests upon the necessity of defining ideas, and as his object was, on occasion of a definition, to follow from the lowest notion to the highest, that of God, he could not but admit of many relations,—relations of higher and lower orders of co-ordination, and consequently also of proximate and remote resemblance and ir-resemblance. However, it would appear, from a passage formerly quoted, that he sought to refer

<sup>238</sup> *Ibid.* p. 134, d. οὐκοῦν εἰ παρὰ τῷ θεῷ αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ ἀκριβεστάτη δεσποτεία καὶ αὕτη ἡ ἀκριβεστάτη ἐπιστήμη, οὐτ' ἂν ἡ δεσποτεία ἡ ἐκείνων ἡμῶν ποτὲ ἂν δεσπόσειεν, οὐτ' ἂν ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἡμᾶς γνοίη οὐδὲ τι ἄλλο τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν, ἀλλὰ ὁμοίως ἡμεῖς τ' ἐκείνων οὐκ ἄρχομεν τῇ παρ' ἡμῖν ἀρχῇ οὐδὲ γινώσκουμεν τοῦ θεοῦ οὐδὲν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ ἐπιστήμῃ, ἐκεῖνοί τε αὖ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον οὕτε δεσπότηται ἡμῶν εἰσὶν οὕτε γινώσκουσι τὰ ἀνθρώπεια πράγματα θεοὶ οὐκ οἶσιν.



to this mutual relation of ideas, their relation to man,—*i. e.*, their sensible manifestation. For it is not merely by their participating with activities and with corporeity, but also with each other, that in the conception ideas individually appear to be multiple.<sup>239</sup> But a participation or a communion of the ideas with each other, is only conceivable as a relation, and if it is from such a participation that the multiplicity of phenomena arise, this mutual relation must be the grounds of the sensible multiplicity.

In order to form any precise conclusion as to the sense of this Platonic doctrine, it is necessary to follow closely some very obscure allusions to it in his writings. Much too of what has been previously ascertained on the nature of the sensible, must for this purpose be kept in mind. But above all things, it is important to remember that Plato regarded the sensible as a mere confusion or jumble of opposite ideas. In discussing this point, he usually adduces the ideas of great and little;—the notion, he affirms, of great or greatness, as also of little or littleness, expresses something absolutely, and it is only by participating in these notions that objects can be said to be either great or little;<sup>240</sup> little, indeed, in relation to a certain greatness, and great in relation to a certain littleness;<sup>241</sup> so that herein is clearly implied a correlation of ideas. Now it may happen to an idea, not indeed so far

<sup>239</sup> De Rep. v. p. 476, a. καὶ περὶ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου καὶ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ καὶ πάντων τῶν εἰδῶν περὶ ὃ αὐτὸς λόγος, αὐτὸ μὲν ἐν ἑκαστον εἶναι, τῇ δὲ τῶν πράξεων καὶ σωμάτων καὶ ἀλλήλων κοινωνία πανταχοῦ φανταζόμενα πολλὰ φαίνεσθαι ἑκαστον.

<sup>240</sup> Phæd. p. 100, e.; p. 102, b.

<sup>241</sup> Ibid. p. 102, c.

forth as it is an idea in itself, but so far forth as it participates in, or stands in some relation to, other ideas,—to have greatness relatively to one and littleness to another; as for instance, Simmias not so far forth as he is Simmias, but so far forth as he has stature or magnitude, is taller than Socrates, and shorter than Phædo. It is thus shewn that an idea can at once be both great and little.<sup>242</sup> But at the same time it is observed that little can never be the great, nor conversely the great little, nor generally any idea become its contrary, either in itself or in man, nor in nature generally, but, as one approximates, the other becomes more remote.<sup>243</sup> Here, then, we have a communion of ideas both one with another, since great and little, and, generally, all such opposites, stand in relation to each other; and further with such other ideas, as those of Socrates and of Simmias. But the communion of notions which takes place in the sensuous perception is wholly different. Great and little, it is stated, are, indeed, perceived by the sight, not separately, but in combination, and it is this confusion of the senses that constrains

<sup>242</sup> Ibid. p. 102, b. ἀλλὰ γὰρ—ὁμολογεῖς τὸ τὸν Σιμμίαν ὑπερέχειν Σωκράτους οὐχ ὡς τοῖς ῥήμασι λέγεται, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἀληθές ἔχειν; οὐ γάρ που πεφυκέναι Σιμμίαν ὑπερέχειν, τούτῳ τῷ Σιμμίαν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τῷ μεγέθει, ὃ τυγχάνει ἔχων· οὐδ' αὖ Σωκράτους ὑπερέχειν, ὅτι Σωκράτης ὁ Σωκράτης ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ὅτι σμικρότητα ἔχει ὁ Σωκράτης πρὸς τὸ ἐκείνου μέγεθος; Ἀληθῆ.—Οὕτως ἄρα ὁ Σιμμίαν ἐπωνυμίαν ἔχει σμικρός τε καὶ μέγας εἶναι, ἐν μέσῳ ὧν ἀμφοτέρων, τοῦ μὲν τῷ μεγέθει ὑπερέχειν τὴν σμικρότητα παρέχων, τῷ δὲ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς σμικρότητος παρέχων ὑπερέχον.

<sup>243</sup> Phæd. p. 102, d. ἐμοὶ γὰρ φαίνεται οὐ μόνον αὐτὸ τὸ μέγεθος οὐδέποτε ἐθέλειν ἅμα μέγα καὶ σμικρὸν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν μέγεθος οὐδέποτε προσδέχασθαι τὸ σμικρὸν, οὐδ' ἐθέλειν ὑπερέχασθαι, ἀλλὰ δεῖν τὸ ἕτερον ἢ φεύγειν καὶ ὑπεκχωρεῖν, ὅταν αὐτῷ προσίῃ τὸ ἐναντίον, το σμικρὸν, ἢ προσελθόντος ἐκείνου ἀπολωλέναι.

reflection, in order to the attainment of clearness and precision, to review the two ideas separately, and not in commixture, for which purpose it is necessary to ask itself what greatness and littleness can be, and thereby it originates the idea of great and little in the thought, calling them in the latter case intelligible, in the former sensible.<sup>244</sup> Here, again, the connexion of the great with the little is supposed to be one of ideas, and the sensuous commixture is merely of these opposites. But it is evident from the general tenor of the two passages last cited, that the idea of great and little are not employed simply as instances, but rather as representatives of all opposite ideas, for the doctrine is not merely drawn from great and little, as perceived in sensible objects, but also from soft and hard, heavy and light, and from all other opposites which are blended together in the world of sense.<sup>245</sup> In the further prosecution of this investigation, one and number, as resulting from unity, are subsequently reckoned among the ideas which are perceived by the senses, in combination with their contraries, and thereby stimulate to the consideration of ideas in their absolute essence,

<sup>244</sup> De Rep. vii. p. 524, c. μέγα μὴν καὶ ὀψις καὶ μικρὸν ἔωρα, φάμεν, ἀλλ' οὐ κεχωρισμένον, ἀλλὰ συγκεχυμένον τι. ἡ γὰρ; Ναί. Διὰ δὲ τὴν τοῦτου σαφῆνειαν μέγα αὐ καὶ μικρὸν ἢ νόησις ἠναγκάσθη ἰδεῖν οὐ συγκεχυμένα ἀλλὰ διωρισμένα, τούναντίον ἢ ἐκείνη. Ἀληθῆ. Οὐκοῦν ἐντεῦθεν ποθεν πρῶτον ἐπέρχεται ἐρεῖσθαι ἡμῖν, τί οὖν ποτ' ἔστιν τὸ μέγα αὐ καὶ τὸ μικρὸν; Παντάπασιν μὲν οὖν. Καὶ οὕτω δὴ τὸ μὲν νοητόν, τὸ δ' ὁρατὸν ἐκατέσαμεν.

<sup>245</sup> De Rep. vii. p. 523, e. τί δὲ δὴ; τὸ μέγεθος αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν μικρότητα ἢ ὀψις ἄρα ἱκανῶς ὁρᾷ καὶ οὐδὲν αὐτῇ διαφέρει ἐν μέσῳ τινα αὐτῶν κείσθαι ἢ ἐπ' ἐσχάτῳ; καὶ ὡσαύτως πᾶχος καὶ λεπτότητα καὶ μαλακότητα καὶ σκληρότητα ἢ ἀφή; καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι αἰσθήσεις ἄρ' οὐκ ἐνδεῶς τὰ τοιαῦτα δηλοῦσιν; κ. τ. λ.

for we may see the individual both as one and also infinite in multitude.<sup>246</sup> Now, calling to mind Plato's mode of exposition in the *Philebus*, where the one and the many are considered in contradistinction to the infinite, as that which constitutes determinate magnitude and the knowable, we shall in some degree be able to see in the doctrine that ideas implant a measure into things, an explanation of their being denominated numbers and units,<sup>247</sup> and in the mixture of the contraries, one and multiple, the reason by which we are able to speak of the numbers of a body.<sup>248</sup> Now, if to this we add that great and little are only relatively to each other, that they allude to excess and deficiency, and that they are susceptible of infinite augmentation and diminution, we shall then have the whole of those conceptions which, according to Plato, have their centre in the sensible.

This, however, merely indicates the mutual enchainment of these conceptions, not their import in the mind of Plato, as explanatory of the sensible by ideas. In fact, we do not find in his Dialogues any detailed and clear information on this head; nevertheless, the passages already cited are sufficient to shew, that to explain this was an important object of his labours. Perhaps, therefore, we may be permitted to advance some conjectures

<sup>246</sup> Ibid. p. 524, d. sq. *ἅμα γὰρ ταῦτόν ὡς ἓν τε ὁρῶμεν καὶ ὡς ἄπειρα τὸ πλῆθος. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ τὸ ἓν, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ξύμπας ἀριθμοὺς ταῦτόν πέπονθε τοῦτο; Πῶς δ' οὐ;*

<sup>247</sup> *Tim.* p. 53, b.; *Phileb.* p. 15, a. b.

<sup>248</sup> *De Leg.* ii. 668, d. Ordinary numbers are, however, to be distinguished from the true or ideal numbers. *De Rep.* vii. p. 529, d. To the latter must be referred the perfect number. Ibid. viii. p. 546, b.

as to the manner in which he further developed this doctrine. The mode in which he supposed the sensible to be a junction of different and opposite ideas, is at least easily conceived; for assuredly, when he explained the sensible to be a confused representation of the truth, he rightly contemplated it under one aspect at least. Hereupon the question arises, how such a confused mode of presentation can be formed, for the sensuous presentation implies the existence of a sensuously presenting being. This Plato was so far from overlooking, that he derives sensation from the union of the soul with body, and makes the sensuous being arise as a third term out of the combination of same with other,<sup>249</sup> because the sensuous perception originates, not merely out of the union of different ideas, but also out of their union into an essential substance. The question, consequently, reduced itself to the necessity of shewing the possibility of such an imperfect and confused mode of presentation. For this purpose the supposition of an imperfect being is necessary, which it would almost appear that Plato by no means intended to deny, when he described the idea as the only truth and reality. For although the world of ideas in its totality—in God—is declared to be thoroughly perfect, and each single idea as having part in the highest idea to participate in this perfection, it may well admit of question, whether, nevertheless, each single idea in and by itself, and as an object of thought separately from the rest, is not conceived as defective,

<sup>249</sup> Tim. p. 35; p. 37, a. sq.

and not partaking in the fullness of entity. It would almost appear that the ideal theory itself necessarily leads to such a conclusion; for, as it investigated all the distinctions and contrarieties possible among ideas, it must have seen and admitted that each subordinate idea is devoid of something which another possesses. It is only this distinction between ideas, as individually separate, that could legitimate the supposition that there are ideas of evil, and of bad, and unlike, for it is merely in some exclusive relation, which prevails among them as individuals, and not in the aggregate of ideas, that such can have an existence. In reference to this opposition, Plato was justified in saying that a necessity subsists that there should always be something opposed to good,<sup>250</sup> a necessity whose nature he makes to correspond with that of matter.<sup>251</sup> Moreover it is only in reference to this contrariety of ideas, that it is lawful to say that each is one and not infinite in number. We have here, then, the view distinctly advanced, that the infinite and nonentity are not merely in the sensible, but also in the ideal, and it must, in all probability, have been accompanied with the admission, that excess and deficiency are also in them, as we have already seen Plato maintaining of the great and little. Furthermore, the infinite is opposed to unity, and number results from the union of the two; it is, therefore, clear that it is only by participating in infinity and unity, that ideas can be considered as numbers. Thus, in the ideas, every

<sup>250</sup> Theæt. p. 176, a. ὑπεναντίον γάρ τι τῷ ἀγαθῷ εἶναι ἀνάγκη.

<sup>251</sup> Tim. p. 56, c.

thing is represented which subsequently comes into being in the world of sensible phenomena, but he, nevertheless, appears to have denied to the ideas, absolutely in and by themselves, the possibility of generation, since each one, however limited it may be, is ever identical with itself. Now, the distance between the sensible phenomena and the ideal, as thus posited under a definite limitation, is not very considerable. In fact, if only we conceive the latter to participate in the cognitive reason, which resides in the absolute unity of good, their limited being will immediately involve a limited cognition, a mode of presentation incapable of discerning the true essence of things. Accordingly, we find the sensuous presentation to be the creation of the ideas in their state of separate subsistence. At the same time we must, consistently with the Platonic view, suppose that the cognitive essence strives after a perfect insight into things, and thereby produces the generation of sensible objects. In the determination of the question previously raised, it ought to be remembered, that as Plato understood the corporeal by the sensible, and the spiritual by the supra-sensible, he could not well do otherwise than attribute to the limited and subordinate idea an intellectual pursuit of the supreme idea, the good absolutely, in which he naturally saw a medium for the connexion of the subsisting and the becoming, which, however, a more accurate comparison of the supra-sensible and the spiritual would evince to be deceptive.<sup>252</sup>

<sup>252</sup> Compare herewith the polemic in the *Soph.* p. 248, sq., against those who posit the ideas simply as absolutely subsisting, and deny to them any

In the preceding investigation we have conscientiously abstained from looking aside to any traditional statements of the doctrines of Plato, over and above what is contained in his works, in order to see and to shew what light might be thrown from the Dialogues on a matter which is usually considered to have been lost with his unwritten doctrines. We shall now cast a rapid glance on the testimony of Aristotle, which entirely confirms our exposition of the connexion of all these doctrines.<sup>253</sup> According to this witness, Plato taught that the ideas are the primary cause of all else; and on this account regarded the elements of ideas to be those also of things; that the elements of ideas are the unit, the great and the little, and that he so opposed these to each other, as to derive the essence from the unit, but the matter from the great and the little.<sup>254</sup> The great and the little are also, by Aristotle, reduced to the idea of the infinite, expressly remarking, that the infinite is not merely in the sensible, but likewise in the

common interaction and passion. This assumption is refuted by shewing it to be impossible that νοῦς, and therefore also ξωή and κίνησις can be wanting to the παντελῶς ὄντι—i. e., to the ideas. In this argument the notion of δύναμις, which was first largely developed by Aristotle, is brought prominently forward.

<sup>253</sup> For a detailed and connected account of Aristotle's statements on this subject, the instructive little work, Platonis de Ideis et Numeris doctrina ex Aristotele illustrata. Scr. Fr. A. Trendelenburg, Lips. 1826, may be consulted and compared with Brandis' Treatise on Plato's Doctrine of Numbers in the Rhein. Museum f. Philol. u. s. w. iii. 4, p. 558, f. Our own remarks on the subject are necessarily brief, both because our design was to draw, wherever possible, from original sources alone, and also because the statements of Aristotle, for the most part, stand in need of an extensive commentary. That Aristotle drew from the ἀγραφα δογματα is likely, from Phys. iv. 2.

<sup>254</sup> Arist. Met. i. 6. ἐπεὶ δ' αἰτία τὰ εἶδη τοῖς ἄλλοις, τὰ κείνων στοιχεῖα ἀπάντων ψήθη τῶν ὄντων εἶναι στοιχεῖα· ὥς μὲν οὖν ἕλην τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρὸν εἶναι ἀρχάς, ὥς δ' οὐσίαν τὸ ἐν.



ideas,<sup>253</sup> and that, on this account, Plato assumed two species of the infinite—that of the great, and that of little, since both, in respect to deficiency and excess, may alike pass into infinity.<sup>256</sup> Moreover, Aristotle does not omit to observe, that great and little, or the principle of the material, may be referred to the idea of the other and the non-being, both in so far as they are combined in sensible things, and also as they are conceived separately from each other,<sup>257</sup> in the mode, *viz.*, in which they have their existence in the ideas, for both are nothing absolutely but merely relatively.<sup>258</sup> Now, although all these are rather confirmatory of the limits contained in Plato's writings, still there are some points alluded to so cursorily, that they would be perfectly unintelligible but for the fuller notice of them in Aristotle. This is especially the case with the mode in which the ideas are brought into connexion with those numbers, which, as different from the mathematical, are, by Plato and his followers, termed ideal numbers<sup>259</sup> (*ἀριθμοὶ εἰδητικοί*). The writings of Plato have familiarised us with the manner in which the terms unity, numbers, and ideas are there employed as

<sup>253</sup> Phys. iii. 4. Πλάτων δὲ—τὸ μέντοι ἄπειρον καὶ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς καὶ ἐν ἐκείναις (sc. ταῖς ἰδέαις) εἶναι.—Πλάτων δὲ δύο τὰ ἄπειρα, τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρόν. Ibid. c. 6.

<sup>256</sup> Ibid. iii. 6. ἐπεὶ καὶ Πλάτων διὰ τοῦτο τὰ δύο ἄπειρα ἐποίησεν, ὅτι καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν αὐξήσιν δοκεῖ ὑπερβάλλειν καὶ εἰς ἄπειρον ἵεναι καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν καθάίρεισιν.

<sup>257</sup> Phys. i. 9. οἱ μὲν τὸ μὴ ὂν τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρὸν ὁμοίως ἢ τὸ συναμφοτέρον ἢ τὸ χωρὶς ἐκάτερον. This is to explain the passage quoted from the Republic, vii. p. 524, c.

<sup>258</sup> Met. xiv. 1. πρὸς τι ἀνάγκη εἶναι τὸ μέγα καὶ μικρόν.

<sup>259</sup> See Trendelenburg, l. l. p. 71, sqq.

equivalent, and with his seeing numbers in bodies; but in Aristotle we further find, that the difference, according to Plato, between mathematical and ideal numbers, was this, that the former are capable of combination, the latter not,<sup>260</sup> since every number is like to all other numbers, but each idea is different from all the rest, but is a something self-subsisting and absolute.<sup>261</sup> Now, consistently with the whole ideal theory, this can only mean that the ideas are like to numbers, as comprising an infinity under a unity,<sup>262</sup> but different, inasmuch as they do not, like numbers, partake of unity all in the same manner, but each exhibits, as it were, different faces of the primal unit or of the good. They are each of them units of a peculiar species. In this statement of the matter there is evidently an historical reference to the Pythagorean doctrine, for Plato, while he approximated on the one hand to the Pythagorean mode of conceiving, found it necessary to give, on the other, some precise distinction between what the Pythagoreans called number, and what he called number and idea.

<sup>260</sup> Met. xiii. 8. There is, I think, a trace of this in Phæd. 101, b. c. The ideas are naturally uncombinable units or numbers, as being qualitatively different. This is asserted in the Soph. p. 261, sq., where, of nouns it is said that they cannot be combined except by means of the verbs: i. e., of becoming. Cf. Trendelenburg ad Arist. de Anima, p. 222, sq.

<sup>261</sup> Met. i. 6. *ἔτι δὲ παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητὰ καὶ τὰ εἶδη τὰ μαθηματικὰ τῶν πραγμάτων εἶναι φησι μεταξύ, διαφέροντα τῶν μὲν αἰσθητῶν τῶν τῷ ἀίδια καὶ ἀκίνητα εἶναι, τῶν δ' εἰδῶν τῷ τὰ μὲν πολλὰ ἅττα ὅμοια εἶναι, τὸ δὲ εἶδος αὐτὸ ἐν ἑκάστον μόνον.* Cf. Phileb. p. 56, d. The doctrine that the objects of mathematical science are intermediate between the sensible and ideas is unquestionably connected with the mode by which, as above noticed, Plato sought to deduce philosophy from the sensible through mathematics.

<sup>262</sup> Met. i. 6. *ἐξ ἐκείνων (sc. τοῦ μεγάλου καὶ τοῦ μικροῦ) γὰρ κατὰ μέθεξιν τοῦ ἑνὸς τὰ εἶδη εἶναι τοὺς ἀριθμούς.* Here the *μέγα καὶ μικρόν* stand as representatives of the contrariety and the thence resulting infinite.

As the tendency of the Pythagoreans was to reduce all to relations of magnitude, so, too, Plato admitted the importance of these relations of great and little, but, at the same time, considered it necessary to admit a qualitative as well as a quantitative difference.<sup>263</sup> In addition to these and similar expressions, more or less akin to the Pythagorean, which Plato employed in his exposition of the theory of ideas, and especially in his physics, many others are adduced by Aristotle, which serve to shew that his oral lessons were richer than his written works in ingenuous allusions of this kind. Among such, I reckon the notional determinations he is said to have given to the numbers up to ten,<sup>264</sup> the admission of an earlier and later in his ideal numbers,<sup>265</sup> and the analogy which he delighted to follow out between numbers, and the higher and lower sorts of conceptions and thoughts.<sup>266</sup> However, both the statements of Aristotle are so obscure, that they very well admit of being taken in a great variety of senses, and the matters themselves are, to our mind, very far from constituting the force and value of the Platonic philosophy; still, we cannot omit to observe, that our own conjecture, as to the mode in which Plato derives the generation of the sensible world from the imperfection of each idea or number in itself, seems to

<sup>263</sup> As such polemical notices of Pythagorean doctrines I consider Polit. p. 284, e. sq. ; de Rep. vii. p. 530, d.

<sup>264</sup> Phys. iii. 6.

<sup>265</sup> Met. xiii. 6.

<sup>266</sup> De An. i. 2. The division of the soul here given into νοῦς, ἐπιστήμη, δόξα and αἰσθησις, so often occurring in the spurious Pythagorean fragments, must not be confounded with that at the end of Rep. vi. into νόησις, διάνοια, πῖστις, and εἰκασία. Cf. Trendel. ad Arist. de An. p. 231, sqq.

derive some confirmation from the statements of Aristotle, for he mentions that numbers strive and long for unity, as for the good in itself.<sup>267</sup>

Thus, then, we find that Plato attempted to account for the existence of the sensible world, by the ideas alone, without recourse to any other nature alien and foreign to them. If we are required to pass an opinion as to the felicity or infelicity of the attempt, we must in candour admit that in the mediate ideas by which he attempts to make the transition from the ideal to the sensible, there is much that is vague and indeterminate. The source of this vagueness lies principally in the insufficiency of the distinction which he makes between different ideas, as indicating either a substantial and absolute entity, or a mere relation or property. To this must be added the vague and indeterminate sense of the Platonic idea of the essence which is exhibited by the ideas severally. In this respect Aristotle does not seem to be to blame, when he asks how ideas or numbers, which are without life,<sup>268</sup> can possibly have a desire or longing, notwithstanding that we are constrained to admit that, according to Plato, some ideas, at least, that of the soul for instance, must be supposed to be endued with life. Again, the distinction which is made between ideas in their unity and totality, and ideas in their opposition to each other, is ex-

<sup>267</sup> Eth. Eud. i. 8. παράβολος δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀπόδειξις, ὅτι τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ ἀγαθόν, ὅτι οἱ ἀριθμοὶ ἐφίενται· οὔτε γὰρ ὡς ἐφίενται λέγονται φανερώς, ἀλλὰ λίαν ἀπλῶς τοῦτό φασι, καὶ ὁρεῖν εἶναι, πῶς ἂν τις ὑπολάβοι ἐν οἷς ζῶη μὴ ὑπάρχει;

<sup>268</sup> Ibid.

tremely vague, although it is the basis on which the whole theory rests. If, moreover we admit that according to man's true and real nature, the world of ideas is his proper home, and that he there contemplated the true essence of things, as is implied in the doctrine of reminiscence, it becomes difficult to account for his removal from this perfect state of being, into the present imperfect existence. Finally, Plato was forced to have recourse to the notion, that there is an impelling necessity in the second causes, the ground of which was the supposition, that there must be a somewhat opposite to good. In this there is undoubtedly contained a very ancient cast of thought, still the very indefinite nature of this necessity shews, that after all his attempts to reconcile the supra-sensible with the sensible, Plato still found in it something inexplicable. This much at least is certain, that on the one hand, the tendency of his views was to refer all real entity to the immutable ideas, and consequently to consider the sensible more as an unsubstantial shadow than a reality; while on the other, he seems never to have forgotten that the only point of view from which philosophical speculation is possible, lies in the sensible, and so again the reality of the sensible appears to be a necessary supposition of his system. In these two tendencies, we may recognise the well-balanced and measured character of his mind. However, to discover their true connexion was granted neither to Plato, nor his age; he saw the enigma, not the solution; can we wonder then that he should have

had recourse to many vague and loose conceptions, in order to explain it, none of which however eventually satisfied his own mind.

The dialectic of Plato however great its defects may be estimated, presents nevertheless a worthy image of the pure philosophical feeling. This Plato made to be grounded in love and a longing after the eternal ideas, by the contemplation of which the mortal soul sustains itself, and by perpetual renovation becomes participant in immortality. Stimulated by such a desire the philosophical mind or soul, strives to attain as far as possible to a perfect remembrance of ideas which are the eternal essence of things, the memory of them being awakened by sensible phenomena, which are resemblances of the ideas and real entity, and thereby serve as means by which the cognition of real being becomes attainable. But while the sensible, by bringing to mind this resemblance to real entity, is subservient to the efforts of the reasonable soul, it also impedes and limits it in its pursuits of the true, since the sensuous representations contain as much of ir-resemblance as of resemblance. But the greatest impediment to philosophical investigation arises from the constant flux of sensation which allows it no stability. Flowing on in a continual series of production and decay, sensible things change their state every moment and never exhibit the full perfection of the subsistent. They comprise at once entity and non-entity, and it is not the true standard and the all-sufficient, which they represent, but only the relative, which constantly

varies by greater or less from the measure of the true and substantive entity. It was to this that Plato looked when he thought he had discovered in the ideas of the other and the relatively great and little, the grounds of the sensible matter of mutability. But contingent being is only for the absolute, a mean merely by which the resemblance to ideas is manifested in sensible things, and viewed in this light, ideas must appear as the ends of sensible existence, and as the standard by which the true therein is to be measured. A multiplicity of ends having been admitted, it followed that there must also be a last end,—a ultimum in the realm of ideas,—therefore a supreme idea. This result follows also from the consideration of the mutual relation of ideas, for one idea must be explained by another, and thus we proceed through a series of subordinate ideas up to higher and higher, in order to reduce them by a legitimate synthesis into unity, until at last we arrive at the highest idea, and then again, by a converse method, to descend by analysis from the supreme unity to the multiplicity of subordinate ideas. In this higher and lower ordination, each subordinate idea requires to be explained by a higher one, and appears merely as a supposition, until it is shewn by the latter to be legitimate. But from such hypotheses or suppositions the mind must at last arrive at that which implies nothing else, and is in itself sufficient; of this kind is the nature of good, which, exhausting all true entity, is itself in want of nothing, but is desired by all. This idea of good, or God, is consequently the

keystone of all rational investigation. It embraces whatever subsists without difference, in time or space,—all truth and science, all substances, and all reason, being neither reason nor essence, but being superior to, unites both within itself. It is the source of motion to all, for all has a desire towards it, and consequently it is the mistress of all generation in which nought is true beyond its resemblance to the good. However, from some impelling necessity, evil, the opposite of good, is in generation mixed up with it. Man, therefore, as living in this scene of production and decay, cannot attain to a complete knowledge of the unity of good, for to him truth, and the science of truth, appear in opposition to each other, and it is not permitted to mortal nature to contemplate the eternal, in its absolute essence, but merely as shadowed forth in the temporal. God, then, is the good itself, of which this sensible world is only an image. But in the present world it ought to be man's endeavour to enlarge and cultivate his science, in order, that by attaining to as pure a knowledge as possible of the multiplicity of ideas, he may be able to discern therein, however imperfectly, the unity of truth and science which subsists in the good.

These then are the general scientific results of the Platonic theory, Plato however could scarcely have thought that he had therein exhausted every topic worthy of the philosopher's attention. If the world of sense, and man in it, ought to become the image of the good, and it be possible in the philosopher to attain to a knowledge of



himself in all his moral relations,<sup>269</sup> or to investigate man's nature and peculiar character and duties,<sup>270</sup> it is clear that his aim must not be directed solely to the cognition of absolute good, as manifested in the sensible world, but also to examine as far as possible into the conditions under which it is produced, and what man, or generally the reason, has to do, in order to co-operate in its production. It belongs therefore to philosophy to investigate the secondary causes of corporeal nature, and its relations to the soul and to reason, through which the evolution of good is to proceed; and also to determine all the special and general ends to which intellectual activity directs itself:—in short, physiology and ethics must accompany dialectical investigations.

<sup>269</sup> Phæd. p. 229, e.

<sup>270</sup> Theæt. p. 174, b.

## CHAPTER IV.

### THE PHYSICS OF PLATO.

THE connexion between the Physics<sup>1</sup> and the Dialectic of Plato lies principally in two points,—the idea of contingency or becoming, and that of real being, which is at once the all-sufficient and good, and the true end of all becoming; for with Plato the physical is but the transition from non-entity to entity.

It is to the idea of becoming that his general view of Physics attaches itself. Nature, in the proper sense<sup>2</sup> of the word, is a constant state of inchoation; the corporeal is invariably changing, and as thought must always resemble its object-matter, the knowledge of nature must, therefore, be variable,<sup>3</sup> and can in no wise be compared with that perfect science whose object is the unproduced, the eternally subsisting; it is nothing more than a body of opinions founded upon irrational

<sup>1</sup> There is much that is valuable, and much also that is very vague, in the work of Lechtenstadt's *Platon's Lehren aus d. Gebiete d. Naturforschung* u. d. *Heilkunde*, Leipz. 1816, 8vo.

<sup>2</sup> *φύσις* is occasionally employed for *οὐσία*, essence or idea. s. q. *Tim.* p. 37, d.; *Crat.* p. 390, e.

<sup>3</sup> *Tim.* p. 27, d. "Ἔστιν οὖν δὴ κατ' ἐμὴν δόξαν πρῶτον διαρετέον τάδε· τί τὸ ὄν αἰεί, γένεσιν δὲ οὐκ ἔχον, καὶ τί τὸ γιγνόμενον μὲν αἰεί, ὄν δὲ οὐδέποτε· τὸ μὲν δὴ νύησει μετὰ λόγου περιληπτόν, αἰεὶ κατὰ ταῦτά ὄν, τὸ δ' αὖ δόξῃ μετ' αἰσθήσεως ἀλόγου δοξαστόν, γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀπολλύμενον, ὥντως δὲ οὐδέποτε ὄν. *Ibid.* p. 29, d. "Ὡστε περὶ τούτων τὸν εἰκότα μῦθον ἀποδεχόμενους πρέπει τούτου μηδὲν ἔτι πέρα ζητεῖν. *Ibid.* p. 37, b.; *Phileb.* p. 59, a. s.

sensation, and is as variable in the thought as nature itself in the becoming. Plato accordingly requires of us not to look for the same degree of accuracy and precision in the doctrine of nature, as is attainable in Dialectic, since the latter science alone is conversant about pure ideâs.

However consistent with the general character of Plato's theory, it was to deny to physical inquiries all pretensions to pure science, it is far from improbable, that he was also influenced, in some degree, by the uncertainty which naturally prevailed in the infancy of physics, and the inadequate and meagre results of observation among the Greeks.<sup>4</sup> But if these considerations indispose us to expect the same precision in the Physics of Plato, as in his Dialectic, any expectation of this kind will be still further diminished, when we find him evincing less inclination for physical than for ethical questions. This is manifest not only from particular passages,<sup>5</sup> but still more so from the fact, that it is only in the *Timæus* that we meet with any extensive or detailed evolution of physical doctrines, whereas moral disquisitions pervade more or less every one of his numerous dialogues. This, likewise, is the reason why, in this department of philosophy, he is more dependent than in the others upon the pre-Socratic philosophy. Hence, he delivers his physical doctrines by the mouth of a Pythagorean, and consequently the *Timæus* is more strongly tinctured with Pythagorism than any other of his

<sup>4</sup> Conf. *Tim.* p. 72, d.

<sup>5</sup> Thus, in *Tim.* p. 59, c., physical inquiries into details are said to serve as a relief from the more profound investigations into eternal being.

dialogues; and it is, therefore, extremely difficult to determine, at times, what belongs to the mere form of exposition, and what is really offered as a probable result of careful investigation and research.

Now becoming, which is the necessary and inseparable condition of nature, has its ground in the absolutely indeterminate, which later philosophers designated by the term matter. Matter, which is a physical hypothesis, having its ground, as already shewn, in dialectic, serves to indicate that which, in becoming, is susceptible of different determinations. It is, therefore, represented as the receptacle, and, as it were, the nurse or mother of all production,<sup>6</sup> while God, or the sum of all ideas, is the father and fashioner of the universe.<sup>7</sup> It is also described as one and the same with space, which furnishes a place for all generate things;<sup>8</sup> in which description we discover the ground upon which Plato connected whatever becomes with the corporeal<sup>9</sup>, for this alone is in space. This principle of nature is, therefore, without form, without an *idea*, and it is only in the productions of the formative energy, and the all-susceptible nature—in the son of the father and the mother—that there is form and determinate idea.<sup>10</sup> In conformity

<sup>6</sup> Tim. p. 49, d. πάσης εἶναι γενέσεως ὑποδοχήν αὐτό, ὅλον τιθήνην.

<sup>7</sup> Tim. p. 28, a.; 50, d.; Phileb. p. 27, b.

<sup>8</sup> Tim. p. 52, a.

<sup>9</sup> Tim. p. 31, b. σωματοειδές—δεῖ τὸ γενόμενον εἶναι.

<sup>10</sup> Tim. p. 50, c. ἐν δ' οὖν τῷ παρόντι χρὴ γένῃ διανοηθῆναι τριττά, τὸ μὲν γιγνόμενον, τὸ δ' ἐν ᾧ γίγνεται, τὸ δ' ὅθεν ἀφομοιούμενον φύεται τὸ γιγνόμενον. καὶ δὴ καὶ προσεικάσαι πρέπει τὸ μὲν δεχόμενον μητρὶ, τὸ δ' ὅθεν πατρὶ, τὴν δὲ μεταξὺ τούτων φύσιν ἐκγόνῳ, νοῆσαι τε, ὥς οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως ἐκτυπώματος ἔσεσθαι μέλλοντος ἰδεῖν ποικίλου πάσας ποικιλίας

with these express statements, we must consider matter as utterly devoid of any primal property, or determinate form and fashion; and if, at times, it would seem that Plato would ascribe to it a certain disorderly motion, we must explain this appearance as a merely figurative mode of representation, intended to throw out, in a stronger light, the opposition between the orderly being in the ideas, and the necessity of becoming out of them.

It is this being of ideas that gives to natural phenomena their true import, as the good for whose sake all is, and from which things must derive their form and fashion; so that relatively to this second principle of natural objects, matter is absolutely passive, and only exists in consequence of man's inability, without it, to conceive or to apprehend the divine subsistence of the ideas and the good, or to become participant therein.<sup>11</sup> Matter, therefore, is nothing more than the condition of all natural existence, which, however, is a necessary condition, and so causes the natural itself to appear as necessary; whereas the shape which is received from the good, is that which, under this condition, comes into being, and has its actual existence in nature. It is evident that, consistently with this view, the Platonic physics must confine itself to the investigation of the final causes of the

τοῦτ' αὐτό, ἐν ᾧ ἐκτυπούμενον ἐνίσταται, γένοιτ' ἂν παρσκευασμένον εὔ, πλὴν ἄμορφον δὲν ἐκείνων ἀπασῶν τῶν ἰδεῶν, ὅσας μέλλοι δέχεσθαι ποθεν.

<sup>11</sup> Tim. p. 68, e. δὴ δὲ χρὴ δὴ αἰτίας εἶδη διορίζεσθαι, τὸ μὲν ἀναγκαῖον, τὸ δὲ θεῖον, καὶ τὸ μὲν θεῖον ἐν ἅπασι ζητεῖν κτήσεως ἕνεκα εὐδαίμονος βίον, καθ' ὅσον ἡμῶν ἢ φύσις ἐνδέχεται, τὸ δὲ ἀναγκαῖον ἐκείνων χάριν, λογιζομένους ὡς ἄνευ τούτων οὐ δυνατὰ αὐτὰ ἐκείνα, ἐφ' οἷς σπουδάζομεν, μόνᾳ κατανοεῖν, οὐδ' αὖ λαβεῖν, οὐδ' ἄλλως μετασχεῖν. Cf. Phileb. p. 28, c. sq.

several forms and dispositions of nature, and wholly neglect whatever it is impossible to refer to some determinate end. The physiology of Plato is consequently teleologic throughout. Every lover, he says, of reason and science, delights to trace those first causes which derive from a rational nature, but regards as second and derivatory all such as, arising from other things, are both themselves moved, and by necessity impart their motion to others, *i. e.*, mechanical causes, since the former effect, by reason and design, the beautiful and the good, whereas the latter, being devoid of intelligence, work disorderly and at hazard.<sup>12</sup>

As the object of Plato in his physical investigations was to give as perfect an account as possible of the origin and composition of the sensible world, he naturally proceeded, first of all, to determine the question whether the world had existed from eternity, or had a beginning. The latter is the case, for it is visible and tangible, and has a body; now all such is sensible, and the sensible is not eternal but produced.<sup>13</sup> But whatever is produced must necessarily have a cause of its production; <sup>14</sup> the world, therefore, must have a cause. As, then, Plato was directly opposed to, and rejected the view which would derive the origin of

<sup>12</sup> Tim. p. 46, d. τὸν δὲ νοῦ καὶ ἐπιστήμης ἐραστὴν ἀνάγκη τὰς τῆς ἔμφρονος φύσεως αἰτίας πρώτας μεταδιώκειν. ὅσαι δὲ ὑπ' ἄλλων μὲν κινουμένων, ἕτερα δ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης κινούντων γίνονται, δευτέρας—λεκτέα μὲν ἀμφοτέρα τὰ τῶν αἰτιῶν γένη, χωρὶς δ' ὅσαι μετὰ νοῦ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν δημιουργοὶ καὶ ὅσαι μονωθεῖσαι φρονήσεως τὸ τυχρὸν ἄτακτον ἐκάστοτε ἐξεργάζονται. Ibid. p. 68, d. sq.; Phæd. p. 97, b. sq.

<sup>13</sup> Tim. p. 28, b.

<sup>14</sup> Tim. p. 28, a. πᾶν δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ γιγνόμενον ὑπ' αἰτίου τινὸς ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίνεσθαι.

things from a nature acting spontaneously and without design, and, on the contrary, referred every thing to a rational and intelligent cause,<sup>15</sup> he formed the idea of a father and fashioner of the universe, who, with reason, accomplishes all natural events. The operations of this cause proceed necessarily according to an idea, which serves as the pattern of all that is to come into being. Now there may be two species of patterns, one eternal and immutable, the other begotten and perishable;<sup>16</sup> but it is not after the latter that God fashioned the world, for the world is the most beautiful of the works of God, who is the best of causes,<sup>17</sup> who, therefore, a stranger to envy, seeks to make every thing as much as possible after his own likeness. The world, consequently, is an image made after a resemblance to that which is best, and reduced from disorderly motion into order, because order is better than disorder.<sup>18</sup>

In order, therefore, that the world might be

<sup>15</sup> Soph. p. 265, c.

<sup>16</sup> The *γεννητὸν* or *γεγονὸς παράδειγμα* (Tim. p. 23, b. e.) is explained, *ibid.* p. 69, e., where it is represented by *ζῶον θνητὸν* and *εἶδος ψυχῆς θνητὸν*, which are not formed by God, but by the created gods. Cf. also Theat. p. 176, e.

<sup>17</sup> Tim. p. 29, a. *εἰ μὲν δὴ καλὸς ἐστὶν ὕδὲ ὁ κόσμος ὃ τε δημιουργὸς ἀγαθός, ὁ δὴλον, ὥς πρὸς τὸ αἰδίου ἐβλεψεν· εἰ δέ, ὃ μὴδ' εἰπεῖν τινὶ θέμις, πρὸς τὸ γεγονὸς.*

<sup>18</sup> L. l. *τούτων δὲ ὑπαρχόντων αὐ καὶ πᾶσα ἀνάγκη τόνδε τὸν κόσμον εἰκόνα τινὸς εἶναι. — λέγωμεν δὴ, δι' ἥντινα αἰτίαν γένεσιν καὶ τὸ πᾶν τόδε ὁ ξυνιστάς ξυνέστησεν. ἀγαθὸς ἦν, ἀγαθῷ δὲ οὐδεὶς περὶ οὐδενὸς οὐδέποτε ἐγγίγνεται φθόνος· τούτου δ' ἐκτὸς ὧν πάντα ὅτι μάλιστα γενέσθαι ἐβουλήθη παραπλήσια ἑαυτῷ. ταύτην δὴ γενέσεως καὶ κόσμον μάλιστ' ἂν τις ἀρχὴν κυριωτάτην παρ' ἀνδρῶν φρονίμων ἀποδεχόμενος ὀφθότατα ἀποδέχοιτ' ἂν. βουλευθεὶς γὰρ ὁ θεὸς ἀγαθὰ μὲν πάντα, φλαῦρον δὲ μὴδὲν εἶναι κατὰ δύναμιν, οὕτω δὴ πᾶν ὅσον ἦν ὁρατὸν παραλαβὼν οὐχ ἡσυχίαν ἄγον, ἀλλὰ κινούμενον πλημμελῶς καὶ ἀτάκτως εἰς τάξιν αὐτὸ ἤγαγεν ἐκ τῆς ἀταξίας, ἡγησάμενος ἐκεῖνο τούτου πάντως ἄμεινον.*

good, and similar to its artificer, God reflected and found that no visible and irrational thing, as a whole, is better than another, which has intelligence, considered as a whole; and at the same time that without a soul the possession of reason is impossible; he, therefore, made the universe, placing intelligence in the soul, and the soul in the body,<sup>19</sup> because body is indispensable to all generated things.<sup>20</sup> We may, therefore, say that the divine Providence made the world, an ensouled rational and living being.<sup>21</sup> In this union, the soul is the mean which connects the eternal and indivisible nature of reason with the changeable and divisible nature of the corporeal, the power of God having combined *the other*, whose nature is impatient of mixture, with *the like*.<sup>22</sup> In all this we have nothing more than the expression of Plato's opinion, that the divine reason cannot manifest itself in the generated world, except as a generated reason, which, therefore, must of necessity participate in body. In the opinion of Plato the

<sup>19</sup> Tim. p. 30, a. λογισάμενος οὖν εὑρισκεν, ἐκ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ὁρατῶν οὐδὲν ἀνόητον τοῦ νοῦν ἔχοντος ὅλον ὅλον κάλλιον ἔσεσθαι ποτ' ἔργον, νοῦν δ' αὖ χωρὶς ψυχῆς ἀδύνατον παραγενέσθαι τῷ· διὰ δὲ τὸν λογισμὸν τόνδε νοῦν μὲν ἐν ψυχῇ, ψυχὴν δὲ ἐν σώματι ξυνιστάς τὸ πᾶν ξυντεκταίνετο, ὅπως ὅτι κάλλιστον εἶη κατὰ φύσιν ἀριστόν τε ἔργον ἀπειργασμένος.

<sup>20</sup> Tim. p. 31, b. σωματοειδὲς δὲ δὴ καὶ ὁρατὸν ἀπτόν τε δεῖ τὸ γενόμενον εἶναι.

<sup>21</sup> Tim. p. 30, b.

<sup>22</sup> Tim. p. 34, e. τῆς ἀμερίστου καὶ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταῦτ' ἔχουσας οὐσίας καὶ τῆς αὖ περὶ τὰ σώματα γιγνομένης μεριστῆς, τρίτον ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἐν μέσῳ ξυνεκράσατο οὐσίας εἶδος, τῆς τε ταύτου φύσεως αὖ περὶ καὶ τῆς θατέρου καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα ξυνέστησεν ἐν μέσῳ τοῦ τε ἀμεροῦς αὐτῶν καὶ τοῦ κατὰ τὰ σώματα μεριστοῦ. καὶ τρία λαβὼν αὐτὰ ὄντα ξυνεκράσατο εἰς μίαν πάντα ἰδέαν, τὴν θατέρου φύσιν δύσμικτον οἶσαν εἰς ταῦτόν συναρμόττον βίᾳ. The context clearly proves that the soul or sensible is the question in hand, and not the mathematical, as some have supposed.



soul is nothing but a generated reason, and is therefore, in a natural union, at once, with reason and with matter, the condition of all generation or becoming.

After establishing in this manner the doctrine that the world is an animate being, Plato proceeds to advance some more negative determinations concerning it, in order that the imperfections of other living beings might not be attributed to it. The world, being made, after the exemplar of the perfect one, must be as perfect as is possible in the case of matter, and on this account also, nothing in matter must be wanting to it. There is, therefore, but one world. The opinion that there is an infinity of worlds, is by Plato treated with perfect contempt, as one which they alone can entertain, who are totally ignorant of the sphere and extent of man's knowledge, referring evidently to the doctrine that every species of infinite overpasses cognition; but, on the other hand, he appears to consider the question, whether there is not a certain definite number of worlds, as more worthy of discussion.<sup>23</sup> There is, however, but *one* world; for creation is fashioned after a single exemplar, which comprises all the several patterns of living beings, and which cannot with another be second, for then the *Ideæ* which embraces these two, would be the true prototype.<sup>24</sup> In this reasoning Plato, without doubt, had in

<sup>23</sup> Tim. p. 55, c. The number five is chosen for the instance, on account of the four elements, which collectively form the fifth figure of the world.

<sup>24</sup> Tim. p. 31, a.

view the necessity of all lower ideas being comprised in one highest; and that the world can only resemble the supreme idea which embraces all others, as a unity to a unity, is implied in the doctrine that the world is an image of the good. Equally connected herewith, in his mind, was the opinion that the world as the work of God, must be perfect, and subject neither to age nor decay; which moreover, would not be possible if there existed any other material power besides itself to exert upon a dissolving and destructive action.<sup>25</sup> The world, therefore, is indissoluble except by him by whom it was composed, who, however, will never dissolve it, since it is only the evil who would destroy what has been beautifully made.<sup>26</sup>

The world, then, being a unity, besides which nothing material exists, it is naturally devoid of all those organs which individual animals possess either for the perception of, or of operating upon, outward objects, or for the reception and secretion of food; but it is constructed with such skill and art, as to have in and of itself every necessary action and passion.<sup>27</sup> In order that it might be able to contain in itself all animals, it is requisite that it comprise every possible figure; it is therefore spherical, fashioned after the most perfect

<sup>25</sup> Tim. p. 33, a.

<sup>26</sup> Tim. p. 32, c. ἄλυτον ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων, πλὴν ὑπὸ τοῦ ξυνδῆσαντος. Ibid. p. 38, b.; p. 41, a. τό γε μὴν καλῶς ἀρμοσθῆναι καὶ ἔχον εὖ λύειν ἰθέλειν κακοῦ.

<sup>27</sup> Tim. p. 33, c. sq. πάντα ἐν ἑαυτῷ καὶ ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ πάσχον καὶ δρῶν ἐκ τέχνης γέγονεν.

and symmetrical of forms, and every way even and smooth; <sup>28</sup> by which description the close unity of the universe is apparently intended. As a sphere, the world is naturally without either upper or lower. As a living being, and participating in the corporeal, it possesses a motion, which is the most perfect possible, and without aberration—the circular movement which carries it, uniformly, round, both in the same and in itself, and has its principle in itself, like to the movement of the reason, which is operated by and in the reason and returns into itself.<sup>29</sup>

As, now, Plato supposed the world to consist of a body and a soul, and derived from the corporeal nature all the changes of the latter, he insisted the more carefully upon the position that the body exists only for the soul, and that the latter, consequently, must be considered as the ground of the corporeal, since the soul is the source of motion, for no soulless thing is capable of moving itself.<sup>30</sup> But as the principle must be antecedent to its derivatory, the soul must be earlier than the body. Again; as God does not permit the younger to rule over the elder; and the soul governs the body, it must, therefore, be more ancient than the

<sup>28</sup> Tim. p. 33, b. By figures we must understand the regular bodies. The sphere, which, after the Pythagoreans, is used as equivalent with the dodecaedron, contains all other regular bodies.

<sup>29</sup> Tim. p. 34, a. *κίνησιν γὰρ ἀπένειμεν αὐτῷ τῶν ἑπτὰ τὴν περὶ νοῦν καὶ φρόνησιν μάλιστα οὔσαν. διὸ δὴ κατὰ ταῦτα ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ περιαγαγὼν αὐτό, ἐποίησε κύκλῳ κινεῖσθαι στρεφόμενον. τὰς δὲ ἕξ ἀπάσας κινήσεις ἀφείλεν καὶ ἀπλανὲς ἀπειργάσατο ἐκείνων.* Ibid. p. 88, e. *τῶν δ' αὖ κινήσεων ἡ ἐν αὐτῷ ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἀρίστη κίνησις, μάλιστα γὰρ τῇ διανοητικῇ τοῦ παντὸς κινήσει ξυγγενής.* De Leg. x. p. 897, c. sq.

<sup>30</sup> Phædr. p. 245, c.

body.<sup>31</sup> It is hardly necessary to remind the intelligent reader of the necessity of separating, in these and similar doctrines, that which belongs to the purely narrative character of exposition, and what belongs to the fundamental thought. The narration of the cosmopœia details as a series of successive events what properly ought to be understood as the coexistent connexion of cause and effect. For instance, the mundane soul, as the ground of all corporeal shapes, is made to be diffused throughout all, in order that it may exercise universal sway. On this account the corporeal appears as its organ, and in this respect sensation is ascribed even to the elementary bodies.<sup>32</sup> Now, notwithstanding the diffusion of the soul throughout the world, it has ascribed to it, in order to indicate its unity, a particular seat in the centre from which it extends its action and influence to the utmost heaven, which it expands around itself, and with which, as a body, invests itself, and so returning again into itself it began a divine commencement of an endless and intellectual existence for all time.<sup>33</sup> The universal soul is next considered as the principle of all particular souls, which derive from it their origin and sustenance.<sup>34</sup> In this description we recognise again that tendency so prevalent throughout

<sup>31</sup> Tim. p. 34, b.; de Leg. x. p. 896, d.

<sup>32</sup> Tim. p. 61, c.

<sup>33</sup> Tim. p. 34, b. ψυχὴν δὲ εἰς τὸ μέσον αὐτοῦ θεῖς διὰ παντός τῆ ἔτεινε καὶ ἔτι ἔξω τὸ σῶμα αὐτῇ περιεκάλυψε. Ibid. p. 36, e. ἡ δ' ἐκ μέσου πρὸς τὸν ἔσχατον οὐρανὸν πάντα διαπλακείσα κύκλῳ τε αὐτὸν ἔξωθεν περιεκαλύψασα αὐτῇ τε ἐν αὐτῇ στρεφομένη θείαν ἀρχὴν ἤρξατο ἀπαύστου καὶ ἔμφορος βίου πρὸς τὸν ζῦμπαντα χρόνον.

<sup>34</sup> Phileb. p. 30, a.

the Platonic philosophy, to derive the particular from the universal, which also gives rise to the thought that the mundane body, as opposed to the soul, must similarly be the principle of production and sustenance to all individual bodies.<sup>35</sup>

Now, as Plato maintained that the corporeal is the seat of perpetual change, he could not consistently attribute to it any permanent character, and in the attempt to give a close determination of its nature, must confine himself to an enumeration of the forms, which the becoming necessarily passes through in space. These are the four elements which he looks upon as so many modes of the corporeal, and consequently says of them, that each may transmute itself into the others.<sup>36</sup> As to their nature, Plato usually expresses himself in two different ways; looking, in the one to the geometrical figure of bodies, and, in the other, to the sensible qualities under which the elements appear. It is at once obvious that in the former he considers the matter from the lofty position of the most general point of view, while in the latter he takes an humbler view of them, from the relation which sensible things stand in to the perception of individual beings. Hence, even the sensations which the elements excite, are referred to their corporeal figures. But even on general grounds, since he considered the indeterminate basis of the corporeal to be space, he was forced to look upon its determinate forms as special figures. The mode, however, in which he deduces them is, like much more in

<sup>35</sup> Phileb. p. 29, a. sq.

<sup>36</sup> Tim. p. 49, a. sq.

the *Timæus*, very Pythagorean, and on this account we are indisposed to give out the statement on this head, as a steady conviction of Plato's mind. It attaches itself to the general position, that harmony and regularity in the relations of body, are better than their contraries, and on this ground the five regular bodies are made the basis of distinction in the elementary forms; the pyramid being made to correspond to fire, the cube to earth, the octaedron to air, the icosaedron to water, while the dodecaedron, as equivalent to the cube, is reserved for the shape of the world, which comprises all the elements.<sup>37</sup> We shall not hesitate to pass over in silence the description of the mode in which these regular figures are formed out of triangles held together by certain numerical ratios, since no one who is capable of discerning philosophical conclusions, from arbitrary hypotheses, will hope to draw instruction from such matters. On the other hand, the proof which Plato thought it necessary to adduce of the necessity of the four elements, is principally founded on the relation which subsists between the corporeal nature, and the sensuous perception of it, but is also drawn in part from a consideration of the mathematical ideas. The corporeal, he says, must be visible and tangible: but without fire nothing can be seen, nor felt without the solid, which cannot be without earth. God, therefore, necessarily composed the world of fire and earth; but two things alone cannot cohere without the intervention of a third; there must,

<sup>37</sup> *Tim.* p. 53, c. sq.

consequently, be some middle bond between the one and the other, which may stand in the same relation to one extreme, as the other does to it. Now *one* such mean would have been sufficient, if bodies had been intended to have a surface only without volume. But more than two are unnecessary to hold together the four connected surfaces of body. Consequently there must be two more elements, water and air, intermediate between fire and earth.<sup>38</sup> It is somewhat surprising that Plato, after connecting earth with touch, and fire with vision, should not have referred the air to hearing, and water to taste: but perhaps his difficulty was that in such a comparison of the elements and the senses, a fifth sense would be without its appropriate element. This difficulty he has, however, removed by referring the sensations of smell to an intermediate state, either of water as it passes into air, or of air into water.<sup>39</sup>

Now, of these elements all the bodies in the world consist. The single figures of the elements are so small as to elude vision, and it is only in their homogeneous combination that they first become visible.<sup>40</sup> Such aggregations arise naturally in consequence of the similar forms having, through the motion of matter, acquired a determinate place where they collect together, like acceding to like.<sup>41</sup> The union, however, among the several corporeal things is such that the dissimilar, but not the similar elementary figures, by exerting

<sup>38</sup> Tim. p. 31, b. sq.

<sup>40</sup> Tim. p. 56, b.

<sup>39</sup> Tim. p. 66, d.

<sup>41</sup> Tim. p. 57, c.

a reciprocal action upon each other, transform themselves, and thereby originate motion.<sup>42</sup> As, now, the homogeneous elements collect themselves into their proper region, all motion would quickly cease, did not the spherical form of the whole compress the elements, and, allowing of no vacuum, force the smaller figures of fire and air into the intervals of the larger.<sup>43</sup> Hence too is explained the mixing of the elements with each other, and their reciprocal transmutations. It is unnecessary to give in detail Plato's explanations of the different species of the several elements; and it will suffice to observe generally that he derives these modifications of the pure elements from their combinations and reciprocal action, without any attempt at accuracy of description.<sup>44</sup>

The world, then, is thus formed by the union of soul and body. But this unity of the whole must also impart itself to a multiplicity of living beings. Accordingly, Plato makes the entire sum of vitality to be divided by the father of all into seven parts, after the relations of harmonical numbers in the octave.<sup>45</sup> Hereby he intended the seven planets of the ancients, which are arranged in accordance with a Pythagorean representation, which Plato

<sup>42</sup> Tim. p. 57, e.

<sup>43</sup> Tim. p. 58, a. πῶς δὲ ποτε οὐ κατὰ γένη διαχωρισθέντα ἕκαστα πέπνυται τῆς δι' ἀλλήλων κινήσεως καὶ φορᾶς, οὐκ εἵπομεν. ὧδε οὖν πάλιν ἐροῦμεν. ἡ γὰρ παντὸς περίοδος ἐπειδὴ ξυμπεριέλαβε τὰ γένη, — σφίγγει πάντα καὶ κενὴν χώραν οὐδεμίαν ἐξ εὐλείπεισθαι. From the non-existence of a vacuum, Plato drew the conclusion that every movement returns into itself as it were in a circle, and thereby explains the apparent attraction of bodies, such as the magnet and amber, in a manner very similar to the Cartesian vortices. Here his physiology is perfectly mechanical. Ibid. p. 79, a. sq.; p. 80, c.

<sup>44</sup> Tim. p. 58, c. sq.

<sup>45</sup> Tim. p. 35, b. sq.



slightly modifies. The most essential point in it is the manner in which he claims, as the most important feature of the creations of intelligence, the determinate order of things according to number and figure, or in other words, the external regularity of phenomena, which is the principle of beauty—the most glorious of all the prototypes. He also insisted no less strongly, that the health and strength of living beings, and, generally, the stability of all works, result from their order and harmonical composition.<sup>46</sup>

In this view, there is nothing essentially different from another statement he gives of the order and events of the world. God, the producing father, looking to the eternal living essence, the prototype of the universe, conceived the idea of making a world as similar to it as possible. And although the generated could not be made eternal, he, nevertheless, gave to the world a moving image of eternity, which we call time. By time, Plato here understands not merely a series of successive states, for this is already implied in the idea of life,<sup>47</sup> but an orderly and regular succession in a determinate ratio of day and night, months and years. This measured time is next described as an effect of the regular motion of the heavens; and the sun, and the moon, and the five other stars, called planets, were created to determine and watch over the numbers of time.<sup>48</sup>

<sup>46</sup> Gorg. p. 503, d. sqq.

<sup>47</sup> Tim. p. 36, e.

<sup>48</sup> Tim. p. 37, c. sq. *ἐξ οὗν λόγου καὶ διανοίας θεοῦ τοιαύτης πρὸς χρόνου γένεσιν, ἵνα γεννηθῇ χρόνος, ἥλιος, καὶ σελήνη καὶ πέντε ἄλλα ἄστρα, ἐπικλήν ἔχοντα πλανητά, εἰς διορισμὸν καὶ φυλακὴν ἀριθμῶν χρόνου γέγονε.*

From this results, in the next place, the arrangement of the grander forces of nature and their isochronous movement. The cursory manner in which Plato hints at rather than explains these more general laws of the world, clearly proves that he did not consider this the strongest point of his physical theory. He supposed a double revolution of the mundane bodies, one forming the outer circle of the world, which, according to ancient notions, embraces the sphere of the fixed stars; the other, the inner circle, and comprises the seven planets. To the outer he ascribed the movement after the nature of the *same*, to the inner that of the other: the former from left to right, wherein lies greater perfection; the latter from right to left. Moreover, God having introduced into this inner sphere certain divisions of orbits and stars, he thereby produced similar and dissimilar motions.<sup>49</sup> Thus the movement of the identical is that which belongs to the whole world, which, revolving round its own centre, moves ever in one and in the same space,<sup>50</sup> after the pattern of the true reason; contrariwise, the movement of *the other*, or of matter, is a progression in a straight line, since Plato attributes to the fixed stars themselves, as well as to the individual beings in their sphere, a double movement, one being that of the *same*, according to which they revolve round a common centre, in and over the same, and always reflecting upon the same; the other being a progressive motion, but still revolving round the centre of the world, since it is also subject to the motion of the *same*, or of the

<sup>49</sup> Tim. p. 36, c. sq.

<sup>50</sup> De Leg. x. p. 893, c.

whole universe.<sup>51</sup> Now, the same effect which the movement of *other* produces in the fixed stars, is accomplished in the planets by that of *same*. For even though no movement but that of *other* were ascribed to them, it would, nevertheless, be overborne by that of *same*, and revolve circularly, though somewhat irregularly, since, considered as separate unities, they revolve in different circles. In this description of the motions of the mundane bodies, the thought is implied, that the grander masses are governed and ordered by the universal life of the world. On this account, these living beings are represented as more perfect than others, whose movement is less regular. Plato calls them divine beings, or a race of heavenly gods, or, as distinguished from the eternal God, generated and visible gods:<sup>52</sup> their bodies are composed principally of fire, in order that they might appear as resplendent and beautiful as possible, and of a spherical form, similar to the shape of the All.<sup>53</sup> In this wise, and thus beautifully constituted and fashioned by God himself, they have not, indeed, actually received immortality, yet, as they are not subject to dissolution, and know not death, they well deserve to be called immortal.<sup>54</sup>

Among these stars, the position obtained by Earth is equivocal and ambiguous. It is the oldest and first of all the bodies within the sphere of fixed

<sup>51</sup> Tim. p. 40, a. *κινήσεις δὲ δύο προσήψεν ἑκάστω, τὴν μὲν ἐν ταύτῳ κατὰ ταῦτά περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν αἰεὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ἑαυτοῦ διανοομένην, τὴν δὲ εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν ὑπὸ τῆς ταύτης καὶ ὁμοίου περιφορᾶς κρατούμενην.*

<sup>52</sup> *θεοὶ ὁρατοὶ καὶ γεννητοί.* Tim. p. 39, e.; p. 40, c. Cf. *ibid.* p. 41, a.; de Leg. xi. p. 930, e.

<sup>53</sup> Tim. p. 40, a.

<sup>54</sup> Tim. p. 41, a.

stars, and its place is in the centre of the universe, where it spreads itself around the mundane pole, or axis rather, and is balanced both by its own equilibrium and by the similarity of the parts around it. It is called the guardian and artificer of night and day.<sup>55</sup> From Plato's mode of expressing himself, it is doubtful whether he supposed the earth in the centre to be at rest, or to revolve around the axis of the world,<sup>56</sup> obedient to the motion of the All; and nothing is said whether, like the planets and the fixed stars, the earth is to be considered as an ensouled being and a generated god,<sup>57</sup> as, however, would appear to be the case, from the rank he assigns it among the other created gods, and from the honourable position of the earth in the centre of the world, and the precedence which it takes over the other planets by right of priority of birth.<sup>58</sup>

<sup>55</sup> Tim. p. 40, b. γῆν δὲ τρῶφον ἡμετέραν, ἐλλομένην δὲ περὶ τὸν διὰ παντὸς πόλον τεταμένον, φύλακα καὶ δημιουργὸν νυκτὸς τε καὶ ἡμέρας ἐμμηχανήσατο, πρώτην καὶ πρεσβυτάτην θεῶν, ὅσοι ἐντὸς οὐρανοῦ γεγόνασιν. Phæd. p. 108, e. There is a very remarkable statement in Plut. Plat. qu. viii. 1. Θεόφραστος δὲ καὶ προσιστορεῖ, τῷ Πλάτῳ πρεσβυτέρῳ γενομένῳ μεταμελεῖν, ὥς οὐ προσήκουσαν ἀποδίδοντι τῇ γῇ τὴν μέσην χώραν τοῦ παντός.

<sup>56</sup> Upon this point of the Platonic system a variety of opinions were early formed among the ancients; in later times the prevailing opinion is, that it is at rest. Vid. Böckh de Platonico Systemate Globorum Cœlestium. The argument which this writer (p. ix.) holds to be decisive of the question, does not preclude all motion—merely the diurnal revolution round its axis.

<sup>57</sup> No inference can be drawn from those mythological forms of expression which speak of the heaven and earth as the father and mother of the other dæmons, as this is evidently an accessory to the physical theory. Tim. p. 40, e.

<sup>58</sup> Against this it might be urged that the residence of the souls in the stars is depicted as a more blissful lot than the condition of man upon earth, and that the earth has not the refulgence of the other planets; but it must be remembered that our residence on earth is said to be in its impure cavities, and not on its resplendent surface, whither those who have lived a holy life ultimately remove. Phæd. p. 109, a.; p. 114, b.

However, in all these descriptions, there is much that is purely mythical, as, for instance, the following narrative of the formation of the mortal races of animals. After the immortal gods, whose bodies are composed principally of fire, had been made, three species of mortal creatures were to be formed, to live on the earth, in the water, and in the air. The ground of the necessity of three species was this, that the idea of the living animal in general implies four species of particular beings, and the world would be imperfect if it did not contain every species possible.<sup>59</sup> We are further told that the supreme God could not himself make the mortal animals, since, in that case, they would have been like and equal to the gods, to whom he consequently committed the task of making them, reserving to himself the office of imparting to these new creatures whatever, in their constitution, was to be immortal.<sup>60</sup> A like number of these perishable animals is assigned to each of the stars,<sup>61</sup> and of all the first birth was the same, in order that none should fall short. The male man was the first birth of mortal creatures,<sup>62</sup> and it was only after

<sup>59</sup> Tim. p. 39, e.; p. 41, b.; p. 92, c.

<sup>60</sup> Tim. p. 41, c. God said to the created gods, δι' ἐμοῦ δὲ ταῦτα γενόμενα καὶ βίου μετασχόντα θεοῖς ἰσάζουσ' ἄν. Ἴν' οὖν θνητὰ τε ᾗ, τό τε πᾶν τόδε θνητῶς ἅπαν ᾗ, τρέψεσθε κατὰ φύσιν ὑμεῖς ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν ζῶων δημιουργίαν, μιμούμενοι τὴν ἐμὴν δύναμιν περὶ τὴν ὑμετέραν γένεσιν. καὶ καθ' ὅσον μὲν αὐτῶν ἀθανάτοις ὁμώνυμον εἶναι προσήκει, θεῶν λεγόμενον ἡγεμονοῦν τ' ἐν αὐτοῖς τῶν αἰὲ δικῇ καὶ ὑμῖν ἐθελόντων ἔπείσθαι σπείρας καὶ ὑπαρξάμενος ἐγὼ παραδώσω.

<sup>61</sup> Tim. p. 41, d.

<sup>62</sup> Tim. p. 41, e. ὅτι γένεσις πρώτη μὲν ἔσοιτο τετραγμένη μία πᾶσιν, ἵνα μή τις ἑλαττοῖτο ὑπ' αὐτοῦ (sc. τοῦ θεοῦ), δεῖο δὲ σπαρείσας αὐτὸς εἰς τὰ προσήκοντα ἐκάστοις ἕκαστα ὄργανα χρόνου φῦναι ζῶων τὸ θεοσεβίστατον, ἐπιλλῆς δὲ οὕσης τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως τὸ κρεῖττον τοιοῦτον εἶη γένος, ὃ καὶ ἔπειτα κεκλησίσοιτο ἀνὴρ.

a fixed period, which the gods knew,<sup>63</sup> that the female, and all other animals—beasts of the earth, fishes of the sea, and birds of the air—issued from this mortal form. From this description it is clear that Plato looked upon the male man as the standard and form of all living things that are born and die: his is the most perfect form, and in him is the seed of all. For, in order that the world might come from the fashioning hands of the gods as perfect as possible, it was necessary that all that is mortal should first arise in the human form, since, in this manner, no one could have ground to question the justice of the gods' distribution, which ought necessarily to impart to each a like measure of existence.

That the original inequality of gifts, whether among men or animals of different species, as being of necessity, and irrespective of the merit or demerit of each, implies an injustice on the part of the giver, is an opinion often met with under a variety of forms: closely connected with it is the view, that the difference of gifts is not merely a characteristic, but also a quantitative difference, which is, in some sort, supported by the numerous instances in experience of the superiority of one animal over another. From the influence of such instances, even Plato could not wholly free himself: not only does he invariably defer to the opinion, that man is better than all other animals, when the question is of the true measure of all things, of which, to his mind, according to the

<sup>63</sup> Tim. p. 76, d.

above-cited passage, the strongest proof was the fact, that man of all animals is the most religious, but he is also so far swayed by Grecian habits and sentiments, as to maintain that the man is superior to the woman.<sup>64</sup> This becomes still more manifest, when without looking to the difference of the corporeal forms and the peculiar destination of the sexes, he makes the distinction between the male and female to consist solely in their respective strength,<sup>65</sup> and so overlooking all characteristic distinction, refers solely to that of degree. This, however, is perfectly consistent with the view, that the difference between living things solely results from the greater or less cultivation of originally similar gifts and endowments. For in order to the comparison of gifts one with another, their sameness in kind is indispensable, and any peculiarity impossible. Here then, again, we have that tendency so prevalent in Plato's philosophy, to reduce all to the universal and the one, but the multiplicity of ideas and phenomena to the great and the little.

To these remarks we must add another upon the mode in which the ideas are handled in the Platonic physics. The world in general, is considered as a copy of the ideas; as it is to be made as similar as possible to the father of all, it must contain all ideas in itself. Now the corporeal is

<sup>64</sup> De Leg. vi. p. 781, b. *ἡ θήλεια ἡμῖν φύσις ἐστὶ πρὸς ἀρετὴν χεῖρων τῆς τῶν ἀρρένων.* De Rep. iv. p. 431, c.; v. p. 469, d. The national degradation of the female sex is, indeed, so far softened in Plato, that he is willing to concede to them an equal education with men, and also political rights. De Rep. v. 451, e.; p. 460, b.; vii. p. 540, c.

<sup>65</sup> De Rep. v. 451, e. *κοινῇ — πάντα · πλὴν ὡς ἀσθενεστέραις χρώμεθα τοῖς δὲ ὡς ἰσχυροτέροις.* Hereto refers the whole of the following disquisition.

looked upon as a mere fluent, in which no form is permanent, but which, ever transmuting itself through the series of elements, is no true image of the idea which subsists ever identical with itself. The latter is most worthily exhibited in the living creature. As the world itself is a living animal, this collectivity of all ideas can only branch out into living copies of the ideas. Of such there are two great species: the immortal and mortal races. The immortal race of created gods is next divided into several species, which are differently determined according to certain numerical relations; the mortal are subdivided into three classes, according as the animals composing them live on the land, or in the water, or in the air. As a proof among many others of the little attention given by Plato to these matters, it is sufficient to notice that, by this division, which is drawn from the elements, the immortal gods are reckoned in the same class with the mortals: an inconsistency which it was not easy for him to avoid. There is, however, one point particularly deserving of notice; that, viz., all the several species of animals are looked upon merely as so many different forms of development of the single idea of the male-man; and that all difference in individual men as to their ideas, is expressly denied, in consequence of the same first birth being attributed to all mortals. This opinion is too deeply rooted in the Platonic theory to be regarded as a merely mythical conception.<sup>66</sup> Consequently, it is impossible to consider the ideas, which Plato elsewhere speaks of,

<sup>66</sup> Cf. Schleierm. Notes to the *Repub.* 616, 617, 625.



such as the idea of man in general, and that of the individual, the ox, the horse, and other animals, as archetypes of separate genera, in which light they are generally regarded in modern times, but rather as archetypes, after which certain series of phenomena or periods of life in time are formed. From this it follows, that no particular mortal being has a peculiar idea distinct from others. Moreover, the ideas expressed by the immortal gods are not fundamentally distinct from those in the mortal races, since all, in the latter, is only a copy and imitation of the former, however inferior in purity and perfection.<sup>67</sup> So that the difference between the two ultimately merges into one of degree. We have it here expressly asserted, that the things of the sensible world have existence only by a union of the ideas with great and little, comprising now more and now less of the ideas. Again, therefore, must we repeat our assertion, that the object of the ideal theory of Plato was not to demonstrate the reality and absolute subsistence of individual things, or even of their several species and genera, but merely to establish the reality of certain ideas in the soul and the reason, which are susceptible of distinction, and may and ought to be the objects of science. This is what is meant by the reality of ideas in the Platonic theory. They are not separate, self-subsisting things energies or substances, but merely certain determinations in the divine reason admitting of distinction, after which the true, in the phenomena of the world and in science, are ordered and

<sup>67</sup> Tim. p. 41, c. sq.; cf. Phædr. p. 252, d. sq.

arranged ; they are real and actual so far, as being copied in every individual soul after the measure of its intelligence, they have corresponding to them a real determination in the reason of God, which is the true law of all modes of existence in the world. They are said to subsist absolutely in and for themselves, because they must severally be conceived each with a determinate difference, and also every corresponding entity in a determinate difference from every other entity in and by itself. This doctrine of the distinction of ideas carefully maintains its proper end throughout, which is to prove, that the rational unity of God must not be understood as an identity, destructive of all diversity, but as an orderly comprehension of the manifold determinations of science.

The mortal animal must, of necessity, consist of soul and body, since death is simply the separation of body and soul.<sup>68</sup> The body, however, is for the sake of the soul, consequently it is by their souls that the several species of animals must be known. Psychology, therefore, so far as it confines itself to the natural disposition for morality, without entering into the consideration of the moral act, is a necessary element of the Platonic physics. Now, the soul being united to the body, it of necessity participates in the motions and changes of the body, and undergoes analogous modifications to those which are suffered by that in union with which it lives. The aggregation and segregation of the bodily particles must be the occasion to it of

<sup>68</sup> Phæd. p. 64, c. ; Gorg. p. 524, b.

variable sensations,<sup>69</sup> and in so far it is in its nature allied to the perishable. However, as participating in the knowledge of the eternal, or the Ideas, in so far a divine principle lives within it—reason. Accordingly, Plato distinguishes two components of the soul—immortal and mortal,<sup>70</sup> of which the one is formed by the generated gods, the other by the supreme God, the latter revealing to it the nature of the whole, and announcing the laws of fate,<sup>71</sup> in order that it may be happy in the remembrance of the eternal. The mortal portion maintains itself by a constant aggregation; it ever needs something new, which it desires for its preservation. Hence it is called the concupiscible (ἐπιθυμητικόν), which, with Plato, essentially indicates nothing more than that vital impulse which tends from one sensation to another. This twofold consideration of the soul serves to introduce the doctrine, that the divine cannot cohere with the mortal without the intervention of some third nature,<sup>72</sup> and that in the same manner as the demons, *i. e.*, the generated gods, are the connecting link between deity and humanity, so, too, the divine force of the soul must be united to its human nature by means of the demonic, in order that the soul may, by this complement, be made and combined into a whole.<sup>73</sup>

<sup>69</sup> Tim. p. 42, a. sq.; Phileb. p. 34, a.

<sup>70</sup> Tim. p. 72, d. The *θυηρόν* is also called *ἄγριον* and *θηριῶδες* or *ζωογενές*. De Rep. ix. p. 589, d.; Polit. p. 309, c.

<sup>71</sup> Tim. p. 41, d.

<sup>72</sup> Conv. p. 202, d. sq.

<sup>73</sup> Plato seeks to found his division of the soul upon experience, at the same time that he admits it to be derived more strictly from the idea. De Rep. iv. p. 435, c. Nevertheless, I do not fear that I shall be charged with temerity for assigning to Plato this derivation of it. For it is quite clear that the *θυμός* holds here the same place as other intermediate members between

This intermediate link Plato calls the irascible or spirit,<sup>74</sup> under which term he comprises all the active faculties of the soul which contain an impulse to action, and to the realisation of the desires formed by the soul, *i. e.*, of its rational ideas. As, however, it is without the divinity of reason, and as its design is to serve and assist the reason in mastering the sensual desires, and, therefore, is conversant about the generable and perishable, it cannot be assigned to the divine portion of the soul, and is, consequently, made to be a second member of the mortal.<sup>75</sup> Accordingly, the irascible portion of the soul indicates that which is allied to, and tends towards the divine.

This division of the soul Plato proceeds to justify by actual experience. For observation proves it to be possible for a desire to arise in the soul,

the higher and lower elsewhere assume. Cf. the following correlatives νοῦς or ἐπιστήμη, δόξα ἀληθείας, ἀνοία;—νοῦς, ψυχή, σῶμα;—θεός, θεοὶ γεννητοί, ἄνθρωπος. Closely allied with the Platonic doctrine of the θυμός is the view of love, as a mean of good for men, as depicted in the Phædrus and Symposium; for this love is also, like θυμός, an ἄφρων ξύμβουλος of the reason. Tim. p. 69, d.

<sup>74</sup> The word θυμός is difficult to be rendered by any German word. Tennemann employs *HERZ* (*heart*). Schleiermacher translates it by *SEEL* or *MUTH* (*zeal* or *spirit*). *MUTH*, however, must not be taken in its present narrow sense, as indicating a peculiar tone of the soul (*courage*), but in its more ancient and more extensive signification (*spirit*). (The English translator has in part adopted the scholastic terminology for the several parts in the Platonic division of the soul, and in part designates them by appetite, spirit, and reason.)

<sup>75</sup> Tim. p. 69, c. οἱ δὲ (sc. θεοὶ γεννητοί) μιμούμενοι, παραλαβόντες ἀρχὴν ψυχῆς ἀθάνατον, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο θνητὸν σῶμα αὐτῇ περιετόρνευσαν· ὀχημά τε πᾶν τὸ σῶμα ἔδωσαν, ἄλλο τε εἶδος ἐν αὐτῷ ψυχῆς προσφοδόμον τὸ θνητόν, θεῖα καὶ ἀναγκαῖα ἐν αὐτῷ παθήματα ἔχον, πρῶτον μὲν ἡδονήν, μέγιστον κακοῦ δόλεον, ἔπειτα λύπας, ἀγαθῶν φυγὰς, ἔτι δ' αὖ θάρρος καὶ φόβον, ἄφρονε ξυμβούλῳ, θυμὸν δὲ δυσπαραμύθητον, ἑλπίδα δ' εὐπράγαγον αἰσθήσει τε ἀλόγῳ καὶ ἐπιχειρητῇ παντὸς ἔρωτι· ξυγκεράσάμενοί τ' αὐτὰ ἀναγκάειν τὸ θνητὸν γένος ξυνέθεσαν.

impelling it to a sensual gratification, which, however, is often overborne by rational reflexion. Hence it is evident that the reason is different from the sensual appetite, since it is impossible that the latter can, at the same time, desire and not desire. The same is the case with the spirit, which often opposes the sensual inclinations, and, in the combat of the soul with itself, takes part with the reason; but, at the same time, cannot be reason itself, since anger and spirit are often exhibited in children, and also in the brutes, who are destitute of rational reflexion; and lastly, since even men are often carried away by it without reflecting upon better and worse, and are afterwards punished by the reason. It is then felt that these three faculties, like three potentates, reside in the soul, and are occasionally at discord and war:—the Appetite, the Spirit, and the Reason.<sup>76</sup>

As the origin of the several parts of the soul is different, the one being immediate from God, the other mediate through the generated gods, so, also, is their destination. While the latter is destined for the necessary causes or means which arise out of its union with matter, the former has for its end to exhibit the eternal ideas, which is the highest end attainable in the sensible world. On this account it is called the divinity in the soul, and while the parts of the soul, which serve merely as means, are perishable, it, as the end of those means, is naturally imperishable. For the sake, therefore, of this divine portion of the soul—for the sake of the reason, the soul itself is called immortal, and to

<sup>76</sup> De Rep. iv. p. 436—441.

it alone do the Platonic proofs of the soul's immortality apply.

These proofs are very far from being of equal cogency and value : some of them, as acknowledged by Plato himself, only amount to probability. Such is the following argument, which is drawn from the superior excellence of the soul as compared with the body : The soul is nearer akin than the body to the uncompounded one, the ever like itself, the divine, and, therefore, the body must serve while the soul rules : consequently, it is argued, the soul must be more lasting than the body, and, as uncompounded, is not subject to dissolution. To this argument it might be reasonably objected, that it does, indeed, make it probable that the soul will outlive the body, but not that it is immortal and perfectly indestructible.<sup>77</sup> Of like value is the argument, that the soul, as invisible and conceivable only, must belong to the eternal ;<sup>78</sup> for although Plato might consider the tenet of the Pythagoreans and other, that the soul is merely a harmony or adjustment of the body, to be easily refuted, either by his peculiar doctrine of the *anamnesis*, or by the objection that, according to this tenet, a soul, more or less unharmonious, could not be an object of thought ;<sup>79</sup> still he must admit that the soul, as invisible, is only such for men,<sup>80</sup>

<sup>77</sup> Phæd. p. 78, sqq., particularly p. 80, b. *τί οὖν τούτων οὕτως ἔχόντων, ἄρ' οὐχὶ σώματι ταχὺ διαλύεσθαι προσήκει, ψυχῇ δὲ αὐτοπαράπαν ἀδιάλυτον εἶναι ἢ ἐγγὺς τι τούτου.* Ibid. p. 88, a. sq.

<sup>78</sup> Phæd. p. 79, b. ; de Leg. x. p. 898, d.

<sup>79</sup> Phæd. p. 91, e. sqq.

<sup>80</sup> Phæd. p. 79, b. It would be very different if the *ἀόρατον* were equivalent with *νοητὸν*, as it is considered in the passage of the Laws.

and at best, the argument would only prove that the soul has, indeed, a resemblance, but not a perfect likeness to the divine.<sup>81</sup> The true grounds of the soul's immortality, according to Plato, (faithful to his principle of method, scientific conviction must ground itself on the idea), are first given in an argument which sets out from the idea of the soul. His proofs are arranged under two heads; first, The soul must be conceived as a self-subsisting essence, as a substance, to use the language of metaphysicians; secondly, that it is the principle of motion in the universe. The two, however, are far from being invariably kept distinct. To the former refer the doctrines, that the number of souls must be constant, and that the immortal cannot be produced from the mortal, since otherwise all would eventually become immortal;<sup>82</sup> and, conversely all must eventually, become dead, if the souls were successively to cease to live;<sup>83</sup> both of which results are equally impossible in a world constantly becoming, and transforming itself. Now it was formerly shewn, that whatever is in becoming, must come out of opposite into opposite, so that out of the living soul, the dead, and out of the dead,

<sup>81</sup> That Plato did not ascribe great importance to this reasoning is clear from his converting it. De Rep. x. p. 611, b. The main force of his argument is drawn from the notion of the subsistence of the soul.

<sup>82</sup> De Rep. x. p. 611, a. οὔτε γὰρ ἂν πον ἐλάττους γένοιτο μηδεμίᾳ ἀπολλυμένης, οὔτε αὖ πλείους. εἰ γὰρ ὅτιον τῶν ἀθανάτων πλέον γίγνοιτο, ὅσθ' ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ θνητοῦ ἂν γίγνοιτο καὶ πάντα ἂν εἴη τελευτῶντα ἀθάνατα;

<sup>83</sup> Phæd. p. 72, c. καὶ εἰ ἀποθνήσκοι μὲν πάντα, ὅσα τοῦ ζῆν μεταλάβοι, ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀποθάνοι, μένοι ἐν τοίτῃ τῇ στήματι τὰ τεθνεῶτα καὶ μὴ πάλιν ἀναβιώσκειτο, ἄρ' οὐ πολλὰ ἀνάγκη τελευτῶντα πάντα τεθνάναι καὶ μηδὲν ζῆν;

the living soul is produced, and the alternate death and reanimation of souls must go on for ever.<sup>84</sup> This doctrine, however, is incomplete without the following argument, drawn from the doctrine of *anamnesis*, or recollection of the ideas. The soul, if it can remember the ideas, must formerly have possessed a knowledge of them, and if this knowledge did not arise in this human life, it must have been anterior to it. Hence it is clear that the existence of the soul is not dependent upon its union with a body.<sup>85</sup> This proved not only that the soul will live after its separation from the body, but also lived before its union with it, without end; as it is natural to it as an essence, which lives for ever in alternate life and death. Finally, the assumption that the soul, in and by itself, and separate from the body, is a self-subsisting essence, is intimately allied to the argument that it must be immortal, because it cannot be destroyed by its peculiar ill—moral evil. For an essence can only be destroyed by some ill necessarily attending it, not by any foreign ill; now, the moral evil would cease to be such, if it annihilated the soul, and thereby released it from all ill.<sup>86</sup> The other argument, which is

<sup>84</sup> Phæd. p. 70, d. sqq. *ικανῶς οὖν ἔχομεν τοῦτο, ὅτι πάντα οὕτω γίγνεται ἐξ ἐναντίων τὰ ἐναντία πράγματα.* — *ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων ἄρα, ὧς Κέβης, τὰ ζῶντα τε καὶ οἱ ζῶντες γίγνονται; Φαίνεται. ἔφη. Εἰσὶν ἄρα, ἔφη, αἱ ψυχαὶ ἡμῶν ἐν ᾠδου.* Cf. *ibid.* p. 103, b.

<sup>85</sup> Phæd. p. 72, e. sq. *καὶ κατ' ἐκεῖνόν γε τὸν λόγον, ὧς Σώκρατες, εἰ ἀληθὲς ἐστίν, ὃν σὺ εἰπὼς θαμὰ λέγειν, ὅτι ἡμῖν ἡ μάθησις οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ ἀνάμνησις τυγχάνει οὖσα, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον ἀνάγκη πού ἡμᾶς ἐν προτέρῳ τινὶ χρόνῳ μεμαθηκέναι ἢ νῦν ἀναμνησκόμεθα, τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον, εἰ μὴ ἦν πού ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ πρὶν ἐν τῷδε τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ εἶδει γενέσθαι. ὥστε καὶ ταύτῃ ἀθάνατόν τι ἔοικεν ἡ ψυχὴ.* Meno, p. 85, e. sq.

<sup>86</sup> De Rep. x. p. 608, d. sq. *τὸ ξύμφυτον ἄρα κακὸν ἐκάστου καὶ ἡ πονηρία ἐκάστου ἀπόλλυσιν, ἢ εἰ μὴ τοῦτο ἀπολεῖ οὐκ ἂν ἄλλο γε αὐτὸ*



drawn from the animating power of the soul, is dependent on the theory of ideas, as establishing the impossibility of separating, at any time, or under any condition, from the respective ideas their necessary and essential properties. Now, the difference between an animate and inanimate body, is merely that the former has a soul, which moves it from within, whereas the latter is moved from without; the soul, therefore, can only be thought of as a moving force, and whatever belongs to it as such, must always belong to it, to the perpetual exclusion of its contrary. To an animating force, life is essential; consequently life must invariably be a property of it, and the contrary be always absent from it; the soul, therefore, is necessarily immortal.<sup>87</sup> This proof is, by Plato, thus brought into connexion with the foregoing. The soul, as the origin of motion or the self-moving, can neither be produced nor decay, for otherwise all motion must eventually cease.<sup>88</sup>

Plato's arguments for the soul's immortality do not present so many difficulties to the student of his philosophy as the question, what state of existence did he assign to departed souls. On

*ἐτι διαφθείρειεν.*—ὅποτε γὰρ δὴ μὴ ἱκανὴ ἦ γε οἰκεία πονηρία καὶ τό οἰκείον κακὸν ἀποκτεῖναι καὶ ἀπολέσαι ψυχὴν, σχολῇ τό γε ἐπ' ἄλλου δλέθρῳ τεταγμένον κακὸν ψυχὴν ἢ τι ἄλλο ἀπολεῖ, πλὴν ἐφ' ᾧ τέτακται. Σχολῇ γ', ἔφη, ὥς γε τὸ εἰκός. Οὐκοῦν ὅποτε μὴδ' ὑφ' ἐνδὸς ἀπόλλυται κακοῦ, μήτε οἰκείου, μήτε ἀλλοτρίου, δῆλον, ὅτι ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ ἀεὶ ὄν εἶναι; εἰ δ' ἀεὶ ὄν, ἀθάνατον. Cf. Phæd. p. 107, c.

<sup>87</sup> Phæd. p. 105, c. sqq.; Phædr. p. 245, c. sq.

<sup>88</sup> Phædr. l. l. ἀρχῆς γὰρ δὴ ἀπολομένης οὔτε αὐτὴ ποτε ἔκ του, οὔτε ἄλλο ἐξ ἐκείνης γενήσεται, εἴπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς δεῖ τὰ πάντα γίγνεσθαι· οὕτω δὴ κινήσεως μὲν ἀρχὴ τὸ αὐτὸ αὐτὸ κινεῖν. τοῦτο δὲ οὐτ' ἀπόλλυσθαι οὔτε γίγνεσθαι δυνατόν, ἢ πάντα τε οὐρανὸν πᾶσάν τε γένεσιν συμπεσοῦσαν στῆναι καὶ μήποτε αὖθις ἔχειν, ὅθι κινήθιντα γενήσεται.

this subject he occasionally speaks, in compliance with the notions prevailing among his countrymen, of a lower world, and of rewards and punishments therein of the good and the evil;<sup>89</sup> and at times he loves to dilate upon the migration of the soul through various human and brute forms.<sup>90</sup> However, these two representations admit of being easily reconciled with each other and combined, by supposing the condition of the soul in the lower world to be an intermediate state between the several courses of its terrestrial life. Of his other statements concerning the soul's existence before and after this life, there is only one point deserving mention. The soul that lives virtuously will hereafter enjoy a happy and blissful existence in the mansions of its kindred star, while an unembodied life in God, is reserved to those who, impelled by true philosophy, are ever striving to emancipate themselves from the bonds and fetters of the body.<sup>91</sup> Those, on the other hand, who are only careful about bodily pleasures, and hate all philosophical meditation, will feel after death the same aversion for the shapeless and incorporeal, and, as shades, still subject to the corporeal principle, will hover round their graves seeking to recover their lifeless bodies.<sup>92</sup> This

<sup>89</sup> Crit. p. 54; Phædr. p. 257, a.; Gorg. p. 522, e. sqq.; Crat. p. 403, a.; Phæd. p. 107; de Rep. x. p. 608, sq.; de Leg. xi. p. 959, a.

<sup>90</sup> Phædr. p. 248, d.; Meno, p. 81; Polit. p. 271, c.; Phæd. p. 84, a.; p. 113, a. sq.; Tim. p. 42; p. 90, e. sq.; de Leg. x. p. 903, c.

<sup>91</sup> Tim. p. 42, b. *καὶ ὁ μὲν εὐ τὸν προσήκοντα βίους χρόνον, πάλιν εἰς τὴν ξυγγόμενον πορευθεὶς οἰκῇσιν ἄστρον, βίον εὐδαίμονα καὶ ξυνήθη ἔξει.*

<sup>92</sup> Phæd. p. 80, e. sq. *ἰὰν μὲν καθαρὰ ἀπαλλάτῃται (sc. ἡ ψυχὴ), μὴδὲν τοῦ σώματος ξυμφέλλουσα, ἄτε μὴδὲν κοινωνοῦσα αὐτῷ ἐν τῷ βίῳ ἐκοῦσα εἶναι, — οὕτω μὲν ἔχουσα εἰς τὸ ὅμοιον αὐτῇ τὸ ἀεὶδὲς ἀπέρχεται, τὸ*

statement is only in part consistent with the former one, where the life of the soul is represented as a migration of the soul through different bodies : for, although the life in the kindred star, or in Hades, is not necessarily an incorporeal existence, still the latter description of the life of the truly philosophical man supposes it to be possible for a human soul to attain to thorough perfection and a complete emancipation from the body. Moreover, we are forced to confess that this latter supposition is scarcely reconcilable with the fundamental principles of the Platonic system. For, on the one hand, it assumes it to be possible for the philosopher to live even upon earth perfectly free and pure from all corporeal gratifications, so far at least as depends upon his will ;<sup>93</sup> a condition which, while it undoubtedly bears witness to the severity of the Platonic morals, is nevertheless impracticable in this terrestrial life ; and consequently the unembodied existence of the soul, which would seem to follow from it, may have floated before the imagination of Plato as an end desirable indeed, but unattainable. For

*θεῖόν τε καὶ ἀθάνατον καὶ φρόνιμον, οἳ ἀφικομένη ὑπάρχει αὐτῇ εὐδαίμονι εἶναι, πλάνης καὶ ἀνοίας καὶ φόβων καὶ ἀγρίων ἐρώτων καὶ ἄλλων κακῶν τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἀπηλλαγμένη, κ. τ. λ. Ibid. p. 114, c. τούτων δὲ αὐτῶν οἱ φιλοσοφία ἱκανῶς καθηράμενοι ἀνευ τε σωμάτων ζῶσι τὸ παράπαν εἰς τὸν ἑπιυτα χρόνον. In opposition to this perfect felicity promised to the philosophical souls, the life in Tartarus is set apart for the incurable, who are destined to serve as warnings to others to avoid their example. Phæd. p. 113, e.; Gorg. p. 525, c.*

<sup>93</sup> This condition is not undesignedly omitted in the following passage, for in strictness it could not stand there. Phæd. p. 82, b. *Εἰς δὲ γε θεῶν γένος μὴ φιλοσοφῆσαντι καὶ παντελῶς καθαρῷ ἀπιδύντι οὐ θέμις ἀφικνεῖσθαι, ἀλλ' ἢ τὸ φιλομαθεῖ. ἀλλὰ τούτων ἕνεκα — οἱ ὀρθῶς φιλοσοφοῦντες ἀπύχονται τῶν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἐπιθυμιῶν ἀπάσων.*

while he described the sensual pleasures and pains as so many nails, by which the soul is fastened to the body, and rendered in some sort corporeal,<sup>94</sup> he must have seen that the soul even of the philosopher, as unable wholly to emancipate itself from pleasure and pain, can never be entirely free from a corporeal nature, and must therefore expect a life befitting its imperfection. Moreover this is in perfect keeping with Plato's general sentiments, according to which nothing in the sensible world can be perfectly free from a mixture with changeable matter; the reason can at most only strive to bring the nature of other, as far as possible under subjection. Accordingly the sketch here thrown out of the philosopher's soul, as at last completely disembodied, must be looked upon as an attempt, essentially characteristic of the author, to depict the Idea of the philosopher released from the sensuous conditions of his existence, but which is far from exhibiting his real opinion of the actual state of things. Differently is it with the other representations he gives of the state of the soul after death. They are in perfect consistency with each other, and all alike express some conjecture, which, however conscious of the uncertainty necessarily attendant upon such disquisitions,<sup>95</sup> Plato nevertheless thought it allowable to advance. The conception of the metempsychosis is both in accordance with his physical system, and also closely enough interwoven with

<sup>94</sup> Ibid. p. 83, d. "Ὅτι ἐκάστη ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη ὥσπερ ἦλον ἔχουσα προσηλοῖ αὐτὴν πρὸς τὸ σῶμα καὶ προσπερονᾷ καὶ ποιεῖ σωματοειδῆ.

<sup>95</sup> Phæd. p. 114, c.

the ethical, to justify the opinion that Plato looked upon it as legitimate and valid, and not a merely figurative or mythical exposition of the soul's life after death.

Its accordance with his physical doctrines we shall now proceed to shew. After the divine portion of the soul is united with the corporeal and the perishable, certain necessary and violent influences of the latter constrain it, which, after the birth of the soul, and during the growth and perpetual flux of the body, are greater than in its full maturity, and consequently the impressions of the soul are strongest at this period. On this account, Plato says, the soul just entered into the body is almost irrational, and, as it were, in a trance, it acts without order or intelligence, until the flux of the corporeal, gradually assuming regularity, allows it to reflect calmly and rationally.<sup>96</sup> United with the mortal body the immortal soul is incapable of any regular movement, but its circulations are hindered and impeded by the aggregation and segregation of the former, so that it can neither rule nor be ruled, but forcibly, attracts and is attracted, unable to participate in the circular motion of the reason, but having the six irregular movements upwards and downwards, backwards and forwards, to the left and to the right.<sup>97</sup> Now as the work of the created

<sup>96</sup> Tim. p. 44, a.; de Leg. ii. p. 672, b. Hereto belongs the drinking of the Lethean stream. De Rep. x. p. 621.

<sup>97</sup> Tim. p. 43, a. τὰς τῆς ἀθανάτου ψυχῆς περιόδους ἐνέδουν εἰς ἐπὶ ῥυτον σῶμα καὶ ἀπὸ ῥυτον· αἱ δὲ εἰς ποταμὸν ἔνδεσθαι πολλὰν οὐτ' ἐκράτουν, οὐτ' ἐκρατοῦντο, βίᾳ δ' ἐφέροντο καὶ ἔφερον, ὥστε τὸ μὲν ὅλον κινεῖσθαι ζῶον, ἀτάκτως μὲν ὑπὲρ τύχοι προΐναι καὶ ἀλόγως, τὰς δὲ ἀπάσας κινήσεις ἔχον.

gods possesses such power over the rational soul, the gods who formed it—the stars—must exercise no inconsiderable influence upon the lot of all mortal creatures. Plato, accordingly, believed that the fate of man is dependent on the complicated motions of the stars, and that, by a due and careful contemplation of the heavens, his future destiny may be discovered.<sup>98</sup>

There is but one thing in mortality which is not subject to the might of these powerful agents. Virtue alone knows no master. Hence, the fate of every one is in his own hands; each may choose the lot he will; if he choose the evil, the fault is his own; God is not responsible.<sup>99</sup> We have here a question started which has been the subject of many an inquiry, but which Plato is content merely to hint at. On the one hand we discern the endeavour to make every individual subordinate to, and thereby to place it in dependence upon, the whole,<sup>100</sup> to which the soul is no less subject than the body,<sup>101</sup> so that the universal must be considered by us as the work and the image of the Deity. On the other hand, Plato seems to ascribe great weight to the thought, that the world and all its individual things, so far as they are ensouled, *i. e.*, as they have their principle of motion in themselves, must possess a certain power of self-control. This thought appears to have pre-

<sup>98</sup> Tim. p. 40, d. This is the earliest trace among the Greeks of the principles of astrology.

<sup>99</sup> De Rep. x. p. 617, e. ἀρετὴ δὲ ἀδίσποτον, ἣν τιμῶν καὶ ἀτιμάζων πλείον καὶ ἔλαττον αὐτῆς ἕκαστος ἔξει· αἰτία ἐλομένου· θεὸς ἀναίτιος. De Leg. x. p. 904, b.

<sup>100</sup> De Leg. x. p. 903, c.

<sup>101</sup> Phileb. p. 29, a. seq.

sented itself very strongly to Plato's mind, while he considered the disorder and confusion which moral evil has occasioned, and still occasions in the world, since he held it to be impossible to refer the cause of the latter to God,<sup>102</sup> although, as formerly shewn, he regarded virtue the opposite of evil, as the essential property of the free will. And virtue is moreover preferable; for when Plato treats of evil in individual souls, he distinctly evinces a great indisposition to attribute it to the free choice of the soul, maintaining that no one is voluntarily wicked, but that his evil propensities arise from the bad constitution of the body and a vicious education, so that the blame of ill deeds lies rather with parents and instructors, than with those who commit them.<sup>103</sup> By this Plato is far from absolutely denying to the soul some power over evil,<sup>104</sup> as, indeed, would be inconsistent after making virtue to abide in the soul by free-will; still it displays, clearly enough, a pervading wish, to remove as far as possible out of sight the question of the origin of evil, since he could not, least of all, place the reason of it in individual souls. In Plato we nowhere arrive at its true and ultimate cause. It was perfectly accordant with his general habit of thought to find it in the corporeal nature which,

<sup>102</sup> Polit. p. 269, d. sq.

<sup>103</sup> Tim. p. 86, b. sq. *κακὸς μὲν γὰρ ἐκὼν οὐδεὶς, διὰ δὲ πονηρὰν ἔξιν τινα τοῦ σώματος καὶ ἀπαίδευτον τροφήν ὁ κακὸς γίγνεται κακός — ὧν αἰτιατέον μὲν τοὺς φυτεύοντας ἀεὶ τῶν φυτευομένων μᾶλλον καὶ τοὺς τρέφοντας τῶν τρεφομένων.*

<sup>104</sup> The position, *κακὸς ἐκὼν οὐδεὶς*, is here used in an universal, and not merely in a physical sense, as in the *Timæus*. It is in the *Ethics* that its more general sense must be developed.

in this world, is the obstacle to perfection,<sup>105</sup> *i. e.*, to reduce it to a purely negative idea, either the nature of other, or the necessity in the sensible world.<sup>106</sup> Still this leads to an incongruity which it is not easy to reconcile; for, on the one hand, the corporeal or material is looked upon as thoroughly passive and negative, and the reason, contrariwise, as the supreme, whereas the latter is nevertheless blinded by the desires which the corporeal gives rise to, and thereby seduced into evil.<sup>107</sup> On this point, therefore, Plato's reflections seem to have taken two different directions: in the one he was disposed to contemplate the individual in its dependence on the universal, and the corporeal on the reason; while the other tended to establish both the liberty of the individual soul, especially for virtue, and to refer the origin of evil to body. These two directions he allows to stand side by side without any attempt to unite them; for as both are in their kind exclusive and universal, it is impossible to consider as such the remark, that the rational soul and the body neither rule nor are ruled, but attract with power and are attracted.

Now in whatever light the influence of the perishable upon the divine must be understood, it is nevertheless clear that the life of individual souls and the changes of their mortal nature, are dependent upon the manner in which they severally employ reason for the guidance and govern-

<sup>105</sup> Crat. p. 403, e.

<sup>106</sup> Arist. Phys. i. 9. ἡ δ' ἐτέρα μοῖρα τῆς ἐναντιώσεως πολλάκις ἂν φαντασθεῖη τῷ πρὸς τὸ κακοποιῶν αὐτῆς ἐναντιέχοντι τὴν διάνοιαν οὐδὲ εἶναι τὸ παράπαν.

<sup>107</sup> This difficulty is only got rid of, not resolved, in the Parm. p. 345, sq. d.



ment of their bodies. He who lives righteously will inhabit his kindred star; he who does not, will, in his second birth, be changed into the nature of the woman, and if he does not then cease to do ill, he will, according to the character of his guilt, be transformed into some corresponding animal, until, purified by numerous transmigrations, he shall have learned to bring the brute portion of his nature into subjection to a regular course of rational life, and so returns again to the first and best species of existence.<sup>108</sup> We here see that Plato admits a gradual corruption, and how he is able to make the choice of every one's earthly lot to be dependent upon the moral culture or degradation of the soul. Thus he thinks it probable that those men who may have lived unrighteously and effeminately will, at their second birth, be changed into women; <sup>109</sup> while those of both sexes whose life has been innocent but frivolous, and who foolishly believed that heavenly things could be seen by the fleshly eye, are changed into birds of the air. Those who have been perfectly estranged from philosophy are changed into beasts of the earth; lastly, the most ignorant and uninformed become creatures of the water, to whom the forming gods do not vouchsafe to re-

<sup>108</sup> Tim. p. 42, b. σφαλείς δὲ τούτων εἰς γυναικὸς φύσιν ἐν τῇ δευτέρᾳ γενέσει μεταβαλοῖ· μὴ πανόμενος δὲ ἐν τούτοις ἐτι κακίας, τρόπον ὃν κακύνοιτο, κατὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα τῆς τοῦ τρόπου γενέσεως εἰς τινα τοιαύτην αἰεὶ μεταβαλοῖ θήρειον φύσιν, ἀλλάττων τε οὐ πρότερον πόνων λήξοι, πρὶν τῇ ταύτῃ καὶ ὁμοίου περιόδῳ τῇ ἐν αὐτῷ ξυνεπισπώμενος τὸν πολὺν ὄχλον καὶ ὕστερον προσφύντα ἐκ πυρὸς καὶ ὕδατος καὶ ἀέρος καὶ γῆς, θορυβώδη καὶ ἄλογον ὄντα λόγῳ κρατήσας εἰς τὸ τῆς πρώτης καὶ ἀρίστης ἀφίκουτο εἶδος ἕξεως.

<sup>109</sup> Tim. p. 90, e.

spire a pure atmosphere.<sup>110</sup> It is somewhat singular that, among these transformations, through the several species of living things, plants are nowhere mentioned, although Plato admitted them to be endowed with life, although participating in the concupiscible portion of the soul alone.<sup>111</sup> He only alludes to them when he is speaking of man's proper aliment, for which he says they are suited, as in some measure akin to human life.<sup>112</sup> This essential gap in Plato's doctrine of living things and their origin, affords another proof of the little care with which he worked it out, and favours the conjecture that he did not estimate very highly its scientific value or importance.

Of this theory the male-man is, as already noticed, the centre. He, accordingly, treats at great length of the structure and composition of the human body, and his determinations upon this point exhibit, in the distinctest and most obvious manner, the character of the Platonic physiology as remounting exclusively to the end of things as they actually are. All, in the human body, is formed for the sake of the reason after certain determinate ends. Accordingly, first of all, a seat must be provided for the godlike portion of the soul, the head, *viz.*, which is round, and similar to the perfect shape of the whole, furnished with the organs of cognition, slightly covered with flesh, which impedes the senses.<sup>113</sup> To the head is given the direction of the whole frame, hence its position at the top; and since the mortal creation possesses

<sup>110</sup> Tim. p. 91, d. sq.

<sup>112</sup> Tim. p. 77, a.

<sup>111</sup> Tim. p. 77, b.

<sup>113</sup> Tim. p. 44, d. sq.; p. 75, b.

all the six irregular motions, and the head ought not to roll upon the ground, the human figure is long in its form, with legs for walking and arms for serving the body, and the anterior part is fashioned differently from the posterior.<sup>114</sup> Now the reason being seated in the head, the spirit or irascible soul has its seat in the breast under the head, in order that it may be within call and command of the reason, but yet separated from the head by the neck, that it might not mix with it.<sup>115</sup> The concupiscible has likewise its peculiar seat in the lower part of the trunk—in the belly—separated by the diaphragm from that of the irascible, since it is destined, being separate from both, to be governed and held in order both [by the spirit and the reason. For this end God has given it a watch, the liver, which, dense, smooth, and shining, and containing in combination both bitter and sweet, is fitted to receive and reflect, as in a mirror, the images of thoughts. Whenever the reason disapproves, it checks inordinate desires by its bitterness; and, on the other hand, when it approves, all is soothed into gentle repose by its sweetness; moreover, in sleep or sickness, or in inspiration, it becomes prophetic; so that even the vilest portion of the body is in a certain degree participant of truth.<sup>116</sup> In other respects the lower portion of the trunk is fashioned with equal adaptation for the ends it has to serve. The spleen is placed on the left side of the liver, in order to secrete and carry off the impurities which the dis-

<sup>114</sup> Tim. p. 44, e.<sup>115</sup> Tim. p. 69, d. sq.<sup>116</sup> Tim. p. 71, a. sq.

eases of the body might produce and accumulate.<sup>117</sup> The guts are coiled many times, in order that the food may not pass through the body too quickly, and so occasion again an immediate desire of more; for such a constant appetite would render the pursuit of philosophy impossible, and make man disobedient to the commands of the divinity within him.<sup>118</sup>

It is not our intention to develope any further the physiological doctrine of Plato; the preceding notice will sufficiently indicate its character: all its positions are advanced as so many conjectures; and although they are devoid of that accuracy which distinguishes all the expositions of Plato, they are, nevertheless, worked out with sufficient care and attention to indicate the degree of importance which he really ascribed to them. They are not an idle ornament of a Platonic dialogue, but opinions which were gradually formed in Plato's mind as he followed out the thought that all in nature has its end and design, and is planned by reason and intelligence.

In the consideration of mortal being, the question of the origin of evil could not escape him. It is clear that he was forced to refer the principle of evil to the nature of *other*, without which becoming and nature are impossible; at the same time, how great was his anxiety to remove it out of sight, is evinced strongly enough by his conception of a race of beings, which have no part in evil—the created gods, and from the promise of a life in the blissful stars, and a participation in the happiness

<sup>117</sup> Tim. p. 72, c.

<sup>118</sup> Tim. p. 73, a.

there to the man who should purify himself as much as possible from the lusts of sense. Evil, therefore, subsists only for the souls still enshrouded in a mortal body. The ground of its existence is, that the mortal is impelled by its sensual desires; it reduces itself, therefore, ultimately to the mode in which the irrational is produced by the union of the reason with the irregular flux of the body. On this account, the desires are classed among the passive states—and even among the diseases of the soul.<sup>119</sup> It was, however, difficult for Plato to reconcile the existence of evil with that of God, the Creator of the universe. He admits, it is true, that the gods must be looked upon as its authors; so far, that is, as it is subservient to good. Now, two cases are possible: physical ill may be designed by the gods either for moral good or for moral evil. In the former case, it must be acknowledged, that with the good, the favourites of the gods, it must contribute to good; <sup>120</sup> in the latter, it must be looked upon as a penalty which tends to make men better, and the man who is punished when he does evil, is less miserable than the guilty who goes unpunished.<sup>121</sup> In this respect, physical ill appears

<sup>119</sup> De Rep. iv. p. 439, d.

<sup>120</sup> De Rep. x. p. 613, a. οὕτως ἄρα ὑποληπτέον περὶ τοῦ δικαίου ἀνδρός, εἰάν τ' ἐν πενίᾳ γίγνηται, εἰάν τ' ἐν νόσοις ἢ τινι ἄλλῃ τῶν δοκούντων κακῶν, ὥς τούτῳ ταῦτα εἰς ἀγαθόν τι τελευτήσῃ ζῶντι ἢ καὶ ἀποθανόντι. οὐ γὰρ δὴ ὑπὸ γε θεῶν ποτὲ ἀμελεῖται, δὲς ἂν προθυμείσθαι ἐθέλῃ δικαίως γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἐπιτηδεύων ἀρετὴν εἰς ὅσον δυνατόν ἀνθρώπῳ ὁμοιοῦσθαι θεῶ.

<sup>121</sup> De Rep. ii. p. 380, a. καὶ λεπτέον ὥς ὁ μὲν θεὸς δικαίᾳ τε καὶ ἀγαθὰ εἰργάζετο, οἱ δὲ ὀνίαντο κολαζόμενοι. Gorg. p. 479, c. sq. Amelioration is regarded as the natural result of punishment.

as a consequence of the moral, and the latter as a mere result of the action of the body on the soul: the one species of evil is, therefore, a consequence of another, and so we come back upon the question of the origin of evil generally. And similarly, in all appearance, is it with the physical evil to which the good are subject. For in what way evil can tend to their benefit, is not very obvious, unless we suppose that as yet they are not perfectly purified from moral evil, but stand still in need of a further incitement to good. Thus, again, we find ourselves involved in that obscurity which prevails throughout the Platonic theory, upon the relation subsisting between God and the sensible world.

Connected with this consideration of moral evil, as a physical result, is the assumption of certain natural periods of the decay and reproduction of all sensible things. Not only does Plato suppose that the earth has already undergone several revolutions, both by water and fire, which few of the human race alone survived,<sup>122</sup> but, on the ground that whatever is produced must decay, he admits even that the duration of the divine work itself is limited, and that its period is determined by a perfect number.<sup>123</sup> This may be easily reconciled with the other statement, that the world, as made in perfect beauty, cannot decay, by supposing that it is not properly the destruction of the world that is here meant, but merely a commencement of a

<sup>122</sup> De Leg. iii. p. 677; Polit. p. 268, e. sq.; Tim. p. 22, c.

<sup>123</sup> De Rep. viii. p. 546, b.; cf. Polit. l. l. The thought is here implied, that all must have a definite measure.

new order of existence ; which supposition is greatly favoured by the closer determinations he gives of the several mundane periods. These he compares with years fruitful and unfruitful both of animals and vegetables. They are, however, favourable not merely to the bodies, but also to the souls of things, in such a manner, that it appears a natural result, when at one time righteousness, and at another depravity, prevail both in individuals and communities.<sup>124</sup> Even this reference of the mundane periods to human things, favours the conjecture, that they are only intended to convey the thought that there will be a complete destruction and reproduction of mortal creatures in certain fixed and natural periods, and dependent upon the action of some unhappy star, mortal is drawn from the superintendence of the gods, which, being left to itself, works its own ruin.<sup>125</sup>

Whatever opinion may be formed upon these points, it is undeniable that the way in which Plato makes the might of the corporeal to be overborne by the reason, is far from establishing the perfect dominion of good. Whether this destruction is to fall upon mortal beings alone, or the divine stars and the composite totality of the world also, there is equally an imperfection in some single part, and consequently in the whole. The power of the gods over men is unable to bring all things to perfection. Indeed, the object, through-

<sup>124</sup> De Rep. viii. l. 1. οὐ μόνον φυτοῖς ἐγγείοις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ἐπεγείοις ζώοις φορὰ καὶ ἀφορία ψυχῆς τε καὶ σωμάτων γίνονται, ὅταν περιτροπαὶ ἐκάστοις κύκλων περιφορὰς ξυνάπτωσι.

<sup>125</sup> Polit. p. 272, e.

out, of Plato's physiology is to shew in what manner the irrational is reduced by reason to order, harmony, and beauty; and how, in and by means of the corporeal, good is effected in the world: but the prevailing thought is, that the created is not like to, but only in some degree resembling the Creator; that the necessary shares in the divine, and that it is agreeable to the nature of becoming to perish in the same manner as it was made, on which account it can only transiently participate in the unchangeable being of ideas.



## CHAPTER V.

### PLATO'S ETHICS.

THE ground thought of the Platonic system of philosophy, suggests at once the point of connexion between it and his ethical theory. All natural phenomena are so ordered, as to subserve to some purpose of good—they are the means by which God, in his providence, effects the triumph of virtue and the defeat of vice; and man is so constituted, as to be a servant of the gods in whatever work they design to accomplish.<sup>1</sup> He is, however, at liberty to choose, by the reason which dwells within him, his own course of life; and it is left to his free will to determine what he will be, and, agreeably to the character he shall thus have formed for himself, the circumstantial relations of life will shape and adapt themselves.<sup>2</sup> Thus human conduct is represented as a continuation of the cosmopœria. That portion of the universe which is allotted to mortality, is given over to the power of man, who is the primal pattern of all the mortal races.

<sup>1</sup> Euthyphr. p. 13, e.

<sup>2</sup> De Leg. x. p. 904, a. sq. ἡμῶν ὁ βασιλεὺς — ταῦτα πάντα ξυνιδὼν ἐμνηχανήσατο, ποῦ κείμενον ἕκαστον τῶν μερῶν κινῶσαν ἀρετήν, ἡττωμένην δὲ κακίαν ἐν τῷ παντὶ παρέχει μάλιστ' ἂν καὶ ῥᾶστα καὶ ἄριστα. μεμνηχάνηται δὴ πρὸς πᾶν τοῦτο τὸ πῦλόν τι γιγνόμενον αἰεὶ ποίαν ἔδραν δεῖ μεταλαμβάνον οἰκίζεσθαι καὶ τίνας ποτὲ τόπους. τῆς δὲ γενέσεως τὸ ποίου τινὸς ἀφῆκε ταῖς βουλήσεσιν ἐκάστων ἡμῶν τὰς αἰτίας. ὕπῃ γὰρ ἂν ἐπιθυμῇ καὶ ὁποῖός τις ὦν τὴν ψυχὴν, ταύτῃ σχεδὸν ἐκάστοτε καὶ τιοῦτος γίγνεται ἕκαστος ἡμῶν ὡς τὸ πολὺ. κ. ε. λ.

By him it is to be further improved ; and it is only necessary that a law should be given, in accordance with which he may effect its perfection—a moral law for the reason, to discover which is the object of ethical inquiry. The theory of ethics must, therefore, pay regard to the nature of man, and to the mode in which his soul is divided into the faculties of reason, spirit, and appetite ; and herein lies the connexion between the physical and ethical systems of Plato.

Ethics, moreover, are intimately allied to dialectics, for establishing the reality of the ideas of goodness and perfection, without which the right conduct of life is impossible. From dialectics, man must borrow the knowledge or science according to which he has to regulate his conduct ; here also does he meet with the idea of right opinion, which, in default of science, may supply its place. Accordingly, the ethical branch of philosophy must look to the other two for its basis and justification.

The different aspects under which Plato presents his ethical theory, are dependent on this twofold connexion ; good is considered partly as a good, partly as a virtue ; and from the previous observation it must be clear, that his theory of the supreme good, and of the relation of particular good to this end and object of the moral endeavour, is proximately allied to the dialectical ; while, on the other hand, his theory of virtue belongs rather to his physical system. Still, between these two parts, as between his physics and dialectics, a most intimate union subsists. There is, however, a third point in the moral theory of

Plato, which is by no means to be neglected: he considers good and virtue not merely as they are modified in individual conduct, but also in the general development, which they are destined to attain in human society, as represented by the state. Thus, then, his ethical inquiries arrange themselves under three heads—the theory of good, that of virtue, and that of the state; the three being most intimately allied with each other.

Looking to the modern state of ethical science, some surprise is naturally felt to find so little attention paid by Plato to the subject of duty or obligation, as that it should nowhere be presented as a distinct and complete subject in itself, and that only incidentally is a duty of performance or endurance mentioned. This omission, however, is fully in the spirit of the Socratic ethics, and especially consistent with Plato's sentiments on morality. For the obligation of duty, as an antagonist principle, implies the existence of some original tendency in human nature, directly opposed to the reason, which Plato does not acknowledge; on the contrary, whatever is in conflict with the reason, appears as a something alien and accessory to the soul. This is expressly asserted in his maxim, that no one is willingly evil. This dogma of Socrates is used by Plato in various acceptations; in all, however, it is implied that reason is the original and true essence of the soul. As, then, the rational soul can only involuntarily be subject to ignorance,<sup>3</sup> it is only against its will that it can be evil. For every volition, by its essential nature,

<sup>3</sup> Soph. p. 228, c.

pursues the good; no one is willing to be subject to evil, or to become bad, for the end of volition is not the immediate act, but the object for the sake of which the act is undertaken, and no man enters upon any act or undertaking, unless for the sake of ultimate good. A distinction must, therefore, be made between what is agreeable, because it seems to be good, and what we desire, because it really is so. Now, it may easily happen that a man, when he engages in an act, because it appears to him to be good, may err, and choose the evil instead of the good; but in that case he labours under an involuntary error, and does not what he really desires, but what, in spite of his wishes, appears to him either as an immediate or as a mean to ultimate good.<sup>4</sup> This involuntary fault is regarded by Plato as a want of art, and the virtuous man, as an artist, who, as such, can accomplish either the right or the wrong; whereas, the evil or unjust man, on the contrary, must be looked upon as one who is deficient in the art of right or wrong conduct, so that his ill deeds must be attributed; not to his will, but to a deficiency in art.<sup>5</sup>

It is of importance, in the present place, to bear in mind, that, in the dialectics, it was shewn to be

<sup>4</sup> Meno, p. 77, b. sq.; Gorg. p. 466, d. sq. ἄλλο τι οὖν οὕτω καὶ περὶ πάντων; ἴάν τις τι πράττει ἕνεκά του, οὐ τοῦτο βούλεται, ὃ πράττει, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο, οὗ ἕνεκα πράττει; Ναί.—“Ἐνεκ' ἄρα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἅπαντα ταῦτα ποιοῦσιν οἱ ποιοῦντες.—τὰ γὰρ ἀγαθὰ βουλόμεθα, ὡς φῆς σύ, τὰ δὲ μήτε ἀγαθὰ μήτε κακὰ οὐ βουλόμεθα, οὐδὲ τὰ κακὰ. Conf. Prot. p. 345, d.; Tim. p. 86, d.; de Leg. v. p. 731, c. sq.; ix. p. 861, b. sq.

<sup>5</sup> Hipp. Min. The result is expressed in the Formula, p. 376, b. ὁ ἄρα ἐκὼν ἁμαρτάνων καὶ αἰσχροῦ καὶ ἀδίκου ποιῶν, εἰπὲρ τις ἴσταιν οὗτος, οὐκ ἂν ἄλλος εἴη ἢ ὁ ἀγαθός.

impossible to apprehend, in its unity, the supreme idea of good, as comprising, within itself, all truth and all certainty. The supreme good, therefore, is unattainable by human reason, to which, however, as the true end of existence, the views of man ought to be directed in every undertaking, for without the knowledge of good, no knowledge is in anywise profitable.<sup>6</sup> We cannot seize the idea of good in its unity; we must, therefore, follow it as manifested in the becoming and the manifold, where it appears at one time as entity and science, truth and reason;<sup>7</sup> at another, as beauty, proportion, and truth;<sup>8</sup> at another, as that which is the common principle of every virtue.<sup>9</sup> All these phenomenal modes of the supreme good have a resemblance to it, but yet are not good in itself, merely a tendency towards it. We are, therefore, little surprised that Plato does not require that we should become like unto God, but merely that we should have a resemblance to him.<sup>10</sup> However vague this demand may be, it, nevertheless, expresses, in the most general manner, the Platonic view of human good. For this resemblance of the phenomenal to the divine, this copying by the changeable of the eternal, is the object to attain which Plato labours throughout his whole system, since, to his mind, the very idea of the inchoate and the sensible world necessarily involves its

<sup>6</sup> De Rep. vi. p. 505, a.

<sup>7</sup> De Rep. vi. p. 508, d. sq.; vii. p. 517, c.

<sup>8</sup> Phileb. p. 65, a.

<sup>9</sup> De Leg. xii. p. 965, c. sq.

<sup>10</sup> Theæt. p. 176, a. διὸ καὶ πειρᾶσθαι χρή ἐνθένδε ἐκείσε φεύγειν ὄντα τὰχιστα. φυγὴ δὲ ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν· ὁμοίωσις δὲ δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον μετὰ φρονήσεως γενέσθαι.

imperfection. His endeavours, consequently, are exclusively directed to shew how, in the multiplicity of life, a combination of several modes of the good may exhibit a resemblance to the divine.

Even in Plato's time a variety of opinions as to the nature of the supreme good had already been formed; but of all these the doctrine that good consists in pleasure, had, by the teaching of Democritus, the Sophists, and Aristippus, been most extensively diffused among his contemporaries. The dialogues are replete with refutations of this opinion. Plato, however, is far from unconditionally denying that pleasure belongs to the good things of human existence; he only seeks to determine its relative value. Pleasure, he held, does not consist, as the Cynics maintained, simply in the negation of its contrary, pain, but it is a feeling of fitness and harmony in man's composite nature which is far from being effected by the removal of some disturbance.<sup>11</sup> In general, pleasure is only an inchoate state, or an exciting cause, the value of which is to be determined differently, according to the respective modes in which it arises. There is, for instance, a species which results from the simple alternation of pleasure and pain; these succeed each other almost incessantly, and the greater the preceding pain may have been, the more intense is the succeeding pleasure. This is shewn in the greatest of human desires,—hunger and thirst, and their gratification, and generally in those of the body in

<sup>11</sup> Phileb. p. 31, d. ; p. 42, d. sq.

which the sensation of a want or pain usually precedes the pleasure of satisfaction.<sup>12</sup> This species of corporeal pleasure is necessarily preceded by pain, because it has its source in the sensual want, and the sensation of want is itself a pain.<sup>13</sup> But there is another species which does not exhibit itself in any alternation with pain, because, although its gratification is perceptible and pleasant, it arises from imperceptible and painless desires. To this class belong both certain pleasures dependent upon the bodily organization,—the sight for instance, of beautiful colours and forms, the perception of agreeable odours and tunes and also the purely intellectual pleasures of knowledge.<sup>14</sup> These are denominated the simple or pure, the others mixed or impure pleasures, as being always combined with more or less of pain. It is obvious that this division of pleasure originated in the consideration of human conduct, in reference

<sup>12</sup> Phileb. p. 44, e. sq. *τι δ' ; οὐχ αὐται τῶν ἡδονῶν ὑπερβάλλουσιν, ὧν ἂν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαι μέγιστα προσγίγνωνται ; Τοῦτο μὲν ἀληθές. Ἄλλ' οὐχ οἱ πυρέττοντες καὶ ἐν τοιούτοις νοσήμασιν ἐχόμενοι μᾶλλον διψῶσι καὶ ῥιγοῦσι καὶ πάντ' ὅποσα διὰ τοῦ σώματος εἰώθασι πάσχειν, μᾶλλον τ' ἐνδεία ξυγγίγνονται καὶ ἀποπληρουμένων μείζους ἡδονὰς ἴσχουσιν ; — καὶ εἴ γε ταῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει, ὅηλον ὡς ἐν τινι πονηρίᾳ ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ σώματος, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν ἀρετῇ μέγιστα μὲν ἡδοναί, μέγιστα δὲ καὶ λῦπαι γίγνονται. Phædr. p. 258, e. ; Phædr. p. 60, b. ὡς ἀτοπον εἰκὲς τι εἶναι τοῦτο, δ καλοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἡδὺ ὡς θανμασίως πέφυκε πρὸς τὸ δοκοῦν ἐναντίον εἶναι, τὸ λυπηρόν, τῷ ἅμα μὲν αὐτῷ μὴ ἐθέλειν παραγίγνεσθαι τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, ἐὰν δὲ τις διώκῃ τὸ ἕτερον καὶ λαμβάνῃ, σχεδὸν τι ἀναγκάζεσθαι αἰεὶ λαμβάνειν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον, ὥσπερ ἐκ μιᾶς κορυφῆς συνημμένω δὺ ὄντε.*

<sup>13</sup> Gorg. p. 496, d. *ὁμολογεῖς ἄπασαν ἔνδειαν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν ἀνιαρὸν εἶναι ; Ὁμολογῶ.*

<sup>14</sup> Phileb. p. 50, e. sq. *τὰς περὶ τε τὰ καλὰ λεγόμενα χρώματα καὶ περὶ τὰ σχήματα καὶ τῶν ὁσμῶν τὰς πλείστας καὶ τὰς τῶν φθόγγων καὶ ὅσα τὰς ἐνδείας ἀναισθήτους ἔχοντα καὶ ἀλύπους τὰς πληρώσεις αἰσθητὰς καὶ ἡδίας καθαρὰς λυπῶν παραδίδωσιν. — ἔτι δὴ τοῖνυν τούτοις προσθῶμεν τὰς περὶ τα μαθήματα ἡδονάς. Cf. de Rep. ix. p. 584, b.*

to pleasure. For those enjoyments which more usually agitate the mind and awaken dangerous passions, are degraded to the lowest rank, while the more innocent are raised highest in the scale, whether they are of a sensual nature, or allied to the possession of intellectual advantages. Still, in making this division, Plato's first object was the refutation of the tenet, that pleasure alone is the true good, and it is assuredly well calculated to prove, that whoever indiscriminately chooses pleasure simply as such, must admit into the mixed compound of his life, the pains which are necessarily associated with impure pleasure. Closely connected with this division is that other, into the better and worse, true and false pleasure;<sup>15</sup> not as if there could be a state of the soul, in which pleasure would not be felt as pleasure, but because a right and a wrong opinion as to its nature, extent, and purity is possible; thus a matter may be chosen as pleasurable which is in an equal degree painful, since it cannot exist except in combination with a pain. In this division, however, Plato looked principally to the mode in which these impure pleasures are only relatively such, since they are incapable of affording pleasure, unless by the gratification of some want, and on the other hand appear as a pain whenever the transition from their opposites has been sudden.<sup>16</sup>

<sup>15</sup> Gorg. p. 499, b.; Phileb. p. 36, c. sq.; de Rep. ix. p. 583, b. sq. Evil and false pleasure one and the same. Phileb. p. 40, c.

<sup>16</sup> De Rep. ix. l. 1. οὐκ ἐναντίον φαμέν λύπην ἡδονῇ; Καὶ μάλα. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ μήτε χαίρειν, μήτε λυπεῖσθαι εἶναί τι;—Εἶναι μὲντοι. Μεταξὺ τούτων ἀμφοῖν ἐν μέσῳ δὲ ἡσυχίαν τινὰ περὶ ταῦτα τῆς ψυχῆς; Οὕτως.—Καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις γε, οἶμαι, πολλοῖς τοιούτοις αἰσθάνει γυγνομένους



True enjoyment, on the contrary, consists in those pure delights which do not arise from the passage from a painful state, and preeminently in those of the soul which it feels with intellect and virtue, when it is filled with the contemplation of true being.<sup>17</sup> True and lasting pleasure, therefore, is that which the rational part of the soul feels in the possession of truth and goodness; the false, on the contrary, that which is pursued by the irascible and the concupiscible.<sup>18</sup> While, then, the pleasure of those who are devoted to sensual enjoyments lies in eating and drinking and the like, or the acquisition of gold and silver, as the means necessary to their gratification; and while those who are under the influence of spirit, delight in honours and distinctions, knowledge is the pure joy of the votary of reason. Now of these several characters he who, on all other subjects, is best qualified to form a correct judgment, will be most likely to form a right estimate of pleasure, and to choose its truest species; the more especially as the rational man must of necessity have tasted every kind, and so know by experience what amount of

τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, ἐν οἷς ὅταν λυπῶνται, τὸ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι καὶ τὴν ἡσυχίαν τοῦ τοιοῦτου ἐγκωμιάζουσιν, ὡς ἡδιστον, οὐ τὸ χαίρειν.—Καὶ ὅταν παύσῃται ἄρα, εἰπον, χαίρων τις, ἢ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἡσυχία λυπηρὸν ἔσται. Ἰσως, ἔφη. Ὁ μετὰξυ ἄρα νῦν δὴ ἀμφοτέρων ἔφαμεν εἶναι, τὴν ἡσυχίαν, τοῦτό ποτε ἀμφοτέρα ἔσται, λύπη τε καὶ ἡδονή.—Οὐκ ἔστιν ἄρα τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ φαίνεται, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, παρὰ τὸ ἀλγεινὸν ἡδὺ καὶ παρὰ το ἡδὺ ἀλγεινὸν τότε ἢ ἡσυχία καὶ οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς τούτων τῶν φαντασμάτων πρὸς ἡδονῆς ἀλήθειαν, ἀλλὰ γοητεία τις.

<sup>17</sup> De Rep. ix. p. 585, d. εἰ ἄρα τὸ πληροῦσθαι τῶν φύσει προσηκόντων ἡδύ ἐστι, τὸ τῷ ὄντι καὶ τῶν ὄντων πληρούμενον μᾶλλον μᾶλλον ὄντως τε καὶ ἀληθεστέρως χαίρειν ἂν ποιοῖ ἡδονῇ ἀληθεῖ.

<sup>18</sup> De Rep. ix. p. 580, d. sq. Cf. Phileb. p. 47, d. sq., which, however, is not in perfect accordance with the passage in the Republic.

real gratification each affords. By preferring, therefore, intellectual joys to all others, he furnishes a convincing proof, that true pleasure consists in the possession of wisdom and virtue. We must here observe, what, indeed, it requires no extraordinary acuteness to discover, that there is much confusion in this classification, for it is at once obvious that all the examples which he gives of pure pleasure do not belong to that of the reason.

However, it is not from this point that he directs his main attack upon the false theory of pleasure; he takes up his position in the general principles of his own system. When Plato laid down that the good is the all perfect, he evidently considered it to be exalted above all that is finite and phenomenal. Thus he shews, by weighing pleasure and knowledge against each other, that neither the former, while it is without a knowledge or consciousness of itself, nor the latter without pleasure, can be that perfect and good thing which is without want.<sup>19</sup> Essentially this only amounts to the expression of his conviction, that none of those opposites which stand out so prominently in human life, can exhaust the idea of good. Acting upon this conviction, he looked to find the good of life in a mixture of elements different both

<sup>19</sup> Phileb. p. 20, e. μήτε ἐν τῷ (βίῳ) τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐνέστω φρόνησις, μήτε ἐν τῷ τῆς φρονήσεως ἡδονή. δεῖ γάρ, εἴπερ πότερον αὐτῶν ἐστὶ τὰγαθόν, μηδὲν μηδεὺς ἐτι προσδεῖσθαι· δεόμενον δ' ἂν φανῇ πότερον, οὐκ ἐστὶ που τοῦτ' ἐτι τὸ δυνάως ἡμῖν ἀγαθόν. — καὶ μὴν ὡσαύτως μνήμην μὴ κεκτημένον ἀνάγκη δὴ που μὴδ' ὅτι ποτὲ ἔχαιρες μεμνησθαι, τῆς τ' ἐν τῷ παραχρῆμα ἡδονῆς προσπιπτούσης μνήμην μὴδ' ἡντινοῦν ὑπομένειν· δόξαν δ' αὖ μὴ κεκτημένον ἀληθῆ μὴ δοξάζειν χαίρειν χαίροντα, λογισμοῦ δὲ στερόμενον μὴδ' εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον, ὡς χαίρήσεις, δυνατόν εἶναι λογίζεσθαι, ζῆν δὲ οὐκ ἀνθρώπου βίον ἀλλὰ τινος πλεύμονος, κ. τ. λ. Cf. *ibid.* p. 60, c. sq.

in nature and value, and so felt it necessary to determine the comparative worth of pleasure and knowledge. For this purpose he established a standard with which the examination of his dialectics has already made us acquainted. He demands what is the relation in which pleasure and knowledge respectively stand to the infinite or indeterminate (*ἄπειρον*) and to limit (*πέρας*). Impure pleasure, as capable of more or less,<sup>20</sup> belongs undoubtedly to the former; pure pleasures, as resulting from knowledge, and the beauty of forms, colours, and sounds, have invariably a measure and limit in themselves; they belong to that which participates in measure.<sup>21</sup> But of all these the prize is borne away by knowledge and reason, for not only have they measure in themselves, but, as being the source of measure and order to all things,<sup>22</sup> impart them to all pure pleasures. Now, as Plato invariably connects the idea of infiniteness with that of becoming, there is nothing inconsistent in these disquisitions upon pleasure when, ultimately returning to the latter idea, he maintains that every species of pleasure, as arising from the mere gratification of a want, is nothing but an inchoate mode, and that, therefore, it cannot belong to the truly good things of the soul; for becoming, since it is merely a tendency to something else, subsists only on ac-

<sup>20</sup> Phileb. p. 27, e.

<sup>21</sup> Phileb. p. 51, a. sq. οὐκοῦν ὅτε μετρίως ἤδη διακεκρίμεθα χωρὶς τὰς τε καθαρὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ τὰς σχεδὸν ἀκαθάρτους ὁρθῶς ἀν' λεχθείσας, προσθῶμεν τῷ λόγῳ ταῖς μὲν σφοδραῖς ἡδοναῖς ἀμετρίαν, ταῖς δὲ μὴ τοῦναντίον ἐμμετρίαν, κ. τ. λ.

<sup>22</sup> Phileb. p. 30, e. sq.

count of that something, *viz.*, on account of permanent essence, which, however, as the object towards which all inchoate states tend, is the good itself. If, therefore, becoming is different from good, pleasure cannot possibly be it.<sup>23</sup> On this account Plato confidently maintains that pleasure must not be attributed to the gods, though knowledge indeed may.<sup>24</sup>

These investigations into the nature of pleasure, which are contained for the most part in the *Philebus*,<sup>25</sup> give rise to many important considerations, which we cannot hastily notice or omit, without incurring the risk of forming a very inadequate and perhaps erroneous view of the Platonic philosophy. The connexion between his several partial investigations is so slightly indicated, that in this point he is liable to the charge of not having taken sufficient pains to render his views and doctrine intelligible.<sup>26</sup> Particularly objectionable is the manner in which, as if hurry-

<sup>23</sup> *Phileb.* p. 53, c. sq. *φημι δὴ γενέσεως μὲν ἕνεκα φάρμακά τε καὶ πάντα ὄργανα καὶ πᾶσαν ὕλην παρατίθεσθαι πᾶσιν, ἐκάστην δὲ γένεισιν ἄλλην ἄλλης οὐσίας τινὸς ἐκάστης ἕνεκα γίγνεσθαι, ζύμπασαν δὲ γένεισιν οὐσίας ἕνεκα γίγνεσθαι ζυμπάσης. Σαφέστατα μὲν οὖν. Οὐκοῦν ἡδονὴ γέ, εἴ περ γένεσις ἐστίν, ἕνεκά τινος οὐσίας ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίγνοιτ' ἂν; Τί μὴν; Τό γε μὲν οὐ ἕνεκα τὸ ἕνεκά του γιγνόμενον αἰεὶ γίγνοιτ' ἂν, ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μοίρᾳ ἐκεῖνό ἐστι· τὸ δὲ τινὸς ἕνεκα γιγνόμενον εἰς ἄλλην, ὃ ἄριστε, μοῖραν θεῖον. Ἀναγκαῖότατον. Ἄρ' οὖν ἡδονὴ γέ, εἴ περ γένεσις ἐστίν, εἰς ἄλλην ἢ τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μοῖραν αὐτὴν τιθέντες ὀρθῶς θήσομεν; Ὀρθότατα μὲν οὖν. Cf. *Gorg.* p. 500, a.; 506, c.*

<sup>24</sup> *Phileb.* p. 33, b.

<sup>25</sup> In the *Gorgias* the investigation into the nature of pleasure is incomplete and partial; and the distinction between true and false pleasure merely hinted at. In the *Republic*, however, the results of the *Philebus* are deferred to, and rendered more precise.

<sup>26</sup> Cf. Schleiermacher's Introduction to the *Philebus*, particularly towards the conclusion.

ing to close the investigation, he passes suddenly, and without any transition, from the idea of pleasure to that of becoming. It is natural to expect that the relation between the ideas of becoming and the indeterminate, should be shewn, or at least hinted at. When, therefore, we attempt to discover what this connexion is, we meet with a circumstance still more remarkable. For it is evident that Plato thought that the becoming and the indeterminate as its ground, are inseparable. Now, as every species of pleasure is considered as a becoming, it must consequently be also indeterminate. This consequence Plato, however, apparently overlooks, when he describes the pure pleasure as determined by measure. To reconcile this inconsistency we might indeed suppose, that pure pleasure belongs to a third species of being, which, composed of the indeterminate and the mean, constitutes the becoming an essence;<sup>27</sup> still this would involve no inconsiderable difficulties. For as pleasure in general is referred to becoming, and knowledge is represented as that which in all becoming produces measure, pure pleasure can only so far have part in measure as it participates in knowledge. The common weakness of humanity would here seem to have fallen upon Plato, for in the examination of impure pleasure, he insists upon the abstraction from pleasure of all cognition, or rather of all consciousness, which, in the consideration of pure

<sup>27</sup> Phileb. p. 26, d. ἀλλὰ τρίτον φάθι με λέγειν, ἔν τούτῳ τιθέντα τὸ τούτων ἐκγονον ἔπαν, γένεσιν εἰς οὐσίαν ἐκ τῶν μετὰ τοῦ πέρατος ἀπειργασμένων μέτρων.

pleasure, he neglects. Without a long and tedious digression it would be impossible to point out all the several inconsistencies with his general view which are to be found in his detailed exposition of this subject. We must content ourselves, therefore, with observing that, according to Plato, pleasure can only participate in truth, so far as it has part in Ideas. Accordingly, he maintains that the delight which the beautiful occasions, must, to be pure and true, direct itself to beauty itself, and not to beautiful objects,<sup>28</sup> although he thereby involved himself in a difficulty, to account for the pure pleasure which is experienced by the smell,<sup>29</sup> since it was impossible to give to it any determinate measure of figure or number. If, now, the ideas of beauty and truth are contained in pure pleasure, they must naturally partake of cognition or consciousness. The relation, therefore, which, according to the principles of Plato, subsists between knowledge and pure pleasure, seems to be in general of the following nature: In the gradual growth of the human consciousness, pleasure is necessarily combined with cognition; so, however, as that at one time pleasure, at another cognition, is the dominant and determining element; in the former case, the pleasure is impure and immoderate; in the latter, a pure pleasure arises, measured and determined by the truth of Ideas. To avoid the

<sup>28</sup> Phileb. p. 51, b. sq.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid. τὸ δὲ περὶ τὰς ὁσμὰς ἦττον μὲν θεῖον γένος ἡδονῶν. This mention of ἦττον, with which of course μᾶλλον must be combined, is naturally startling in a consideration of pure pleasure.

former, and to pursue the latter, ought therefore to be the object of a truly intellectual life.

Now, viewed in this light, it is undoubtedly correct to consider pleasure as not a good in itself, but a mean merely to good. Pleasure, as belonging to incipency, is a necessary component in the human consciousness; like all else that becomes to be, it exists only for the sake of the good; <sup>30</sup> it is one of the second causes or material instruments by which good is produced in the world. Here, however, it might be asked, how can pleasure avail any thing in the consummation of good, when, in truth, it rather seems, in respect to the moral conduct or cognition, to be wholly indifferent, or, rather, in Plato's opinion, one of the greatest obstacles to right knowledge, as nailing the soul fast to the body, and giving rise to the opinion, that the nature of pleasure is most clear and undoubted, when the case is far otherwise.<sup>31</sup> These expressions, however, like those concerning the impediments to knowledge, presented by sensation, must, in order to their being rightly understood, be limited to the necessary imperfection of this world, which may, at times, be the corrupt source of error. On the other hand, whenever he is looking to the whole nature of man, Plato considers it necessary not to neglect the union of the rational with the sensible, but to strive to attain to a harmony of body and soul, and not to excite either

<sup>30</sup> Gorg. p. 506, c. τὸ ἡδὺ ἕνεκα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ (πρακτέον).

<sup>31</sup> Phæd. p. 83. ὅτι ψυχὴ παντὸς ἀνθρώπου ἀναγκάζεται ἅμα τε ἡσθῆναι καὶ λυπηθῆναι σφόδρα ἐπὶ τῇ καὶ ἡγεῖσθαι, περὶ δ' ἂν μάλιστα τοῦτο πάσχη, τοῦτο ἐναργέστατόν τε εἶναι καὶ ἀληθέστατον, οὐχ οὕτως ἔχον.

separately.<sup>32</sup> This precept is grounded on the general view, that the body is, as it were, the medium of all those higher developments, without which the rational existence of the soul cannot manifest itself; and, at the same time, as the notion of body involves that of becoming, pleasure, as the incipient element of the consciousness, is looked upon as the necessary attendant upon the rational development. Nevertheless, it is only so far as it has a due measure, and is regulated in accordance with the ends of intelligence, that it can be regarded as a mean to true pleasure; and, on the other hand, so soon as it goes beyond the due measure, it becomes a hindrance to intellectual life. In this light, good pleasure appears to be necessary, but evil the contrary;<sup>33</sup> and it is, therefore, one of the problems of a moral life, to limit, and to bring within the measure of the reason all those desires, which are directed to pleasure merely as such. Among the necessary pleasures must be reckoned both those pure enjoyments which the soul derives from itself, and also those impure ones which minister to the preservation and health of the body, but which, in a certain sense, are a medium of pure pleasure, whenever they are united with the virtue of the soul, which furnishes them with their due measure.<sup>34</sup> Thus, then, even those pleasures which are more or less mixed up with

<sup>32</sup> Tim. p. 87, e. sq. *μία δὲ σωτηρία πρὸς ἄμφω, μήτε τὴν ψυχὴν ἀνευ σώματος κινεῖν, μήτε σῶμα ἀνευ ψυχῆς· ἵνα ἀμυνομένῳ γίγνωνται ἰσχυρόπω καὶ ὑγιᾶ.* De Rep. ix. p. 591, c. ὅ γε νοῦν ἔχων — αἰεὶ τὴν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἁρμονίαν τῆς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἕνεκα ξυμφωνίας ἁρμοττόμενος —.

<sup>33</sup> De Rep. viii. p. 558, d. sq.

<sup>34</sup> Phileb. p. 62, e. sq.



corporeal gratifications and negative pleasure, appear to be necessary and to minister to good, inasmuch as they tend to preserve the union of the soul with body, without which the life of reason is impossible for man. But pure pleasure is the necessary condition of becoming, since the soul, by becoming full of that of which it has previously felt a want, experiences pleasure; and, by the lot of animated beings, their knowledge and being can only be maintained by constant renovation.

Closely connected in Plato's mind with this doctrine of pleasure, was the opinion prevalent among the multitude concerning particular good. Unable to distinguish the means from the end, they mistake them for the good itself. They are undoubtedly good when rightly and intelligently employed for the consummation of their end: but misemployed, they become, in the same degree, mischievous.<sup>35</sup> They stand, therefore, intermediate between good and evil. To enumerate them, they are sensual pleasures, health, beauty, and riches, which are the objects of the appetite, glory, which is the pleasure of the spirit, and also acuteness and discernment when not directed to good.<sup>36</sup> Of all these, as of pleasure in general, it holds that they are not good, except in moderation, for excess is pernicious in all things; deficiency, however, is equally possible and injurious; it is, therefore, only when they have received from the

<sup>35</sup> Meno, p. 87, e.; de Leg. i. p. 631, b. διπλᾶ δὲ ἀγαθὰ ἴσιν, τὰ μὲν ἀνθρώπινα, τὰ δὲ θεῖα· ἡρτῆται δ' ἐκ τῶν θείων θάτερα. De Leg. ii. p. 661, b.; de Rep. ii. init.

<sup>36</sup> De Rep. vii. p. 519, a. τῶν λεγομένων πονηρῶν μὲν, σοφῶν δὲ — τὸ ψυχάριον — ὅσῳ ἂν ὀξύτερον βλέπῃ, τοσοῦτ' ὡς πλείω κακὰ ἐργαζόμενον.

reason their due measure, that they are truly profitable.<sup>37</sup>

Now, as Plato declares that a full insight into the nature of the highest good is not vouchsafed to human nature, but that he is only acquainted with a mixture of the necessary and the good, which gives rise to a plurality of good, it was requisite that he should determine what, in this concrete life, is to be regarded as good and its relative worth. He has, accordingly, given a graduated table of good, but so hastily and cursorily, that its explanation involves many and great difficulties.<sup>38</sup> In the highest rank he places that which affords the measure for all the relations and seasons of life; and which, therefore, is the cause of all good.<sup>39</sup> In the second stands whatever is a

<sup>37</sup> De Leg. iii. p. 690, e.; v. p. 728, d.; de Rep. viii. p. 563, e.

<sup>38</sup> Phileb. p. 66, a. ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μὲν πῃ περὶ μέτρον καὶ τὸ μέτρον καὶ καίριον καὶ πάνθ' ὁπόσα χρὴ τοιαῦτα νομίζειν τὴν αἰδίων ἡρῆσθαι φύσιν.— Δεύτερον μὴν περὶ τὸ σύμμετρον καὶ καλὸν καὶ τὸ τέλειον καὶ ἱκανὸν καὶ πάνθ' ὁπόσα τῆς γενεᾶς αὐτῆς ἐστίν.— Τὸ τοίνυν τρίτον, ὡς ἡ ἐμὴ μαντεία, νοῦν ἢ φρόνησιν τιθεὶς οὐκ ἂν μέγα τι τῆς ἀληθείας παρεξίλοις.— Ἀρ' οὖν οὐ τέταρτα, ἀ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς ἐθεμεν, ἐπιστήμας τε καὶ τέχνας καὶ δόξας ὁρθὰς λεχθείσας, ταῦτ' εἶναι τὰ πρὸς τοῖς τρισι τέταρτα, εἶπερ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ γέ ἐστι μᾶλλον ἢ τῆς ἡδονῆς ζυγγεῆ;— Πέμπτας τοίνυν, ἀς ἡδονὰς ἐθεμεν ἀλύπους ὀριστάμενοι, καθαρὰς ἐπονομάσαντες τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς, ἐπιστήμας τε καὶ αἰσθήσεων ἐπομένας;— Ἐκτῇ δ' ἐν γενεᾷ, φησὶν Ὀρφεύς, καταπαύσατε κόσμον ἀοιδῆς, ἀτὰρ κινδυνεύει καὶ ὁ ἡμέτερος λόγος ἐν ἑκτῇ καταπεπαυμένος εἶναι κρίσει. Of the various commentaries upon this famous passage, see the conclusion of Schleiermacher's Introduction to the Philebus; Ast's Plato's Life and Writings, p. 296, c.; Stallbaum, Proleg. in Phileb. p. xciv. sq. With the exposition of the latter I agree in the main. There is much truth in his remark, that the question here is of the possessions of men. Those who overlook this fact have been misled by the difficulty of the first two passages.

<sup>39</sup> It is this that constitutes the difference between it and the philosophical knowledge which stands in the third place, and is totally free from practical applications. This is far from being an uncommon distinction with Plato, and is here indispensable where he is separating the principles and the con-

creation of this rational and measure-giving energy, the due measure, the beautiful, the sufficient, in the combination of human pleasure and knowledge.<sup>40</sup> Next come the different elements of this mixture: the third place being reserved for pure and philosophical science, after which the non-philosophical follow in the fourth place, together with those arts whose cultivation is more or less dependent upon right opinion, of which Plato has elsewhere shewn that they are indispensable for the business and affairs of this life.<sup>41</sup> In the fifth and last place, we find those pleasures which are free from all pain, and which are consequences of the sensuous perception, and of the acquisition of knowledge. As to the sixth degree of pleasure, Plato is silent. We know, however, that it consists of the pleasure more or less accompanied with pain, without which, however, the life of the soul in the body is impossible. Hither, too, must we refer every species of relative good that produces such pleasures as minister to the health and preservation of the body. This is the lowest grade of good.

Thus did Plato explain his view of all the special instances of good in human life, which, relatively

stituents of life. Cf. Theæt. p. 173, c. sq.; de Rep. vii. p. 516, c. sq.; 519, b.; and the Phileb. p. 62, a. sq., which is most directly pertinent to this matter.

<sup>40</sup> It is necessary to bear in mind that Plato has shewn, in the Phileb. p. 20, e., that neither *φρόνησις* nor *ἡδονή* is *τέλειον* and *ικανόν* from man, and that there is a *σύμμετρον* even in *ἡδονή*.

<sup>41</sup> Phileb. p. 62, a. sq. πῶς φύσις; ἢ τοῦ ψεύδους κανόνος ἕμα καὶ τοῦ κύκλου τὴν οὐ βίβαν οὐδὲ καθαρὴν τέχνην ἐμβλητέον κοινῇ καὶ συγκερατῆον; 'Αναγκαῖον γάρ, εἰ μέλλει τις ἡμῶν καὶ τὴν ὁδὸν ἐκάστοτε ἐξευρῆσθαι οἴκαδε.

to the supreme good, are but resemblances and copies of it. Well might one exclaim how vaguely and how incompletely in every respect! Still it would be unjust to retort upon him the reproach he cast upon some of his fellow disciples, that they explained good by intelligence, but that, being pressed to define it more closely, they were unable to give any other answer, than that it is intelligence and knowledge of what is good.<sup>42</sup> For, in justice, we must admit that he attempted to distinguish among the motions of the soul those which give rise to pure and impure pleasures.

To this doctrine of special good that of virtue is intimately allied. For all must perceive that, by the description of the supreme good, as the measure and the power of observing measure, he thereby intended virtue, which is the source of all good, for man. On this account he regarded virtue as the true good of the soul.<sup>43</sup> It is the power or energy by means of which the soul fitly accomplishes its proper work—life,<sup>44</sup> it is, therefore, generally the ground and principle whence every single good of the soul issues.

As, by this explanation, we are referred to the notion of life, whose principle is the soul, it is clear that the Platonic consideration of virtue must

<sup>42</sup> De Rep. vi. p. 505, b.

<sup>43</sup> Gorg. p. 506, c. sq.

<sup>44</sup> De Rep. i. p. 353, d. sq. *τί δ' αὖ τὸ ζῆν; ψυχῆς φήσομεν ἔργον εἶναι; Μάλιστα γ', ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀρετὴν φαμέν τινα ψυχῆς εἶναι; Φαμέν. Ἄρ' οὖν ποτὲ ψυχὴ τὰ αὐτῆς ἔργα εὖ ἀπεργάζεται στερομένη τῆς οἰκείας ἀρετῆς; ἢ ἀδύνατον; Ἀδύνατον.* Gorg. p. 503, e. To the same purport is whatever Plato says of the soul's health and well-being. De Rep. iv. p. 444, d. It is also reduced to the harmony of the soul. De Rep. viii. p. 554, e. de Leg. ii. p. 653, b.; Phæd. p. 93, e.

be more or less dependent on his physics, to which he assigns that notion. Accordingly, the perfect idea of virtue must be dependent upon the division of the principle of life in the mortal creature, according to its constituent elements into that of the immortal and that of the mortal parts of the soul—into reason, spirit, and desire. Upon this division of the soul's faculties depends that of virtue, and, according to Plato, it is only an acquaintance with all the several virtues that can give rise to a truly vivid conception of the unity of virtue.

In the more popular and introductory dialogues, the Socratic question, whether virtue is one or many, is often raised without, however, receiving any decisive solution.<sup>45</sup> This question is connected with the more general one, whether the one can be manifold, or the manifold one. From the dialectic, it must be clear that, on this point, Plato necessarily came to the conclusion, that virtue must both be regarded as one,<sup>46</sup> and also, in a different respect, as many.<sup>47</sup> In a moral point of view, however, this question of the unity of virtue, must be taken in quite another sense; for as all good is considered as a due measure and proportion, no single virtue by itself, and apart from the rest, can be truly virtuous. It is on this account that Plato often, and especially in the introductory dialogues, paints some single virtue as comprising in itself the sum of all virtues. Thus

<sup>45</sup> Protag. p. 329, c. sqq.; Lach. p. 198, d. sqq.

<sup>46</sup> Particularly de Leg. xii. p. 963, c.

<sup>47</sup> Particularly Polit. p. 306, a. sqq.

Justice is often used for Virtue in general,<sup>48</sup> because no action, which is not also just, can be virtuous : and similarly with wisdom,<sup>49</sup> temperance,<sup>50</sup> and valour.<sup>51</sup> For these, individually, are only virtues so far as they are in harmony with the other developments of the soul, and by adopting the measure which reason assigns to them.

The source of this confusion of terms and ideas is evidently the looseness of ordinary discourse, and the unscientific usage of words, to which looseness of language Plato naturally accommodated himself, when it was sufficient for the end he had in view, to illustrate his theory by the instance of some particular virtue, without deducing its necessity from out of the idea. In such cases we meet with divisions of virtue, such as that in the Protagoras into five parts, where piety is added to the usual four virtues,<sup>52</sup> or that in the Republic, where two otherwise unnoticed virtues, nobleness of sentiment and magnanimity, are placed by Plato along side of temperance and valour.<sup>53</sup> Such inaccuracy of diction rather than of thought, are most common in those branches of philosophical inquiry, which, treating of ordinary matters, draw their

<sup>48</sup> Gorg. p. 504, c. ; de Leg. i. p. 630, c. ; ix. p. 863, e. sq.

<sup>49</sup> Phæd. p. 68, c. sq. ; Euthyd. p. 281.

<sup>50</sup> Gorg. p. 504, c. ; Charm. p. 165, b. sqq. ; 174, b. sq.

<sup>51</sup> Lach. p. 198, d. sqq. ; Prot. p. 349, d. sqq.

<sup>52</sup> Prot. p. 329, c. Plato often mentions *δσιώρης* as a virtue. Gorg. p. 507, b., its notion is determined, but with any thing but scientific precision : for *σωφροσύνη* is there taken for virtue in general, and as opposed to *ἀφροσύνη* (as elsewhere, *e. g.*, Prot. p. 332, a.) is employed in a sense the very opposite to its scientific signification.

<sup>53</sup> De Rep. iii. p. 402, b.

phraseology from the language most commonly in use. The Platonic theory of virtue does not assume a scientific character until it remounts to the elements of human vitality, reason, spirit, and the sensuous desires.

This is the ground of the fourfold division of virtue which Plato follows, in working out scientifically the principles of his moral theory.<sup>54</sup> Each of the three parts of the soul has its appropriate virtue; but to the perfection of virtue in the human soul a fourth is necessary, the due proportion and harmony of the three, by means of which each pursued its destined direction in the development of life, without obstructively interfering with the others. The virtue of the reason he calls prudence (*φρόνησις*) or wisdom, that of the spirit courage, that of the desires we may designate by temperance (*σωφροσύνη* as opposed to *ἀκολασία*) while justice is the name of the fourth, whose office is not to regulate the moral evolution of the several parts, but their due regulation and mutual adjustment.<sup>55</sup>

In order that man may act rightly, there must be some end of his being, with the nature of which he ought carefully to acquaint himself. This end is

<sup>54</sup> Schleiermacher, in his Introduction to the Republic, p. 26, apparently wishes to intimate that this division was not intended seriously as a pure scientific matter, when he supposes Plato had adopted it out of regard for existing opinions. It appears, however, to be so closely intertwined with the physical and dialectical systems, that to reject it upon such a supposition would entail a heavy and important sacrifice. The reasons which Schleiermacher adduces in support of his opinion appear to me to be drawn from a comparison of the state with the individual, which naturally gave rise to much that is strained and unnatural.

<sup>55</sup> De Rep. iv. p. 444, c. sqq.

the real and true good, and a knowledge of it is indispensable to the moral man, and constitutes the virtue of wisdom.<sup>56</sup> It is, therefore, necessary to all who would in any wise be moral, and the more so the more every individual is bound to strive after due measure in all his actions, which, however, science alone, that true art of measuring, can discover.<sup>57</sup> So intimately is science allied to virtue! It is the greatest force in life;<sup>58</sup>—true science is merely the science of good. Accordingly, in obedience to these principles, Plato insists upon the importance for the moral purposes of instruction in the nature of the good. Virtue, so far as it rests upon science, may be learned in the same sense as science itself is teachable, *i. e.*, originally and naturally it dwells potentially in the soul, and for the right attainment of virtues nothing more is requisite than a fitting direction of the mind leading man to contemplate the good through the medium of reflection and reminiscence.<sup>59</sup> Plato here does not omit to remark that the knowledge of good may nevertheless be overborne by evil

<sup>56</sup> Charm. p. 174, d.; de Rep. vii. p. 519. *μήτε τοὺς ἀπαιδεύτους καὶ ἀληθείας ἀπίρους ἱκανῶς ἂν ποτε πόλιν ἐπιτροπεύσαι, μήτε τοὺς ἐν παιδείᾳ ἑωμένους διατρίβειν διὰ τέλους· τοὺς μὲν ὅτι σκόπον ἐν τῇ βίῳ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ἔνα, οὗ στοχαζομένους δεῖ ἅπαντα πράττειν, ἂ ἂν πράττωσιν, ἰδίᾳ τε καὶ δημοσίᾳ· τοὺς δὲ, ὅτι ἐκόντες εἶναι οὐ πράξουσιν.*

<sup>57</sup> Gorg. p. 500, a.; Prot. p. 356, d.; Polit. p. 284, e.

<sup>58</sup> Prot. p. 352, b. sq.

<sup>59</sup> The disquisitions in the Meno and Protagoras, upon the possibility of teaching virtue, are well known. To these must be added the Euthyd. p. 281, e. sq. The solution is given de Rep. vii. p. 518, b. sq. *αἱ μὲν τοίνυν ἄλλαι ἀρεταὶ καλούμεναι ψυχῆς κινδυνεύουσιν ἐγγύς τι εἶναι τῶν τοῦ σώματος· τῇ ὄντι γὰρ οὐκ ἐνοῦσαι πρότερον ὕστερον ἐμποιεῖσθαι ἔθεσί τε καὶ ἀσκήσεων· ἡ δὲ τοῦ φρονεῖσθαι παντὸς μᾶλλον θειοτέρου τινὸς τυγχάνει, ὥς ἔοικεν, οὐσα, ὃ τὴν μὲν δύναμιν οὐδέποτε ἀπόλλυσιν, ὑπὸ δὲ τῆς περιγωγῆς χρησίμῳν τε καὶ ὠφέλιμον καὶ ἀχρηστον αὐ καὶ βλαβερὸν γίνεται.*



inclinations, or sensual desire, not, indeed, simply by these, but in consequence of a previous knowledge having passed into an ignorance of good,<sup>60</sup> being corrupted by some blinding influence which the soul was unable to resist. For no one willingly and consciously choses evil.

The possibility of the rational intelligence being overpowered by external influences, refers us back to the doctrine that reason in man is imperfect, and is, for the most part, not a true insight, but only a right opinion, for if it were the former, it would not be fleeting and changeable. This, too, is the cause why we at most bear within us copies of the virtues, and not true virtue itself.<sup>61</sup> This imperfect virtue of right opinion is distinguished from true virtue, partly by the uncertainty with which it maintains its position in the soul, partly by its inability to communicate itself to others, and is even itself not fully conscious of its own origin and principle on which it rests, but dwells within men as it were by divine inspiration. From all this it follows, that the virtue of the philosopher is alone true, while that of other men, when compared with his, is but as a shadow to a substance.<sup>62</sup> In this figure we recognise Plato's usual habit of depicting the philosopher as a pattern for all men.<sup>63</sup>

✓ But in order that this knowledge may pass into

<sup>60</sup> Prot. ὥστε τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἡδονῆς ἥττω εἶναι ἀμαθία ἢ μεγίστη. Whoever has the science of justice is just. Gorg. p. 460, a.

<sup>61</sup> Conv. p. 212. Cf. Schleierm. *ibid.* According to the Meno, p. 100, a., virtue founded on right opinion is to wisdom as a shadow to a reality. Different from this is the *σκιαγραφία* of virtue, which is only once mentioned by Plato (Phæd. p. 69, b.), and which is intended to indicate apparent virtue resting on no moral motive.

<sup>62</sup> Meno, p. 97, a. sq.

<sup>63</sup> Phæd. p. 68, c. sq.

action and outward practice, the energy of the human soul must be set in motion. Human action requires means and cooperating causes; such is courage the virtue of spirit, which is to minister and to support the reason. What Plato calls courage in a moral sense, does not consist in a contempt of death, fortitude in danger, nor even in a correct appreciation of what is or not dreadful,<sup>64</sup> but solely in the maintenance of right opinion as to what is or not really to be feared, *i. e.*, as to good and evil.<sup>65</sup> As, then, moral courage is to assist in the maintenance of a correct opinion of as to what is really good, it follows that wisdom is never firmly established and fully perfect in the soul of man; for otherwise there would be no chance of its being lost, but it would be sufficient to maintain itself, and every virtue would amount to wisdom. The ground, however, of this instability of human knowledge of good lies in the sensual desires, which are a part of our composite nature, and which delude man with an imaginary good, and having pleasure from their object perplex him in the pursuit of the true good, and alarm him with imaginary fears and anticipations of pain. Courage is, therefore, necessary for a life of morality, and its task is to defend the

<sup>64</sup> Thus courage is explained in the *Protag.* p. 360, b. sq.; but it is shewn in the *Lach.* p. 198, d., that according to this description it must comprise all other virtues.

<sup>65</sup> *De Rep.* iv. p. 429, b. sq. σωτηρίαν ἔγωγ', εἶπον, λέγω τινὰ εἶναι τὴν ἀνδρίαν. Ποίαν δὲ σωτηρίαν; Τὴν τῆς δόξης τῆς ὑπὸ νόμου διὰ τῆς παιδείας γεγονυίας περὶ τῶν δεινῶν, ἃ τέ ἐστι καὶ οἶα. εὐὰ παντὸς εἰ ἔλεγον αὐτὴν σωτηρίαν τῷ ἔν τε λύπαις ὄντα διασώζεσθαι αὐτὴν καὶ ἐν ἡδοναῖς καὶ ἐν ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ ἐν φόβοις καὶ μὴ ἐκβάλλειν.

rational intelligence against the alarms with which the sensual desires would seek to sway the soul.

Temperance, the third virtue, directs itself to the sensual desires, which Plato looks upon as the baser portion of the soul, being conversant solely with the becoming.<sup>66</sup> As such, it is intended to be ruled by the nobler, and its virtue, consequently, lies in obedience to the reason, in order that there may be no dissension in the soul, but harmony and order. Temperance, therefore, is indispensable to the virtuous man, as enabling him to reduce the necessary desires within due and proper bounds, guarding them both from excess and from defect.

How these two virtues of fortitude and temperance cannot exist without a perfect acquaintance with the good, while every other species of them undirected to the good, are merely apparent virtues, but in reality cowardice and intemperance, is shewn by Plato in a manner which affords beautiful testimony to the purity of his moral theory. Those, he says, are usually styled temperate who abstain from all excess, and moderately indulge themselves, in order to avoid sickness, or pain, or deprivation of some other gratification, and in order to enjoy their temperate indulgences as long as

<sup>66</sup> De Rep. iii. p. 389, d.; iv. p. 430, d. sq. The object of the definitions advanced in the Charmides of σωφροσύνη is not the discovery of its proper notion. The same is the case in the Protag. p. 332, a., and Phædr. p. 237, c. The most precise is that in the Phædr. p. 68, c. ἡ σωφροσύνη τὸ περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς μὴ ἐπτοῦσθαι ἀλλ' ὀλιγώρως ἔχειν καὶ κοσμίως. Moreover, Plato's use of σωφροσύνη is extremely vague, particularly in the earlier dialogues: thus, in the passages cited above from the Republic, it tranches far upon the domain of justice, while in the Phædo it closely resembles fortitude. The proper scientific notion of σωφροσύνη must, therefore, be deduced from the Platonic ground for the division of virtue.

possible ; and those are often called brave who fear not death when they are in danger of losing other enjoyment. The former, that is, are temperate from an intemperate desire of pleasure ; the latter brave from the fear of losing either their honour or some other good possession. Strange temperance that whose root is intemperance, and rare valour whose spring is cowardice ! This, then, cannot be a true sacrifice to virtue, which merely exchanges pleasure for pleasure, pain for pain, fear for fear, or greater for less. The true coin, for which all else ought to be changeable, is a right understanding of what is good.<sup>67</sup>

The virtues of temperance and fortitude, as those which relate to the corporeal portion of man, are opposed to wisdom as the virtue of the pure reason, and are generally treated of by Plato in common. In one respect they are, it is true, opposed to each other ; fortitude having a tendency to degenerate into roughness and ferocity, but temperance into idleness and indifference ;<sup>68</sup> but, on the other hand, they again shew a resemblance to each other in the fact, that individuals evince a natural tendency to one or other of them. On this account, a happy natural disposition and a good education are alike indispensable to the formation of the perfect man.<sup>69</sup> Fortitude and temperance, therefore, are but the rational development of cer-

<sup>67</sup> Phæd. p. 68, c. sq. *μη γὰρ οὐχ αὐτὴ ἣ ἡ ἐρῶς πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀλλαγὴ, ἡδονὰς πρὸς ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας πρὸς λύπας καὶ φόβον πρὸς φόβον καταλλάττεσθαι, καὶ μείζω πρὸς ἐλάττω, ὥσπερ νομίσματα, ἀλλ' ἣ ἐκεῖνο μόνον τὸ νόμισμα ὀρθόν, ἀνθ' οὗ δεῖ ἅπαντα ταῦτα καταλλάττεσθαι, φρόνησις.*

<sup>68</sup> Polit. p. 309, b. sq. ; de Rep. iii. p. 410, d.

<sup>69</sup> De Leg. vi. p. 765, e. ; Phædr. p. 269, d.

tain natural dispositions, whereas wisdom is independent of any such original gifts, but all men enjoy it equally and alike.<sup>70</sup> The former virtues are, consequently, supposed to be capable of developing themselves by practice and exercise, and Plato is thus led to distinguish between habitual and philosophical virtue,<sup>71</sup> and even speaks of an inborn virtue of temperance, which, however, in itself, and destitute of all the other virtues, is utterly worthless.<sup>72</sup> This is in some measure connected with the Platonic view, that nothing which is dependent upon the corporeal submits itself to the orders of the reason without discipline and restraint; whereas the pure reason is order to itself, and participates in all virtue and all beauty so soon as it is left to follow freely its own tendency.<sup>73</sup>

Lastly, justice, the fourth virtue, is employed by Plato to indicate a far higher notion than is usually conveyed by that name: with him it does not simply mean the virtue of rendering to all their due—to a friend good, but evil to a foe; for as

<sup>70</sup> Polit. l. i. De Leg. iv. p. 710; xii. p. 963, e. *ἀνευ γὰρ λόγου καὶ φύσει γίγνεται ἀνδρεία ψυχῇ*. Tim. p. 70, a. De Rep. vii. p. 518, d. *αἱ μὲν τοίνυν ἄλλαι ἀρεταὶ καλούμεναι ψυχῆς κινδυνεύουσιν ἰγγύς τι εἶναι τῶν τοῦ σώματος· τῇ ὄντι γὰρ οὐκ ἐνοῦσαι πρότερον ὕστερον ἐμποιεῖσθαι ἔθεσί τε καὶ ἀσκήσεσιν· ἡ δὲ τοῦ φρονῆσαι, κ. τ. λ.*

<sup>71</sup> De Rep. x. p. 619, c. *ἔθει ἀνευ φιλοσοφίας ἀρετῆς μετεληφότα*.

<sup>72</sup> De Leg. iv. p. 710, a. *τὴν δημῶδη γε (sc. σωφροσύνην) — καὶ οὐχ ἦν τις σεμνόνων ἀν λέγοι, φρόνησιν προσαναγκάζων εἶναι τὸ σωφρονεῖν, ἀλλ' ὅπερ εὐθὺς παισὶ καὶ θηρίοις, τοῖς μὲν ἀκρατῶς ἔχειν πρὸς τὰς ἡδονάς, ξύμφυτον ἐπανθεῖ, τοῖς δὲ ἐγκράτῳς· ὃ καὶ μονούμενον ἔφασκεν τῶν πολλῶν ἀγαθῶν λεγομένων οὐκ ἄξιον εἶναι λόγου*.

<sup>73</sup> It is this condition that must be understood when Plato speaks of a disposition for philosophy. De Rep. vi. p. 491, d.; p. 503, b. sq. Cf. Theætet. p. 144, a. Still it must be admitted that it is extremely difficult, throughout these disquisitions, to distinguish accurately the notion of *θυμὸς* from that of *νοῦς*.

a true art and virtue, it is impossible that it should inflict upon its enemies that which is so opposite to its own nature— injustice.<sup>74</sup> Still less is that justice which law or human institutions establishes,<sup>75</sup> for, in general, the good must not be estimated by the opinions or conventions of men, but it is an eternal and divine idea. Moreover, with Plato, justice is not conversant about the external act, but stands for the harmonious and proportional development of the inner man, by means of which each faculty of his soul, without interfering with the others, performs its due functions, and thereby produces within him complete and perfect order.<sup>76</sup> It is evident that it is the bond and unity by which the other three virtues coexist and cohere. Without them, therefore, it is inconceivable, for they constitute its object matter; but, on the other hand, they cannot subsist without justice, for in that case they would be devoid of that harmony which is indispensable to the preservation of mortal existence; they would be without the form which hold together the parts into a whole.<sup>77</sup> On

<sup>74</sup> De Rep. i. p. 331, e. sq.

<sup>75</sup> Ibid. p. 338, e. sq.

<sup>76</sup> In the Gorg. p. 507, b., we meet with an external reference of justice, and also a division of virtue drawn from external considerations: *καὶ μὲν περὶ μὴν ἀνθρώπους τὰ προσήκοντα πράττων, δίκαι' ἂν πράττοι, περὶ δὲ θεῶς ὅσια*. On the other hand, the essence of justice is more scientifically explained, particularly in de Rep. iv. p. 443, c. *τὸ δὲ γε ἀληθὺς τοιοῦτον μὲν τι ἦν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡ δικαιοσύνη, ἀλλ' οὐ περὶ τὴν ἔξω πρᾶξιν τῶν αὐτοῦ, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὴν ἐντὸς ὡς ἀληθῶς, περὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ, μὴ εἰσάγοντα τὰ ἁλλότρια πράττειν ἕκαστον ἐν αὐτῷ, μηδὲ πολυπραγμανεῖν πρὸς ἄλληλα τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γένη, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι τὰ οἰκεία εὖ θίμενον καὶ ἄρξαντα αὐτὸν αὐτοῦ καὶ κοσμήσαντα καὶ φίλον γενόμενον ἑαυτῷ καὶ ξυναρμόσαστα τρία ὄντα, κ. τ. λ.*

<sup>77</sup> De Rep. iv. p. 433, b. *δοκεῖ μοι τὸ ὑπόλοιπον ἐν τῇ πόλει ὧν ἐσκήμμεθα, σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ φρονήσεως, τούτων εἶναι, ὃ πᾶσιν ἐκείνοις τὴν δύναμιν παρέσχεν ὥστε ἐγγενέσθαι καὶ ἐγγενόμενοις γι᾽ σωτη-*

this account, Plato generally insists, that the just man alone can live in harmony either with himself or with others; whereas, injustice, on the other hand, occasions the faculties and endeavours of individuals to be at issue both with themselves and with others. Weakness is the natural consequence of injustice—strength of its contrary: the just man alone is at one with himself, whereas the unjust is not one but a compound of many loosely connected parts.

Now, although the Platonic division of virtue is so closely bound up with that of the faculties of the soul, that any opinion of the unsoundness of the latter must necessarily lead to its rejection, it must nevertheless be admitted to be a striking description of the mutual connexion of all the elements of moral culture. In the notion of justice they all meet together and centre, which by exhibiting in the first place the moral life of the individual as a perfect whole, and in the next by requiring an application of the same principle to communities, advances the moral consideration beyond the narrow circle of individual life. When in the individual every part of the soul performs its proper function, without unduly encroaching upon the other two, in violation of right measure; all exclusive pursuits are avoided, whether of pleasure, or knowledge, or political distinctions.<sup>79</sup> But, at the same time, although each of the

*ρίαν παρέχειν, ὥσπερ ἂν ἐνῷ, καὶ τοὶ ἔφαμεν δικαιοσύνην ἔσεσθαι τὸ ὑπολειφθὲν ἐκείνων, εἰ τὰ τρία εἴρωμεν.*

<sup>79</sup> Gorg. p. 507, e.; de Rep. i. p. 351, a. sqq.

<sup>79</sup> To accomplish this is the endeavour of spirit. De Rep. viii. p. 548, c. sqq.; ix. p. 581, a.

elements, whose common influence form and fashion the human character, must receive its appropriate development, equal honour is not due to them all. On the contrary, it is implied in the very notion of justice, that each as it is to perform its due office, ought also to receive its due appreciation.<sup>80</sup> Accordingly, spirit and appetite must be subordinate and obedient to Reason, and their virtues consist solely in their readiness to receive from it their orders and direction, so that in every description of them, regard must be paid to this superintendence of reason or knowledge; whereas, on the other hand, the design of the reason is to overlook these two parts, and to accomplish whatever is conducive to the common interests of all.<sup>81</sup> By this means perfect harmony is promoted, the reason, however, and science being, according to the principles of Socrates the supreme ruler and sole end of life, because even while it is not permitted to neglect the other elements of human action, it is even therein fulfilling its proper office, since the former exists only as the ministering means of its production and continuance.

But in the same manner that a just disposition

<sup>80</sup> De Leg. vi. p. 756, e. sqq.; Gorg. p. 508, a.

<sup>81</sup> De Rep. iv. p. 442, b. *καὶ ἀνδρείον δὴ, οἶμαι, τοῦτῃ τῷ μέρει καλοῦμεν ἕνα ἕκαστον, ὅταν αὐτοῦ τὸ θυμοειδὲς διασώζῃ διὰ τε λυπῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου παραγγελθὲν δεινόν τε καὶ μὴ. 'Ορθῶς γ', ἔφη. Σοφὸν δὲ γε ἐκείνῳ τῷ μικρῷ μέρει, τῷ δ' ἡρχέ τ' ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ ταῦτα παρήγγελλεν, ἔχον αὖ κάκεινο ἐπιστήμην ἐν αὐτῷ τὴν τοῦ ξυμφέροντος ἐκάστω τε καὶ ὅλῃ τῷ κοινῷ σφῶν αὐτῶν τριῶν ὄντων. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Τί δὲ; σόφρονα οὐ τῇ φιλίᾳ καὶ ξυμφωνίᾳ τῇ αὐτῶν τούτων, ὅταν τό τε ἄρχον καὶ τῷ ἀρχομένῳ τὸ λογιστικὸν ὁμοδοξῶσι δεῖν ἄρχειν καὶ μὴ στασιάζουσιν αὐτῷ; Σωφροσύνη γοῦν, ἣ δ' ἔς, οὐκ ἄλλο τί ἐστίν ἢ τοῦτο, πόλειός τε καὶ ἰδιώτου.*



and regulation of the several faculties is necessary to a moral life, so if men are to live together in society morally and virtuously, justice must reign among them. It is perhaps characteristic of Plato's philosophy, to consider every thing in its relation to the whole, so that even overlooking its Greek character, it appears quite natural that he should investigate the principle of morals, not merely in the individual, but also in the community. If any surprise is felt upon this point, it is rather to find him taking such a confined view of society, as to limit his attention within the narrow sphere of a small Greek community. This is however to be accounted for both by the national sentiments in general, and by the particular grade of enlightenment at which the Greeks then stood. In the same manner as they considered themselves distinct from the Barbari, they in all probability looked upon national divisions as natural and necessary, over which man has no control, being ordered by God who combines all the various races into unity,<sup>82</sup> so that the social virtues must restrict their action within the fixed and definite limits of particular states. Such being the prevailing sentiments upon this point, Plato accomplished as much as could be expected of one man, when he extended his views so far as to represent the several Greek races as forming one political unity, and to regard, what is called a war among the Greeks, as a mere civil commotion and party outbreak.<sup>83</sup>

<sup>82</sup> Polit. p. 269, c. sq. In this respect men appear more like a flock than a shepherd, and government belongs to God alone.

<sup>83</sup> De Rep. v. p. 469, b. sqq. *φημι γὰρ τὸ μὲν Ἑλληνικὸν γένος αὐτὸ*

How closely connected in Plato's opinion were the moral virtues of the citizen with those of the individual, is clearly expressed both in the general spirit of his ethical theory as in that particular averment, that even though by the aid of philosophy a man may have preserved himself pure from all unjust and unholy deeds, he is still far from having reached the highest degree of excellence, unless it should have been his happy lot to live in a well-ordered polity.<sup>84</sup> For in such a state he will, both himself attain to still greater perfection and also be serviceable to his fellow citizens. From this it is manifest that Plato looked upon the state as beneficial to individual improvement, and the administration of political affairs to be a noble and praiseworthy undertaking. There are, it is true, many passages in his dialogues where the philosopher is described as taking no pleasure in public duties, and compelled almost against his will to take part in them, from a desire to be serviceable to others:<sup>85</sup> yet upon a comparison of these conflicting passages, no doubt can remain as to Plato's real sentiments. In those descriptions of the philosopher, which make him superior to any pleasure in political honours, we have depicted the ideal of the philosopher, as removed from all those wants and

*αὐτῷ οἰκεῖον εἶναι καὶ συγγενές, τῷ δὲ βαρβαρικῷ ὀθνεῖόν τε καὶ ἀλλότριον. Καλῶς γε, ἔφη. "Ἑλλήνας μὲν ἄρα βαρβάρους καὶ βαρβάρους "Ἑλλησι πολεμεῖν μαχομένους τε φήσομεν καὶ πολεμίους ψυσεῖ εἶναι καὶ πόλεμον τὴν ἔχθραν ταύτην κλητέον. "Ἑλλήνας δὲ "Ἑλλήσιν, ὅταν τι τοιοῦτο δρῶσι, φύσει μὲν φίλους εἶναι, νοσεῖν δ' ἐν τῷ τοιοῦτῳ τὴν "Ἑλλάδα καὶ στασιάζειν καὶ στάσιν τὴν τοιαύτην ἔχθραν κλητέον.*

<sup>84</sup> De Rep. vi. p. 496, e.

<sup>85</sup> Theæt. p. 172, c. sq.; de Rep. i. p. 346, e.; vii. p. 519, c. sq.

limitations under which he appears among men. Looking to this ideal, Plato might well say, that, living in the contemplation of all that is highest and most excellent, the philosopher feels no desire to take a part in the administration of the state, and least of all of such a corrupt and evil polity as was presented to Plato's mind by his own city : when however he treats of the philosopher as a man, he does not deny that, as such, and living among men, he can not arrive at the highest perfection attainable by human nature, unless he places himself in the most favourable situation possible, by taking an active part in the public administration, and performing a duty of necessity if not of beauty.<sup>86</sup>

In the *Republic* and the *Laws*, his greatest works, Plato has entered at large upon the right constitution of a state. A very false view of the relative importance and connexion of the two works, is presented by the prevailing opinion, that the *Republic* is a sketch of a purely ideal constitution, while the *Laws* contain his ideas of what is practically attainable. It is, indeed, so far founded on truth, as the object of the *Laws* being to shew how a state, under certain internal and external conditions, may be administered in accordance with the principles of reason, his precepts go more into detail, and defer more to those actual circumstances upon which every individual case is more or less dependent, than was possible in the *Republic*, where his purpose was solely to give a general sketch of a political constitution. For,

<sup>86</sup> De Rep. vii. p. 540, b.

such considerations apart, there is as much that is purely ideal in the Laws, as in the Republic. For the right appreciation of these two works, therefore, we must not defer too much to that common opinion, that, in the latter, Plato wished to depict a state of things totally impracticable. Undoubtedly his sketch of a constitution appeared to him impracticable in the actual state of human things, wherein he saw a deep and rooted corruption of the moral principle; but that he did not consider it absolutely unattainable, is clear from the many traces we discover of a deference to the weakness of humanity, to which alone the great severity in many of his ordinances are to be accounted for. He admits, it is true, that the constitution he is describing is not to be found upon earth, but by designating it as the pattern of that in heaven, by which the philosopher ought to form himself, he plainly intimates that man ought to endeavour, as far as possible, to approximate to its realisation;<sup>87</sup> and he even investigates the conditions under which its actual attainment would be possible.<sup>88</sup> Moreover, he is far from dissembling that the establishment of a government and a legislation presupposes the existence of certain imperfections, which are inseparable from the social community;

<sup>87</sup> De Rep. ix. p. 592, a. ἐν ᾗ νῦν δὴ διήλθομεν οἰκίζοντες πόλει λέγεις, τῇ ἐν λόγοις κειμένη, ἐπεὶ γῆς γε οὐδαμοῦ οἶμαι αὐτὴν εἶναι. 'Ἄλλ', ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐν οὐρανῷ ἴσως παράδειγμα ἀνάκειται τῷ βουλομένῳ ὁρᾶν καὶ ὁρῶντι ἑαυτὸν κατοικίζειν. διαφέρει δὲ οὐδέν, εἰτὶ που ἔστιν, εἴτε ἔσται· τὰ γὰρ ταύτης μόνης ἀν πράξειεν, ἄλλης δὲ οὐδεμιᾶς. De Rep. v. p. 472. b. sq.; vi. p. 501, e. sq. νῦν δὲ, ὡς ἔοικε, ξυμβαίνει ἡμῖν περὶ τῆς νομοθεσίας ἄριστα μὲν εἶναι, ἀ λέγομεν, εἰ γίνουτο, χαλεπὰ δὲ γενέσθαι, οὐ μέντοι ἀδύνατά γε. De Leg. v. p. 739, a. sq.; 746, b. sq.

<sup>88</sup> De Rep. vi. p. 502, a. sq.; de Leg. iv. p. 709, e.

for the best, and especially written laws, are but imitations of, or inadequate substitutions for, those true laws which ought to be present in every human soul through a perfect insight into good.<sup>89</sup> That this conviction of the inadequacy of government is the ground of all his regulations, is clear from his declaration, that, in a perfect state, which in truth, as establishing a perfect identity of interest and will, would not properly be such, but rather a subversion of all society, all things must be common to all, even eyes, ears, and hands,<sup>90</sup> so that in such a community the social life would be, as it were, the life of one man.<sup>91</sup> He regards, therefore, the distinction of individuals into a plurality of persons, to be an unavoidable imperfection of a state, and to this original defect, as well as those which necessarily result from the difference of sex, character, and temperament among men, he is constantly deferring at the same time that he is labouring to reduce them to the idea of good, and seeking to ascertain how, under such conditions, it may be realised or copied in a state.

There are principally two faults in the descrip-

<sup>89</sup> Phædr. p. 277, d.; Polit. p. 300, c.; de Leg. ix. p. 874, e. sq. προβ-  
ρήτειον δὴ τι περὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων τοιόνδε, ὥς ἅρα νόμους ἀνθρώποις  
ἀναγκαῖον τίθεσθαι καὶ ζῆν κατὰ νόμους. — ἡ δὲ αἰτία τούτων ἦδε, ὅτι  
φύσις ἀνθρώπων οὐδενὸς ἱκανὴ φύεται, ὥστε γινῶναι τε τὰ συμφέροντα  
ἀνθρώποις εἰς πολιτείας καὶ γνοῦσα τὸ βέλτιστον αἰεὶ δύνασθαι τε καὶ  
ἐθέλειν πράττειν. — ἐπιστήμης γὰρ οὔτε νόμος οὔτε τάξις οὐδέμια κρείττων,  
οὐδὲ θέμις ἐστὶ νόον οὐδενὸς ὑπήκοον οὐδὲ δοῦλον, ἀλλὰ πάντων ἄρχοντα  
εἶναι, ἐάν περ ἀληθινὸς ἐλευθερός τε ὄντως ᾗ κατὰ φύσιν. νῦν δὲ — οὐ γὰρ  
ἔστιν οὐδαμοῦ οὐδαμῶς, ἀλλ' ἡ κατὰ βραχύ. διὸ δὴ τὸ δεύτερον αἰρετέον,  
τάξις τε καὶ νόμον, αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ μὲν ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ὀρθῶς καὶ βλέπει, τὸ δ' ἐπὶ  
πάν ἀδυνατεῖ.

<sup>90</sup> De Leg. v. p. 739, c.; de Rep. v. p. 462, c.

<sup>91</sup> De Leg. viii. p. 828, e.

tion of the Platonic state, which are not easily reconciled with modern feelings. We notice them in the present place, because they lie in his very fundamental view. One is imputable not to Plato individually, but to the general views entertained in ancient times, which considered the state alone the worthy field and fitting object of all the great and noble efforts of human activity.<sup>92</sup> This was natural enough among those whose religious duties were merged in the civil, and while the prejudice which divided the human race into Greek and Barbarian, offered a barrier to any interchange of moral offices with those without the pale of their respective states. Whatever may be the pernicious consequence of such an opinion, it is broached most distinctly and decidedly by Plato as one who entered more deeply than any of the Greeks of aftertime into the spirit of his nation, and more strictly analysed its principles. To Plato, the state is every thing ; whatever is not subject to it, whatever does not minister to its interests, is diseased, and must be removed by the knife or the caustic ; and if there be any, as, for instance, the philosopher, that may justly withdraw from it, it is only so long as the state is formed upon an imperfect model. This is the source of the extreme and extravagant institutions of the Platonic Republic. To the absolute sovereignty of the state all must be sacrificed. Accordingly, the right of property, if not entirely abrogated, is reserved for the basest portion of the community, those occupied in trade.

<sup>92</sup> De Leg. vii. p. 817, b. *πᾶσα οὖν ἡμῖν ἡ πολιτεία ξυνίστηκε μίμησις τοῦ καλλίστου καὶ ἀρίστου βίου.*

Even domestic life is not allowable for the perfectly free citizens, if we so term the members of such a state. That the children belong to the state and not to their parents, follows naturally; but this is not enough, even women are public property.<sup>93</sup> The duty of education, from the earliest infancy, lies of course in the state; the arts, as means of education, especially music, poetry, and dancing, are placed under its absolute and exclusive control;<sup>94</sup> and although religion might appear to be one of the grounds on which the state rests, and respect for the divine oracles is carefully inculcated,<sup>95</sup> still the Greek religion was so intimately allied to poetry, that it must, with the latter, be subjected to the supreme art of the politician.<sup>96</sup> In such a constitution, it would be idle to expect that the happiness of individuals should be proposed as the end towards which the efforts of the whole are directed; on the contrary, the only object of the statesman is the happiness of the whole, and to the several classes of the community a limited happiness at most is allowable.<sup>97</sup> While then all

<sup>93</sup> De Leg. v. p. 739, b. *πρώτη μὲν τοίνυν πόλις τί ἐστι καὶ πολιτεία καὶ νόμοι ἀριστοί, ὅπου τὸ πάλαι λεγόμενον ἀν γίγνηται κατὰ πᾶσαν τὴν πόλιν ὅτι μάλιστα· λέγεται δὲ ὡς ὕψως ἐστὶ κοινὰ τὰ φίλων. τοῦτ' οὖν εἰ τί που νῦν ἐστὶν εἰ τ' ἔσται ποτέ, κοινὰς μὲν γυναῖκας, κοινούς δὲ εἶναι παῖδας, κοινὰ δὲ χρήματα ζύμπαντα, καὶ πάση μηχανῇ τὸ λεγόμενον ἴδιον πανταχόθεν ἐκ τοῦ βίου ἅπαν ἐξήρηται, μεμηχάνηται δ' εἰς τὸ δυνατόν καὶ τὰ φύσει ἴδια κοινὰ ἀμηγήπη γεγονέναι, κ. τ. λ.* De Rep. iii. p. 416, sq.; iv. p. 423, e.; v. p. 457, b. The well-known deviations from this principle in the Laws, are instanced as concessions of the Lawgiver to the weakness of humanity.

<sup>94</sup> Especially from de Rep. ii. p. 376, to the middle of the third book.

<sup>95</sup> De Rep. iv. p. 427, b. sq.; de Leg. vi. p. 759, a. sqq.; vii. in the beginning and elsewhere.

<sup>96</sup> De Leg. vii. p. 801, c. sqq.

<sup>97</sup> De Rep. iv. init.

the objects and endeavours of the individual are subordinate and devoted to the body politic, he, who administers the state is truly and perfectly a sovereign; he has authority over all laws, and is bound by none;<sup>98</sup> and this consideration furnishes Plato with his bitterest reproaches against the actual statesmen of his day, as being rather the ready servants of the people than their absolute leaders,<sup>99</sup> and with the severe standard he establishes of the fitness of all who set themselves up for statesmen, *viz.*, the successful result of their endeavours to ameliorate the state, on the ground that no true statesman will ever be ruined by the injustice of the people over which he presides.<sup>100</sup> To a certain point this ideal picture of the political relations may be excused; but when, on the other hand, the ideal is at issue with the imperfection of reality, and Plato requires that the latter should be sacrificed to the demands of the former, it must be decried as unreasonable and immoral. Thus no one can justify the exposure and abandonment of deformed and sickly infants,<sup>101</sup> or the denial of all food and

<sup>98</sup> Polit. p. 293, e. sq. Here, however, he is only speaking of an ideal sovereign who properly is God, as is clear from p. 300. Nevertheless the grounds which are adduced against the universal supremacy of the law is of general application, p. 294, a. sq. *ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἔχειν πρὸς τὰ μηδέποτε ἅπαντα τὸ διὰ παντὸς γινόμενον ἀπλοῦν.* On this account strict obedience to the laws is insisted upon in the Laws, on the ground of the non-existence of truly enlightened men. De Leg. ix. p. 875.

<sup>99</sup> Gorg. p. 517, b. sq.

<sup>100</sup> Gorg. p. 519, c. *προστάτης γὰρ πόλεως οὐδ' ἂν εἰς ποτὶ ἀδίκως ἀπόλοιτο ὑπ' αὐτῆς τῆς πόλεως, ἧς προστατῇ.* Thus Miltiades, Themistocles, Cimon, Pericles, and Alcibiades, are considered by Plato as corruptors of the people. Aristides is judged more favourably, not without a partial wresting of the ground principle. Gorg. p. 526, b.

<sup>101</sup> De Rep. v. 459, d.; 460, c.; Tim. p. 18, e. The passage in the Timæus is obscure, and unsatisfactorily explained by commentators. From



attention to the sick as useless both to themselves and others.<sup>102</sup> But the inconsistency of his rules with any culture of the true sentiments of humanity, bespeaks itself most plainly in the avowal of his belief, that, for it, the right organisation of a republic, it is necessary to initiate its citizens in every species of falsehood and fraud, and to employ deception as a medicine.<sup>103</sup>

The other error, with which Plato is justly chargeable, is of a kind common enough among philosophers. In their avocations as such, being exclusively occupied with general views, they forget, at times, to return to the consideration of details. With Plato, indeed, this is not exactly the case, still he is continually seduced by a certain inclination to see nothing in the several elements of the state than such elements merely, and to overlook entirely that they are also men. With Plato the individual is merged not only in the general body, but also in each of its constituent bodies, and consequently the several characters of his republic are divested of every human and personal trait, in order to appear as the mere representatives of their respective grades or classes.

the Republic it would appear that he wished the exposure of weakly children. There can be no doubt of the fact as to the issue of late and irregular connexions. De Rep. v. 461, c.

<sup>102</sup> De Rep. iii. p. 405, c. sq.

<sup>103</sup> De Rep. iii. p. 389, b. εἰ γὰρ ὁρθῶς ἐλέγομεν ἄρτι καὶ τῷ ὄντι θεοῖσι μὲν ἄχρηστον ψεῦδος, ἀνθρώποις δὲ χρήσιμον ὡς ἐν φαρμάκου εἶδει, δῆλον ὅτι τό γε τοιοῦτον ἰατροῖς δοτέον, ἰδιώταις δὲ οὐχ ἀπτόειν. Δῆλον, ἔφη. Τοῖς ἄρχουσι δὲ τῆς πόλεως, εἰ πέρ τιςιν ἄλλοις προσήκει ψεύδεσθαι.—ἐπ' ὠφελείᾳ τῆς πόλεως. De Rep. v. p. 459, c.; Tim. l. 1. This innocent deceit is by Schleiermacher, *Introd. to the Rep.* p. 18, referred to the mythical style. I question, however, whether this is a legitimate exposition of Plato's doctrine.

He seems totally to forget that it is only in virtue of certain functions that, in a state, an individual belongs to a certain class, and that, by his various functions, the same man may belong to several ; and, accordingly, he treats of the warrior merely in his character of warrior, and the sovereign merely as such. Occasionally he admits this himself,<sup>104</sup> but, far from looking upon it as an error, he maintains that it is necessary to follow such a course, in order to exhibit the state as a whole. This is the basis of what is called the aristocratic tone of his sentiments. It is impossible to say that the constitution recommended by Plato is purely aristocratical ; for it wants, in fact, many of the most essential elements of such a polity. If we would place Plato's views on this subject in their true historical bearing, we must observe that, at this date, the Greeks, after passing through many ochlocratical and oligarchical storms and revolutions, began to be favourably disposed towards monarchy. Thus, it is a monarchy, even absolute monarchy, that Plato prefers to all other forms of government, though, indeed, his sovereign is no longer a fallible man but a perfect sovereign ; whose every thought and reason is centred in his sovereignty, and who has brought philosophy to perfection. His reason for recommending that the sovereign power should centre in a single person is, partly the fact that very few are endowed with political sagacity, partly on his conviction that the truly intelligent mind is alone sufficient for the superintendence of the state. For to what purpose

<sup>104</sup> De Rep. i. p. 340, d. e. ; iv. 420, c. sq.

would it be to associate others with such.<sup>105</sup> Compared with this true form of polity, democracy, oligarchy, aristocracy, and the ordinary monarchy are worthless, they are not polities, merely so many modes of social unions.<sup>106</sup> This is the extreme case to which a strict adherence to his principles leads Plato: at times, however, he occasionally remits its rigour, and confesses that those mixed constitutions, which combine the monarchical and democratical principle, are the best, and in this respect the Cretan and Spartan constitutions are preferable to the Athenian.<sup>107</sup> Hereby he admitted the superiority of an aristocracy over a democracy, and still more decidedly does he express his preference for the former, when he defined it to be every form of polity where the best man or men are supreme.<sup>108</sup> In this sense even the popular constitution of Athens is ironically called an aristocracy.<sup>109</sup> However, this usage of a mere word is far from conveying so adequate a notion of the aristocratic leaning of Plato's sentiments, as is presented by the conception he formed of the organisation of a state. The first thing to be observed is justice, which, however, does not consist in conceding equal power and honour to all, but in giving to each according to his merit, more to the better, less to the worse, since to every part

<sup>105</sup> On this account the sovereignty passes successively through the hands of the philosophers. De Rep. vii. p. 540, b. In the Laws the state is committed to a senate; the *νυκτερινὸς σύλλογος*.

<sup>106</sup> *πόλεων οἰκήσεις*. De Leg. iv. p. 711, d. sq.; Polit. p. 300, e. sq.; de Rep. viii. init.

<sup>107</sup> De Leg. iii. p. 693, d. e.

<sup>108</sup> De Rep. iv. fin.; viii. p. 544, e.

<sup>109</sup> Menex. p. 238, c.

of the state, that which is in accordance with its Idea, ought to be assigned.<sup>110</sup> Among the chief results of this principle are the marked distinction of ranks, as essential to all aristocracies, and the complete exclusion of the lowest classes from all share in the proper duties of the citizen, and, lastly, the repeated warnings against all innovation<sup>111</sup> as tending to disturb the original inequality of the classes. For although Plato is of opinion that, where the sovereign is endowed with perfect insight into morality, there is no need of established laws, and that it is advisable to issue laws, or rather edicts, as circumstances may call for them; nevertheless, in the imperfect state of human society, he insists that the ancient laws and institutions should be venerated as of divine ordinance. Moreover, great importance is attached to descent from noble and powerful lineage, though this perhaps is a softening of his leading principle, which is in favour of the aristocracy of talent, not of birth, or still less of wealth. It is true he is of opinion that, for the most part, good are born from good, and bad from bad, though, occasionally, it may be otherwise. For this reason, the wise rulers of the community ought sedulously to acquaint themselves with the disposition and character of every individual, and to bring him up to that particular occupation, in which his natural talents will be most beneficial to the state, for it is only by such

<sup>110</sup> De Leg. vi. p. 756, e. sqq. Lot ultimately decides after the election by choice, and only permitted because of imperfection.

<sup>111</sup> De Rep. iv. p. 424, b.; de Leg. ii. p. 656, d. sq.; iv. init. Polit. p. 300, e.

wise care that a state can endure as a compact and well-digested unity.<sup>112</sup>

Apart from these defects, or rather asperities of doctrine, there is little that is offensive in Plato's theory of the state. He makes a distinction between the wants and helplessness, which first gave rise to the state, and the end to which it ought to minister. The former is the incapacity of the individual singly to procure all the necessities of existence, and the consequent necessity of seeking the aid of others. Hence associations are formed, whose only object is, by the aid of the rest, to procure for each, in the easiest manner possible, what is absolutely requisite.<sup>113</sup> This leads to a division of labour, it being quickly found to be advisable that every one should prepare and procure for the rest that for which he is best qualified by nature, and abstain from all other labours, in order to improve himself to the utmost in his peculiar art.<sup>114</sup> Tradesmen and commerce quickly follow for the convenience of exchange, which the division of labour renders necessary. All this, however, even though it be carried to the greatest perfection of which it is capable, and should supply means not merely of satisfying, but also of indulging and pampering the sensual wants of man, is far from constituting a

<sup>112</sup> De Rep. iii. p. 415, a. sq.; iv. p. 423, c. sq.; v. p. 459, a. sq.; Tim. p. 18, e.

<sup>113</sup> De Rep. ii. p. 369, b. *γίγνεται τοίνυν πόλις, ἐπειδὴ τυγχάνει ἡμῶν ἕκαστος οὐκ αὐτάρκης, ἀλλὰ πολλῶν ἐνδεής.*

<sup>114</sup> De Rep. ii. p. 370, c. *ἐκ δὲ τούτων πλείω τε ἕκαστα γίγνεται καὶ κάλλιον καὶ ῥᾶον, ὅταν εἷς ἐν κατὰ φύσιν καὶ ἐν καιρῷ σχολὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἔγων πράττῃ.*

true state.<sup>115</sup> For the same reason, Plato lays little stress upon the conditions upon which the first foundation of the state depends—the site, soil, and climate—however superior to all other lands he might consider Greece to be in these respects. He either alludes to them in a general way, and in reference to their influence on population and the moral temperament,<sup>116</sup> or else advances a few negative precepts, evidently drawn from the circumstances of his native country, and intended to guard against choosing such a site, as, by its proximity to the sea, and other advantages for commerce, navigation, and naval warfare, would be likely to render the citizens too wealthy or overbearing, and faithless in peace and war.<sup>117</sup> The state is not intended to promote the sensual enjoyments, but the true political art consists in making the members of the state better men.<sup>118</sup> All the ordinances of the state, therefore, ought to be in conformity to the idea of good, without which, to assume the sovereignty, a state cannot exist.

Now, setting out with a comparison between the state and the soul, and convinced that the mass of the people must be reduced to as perfect a unity as possible, Plato insists that the state should be

<sup>115</sup> This is intimated by the question, whether, in such a society, artisans, tradesmen, and hirelings ought to be admitted. *De Rep.* ii. p. 371, e.

<sup>116</sup> *De Leg.* v. fin.

<sup>117</sup> *De Leg.* iv. p. 704, sqq.

<sup>118</sup> *Gorg.* p. 464, b. sq.; 515, b. *ἔρωτῶ βουλόμενος εἰδέναι* — εἰ ἄλλου τοῦ ἄρα ἐπιμελήσει ἡμῖν ἐλθὼν ἐπὶ τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράγματα, ἢ ὅπως ὅτι βέλτιστοι οἱ πολῖται ὦμεν. *De Leg.* iv. p. 707, d.; vi. p. 770, c.; xii. p. 962, a. sqq. *πρὸς γὰρ ἔν ἴφαιμεν δεῖν αἰεὶ πάνθ' ἡμῖν τὰ τῶν νόμων βλέποντ' εἶναι, τοῦτο δ' ἀρετὴν που ξυνεχωροῦμεν πάνυ ὀρθῶς λέγισθαι.*

ordered in the same manner as the individual soul. He demands that there should be one part to correspond to the reason, to whom the sovereignty is to be entrusted; a second, answering to spirit, is to assist the sovereign; and lastly, a third part, which is made parallel to the appetite, and intended to supply the bodily wants of the community. These are the three social classes—the ruler, the warrior, and the craftsman. Each contributes a peculiar virtue to the general body: by its ruling class it becomes sagacious, bold by its warriors, and temperate by the obedience of the artisan to the orders of his ruler; from due combination of these virtues in the whole community, there results civil justice.<sup>119</sup>

It is manifest that this constitution is based on the principle, that to every soul a particular sphere of action is assigned by nature, a principle which is only so far of importance as it enabled Plato to determine the several spheres notionally by the several parts of the soul, and so transform men into general notions. Now, the most important contrast we here find, is the one between that which,

<sup>119</sup> De Rep. iv. p. 427, c. sqq. τῷ σμικροτάτῳ ἄρα ἔσθαι καὶ μέρος ἑαυτῆς καὶ τῇ ἐν τούτῳ ἐπιστήμῃ, τῷ προεστῶτι καὶ ἄρχοντι, ὅλη σοφὴ ἀν εἴη κατὰ φύσιν οἰκισθεῖσα πόλις. — τίς δὲν εἰς ἄλλο τι ἀποβλέψας ἢ δεῖδην ἢ ἀνδρείαν πόλιν εἰποι, ἀλλ' ἢ εἰς τοῦτο τὸ μέρος, ὃ προπολεμεῖ τε καὶ στρατεύεται ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς; — οὐκοῦν καὶ ταῦτα ὀρθῶς ἐνόντα σοι ἐν τῇ πόλει καὶ κρατουμέναις αὐτῇ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας τὰς ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς τε καὶ φαύλοις ὑπὸ τε τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ τῆς φρονήσεως τῆς ἐν τοῖς ἐλάττωσι τε καὶ ἐπεικεστέροις; — ἰθέμεθα δὲ δὴ πού καὶ πολλάκις ἐλέγομεν, εἰ μέμνησαι, ὅτι ἕνα ἕκαστον ἐν δέοι ἐπιτηδεύειν τῶν περὶ τὴν πόλιν, εἰς δ' αὐτοῦ ἡ φύσις ἐπιτηδειοτάτῃ πεφυκυῖα εἴη. — ἐνάμιλλον ἄρα, ὥς ἰοῖκε, πρὸς ἀρετὴν πόλεως τῇ τε σοφίᾳ αὐτῆς καὶ τῇ σωφροσύνῃ καὶ τῇ ἀνδρίᾳ ἢ τοῦ ἕκαστου ἐν αὐτῇ τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν δύναμις. Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν δικαιοσύνην τὴν γὰρ τούτοις ἐνάμιλλον ἀν εἰς ἀρετὴν πόλεως θείης; Παντάπασιν μὲν οὖν.

both in the soul and the state, is to rule, and that which is to be ruled. Without such a contrariety of sovereign and subject, a state is inconceivable.<sup>120</sup> This Plato enhances to the utmost, and entertains the conception, not merely of a perfect sovereign, but also of a perfect subject, who only differs from a slave by having the state and not an individual for his master. This is perfectly consistent with that opinion of Plato, where he regards slavery as a dispensation of nature, resulting from the baseness of the natural sentiments.<sup>121</sup> To be subjects in the full sense of the word, all are destined, who gratify solely the wants of their sensual appetites. Upon such, as forming the basest and most contemptible portion of the commonwealth, he bestowed but little regard. He assumes them to be necessary to the existence a state, in order that the other two may not be obliged to find the means of gratifying the natural wants of the body. They are left to train themselves, as being certain to find the means of appeasing their natural wants; even legislation and administration of justice for the trading portion of the community, is contemptible,<sup>122</sup> and the only precept he gives is, that the merchant ought not to be either over rich nor over poor; for, in the former case he would be unwilling to work; in the latter, he would be unable

<sup>120</sup> De Leg. iii. p. 689, a.; de Rep. iii. p. 412, a.

<sup>121</sup> Polit. p. 309, a. Hellenes are not, however, to have Hellenes as slaves. De Rep. v. 469, c. In the description of a colony in the Laws, artisans are omitted as a class of citizens. These are to be employed in agriculture and war, and in their leisure instructed in justice, while all handicrafts are to be left to their slaves or foreign residents. De Leg. vii. p. 846, d.

<sup>122</sup> De Rep. iv. p. 425, c. sq.



to procure the necessary tools for the performance of his labours.<sup>123</sup>

From this rigorous distinction which Plato draws so broadly between the artisan and the sovereign class, he recedes somewhat when he proceeds to mark the separation between the ruling class and their assistants, the warriors. We must admit that this is one of those little deviations from the ground principle, which, in reasonings from analogy, so easily insinuate themselves. In fact, if the class of the warrior represents, in the state, the development of spirit, it is difficult to say why the distance between the sovereign and the warrior should be less than that between the latter and the artisan. It may, indeed, be urged in its favour that spirit, according to its notion, is destined to be the assistant of the reason, but the opponent of the sensual desires; Plato himself drew a broad line of distinction between it and the reason, by ascribing the former to the mortal, the latter to the immortal portion of the soul. Moreover, it cannot be as a consequence of this notional derivation of the warrior class that he allows of a promotion from the warrior to the ruling class, and recommends that the best and oldest of the former should be advanced to the sovereignty:<sup>124</sup> it rather follows the office assigned to them, of serving as assistants to the magistrates.<sup>125</sup> The less desirable it is that the sovereign should interfere

<sup>123</sup> De Rep. iv. p. 421, c. sq.

<sup>124</sup> De Rep. i. p. 412, c.

<sup>125</sup> This is one of the principal points which have deterred me from subscribing to the opinion, that the object of the Republic is not so much to depict a state as to the justice and virtue of individual souls. The reason

with the legislation and the administration of justice, the more need is there of prudent and vigilant ministers. Although Plato derives the necessity of a warrior class from the natural rise of war, so soon as the population becomes too numerous for the state, and cannot draw the necessary supplies from the existing territory; <sup>126</sup> still, in the training he proposes for this class, he does not seem to have paid much consideration to the purposes of war, which he apparently regards as a necessary evil; <sup>127</sup> and he makes their principal design to consist in overpowering internal enemies, or rather in preventing their existence, by promoting among the citizens universal devotion to the best interests of the commonweal. To such an office, a knowledge of good and evil, and penetration to discern what is or not injurious to the state, are indispensable. <sup>128</sup> Now, in the same manner that it is thus necessary that the reason of the *warrior class* (φύλακες) should be cultivated, in order that they may know what is fitting or opposed to the general good, the ruling class must not be deficient in spirit, in order to maintain the true opinion of good against whatever is calculated to deter or seduce men's minds from admitting it. <sup>129</sup> In this manner, the two superior classes of Plato's republic almost merge into one; at least the possibility is admitted, that a warrior may be elevated to the sovereignty, when ad-

adduced by Schleiermacher, in support of this opinion, rests chiefly on the ground that the state is to be understood analogically to the human soul, and so that the one merges into the other.

<sup>126</sup> De Rep. ii. p. 373, d. sq.

<sup>127</sup> De Leg. i. p. 628, c.

<sup>128</sup> De Rep. ii. p. 375, d. sq.; iii. p. 414, a.; 415, d.; Tim. p. 17, d.

<sup>129</sup> De Rep. iii. p. 412, e. sq.

vanced in years and in science, and, accordingly, it is essentially just to admit only of a difference of degree between the two.

The marked and unalterable nature of the distinction between the two upper, and the lower class, is most strongly evinced by the different character of the education allotted to them respectively. While the education of the latter is left to hazard, that of the warrior is throughout to be carefully regulated by the state. Plato clearly saw that no state can long flourish, whose citizens have not been wisely formed by a careful and well-advised system of education; hence his precept that the civil administration should begin with its youthful members;<sup>130</sup> hence, too, the boast of the Platonic Socrates, that he alone, or nearly so, of all his contemporaries, professes the true art of politics.<sup>131</sup> In the sketch he gives of the proposed education of the second class, Plato adheres to the national system, not however without improving and enlarging it. Education he makes to be two-fold: that of the body, which he calls gymnastics, and that of the soul—music.<sup>132</sup> To the former, he ascribes every exercise and training of the body, whether patience under hardships, or endurance

<sup>130</sup> Euthyphr. p. 2, d.

<sup>131</sup> Gorg. p. 521, d.

<sup>132</sup> De Rep. ii. p. 376, c. τίς οὖν ἡ παιδεία; ἡ χαλεπὸν εὐρεῖν βελτίω τῆς ὑπὸ τοῦ πολλοῦ χρόνου ἐξημένης; ἔστι δὲ που ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ σώμασι γυμναστική, ἡ δ' ἐπὶ ψυχῇ μουσική. De Rep. iii. p. 410, b. sq. ἄρ' οὖν καὶ οἱ καθιστάντες μουσικῇ καὶ γυμναστικῇ παιδεύουσιν οὐχ αὐτοὶ ἐνεκά τινος οἰοῦνται καθιστᾶσιν, ἵνα τῇ μὲν τὸ σῶμα θεραπεύουσιν, τῇ δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν; Ἄλλὰ τί μὴν; ἔφη. Κινδυνεύουσιν, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, ἀμφοτέρω τῆς ψυχῆς ἐνεκά τὸ μέγιστον καθιστάναι.—ἢτι οἱ μὲν γυμναστικῇ ἀκράτῳ χρησάμενοι ἀγριώτεροι τοῦ θύοντος ἀποβαίνουσιν, οἱ δὲ μουσικῇ μαλακώτεροι αὐτοὶ γίγνονται ἢ ὥς κάλλιον αὐτοῖς, κ. τ. λ.

of hunger and thirst, cold or heat ; and also dancing. But at the same time he remarks that this bodily training ought not to be for its own sake merely, but for that of the nobler part of the soul, in order to strengthen the spirit, and to qualify it to bring the sensual desire under the control of the reason. His idea of music, as a means of education, is still more extensive : it comprises all the arts of the muses, the ordinary instruction in grammar, and also the sciences and the fine arts. In this enlargement of the sphere of mental education, he was met by the practice of his contemporaries, which had already begun to combine with music many other arts and acquirements. But, on the one hand, the views of Plato, far transcend the general demands of his age ; on the other, he is anxious to obviate the evil of prevailing opinions. For the due appreciation of both these objects of his theory of education, it is necessary to understand the two ends which he wished to effect by instruction in music. The one is to furnish a counteraction to gymnastics ; for he observes that the bodily exercises which promote spirit or courage, have a tendency to induce harshness and severity of character, unless tempered by the softer arts of music, which again are calculated to lead to effeminacy and excessive gentleness, when they are not counteracted by the sterner influences of bodily exercise. This leads him to establish many restrictive laws concerning music : it ought not to be either too effeminate or too extravagant.<sup>133</sup> This restriction

<sup>133</sup> De Rep. iii. p. 398, d. sq. ; Laches, p. 188, d., et passim.

evinces a disposition to oppose the prevailing bias for variety and attractiveness in the arts, which he proscribes as a luxury, and recommends the simplicity and gravity of the olden manner. The other arts likewise ought to be under the control and management of the state, and not permitted to flatter the passions and vices of men;<sup>134</sup> but especially poetry, whose evil influence on the moral habit, Plato greatly dreads, and deems advisable to restrain. We cannot deny that he takes a very low view of the fine arts, and considers them as merely imitations, and that too of phenomena, not of the ideas, for they are not cultivated with science, which is the invariable attendant of the latter.<sup>135</sup> Plato appears here not to have given sufficient attention to the fact that a certain divine enthusiasm is manifestly present in the poet.<sup>136</sup> Such an art of imitation he looks upon as an illusion,<sup>137</sup> which may be advantageously employed for educational purposes—for such is an excellent and powerful means of instruction<sup>138</sup>—but requiring to be rightly directed in conformity with the ends of education, if it is not to prove injurious. Of dramatic and epic poetry in particular, he remarks, that it endeavours to please by its successful imitation of the passions and emotions of the soul, and so seduces it into feeling a false pleasure in that which in

<sup>134</sup> De Rep. iii. p. 400, e. sq.

<sup>135</sup> De Leg. ii. p. 668, a.; de Rep. x. p. 598, a. sq.

<sup>136</sup> This he admits himself, Apol. p. 22, b.; Phædr. p. 245, a.; Io, p. 533, c. sq., et passim.

<sup>137</sup> De Rep. x. p. 602, b.; Polit. p. 288, c.

<sup>138</sup> De Leg. i. p. 643, b. sq.; de Rep. vii. p. 536, e.

reality is shameful; and on this account he requires that poetry of this kind should be banished from the republic.<sup>139</sup> To lyric poetry he is more favourably disposed, but requires that it, abstaining from all seductive ornament or sentiment, and recommending nothing indecent or unbecoming, should only sing, with due reverence, the praises of gods and heroes. This species of poesy he allows to be cultivated in the state, under the direction of authority, which is experienced in good.<sup>140</sup> Thus did Plato continue the old feud between philosophy and poetry, both limiting and enlarging it.

If to the above exercises in the arts we add instruction in grammar, notwithstanding that it seems scarcely to belong to the circle of the Muses, and is but lowly esteemed by Plato himself,<sup>141</sup> we shall have combined whatever is subservient to one of the two ends which instruction in music is to accomplish. It is clear that Plato's object herein was to limit the sphere of education, as cultivated by his enlightened contemporaries, while to give to it a wider extension, was the other end which he had in view. That this is the foundation of all the commendation he bestows upon music, becomes clear, when we find him maintaining that those

<sup>139</sup> *De Rep.* iii. p. 398, a.; x. p. 603, c. sqq.; *de Leg.* vii. p. 810, e. sqq.

<sup>140</sup> *De Rep.* x. p. 607, a.; *de Leg.* iv. p. 719, b.; vii. p. 801, c. Here we have a proposition for a regular censorship, to which comedy and tragedy are subject, even in imperfectly organised states. But poetry and imitation are not to be permitted to citizens, only to slaves and foreigners. *De Leg.* vii. p. 816, e. Other species of poetry may, under regulation, be practised by citizens if possessed of such talents. *De Leg.* vii. 829, c. sq.

<sup>141</sup> *De Leg.* vii. p. 809, e. sq.

who know how to tune gymnastic and music to harmony within the soul, and not those who can reduce one string in unison with another, are the best musicians.<sup>142</sup> For theirs is a music which is above music simply and gymnastic. All who know aught of Plato, will at once perceive that by this music of the soul he intends philosophy.<sup>143</sup> The formation of the mind in philosophy is not so much designed to make the warrior skilful and consummate in his duties as such, as to initiate him in that knowledge and skill by which the rulers direct the commonwealth. In the Platonic view of virtue and the state, it is implied, that true good in the individual and the community can only spring from an insight into the nature of good; and, as the knowledge of good, in and for itself, is only to be found in philosophy, Plato was far from fearing to announce the maxim so celebrated, and, at the same time, so decried, that a state can never be fully freed from its evils until philosophers become its kings, or kings learn to be philosophers.<sup>144</sup> Accordingly, he gives, of necessity, a sketch of the manner in which the warrior class may be trained

<sup>142</sup> De Rep. iii. p. 412, a. τὸν κάλλιστ' ἄρα μουσικῇ γυμναστικὴν κεραινύοντα καὶ μετριώτατα τῇ ψυχῇ προσφέροντα τοῦτον ὁρθότατ' ἂν φαίμεν εἶναι τιλίως μουσικώτατον καὶ εὐαρμοστότατον, πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τὸν τὰς χορδὰς ἀλλήλαις συνιστάντα.

<sup>143</sup> Thus philosophy is opposed to the δημῳδῆς μουσικῇ, Phæd. p. 61, a.; cf. Heindorf, ad h. l.

<sup>144</sup> De Rep. v. p. 473, c. ἰὰν μὴ ἢ οἱ φιλόσοφοι βασιλεύσωσιν ἐν τοῖς πόλεσιν ἢ οἱ βασιλεῖς τε νῦν λεγόμενοι καὶ δυνάσται φιλοσοφήσωσι γνησίως τε καὶ ἱκανῶς καὶ τοῦτο εἰς ταῦτόν ξυμπέσῃ δυνάμις τε πολιτικὴ καὶ φιλοσοφία, τῶν δὲ νῦν προειρομένων χωρὶς ἐφ' ἑκάτερον αἱ πολλαὶ φύσεις ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀποκλεισθῶσιν, οὐκ ἔστι κακῶν παῦλα τοῖς πόλεσι, δοκῶ δὲ οὐδὲ τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ γίνεσθαι. De Rep. vi. init.; vii. p. 521, b.; Polit. p. 294, a. sq.; de Leg. xii. p. 965, a. sq.

to philosophy. For this purpose he distinguishes two methods for the study of music, or for the immediate development of the conceptions and thoughts; one is directed to the sensible, and gives rise to opinion; the other leads to notions, and those knowledges which the soul attains by its own energy and reflection. Both these are subdivided into two parts, of which the relation of the one to the other is that of lower to higher, the former being designed to minister to the latter. It is of importance to keep in mind, that this division is only made for the purposes of education. The two principal parts have reference to the two ends which are proposed in the cultivation of the musical arts, and the province of opinion consequently comprises those exercises alone which ought to be common to all of the warrior-class; *i. e.*, on the one hand, the cultivation of the imitative arts, which is here called the science of forms (*εἰκασία*), and, on the other, to an acquaintance with good and evil in the sensible reality, or faith (*πίστις*),<sup>145</sup> as Plato terms it. These, however, are only intended to be preparatory to the scientific enlightenment in which again he distinguishes the lower, which comprises the mathematical sciences, together with astronomy and scientific music, from the higher, or philosophy. To the former he refuses to give the name of science, and designates them by reflection

<sup>145</sup> In the above passage *εἰκασία* is incorrectly translated *probability*. Still greater is the error which would make *δοξα*, in this division, to be opposed to the sciences of opinion. Our own explanation is founded on *de Rep.* vi. p. 509, *e.* *ἐν μὲν τῷ ὁρωμένῳ τὸ μὲν ἕτερον τμήμα εἰκόνες. λέγω δὲ τὰς εἰκόνας πρῶτον μὲν τὰς σκιὰς, ἔπειτα τὰ ἐν τοῖς ὕδασι φαντάσματα καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὕδασι πυκνὰ τε καὶ λεῖα καὶ φανὰ ξυνίστηκε καὶ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον.*



(διάνοια), and maintains that they are only so many means to be employed in the attainment of philosophy or rational intelligence (νόησις).<sup>146</sup> It is only those of the warriors who are most highly distinguished by nature, that are capable of arriving at this high degree of enlightenment; these from the age of twenty years ought to undergo constant examinations as to their capacity to perceive the harmony and unison which subsist between the special sciences they have previously been taught, and to understand the nature of the subsistent; but from their thirtieth year to be trained in Dialectics.<sup>147</sup> This is Plato's plan for the formation of the supreme ruling class; and there only remains one point to be noticed as characteristic of the peculiar tone of his sentiments, that he vouchsafes even to women a share in this education; for at the same time that he held them to be in every respect weaker than men, he still conceived it to be possible for a woman duly to perform all the functions of the sovereignty.<sup>148</sup>

When, now, it is considered that it is the oldest of the warriors, as being the most fully fitted, that are to be chosen magistrates, on condition that they are not under fifty years of age,<sup>149</sup> and that, as rulers, they are entrusted with the education of the young; it would appear that it was Plato's object to make the state, in reference at

<sup>146</sup> De Rep. vi. fin. καὶ μοι ἐπὶ τοῖς τέτταρσι τμήμασι τέτταρα ταῦτα παθήματα ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γιγνόμενα λαβῆ, νόησιν μὲν ἐπὶ τῷ ἀνωτάτῳ, διάνοιαν δὲ ἐπὶ τῷ δευτέρῳ, τῷ τρίτῳ δὲ πίστιν ἀπόδος καὶ τῷ τελευταίῳ αἰκασίαν. De Rep. vii. p. 533, c.

<sup>147</sup> De Rep. vii. p. 537, b.

<sup>148</sup> Ibid. p. 540, c.

<sup>149</sup> Ibid. p. 540, a.; de Leg. v. fin.

least to the perfect citizen, a grand institute of national education.<sup>150</sup> This is the ground of his rule, that it must not be too great, but merely sufficient amply to meet all wants; <sup>151</sup> hence, too, every thing is so disposed, that the warrior class may appear but as one family. They are not to have separate houses, property, or even wives, who are merely regarded as necessary to the continuance of the state; and lastly, the children do not belong to their parents, but to the state. It is true, he alleges, that the object of these provisions is to remove all occasion of severity on the part of the guardians of the state against their subjects, and to ensure a race of sound and healthy children: <sup>152</sup> still, whatever weight he may have laid on these two motives, and especially on the latter, he appears to have been mainly influenced by the belief, that by such regulations the state would best maintain a proper unity, like that of a family at least, even if not of an individual.<sup>153</sup> For this he every where declares to be the end and merit of justice, that both in the individual soul and the state, it effects unity and assuages all the dissensions which necessarily arise from the corruption of either.

<sup>150</sup> Menex. p. 238, c. *πολίτεια γὰρ τροφή ἀνθρώπων ἐστὶ, καλὴ μὲν ἀγαθῶν, ἣ δὲ ἐναντία κακῶν.* De Leg. ix. p. 867, e. Hence the laws are of the little as compared to the one and the great principle of education. De Rep. iv. p. 423, d. *τὸ λεγόμενον ἐν μίγα* —, *μᾶλλον δὲ ἀντὶ μεγάλου ἱκανόν* — *τὴν παιδείαν καὶ τροφήν.*

<sup>151</sup> De Rep. iv. p. 423, c. De Leg. v. p. 737, d. give 5040 as the fitting number; to this an agricultural class is added in the Laws.

<sup>152</sup> De Rep. iii. p. 415, a. sq.; iv. init.

<sup>153</sup> Ibid. v. p. 461, e. sq. Hence the advance of trade is given as the origin of state. De Leg. iii. p. 631. Education, however, is for the state, and not for the family, to whom, rather than their parents, children belong.

With whatever feelings we may peruse this sketch of a commonwealth, an instinctive emotion of admiration arises within us, when, at the conclusion, Plato, looking far beyond the narrow limits of a Grecian city, depicts the effects of justice when established in the sovereignty of the whole world. We here perceive that his object was not to describe the state as any close and narrow unity, but as a portion of the world whose ruling principle is also justice. The closing passages of his ethical theory thus bring it in harmony and connexion with his view of the mundane development. In the Republic, he teaches us that the just man ought not to regulate his conduct by any consideration of his own happiness, however natural it may be that every species of virtue should pursue its appropriate pleasure; and at the close he shews that, as the individual cannot be at peace with himself, except by the harmonious adjustment of all his moral faculties, which allows to each its just right unimpeded, so, too, for the whole body of the world happiness exists only in the same degree as justice, and that each individual derives the greater benefit from the whole community the more perfect the harmony in which he lives with all others. Justice is good, not only in itself, but in its effects:<sup>154</sup> it renders all things fitting and friendly to men,<sup>155</sup> and the just man may, consequently, expect the outward circumstances of his existence to fashion themselves in conformity with that which is truly for his good. Justice, it is true,

<sup>154</sup> De Rep. ii. p. 357, d.

<sup>155</sup> Gorg. p. 507, e.; Lys. p. 214, c.

is its own reward ; but it is also acknowledged by the gods, who therefore, as they love the just, will reward them with all good things. Influenced by this conviction, no surprise ought to be felt at the difficulties in which the just on earth are often involved ; for even poverty, sickness, and other apparent evils, by the aid of the gods, minister to such for good. But above all, man ought not to confine his view to this brief existence, for the just do not attain their due reward until, released from the body, they shall become free from the evil which, in the present life, oppresses them.<sup>156</sup>

When we review all these doctrines of Plato, it is impossible to deny that they are pervaded with a grand and sublime view of life and the universe. This is the noble thought, which inspires him to say, ‘ God is the constant and immutable good ; the world is good in a state of becoming, and the human soul that in and through which the good in the world is to be consummated.’ In this sublime conception we recognise the worthy disciple of Socrates ; to illustrate it was the object and design of his whole philosophy. He further shews himself the faithful continuator and improver of the Socratic doctrine, when he considers it to be indispensable that the philosophical effort should take up its position in humanity and its imperfect thoughts, and thereby protests against all those doctrines which, by eliminating all multiplicity and becoming, peril the cause of philosophy herself ;

<sup>156</sup> De Rep. x. p. 608, c. 24.

while, on the other hand, the pure rational thought, abstracted from all its mutable exciting causes, is alone of any philosophical value in his eyes. Maintaining such opinions, he necessarily held that there is a multiplicity of ideas and entities, having with each other a variety of mutable relations; he might, therefore, well devote all the powers of his dialectical genius to the further improvement of the Socratic method, which consisted essentially in the discovery of the definition of, and the several relations among ideas. His merit lies chiefly in having advanced certain distinct and precise rules for this method, and in insisting, with a perfect consciousness of its importance, upon the law of science, that to be able to descend from the higher to the lower ideas by a principle of the reason, and reciprocally from the multiplicity of the lower to form higher ones, is indispensable to the perfect possession of any knowledge. When further he laid down the idea of good as the highest idea, the true object of all knowledge, he was impelled to conceive all that is in the world under its reference to the idea of good, and in perfect agreement with Socrates' opinion, to consider natural objects as formed after that idea, from the aspect of their final causes, and comprise Ethics under Dialectic, as resulting from knowledge.

While Plato thus propagated the Socratic doctrine, giving it occasionally both wider applications and closer determinations, he, at the same time, imparted to it a more liberal character, and, instead of the hostile position which, at its first rise, it naturally maintained against the earlier phi-

losophy, substituted an impartial estimate of its value and merits. It has been already observed, that he adopted many of the philosophemes of his predecessors, and the present is the fitting place to shew both the new form that he gave to them, and to point out the profit which thence accrued to his own system. From the dynamical physiology, as perfected by Heraclitus, he derived the principal features of his own theory of the universe, which he regarded as a perfectly living or ensouled being, subject to the perpetual flux of becoming, and destined, by its order and proportion, to be the most perfect representation of the rational ideas. Now, although this aspect of the system of nature was the most attractive to Plato's mind, he, nevertheless, did not neglect the mechanical view, which, although it is chiefly employed in his account of individual objects, is the ground of his general view of body as a lifeless mass, deriving its motion from some extrinsical cause, and merely ministering to the soul. In this manner did he maintain and carry forward the rigorous contrariety between body and soul. The latter, however, he considers not merely as the motive principle which disposes the corporeal in accordance with certain ends and designs, but also as the final cause of the whole mundane development. On this side, his doctrine is nearly allied to the Pythagorean philosophy, towards which it inclines in its predominantly ethical consideration of nature, and the conception of the mundane relations as certain harmonical laws, capable of being numerically determined. Hence also he derived the ruling thought of his entire

theory, that the proportional and self-sufficient is alone good, and that evil consists simply in excess and deficiency. Still more decided is his bias for Eleatic opinions. The animating principle of this philosophy, that the perfect alone truly and immutably subsists, is rigorously worked out by Plato, who has attempted to illustrate, in a variety of ways, the identity of whatever appears to be different, while the unity of essence and science is posited in the perfect one. He accordingly adopts the Eleatic contrariety of the rational knowledge of truth and the sensuous opinion, softening, however, its asperity, in order to do justice to the other elements of Greek philosophy.

When once it is acknowledged that all the results of the earlier philosophy received from Plato their due consideration, the largeness and circumspectness of view with which he prosecuted its development cannot fail to be duly appreciated. He did not allow himself to be disturbed by the mass of conflicting opinions, which, in his time, agitated the scientific mind of the Greeks, but, on the contrary, set himself in opposition to the Sophists, who suffered themselves to be entangled in their complicated web, or misemployed them for the amusement of those to whom whatever is great and good was indifferent. But Plato did not simply collect and arrange these various opinions; he breathed into them the life-giving breath of unity and totality. This he was able to do, by refusing to stand still at the point of development, to which they had been already brought, and, quick to perceive the result to which they naturally tended,

by carrying each, in its due direction, far beyond where his predecessors had been content to stop. Thus dissatisfied with the one-sided controversy which the Eleatæ had raised against the sensuous presentation, he employed the perpetual mutability to which sensation is subject, and the fact, that sensations exist only for the sentient, to shew that alone it is incapable of furnishing a knowledge of any thing that is really permanent, universal, and absolutely subsisting. Yet while he thus proved that those who look to sensation alone, are unable to apprehend the true essence of things, he did not deny that their perceptions correspond to the relative conditions of phenomena. However he opposed real and absolute entity to relative phenomena, and that approximated to the opinion which derives all things from opposite principles, shewing that such opposites exist only in the domain of opinion, since becoming is but a transition from one opposite to another; while in fact, the ground of becoming remains ever identical with itself, and must be conceived as a principle or cause which combines all opposites. Thus his own view goes far beyond that of the Eleatæ, removing, on the one hand, the limits which they set to their doctrine, and, on the other, employing the affirmative portion of their dialectic to very different results from what its authors had ever anticipated. In the former respect, he combined it with the dialectical, the latter with the ethical labours of Socrates. Thus he perceived that the philosopher cannot deviate from that which is furnished him by the



forms of science and thought; and that as every regular method requires certain classifications and divisions of ideas, the plurality both of ideas and of essences must be admitted, since every notion indicates an essence. Nevertheless, even while he asserted the necessity of this assumption, he was far from denying that the Eleatæ had rightly maintained that the supreme one comprises all perfection; and as he held the latter to consist in the essence, he taught that all ideas and all essences are comprised in the idea of absolute good, or of God, the only essential difference between Plato and the Eleatæ being, that he did not sacrifice to this supreme unity the true multiplicity of ideas; for that many can be in one, he held to be dialectically established. In the way that Plato thus insisted on the necessity of establishing the systems of thought and of being, by the complete organisation of science, he conferred a most important service upon the cause of philosophy. In this respect he gave solidity and fruitfulness to his investigations, by making it his first object, to determine, after the manner of Socrates, the nature of good. The vital principle of his philosophy is the attempt to shew, that true science is the knowledge of good; and that even though man may be unable to apprehend it in its unity, because that, subject to the restraints of body, he never perceives it except in becoming, he is, nevertheless, permitted to recognise, in the multiplicity of ideas, the better and the worse, by calling to mind the eternal measure of all existence, with which he is in his origin connected. Plato may have erred more than

once in his attempts to determine the nature of good; and how could it be otherwise in one of his age and nation? Still he has pointed out to all who aspire to a knowledge of the divine nature, an excellent road by which they may arrive at it. This point of his doctrine was overlooked by his pretended disciples; for he cautiously abstained from any attempt to discover the idea of God or goodness in its supra-substantial or supra-scientific unity, and when, at times, he touched upon it in his investigations, he invariably had recourse to merely mythical figures, or else solely strove, by developing a multiplicity of ideas which it comprises, to obtain some conception of it, however distant and inadequate.

Unwillingly, as Aristotle says, do we censure our friends; but truth is dearer to us. We do not intend to notice all the defects of the Platonic style and exposition—of this, much has been noticed in passing—and shall confine our remarks to a fault of system which has greatly weakened the influence of his philosophy. It is evident that he was unable to find a transition from his world of ideas to that of sense. He seems, it is true, to have had a vague notion, that every individual, in opposition to some other object of thought, must, as such, be imperfect; and that, for this reason, every individual soul participating in the nature of opposite or other, must be subject to a relative becoming. But, on the one hand, this conception is very far from being worked out clearly and fully—at least no precise information is afforded either by his dialogues or disciples; and, on the other, it is at best

too vague to be regarded as a satisfactory solution of the difficulty. For the most part, Plato insists upon the truth of philosophical investigation and the vitality of the reason, solely with a view to controvert those sensuous representations which apparently lead to a denial of becoming. This, on the one hand, led him, when touching upon the connexion between ideas and sensible becoming, to convey his conceptions on this point in very vague and indeterminate figures, among which his Pythagorising modes of exposition must be reckoned. This, too, has led to many of the mystical excrescences of his system. On the other hand, it must not be overlooked, that Plato is always animated by a strong bias to ensure the recognition of the truth of ideas and of the Eternal Being; and that when he is speaking of verity in its highest sense, it is to the ideas alone that he is willing to ascribe truth and entity. By this means the reality of the sensible, as opposed to the ideas, becomes so vague, as almost to be evanescent. For, although he assumes its resemblance to, or participation in ideas, and thereby places its existence beyond dispute, still, in what manner this is conceivable, is a point on which we in vain seek for information. Thus the Platonic philosophy diverts its investigations from actual life, from that which lives and is the object of experience, and this constitutes principally the one-sidedness of its character. Plato did not, indeed, renounce all inquiry into the phenomena of nature and rational life, being constrained by the force of reason, which overmasters every exclusive tendency of doctrine;

nevertheless, the phenomenal, in whatever manner he may have regarded it, is far from adjusting itself to his theory. For instance, when he conceives the corporeal, which is the ground of all sensible phenomena, to be a mean for good, he betrays his tendency to depreciate it as the principle of evil. When he praises the sensuous perception as the medium by which the eternal ideas are brought to man's recollection, the question naturally arises, how comes it that they should ever have been forgotten? and he tells us it is a consequence of the sensuous flux of the corporeal. And in answer to the general question, what is the end and object of human existence? we are told it is to realise in man as pure a knowledge of the good, and to effect as much pure good as possible. But if he were formerly in possession of this goodness, wherefore has an evil fate deprived him of it? But even the last end and aim of human exertion becomes evanescent; for, supposing him to have arrived at this highest state of purity, and attained to a fairer and better existence, the stern force of necessity still overpowers him, and plunges him again into the cares and anxieties of life. Thus the hypothesis of a premundane existence of the soul and a pure contemplation of the ideas, is irreconcilable with any rational end for the great sum of existence.

It was necessary to notice, in the present place, these defects of the Platonic system, since, otherwise, it would be difficult to understand the further development of philosophy.

## CHAPTER VI.

### PLATONISTS OF THE OLD ACADEMY.

THE death of Plato, like that of Socrates, dissolved the union between the various and opposite dispositions, which the personal influence of the teacher had attracted and harmonised; Xenocrates and Aristotle proceeded to Atarneus, the court of the tyrant Hermeias,<sup>1</sup> while Speusippus, the nephew of Plato, remained and taught in the Academy.

Here, then, our way again branches forth in two directions. In the one we have to follow the Academy, in the other Aristotle. How different the interest they awaken! For, as formerly observed, the development of philosophy had now attained to a perfect unity, and while it advances under one master, and in one school exclusively, the other labourers either betray a senile anxiety for the old, or else are already fast falling into error. Whatever may have been the value of their inventions and doctrines, they cannot shew any valid title to a place among those who have advanced the limits of philosophy. Such is the case with the Academicians, who are generally accounted the truest followers of Plato, whereas Aristotle, so often charged with infidelity to the principles of his great master, lives on in the history of philosophy with unfading renown. The fate of great philosophers resembles that of great statesmen. Living they

<sup>1</sup> Strab. xiii. p. 127. Tauch.

gather around them a band of faithful associates, who when they are no more, would each play the master; but the work proceeds badly, until at last another and a stranger puts himself at the head of the great movement of mind, which the departed great had awakened.

We propose, however, to consider the Academy in the first place, less for its pre-eminence of merit, than because it already exhibits a condition of Greek civilisation, well calculated to prepare and to introduce the later development of philosophy. After the death of Plato, Speusippus, who continued the lessons of his great master and uncle, held the chair for six years. To him succeeded Xenocrates, another disciple of Plato, who is followed by a succession of teachers, who were all formed in his school. We are now arrived at an age in which scientific establishments for the higher branches of education were formed. The teacher's office seems to have devolved by regular succession,<sup>2</sup> and, in this particular school, to have been held by right of tenure of the garden and Academy, which were originally the property of Plato.<sup>3</sup>

The presumption is certainly allowable, that the followers of Plato in the Academy, cherished an honest desire to propagate his doctrine in its integrity, and only occasionally ventured to enlarge, or more closely to define it. But the transmission of philosophy is impossible, unless it keeps pace with the general enlargement of sentiments and feelings, and, accordingly, many applications and

<sup>2</sup> Diog. L. iv, 3.

<sup>3</sup> Plut. de Exil. 10.

expositions were inevitably introduced into the body of the doctrine, which were little in unison with the Platonic cast of thought. And, accordingly, Aristotle often distinguishes Platonic from the Academic doctrines. Unfortunately, however, the traces which, in our attempt to delineate the progressive formation of the latter, are so very obscure, that, at most, we must content ourselves with a probable result.

Nevertheless, we do not scruple to affirm, that the tendency to erudite speculation, so distinctive of the Academy, is much more decided in Speusippus than in Plato. This was the natural course of the philosophical schools as the higher institutions of mental culture among the Greeks: commencing with philosophy, they were maintained by erudition: and as they undertook the complete education of the youthful Greeks, they necessarily drew within the circle much that was alien to philosophy. The great learning of Speusippus is proved by many anecdotes: his library was purchased by Aristotle at the high price of three talents;<sup>4</sup> he, it is said, was the first to investigate the common elements, and connexion between the several sciences;<sup>5</sup> and to have insisted upon the principle, that he who would give a definition of any term or object,

<sup>4</sup> Diog. L. iv. 5; Gell. Noct. Att. iii. 17. The philosophy of Speusippus is not very highly estimated by Aristotle.

<sup>5</sup> Diog. L. iv. 2. οὗτος πρῶτος — ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἐθεάσατο τὸ κοινὸν καὶ συνφκίῳσι καθίσταν ἢν δυνατόν ἀλλήλοις. That the μαθήματα are not simply the mathematical sciences, is, I think, clear; for herein Speusippus only carried out a doctrine of Plato. Cf. Tennemann, Gesch. d. Phil. iii. p. 7. However, the assumption of Tennemann, that the *δμοια* of Speusippus contained an analogy of the sciences, is not confirmed by the passages in Athenæus.

ought to know all things, as undertaking to indicate all the points of difference by which the object to be defined is distinguished from all others.<sup>6</sup> This principle, which restrained within due limits is invaluable, is well calculated to point out the necessary enchainment of all sciences, as understood and taught by Plato. Lastly, we are told that Speusippus, faithful to his master's doctrine, that an investigation of their differences and resemblances is necessary to a right knowledge of things, composed a work in ten books, in which he enumerates the resemblance of all the objects with which he was acquainted.<sup>7</sup>

It was, perhaps, a consequence of this pursuit of universal knowledge that led Speusippus to advance a formula, in which he sought to give a precise determination of the manner in which science may be drawn from sensation. He opposed, for instance, a scientific sensation to the scientific reason, in which, however, sensation participates, since it is by reason that it practises itself and gains experience, whereby intelligent artisans acquire

<sup>6</sup> Themist. in Arist. Anal. Post. ii. 24, p. 26, ed. Venet. 1560. *Visum autem Speusippo est, utique non recte, eum, qui definiturus sit, scire omnia oportere. Necessarium, inquit, est, omnes rei differentias teneri, per quas genus id, quod definire velis, a cæteris differat. Hoc nemo assequi potest, qui cætera non cognoscat.*

<sup>7</sup> Diog. L. iv. 5. *διάλογοι τῶν περὶ τὴν πραγματείαν ὁμοιωνί*, i. which is quoted by Athenæus by the title *ὁμοια*, especially in the 7th book. It is an idle conjecture of Menage, that they are the work of Speusippus the physician. From the quotations of Athenæus, it is clear that Speusippus attempted to determine the resemblance of plants and animals. It is, therefore, probable that he had planned a systematic natural history. Another work of his bears the title *διαίρεσεις καὶ πρὸς τὰ ὁμοια ὑποθέσεις*. The quotations in Athenæus are not from this work, for it appears to have consisted only of a single book, and probably also not in the form of dialogue.



greater nicety and correctness in the sensations which belong to their particular art.<sup>8</sup>

So far, we have met with nothing more than a further development and application of true Platonic principles, but, nevertheless, distinctly marked with the prevailing character of his age. There is, however, a matter in which he appears to have gone further than was consistent in a disciple of Plato. We formerly remarked that the latter philosopher had, in his old age, adopted more and more of the Pythagorean theory of numbers, not, however, to such an extent as would constitute an essential modification of his fundamental view. A further proof of this, if any confirmation be wanted, is to our minds furnished by our finding his disciples, Speusippus, Xenocrates and Hestæus,<sup>9</sup> gradually occupying themselves more and more with disquisitions upon the nature of numbers, so that it would almost seem as if they thought to discover in numbers the secret of all things. Our statements on this subject rest principally on some very obscure allusions of Aristotle, the greater part of which we may justly omit, as belonging to that play of subtlety which has so often been mixed up with philosophy. There is only one point clearly established, which is, however, sufficient to exhibit the true import and peculiar character of this doctrine. Aristotle

<sup>8</sup> Sext. Emp. adv. Math. vii. 145. ὥς ἡ τοῦ μουσικοῦ αἰσθησις ἐνάργειαν μὲν εἶχεν ἀντιληπτικὴν τοῦ τε ἡρμωσμένου καὶ τοῦ ἀναρμόστου, ταύτην δὲ οὐκ αὐτοφύη, ἀλλ' ἐκ λογισμοῦ περιγεγονυῖαν· οὕτω καὶ ἡ ἐπιστημονικὴ αἰσθησις φυσικῶς παρὰ τοῦ λόγου τῆς ἐπιστημονικῆς μεταλαμβάνει τριβῆς πρὸς ἀπλανῆ τῶν ὑποκειμένων διάγνωσιν.

<sup>9</sup> Theophr. Met. 3.

tells us that Speusippus assumed more species of essences, and more grounds of it, than Plato did, *viz.*, number, extended magnitude, soul, and so forth.<sup>10</sup> The unit he made to be the first ground of numbers,<sup>11</sup> a view which is, however, common to Plato and the Platonists generally. But he differed from Plato and returned to the simple Pythagorean doctrine, that the first ground and the first one is not absolute or universal good, but merely one among many species of good.<sup>12</sup> To this opinion, Speusippus would appear to have been led by the consideration, that by positing the unit as the absolute good, we are forced to regard multiplicity, as opposed to unity, as evil; and since all issues from opposites, all must in that case be supposed to rise from absolute good and absolute evil.<sup>13</sup> Such a dualism Speusippus sought to avoid, by refusing to ascribe pure good to the first beginning or the unit. But, in consequence of this, he was driven to regard the first ground of all things as not absolute good, and as, pro-

<sup>10</sup> Met. vii. 2. Σπεύσιππος δὲ καὶ πλείους οὐσίας ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐνὸς ἀρξάμενος καὶ ἀρχὰς ἐκάστης οὐσίας ἄλλην μὲν ἀριθμῶν, ἄλλην δὲ μεγέθων, ἴκτιρα ψυχῆς· καὶ τοῦτον δὲ τὸν τρόπον ἐπεκτείνει τὰς οὐσίας. Herewith agrees, to all appearance, Jambl. ap. Stob. Ecl. i. p. 862. ἐν ἰδίᾳ δὲ τοῦ πάντη διαστατοῦ (τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι) Σπεύσιππος.

<sup>11</sup> This is plain from Arist. Met. xiv. 4, 5, which passages I refer, with Brandis, to Speusippus, on the authority of *ibid.* xii. 7.

<sup>12</sup> Arist. Eth. Nic. i. 4. πιθανώτερον δ' ὁμοίωσιν οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι λέγειν περὶ αὐτοῦ (τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ) τιθέντες ἐν τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν συστοιχίᾳ τὸ ἓν. οἷς δὲ καὶ Σπεύσιππος ἐπακολουθήσαι δοκεῖ. He also makes the *νοῦς* to be distinct from the unit. Stob. Ecl. i. p. 58. Σπεύσιππος τὸν νοῦν οὔτε τῷ ἐνὶ οὔτε τῷ ἀγαθῷ τὸν αὐτόν, ἰδιοφυῇ δέ.

<sup>13</sup> Arist. Met. xiv. 4. — καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον στοιχεῖον, εἴτε πλῆθος ὃν εἴτε τὸ ἄνισον καὶ μέγα καὶ μικρόν, τὸ κακὸν αὐτό. διόπερ ὁ μὲν ἐφευγε τὸ ἀγαθὸν προσάπτει τῷ ἐνὶ ὡς ἀναγκαῖον ἂν, ἵπαι δ' ἐξ ἐναντίων ἡ γίνεσις, τὸ κακὸν τὴν τοῦ πλήθους φύσιν εἶναι.

bably, he did not wish to eliminate the latter from philosophy, where it had been too deeply ingrafted by his great master, he was obliged, as his only resource, to suppose it to be a development of the first principle. In order to support this view, he recurred to the olden comparison of the genesis of the world to the production of a living creature from seed: the first unit is a seed of this kind, out of which the good is subsequently evolved.<sup>14</sup> In this direction he proceeded so far as to refuse to call the first one an entity,<sup>15</sup> evidently on the ground that it has only a potential being. It was, perhaps, in reference to this doctrine, that he is accused of having sought to degrade the idea of god, by committing the guidance of all things to an animal force,<sup>16</sup> having made rare the truly venerable, placing it around the centre of the world, and perhaps also on the two sides of the extreme heaven,<sup>17</sup> where, indeed, the Pythagoreans saw the divine. If, now, by the help of these doctrines, we judge of the passage previously cited from Aristotle,<sup>18</sup> which speaks of

<sup>14</sup> Arist. Met. xii. 7. ὅσοι δὲ ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, ὥσπερ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι καὶ Σπείσιππος τὸ κάλλιστον καὶ ἄριστον μὴ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἶναι διὰ τὸ καὶ τῶν φυτῶν καὶ τῶν ζώων τὰς ἀρχὰς αἰτία μὴν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ καλὸν καὶ τέλειον ἐν τοῖς ἐκ τούτων, οὐκ ὁρθῶς οἰονταί. Cf. *ibid.* xiv. 4. Damasc. *Quæst. de Prim. Princ.* i. p. 3.

<sup>15</sup> Arist. Met. xiv. 5. οὐκ ὁρθῶς δ' ὑπολαμβάνει οὐδ' εἴ τις παρεκάζει τὰς τοῦ ὅλου ἀρχὰς τῇ τῶν ζώων καὶ τῶν φυτῶν, ὅτι ἐξ ἀορίστων ἀτελῶν θεῖ αἰεὶ τὰ τελειότερα, διὸ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πρώτων οὕτως ἔχειν φασίν, ὥστε μὴδὲ ὅν τι εἶναι τὸ ἐν αὐτοῖς.

<sup>16</sup> Cic. de Nat. D. i. 13. Speusippus—vim quandam dicens, qua omnia regantur, eamque animale, evellere ex animis conatur cognitionem deorum.

<sup>17</sup> So, perhaps, we may infer from the confused passage in Theophr. Met. 9. εἰ γὰρ καὶ οἱ περὶ τῆς ὅλης οὐσίας λέγοντες, ὥσπερ Σπείσιππος σπάνιόν τι τὸ τίμιον ποιεῖ, τὸ περὶ τὴν τοῦ μέσου χώραν· τὰ δ' ἄκρα καὶ ἐκατέρωθεν, τὰ μὴν οὖν ὄντα καλῶς ἐτυχεῖν ὄντα.

<sup>18</sup> Met. vii. 2.

a series of essence and principles, we can form no other conception of it than that he derived the perfect from out of imperfect principles, *viz.*, extended magnitude from the unit as the principle of number, and next, the principle of soul, and so on up the decade which he described to be the most perfect essence.<sup>19</sup> We are hazarding conjectures, but, conjecture as we may, it is at least certain, that, in this doctrine, he deviated essentially from his master, both by making the first ground different from the first good, and by plunging deeper into the fantastic theory of numbers. The one is evidently a recurrence to the unevolved principle adopted by the earlier philosophers; the other, the more it receded from careful prudent inquiry, must have evinced the greater contempt for the modest demands of a knowledge of reality.<sup>20</sup>

Xenocrates, born at Chalcedon, Olymp. 96. 1,<sup>21</sup> who is said to have been a disciple of Æschines the Socraticist,<sup>22</sup> before he attached himself to Plato, succeeded Speusippus, and pursued for twenty years<sup>23</sup> an equally unprofitable career. The moral sternness of his character, his devotion to his mas-

<sup>19</sup> Theol. Arithm. p. 62.

<sup>20</sup> In an unpublished commentary on the Phædo of Plato (Cousin, Journ. des Savans, 1835, p. 145,) we find it stated that Speusippus and Xenocrates made the soul to be immortal, *μέχρι τῆς ἀλογίας*, with many other equally obscure statements. There are notices of some ethical doctrines of Speusippus in the Clem. Alex. Strom. ii. p. 367, 418; Senec. Ep. 85. They are too meagre to allow us to draw from them any certain conclusion. When Cicero says, Orat. iii. 18; cf. Qu. Ac. i. 4, sq., that Speusippus and the old Academy differed but slightly from Aristotle, he apparently refers to the theory of soul.

<sup>21</sup> Cic. Qu. Ac. i. 4; Diog. L. iv. 14. Cf. Van de Wynpersse *Diatriba de Xenocrate Chalcedonio*. Lugd. Bat. 1822, and the review thereof in the Heidelb. Jahrb. 1824, p. 475, sqq.

<sup>22</sup> Athen. xi. p. 116, 507.

<sup>23</sup> Diog. I. i. 1.

ter, and zeal for philosophy, constitute his principal claims to our admiration; for in the judgment of Plato, and the general opinion of antiquity, his intellectual powers were far from being of the higher order, remarkable neither for quickness nor penetration.<sup>24</sup> And, indeed, if we may be allowed to draw any inference on such a matter from the paucity of information which has been bequeathed to us concerning his doctrines, we are disposed to assent to the justice of this sentence. From several indistinct allusions, coupled with the development of scientific exposition, we are led to conjecture that Xenocrates delivered his doctrine in the form of a treatise and not of dialogue.<sup>25</sup> This form of exposition rendered it necessary to arrange his matter under different heads; from which the formal division of philosophy into Logic, Physics, and Ethics, naturally followed, of which Xenocrates is said to have been the inventor.<sup>26</sup> However, we have already attempted to shew that his merits are restricted to that of reducing to a definite form what had been previously established by Plato with great clearness and precision.

Whatever may be the value of Xenocrates' labours in the cause of philosophy, they were exclusively confined to an attempt to embody the Platonic doctrine in a system of mathematical formulæ. Thus did Pythagorism gain ground more and more in the Academy. The manner in which Plato dis-

<sup>24</sup> Cic. de Off. i. 30; Plut. de Rect. Rat. Aud. 18; Conj. Præc. 28; Diog. L. iv. 6.

<sup>25</sup> Diog. L. iv. 11, 16.

<sup>26</sup> Sext. Emp. adv. Math. vii. 16.

tinguished the mathematical from the sensible and the ideal, seems to have dissatisfied his followers as vague and inadequate. And, accordingly, unwilling to be guided by it, they were, on the one hand, led to form the most idle and arbitrary hypotheses, and, on the other, in their wish to gratify the growing demand for a knowledge of actual life, to give a very palpable explanation of the transcendent ideas. Aristotle remarks that three different views of number, all deviating widely from the doctrine of Plato, were formed among his disciples. Some rejected the ideal numbers and admitted the mathematical, others sought to identify the two, and a third and last party recognised the ideal alone.<sup>27</sup> Xenocrates, it would seem, belongs to the first class, at least this is the opinion of Aristotle's commentators,<sup>28</sup> and we may, therefore, venture to assume that he evinced a desire to give philosophical interpretations of mathematical doctrines, or, at least, to look to the latter for a knowledge of the ideas. Tiffis conjecture is justified by the view which Xenocrates

<sup>27</sup> Arist. Met. xiii. 9. οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὰ μαθηματικὰ μόνον κοινοῦντες παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητά, ὁρῶντες τὴν περὶ τὰ εἶδη δυσχέρειαν καὶ πλάσειν, ἀπίστησαν ἀπὸ τοῦ εἰδητικοῦ ἀριθμοῦ καὶ τὸν μαθηματικὸν ἱκοίησαν· οἱ δὲ τὰ εἶδη βουλόμενοι ἕμα καὶ ἀριθμοὺς ποιεῖν, οὐχ ὁρῶντες εἶ, εἰ τὰς ἀρχὰς τις ταύτας θήσεται, πῶς ἔσται ὁ μαθηματικὸς ἀριθμὸς παρὰ τὸν εἰδητικόν, τὸν αὐτὸν εἰδητικὸν καὶ μαθηματικὸν ἱκοίησαν ἀριθμὸν τῷ λόγῳ, ἵπαι ἔργῳ γε ἀνῆρηται ὁ μαθηματικός· ἰδίας γὰρ καὶ οὐ μαθηματικῶς ἱποθέσεις λέγουσιν. Arist. Met. xiii. c. 6. ἄλλος δὲ τις τὸν πρῶτον ἀριθμὸν τὸν τῶν εἰδῶν ἕνα εἶναι. Arist. Met. xiii. c. 8. ὅτι μὲν οὖν εἴπερ εἰσὶν ἀριθμοὶ αἱ ἰδέαι, κ. τ. λ. Cf. Heidelb. Jahrb. 478.

<sup>28</sup> Syrian in Met. xii. p. 71; Philop. in Met. p. 56, b.; 58, b.; 60, b. The commentators contradict one another: they had not before them the writings of Xenocrates, and appeal to the authority of Alexander of Aphrodisia. Their opinion appears to be confirmed by the objection which Aristotle makes to this doctrine as leading to unmathematical assumptions.

entertained of the relation of science, and sensuous perception to the essence of things. Of this he assumed that there are three species, the sensible, that discoverable by reason, and that which is composed of both these, and is the object-matter of opinion. The second, which belongs to the ideas, is without the heaven or the world; the sensible within it; and, lastly, the third is the heaven itself, which, for the sensuous perception, is visible, and for the rational cognition discoverable by Astronomy.<sup>29</sup> Now, as Astronomy was held both by Plato and the ancients in general to be a mathematical science, it is clear that Xenocrates assigned to the mathematics an equal rank with philosophy. Accordingly, we are expressly told that no one ever went further than Xenocrates in accounting for things according to the series of numbers;<sup>30</sup> in all probability, because he thought, by a perfect knowledge of numbers, it would be possible to discover the essence of things.

It is, therefore, in perfect consistency that he attempted to reduce philosophical notions to mathematical formulæ. The monad and the duad

<sup>29</sup> Sext. adv. Math. vii. 147. *Ξενοκράτης δὲ τρεῖς φησὶν οὐσίας εἶναι, τὴν μὲν αἰσθητὴν, τὴν δὲ νοητὴν, τὴν δὲ σύνθετον καὶ δοξαστὴν· ὧν αἰσθητὴν μὲν εἶναι τὴν ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ, δοξαστὴν δὲ καὶ σύνθετον τὴν αὐτοῦ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ· ὅρατι μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶ τῇ αἰσθήσει, νοητὴ δὲ δι' ἀστρολογίας.* In what follows it is of importance to remark that Xenocrates does not apparently distinguish between *ἐπιστήμη* and *διάνοια*, and also ascribes a truth to *αἰσθησις*, though different from that which belongs to the scientific *λόγος*. With this division, it is probable that his attack upon the Aristotelian categories was connected, which Xenocrates grounded upon the fact that every thing is either *καθ' αὐτὸ* or *προς τι*, assuming, nevertheless, that they may still be combined. Vide Simp. in Cat. fol. 15, e. Bas.

<sup>30</sup> Theopr. Met. iii.

are the gods who govern the universe, whose multiplicity is again distributed into the eight stars;<sup>31</sup> the soul is a self-moving number,<sup>32</sup> the divine is compared to an equilateral triangle, because it is composed of like sides, the mortal to the scalene, because its sides are all unlike, but the demonical to the isosceles, because it has both like and unlike sides.<sup>33</sup> He might, perhaps, have sought to connect this explanation with the Platonic doctrine of the triangular composition of the elements, as well as the famous doctrine of indivisible lines—that singular hypothesis which already is evidence of the complicated absurdities of the Pythagorising Platonists. In general these formulæ bespeak the predominate tendency of the Platonic school towards mathematical symbolism; nevertheless there are some particulars which appear to deserve a more detailed examination.

The manner in which Plato attempted to discover the divine principle of the universe, not in itself, but in certain relations or degrees, naturally led to fanciful modes of thought among those who, not content, as he was, to have recourse to myths, sought to reduce all thoughts to some visible and palpable form. Of this, many traces are to be found, both in the Academy generally, but especially in Xenocrates. The latter, however, adhered

<sup>31</sup> Stob. Ecl. i. p. 62; Cic. de Nat. D. i. 13; Clem. Alex. Protrept. p. 44.

<sup>32</sup> Plut. de Anim. Procr. i.

<sup>33</sup> Plut. de Orac. Def. 13.

<sup>34</sup> It is often mentioned by Aristotle without naming Xenocrates, who is, however, usually named by commentators; e. g., Simpl. Phys. fol. 30, a., who generally refer it to the arguments of Zeno, which, however, are far from accounting for the assumption.



strictly to the Socratic dogma, that the divinity is to be traced solely in the rational consciousness of its existence. On this account he ascribes to the irrational animals even, a conception of the godlike as pervading the whole universe,<sup>35</sup> and reduced the demonical, which mediates between the divine and the mortal, to the good or bad dispositions of the soul.<sup>36</sup> But he was not content to stop here; on the contrary, he composed a long and detailed theory of the gods and demons. He assumed that there are demons indwelling in the corporeal elements,<sup>37</sup> and favoured thereby many superstitious conceptions of the power of the demons, and especially of evil ones.<sup>38</sup> But the fanciful character of his mind evinced itself most strikingly in the manner in which he attempted to construct a gradual passage from the supreme idea of God to its manifestations in mundane phenomena; for, however mutilated and fragmentary are the traditions on this head, they enable us to perceive its most general features. He spoke of a highest and lowest Zeus,<sup>39</sup> and of two gods, male and

<sup>35</sup> Clem. Alex. Strom. v. p. 590. Καθόλου γ' οὖν τὴν περὶ τοῦ θείου ἰννοίαν Ξενοκράτης — οὐκ ἀπελπίζει καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀλόγοις ζώοις. Animals are not totally devoid of reason.

<sup>36</sup> Arist. Top. ii. 2. Καθάπερ Ξενοκράτης φησὶν εὐδαιμόνα εἶναι τὸν τὴν ψυχὴν ἔχοντα σπονδαίαν· ταύτην γὰρ ἑκάστη εἶναι δαίμονα. Stob. Sermon. c. 24. Δαίμονος κακία τοὺς πονηροὺς κακοδαίμονας ὀνομάζομεν.

<sup>37</sup> Stob. Eccl. i. p. 62.

<sup>38</sup> Plut. de Is. et Os. 25, 26; De Def. Orac. 17.

<sup>39</sup> Clem. Alex. Strom. v. p. 604. Ξενοκράτης — τὸν μὲν ὕπατον Δία, τὸν δὲ νῆατον καλῶν. Plut. Plat. Qu. ix. 1. ἧ καὶ Ξενοκράτης Δία τὸν ἐν μὲν τοῖς κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχουσιν ὕπατον καλεῖ, νῆατον δὲ τὸν ὑπὸ σελήνην. The terms ὕπατος and νῆατος are musical and Pythagorean. It is questionable whether it is correct to place the lowest Zeus in the region under the moon; with the Pythagoreans it certainly indicated the god of the

female; the former he designated as unity, the latter as multiplicity. The male deity, the father of the gods, Zeus, dwells in heaven, and is the odd number, intelligence, and the first god. The female, on the other hand, is, as it were, the mother of the gods, and the soul of all, and rules over the oblique movements of the planets in the sphere of the fixed stars.<sup>10</sup> However incomplete this statement may be, it is seemingly allowable to infer from it, that Xenocrates placed in the heavenly region of the fixed stars that which ever subsists in the same relations, *i. e.*, the Ideas, where, too, he placed the reason of the world, which he distinguished from its soul, whose dominion is restricted within the smaller circle of the planetary orbits. Now, as he distinguished these two rulers of the world, and yet united them under the notion of the divine, it is evident that his object must have been to point out and to render apparent the idea of the divine action in individual objects. This attempt is carried still further, and divine honours are ascribed to the stars of the mundane

lower world. Lobeck, *Aglaop.* p. 1098. That Xenocrates, in his *Mythology*, embraced the gods of the lower world, is clear from *Sext. Emp. adv. Math.* vii. 149.

<sup>10</sup> *Stob. Ecl.* i. p. 62. *Ξενοκράτης τὴν μονάδα καὶ τὴν ἐνείκη θεός. τὴν μὲν ὡς ἄρρενα πατὴρ ἐχούσαν τάξιν, ἐν οὐρανῷ βασιλεύουσαν, ἣν τινα προσαγορεύει καὶ Ζῆνα καὶ περιττὸν καὶ νοῦν, ὅστις ἐστὶν αὐτῷ πρῶτος θεός· τὴν δὲ ὡς θηλείαν, μητὴρ θεῶν δίκην, τῆς ὑπὸ τὸν οὐρανὸν λήξιος (ἢ λήξεως ἢ λοξώσεως) ἡγουμένην, ἣτις ἐστὶν αὐτῷ ψυχὴ τοῦ παντός. θεῶν δὲ εἶναι καὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τοὺς ἀστέρας πυρώδεις ὀλυμπίους θεούς.* Cf. *Cic. de Nat. D.* i. 13. It is not quite clear whether Xenocrates considered the *δυὰς* and the *νέατος Ζεύς* to be identical, and whether he did not suppose the *μονὰς* and the *δυὰς* to be united in some higher notion. His representation of heaven likewise presents many difficulties, since he places in it both good and evil demons. *Plut. de Is. et Os.* 26.

economy, and the gradual dissemination of demonic powers is carried through the world down to the corporeal elements. Thus did he lay open to view the entire chain, along which the divine influence, gradually descending lower and lower into the scale of existence, pervades the universe. Numbers form the links or degrees through which the divinity thus descends to earth. But it is particularly deserving remark that, in this description, the divine duad, the female principle, occupies the place which, in the *Timæus*, Plato assigns to matter.<sup>41</sup> For by this means, a conception which is merely of negative signification, becomes so closely mixed up with the notion of God as almost to excite a suspicion, that Xenocrates, like Speusippus, had not maintained this notion in all its purity, as conceived by Plato.

There are yet two points to be noticed: Xenocrates' account of the soul, and his doctrine of indivisible lines; both of which are frequently mentioned by ancient writers. The soul, he taught, is a self-moving number.<sup>42</sup> This reminds us, on the one hand, of the ancient endeavour to reduce all things to number, and to the distinction between the unchangeable reason and the moveable soul.<sup>43</sup>

<sup>41</sup> Xenocrates would appear to have conveyed this in other figures besides. See Cousin, in *Journ. des Savans*, 1835, p. 145, according to the commentary on the *Phædo*. As to the philosophical exposition of the myth, cf. Löbeck *Aglaoph.* p. 710, sq.

<sup>42</sup> *Arist. de An.* i. 2, 4; *Anal. Post.* ii. 4, as always, without the name of its author. *Plut. de Anim. Procr.* l. *Ξενοκράτης—τῆς ψυχῆς τὴν οὐσίαν ἀριθμὸν αὐτὸν ὑφ' αὐτοῦ κινούμενον ἀποφγνόμενος*. The explanations of the commentators on Aristotle do not afford any information as to its author, confining themselves to an elucidation of the doctrine.

<sup>43</sup> Cf. the passages above quoted. *Plut. Qu. Plat.* ix. 1, and *Stob.* l. l.

From the two first grounds, one and many, Xenocrates seems to have distinguished two subordinate principles, same and other, and to have derived from the former the constant, and from the latter the variable, and it is from the union of these two that the soul draws its variable essence.<sup>44</sup> By this distinction of the principles of being and becoming, it is clear that nothing is gained beyond the appearance of facilitating a more precise determination of ideas, whose only ground, however, is the display of a most unprofitable subtlety upon the principles of mathematics and physiology. That we are not unjustly censuring Xenocrates, is clear from his doctrine of indivisible lines. Its origin seems to have been a desire to refute both Zeno's argument, drawn from the infinity of division, and the atomistic theory; but it is, at the same time, still more intimately allied to the Platonic explanation of the several elements, by the lateral differences of triangles.<sup>45</sup> But whatever may have been its origin, it is clear that it is the issue of a difficulty, in which it would be far better to remain involved, than to have recourse to such an expedient in order to appear to have something to say.

<sup>44</sup> Plut. de An. Procr. 2. οἱ μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἢ γένεσιν ἀριθμοῦ ἐηλοῦσθαι νομίζουσι τῇ μίξει τῆς ἀμερίστου καὶ μερίστης οὐσίας. ἀμερίστον μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τὸ ἓν, μερίστον δὲ τὸ πλῆθος, ἐκ δὲ τούτων γίνεσθαι τὸν ἀριθμὸν τοῦ ἐνὸς ὀρίζοντος τὸ πλῆθος καὶ τῇ ἀπειρίᾳ πέρας ἐντιθίντος, ἣν καὶ θανάδα παλοῦσιν ἀόριστον. — τοῦτον δὲ μήπω ψυχὴν τὸν ἀριθμὸν εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ κινητικὸν καὶ κινήτων ἐνδεῖν αὐτῷ· τοῦ δὲ ταύτου καὶ τοῦ ἱτέρου συμμειγνύων, ὧν τὸ μὲν ἐστὶ κινήσεως ἀρχὴ καὶ μεταβολῆς, τὸ δὲ μονῆς, ψυχὴν γεγενῆσθαι, μὴδὲν ἦττον τοῦ ἰστάναι καὶ ἵστασθαι δύναμιν ἢ τοῦ κινεῖσθαι καὶ κινεῖν οὖσαν.

<sup>45</sup> Arist. de Lineis Insec. init.

Accordingly, we find that Xenocrates did nothing more than enrich the Platonic doctrines with certain formulæ designed to introduce mathematics further into the domain of philosophy, but at the same time betraying an endeavour to connect the Platonic theory of ideas, more and more, with empirical knowledge. The same spirit animates, to all appearance, his ethical doctrines, which, otherwise, are not marked with originality.<sup>46</sup> For felicity, as the end of the rational life, is placed by him not only in the virtue of the soul, but also in faculties which are subordinate to it, on the ground that they are essential to the corporeal and to the acquisition of external advantages.<sup>47</sup> This appears to have been the ground of his distinction of reason into theoretical and practical,<sup>48</sup> and for his conceding some enjoyments to the sage or the possessor of theoretical reason.<sup>49</sup> With this moderation of doctrine, consist fully those tenets ascribed to the old Academy, which insist upon the observance of measure in every act, and the good tendency even of the irrational emotions of the soul.<sup>50</sup>

In order to acquire a fuller and more connected acquaintance with the tendency of the old Academy to the visible world, and the fantastic repre-

<sup>46</sup> For details consult Wynpersse, l. l. p. 161, sqq.

<sup>47</sup> Clem. Alex. Strom. ii. p. 419. *Ξενοκράτης — τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἀποδίδωσι καὶ τῆς οἰκίας ἀρετῆς καὶ τῆς ὑπηρετικῆς αὐτῇ δυνάμεως. εἴτα ὡς μὲν ἐν ᾧ γίνεται, φαίνεται λέγων τὴν ψυχὴν, ὡς δὲ ὑφ' ὧν, τὰς ἀρετάς, ὡς δὲ ἐξ ὧν ὡς μερῶν, τὰς καλὰς πράξεις καὶ τὰς σπουδαίας ἔξεις τε καὶ διαθέσεις καὶ κινήσεις καὶ σχέσεις, ὡς τούτων οὐκ ἄνευ τὰ σωματικά καὶ τὰ ἰκτός.*

<sup>48</sup> Clem. Alex. Strom. ii. p. 369.

<sup>49</sup> Cic. Qu. Ac. ii. 44.

<sup>50</sup> L. l.

sentations to which it gave rise, a rapid perusal of the sonorous and obscure inanities of the *Epinomis* will suffice. Whether Philip the Opuntian be or not its author,<sup>51</sup> it is highly probable that it owes its origin to the old Academy. The estimation in which the mathematical sciences, especially Arithmetic and Astronomy, are there held, cannot be considered purely Platonic. It is an example of that human longing for some definite theory of the divine, and demonic natures in heaven and earth, which leads a false and extravagant piety to distinguish between visible and invisible gods, demons and demigods; which, in its incapacity duly to appreciate the extent and value of human knowledge, evinced the greater disposition to confound, in the Platonic system, what is purely figurative with the reality, it was intended, however inadequately, to represent. In this tendency of the old Academy, two elements are blended together, which apparently are directly irreconcilable with, and yet follow from each other; on the one hand, a soaring flight of the imagination into the region of the infinite, and on the other, a lingering within the sphere of sensation, and its forms, in order to supply, the imagination at all hazards, with types and figures. This is the inevitable fate of all those who are unable to understand the true connexion which subsists between the ideas and the sensible reality, and who have not yet discovered the way to the former, and only have heard specious accounts of it. They would wish to soar to that

<sup>51</sup> *Diog. L. iii. 37.*

higher point which, excited by the lofty wisdom of others, they regard to be sublime, while the lowness of their own thoughts plunges them down again within the domain of the common and the sensible. They live on, feeding on hollow words, unsatisfied with the feast of the sage. It may, perhaps, be said that Plato furnished the occasion to such idle vanities, by inadequately teaching how the reality of the sensible is subject to the ideas; still this could not have led any into error, except those who were unable to embrace the actual with powerful minds.

The other members of the Academy, Polemo, Crates, and with them Crantor, weary of such unprofitable vanities, appear to have returned to a more sober spirit of inquiry, without however conferring any important service upon philosophy. Of Polemo it is told that he was converted by the philosophical lessons of Xenocrates from a course of lawless dissipation to a life of severe morality.<sup>52</sup> This anecdote is apparently confirmed by the fact that his attention was exclusively directed to moral questions, to the neglect of dialectic.<sup>53</sup> This affords to our minds a further proof of the gradual decay of true scientific feeling in the Academy. When Polemo introduced the precept, 'Live agreeably to Nature,'<sup>54</sup> as the first principle of morality, it is probable he did not think to deviate essen-

<sup>52</sup> Diog. L. iv. 16; Valer. Max. vi. 9.

<sup>53</sup> Diog. L. iv. 18.

<sup>54</sup> Cic. de Fin. iv. 6; Ac. ii. 42. *Honeste vivere, fruentem istis rebus, quas primas homini natura conciliet.* Therefore more in a Peripatetic than in a Stoical sense. The continuation of the above passage proves that it was from the works of Polemo that Cicero derived his view of the agreement of the old Academy and the Peripatetics in their theory of good.

tially from Plato, or to open a new road of investigation. Moreover, it would seem to have now become the first object with the Academy, to return to the pure and unperverted doctrine of Plato,<sup>55</sup> of whose works at least Crantor is said to have been the first commentator.<sup>56</sup> And this, even, is a proof of the decay of the original powers of mind, and of the commencement of erudition in the treatment of philosophy. Arcesilaus, a disciple of Polemo, introduces into the Academy a new line of development, which belongs to a later age and a different direction of mind.

<sup>55</sup> The doctrine of the *οἱ κατὰ τὸν Κράντορα* is a proof of this. *Plut. de Anim. Procr.* i. 2.

<sup>56</sup> *Procl. in Tim.* p. 24. To these commentaries belong, in all probability, his investigations into the nature of the Platonic numbers mentioned by *Plut. de An. Procr.* 16, 20, 29. In the unpublished commentary on the *Phædo*, already noticed, there is mention of *οἱ Ἀριστοὶ ἱεργῆται*, and expositions of particular passages are ascribed to Xenocrates and Speusippus. Still it is hardly probable that these Academicians composed commentaries, in the proper sense, upon the writings of Plato. Vide Cousin, in the *Journal des Savans*, 1835, p. 143, sqq. The chief features of the moral theory of Crantor are given in a fragment in *Sext. Emp. adv. Math.* xi. 51, sq., which is composed in a rhetorical spirit.

END OF VOL. II.







